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Author SHA1 Message Date
Sharang ParnerkarandClaude Fable 5 02c7552725 fix(mcp): bind tenant to session — bearer context was lost over HTTP
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Root cause (found while wiring the breakpilot MCP loop, A): every MCP tool call
over Streamable HTTP failed with '-32603 no tenant context — bearer middleware
not in chain'. The bearer middleware sets the tenant in a tokio task_local scoped
around the request, but rmcp's StreamableHttpService spawns the session's
tool-serving task (tower.rs: 'spawn a task to serve the session'), and task_locals
do NOT cross tokio::spawn. So initialize/tools-list worked but every real tool call
(list_findings, oscal_assessment, ...) failed — meaning the loop never worked over
HTTP and breakpilot's client fell back to demo data.

Fix: bind the tenant to the per-session server instance instead of a per-request
task_local. rmcp calls the service factory in the request task (before the spawn)
and still inside the middleware's scope, so the factory reads the bearer-set
tenant once and bakes it into ComplianceMcpServer; tool_db() then reads
self.tenant_id. stdio passes its synthetic tenant the same way. No tool-handler
changes; the middleware still validates (and can revoke) the token per request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 11:23:25 +02:00
2 changed files with 6 additions and 48 deletions
+2 -35
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@@ -277,10 +277,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
}
}
// Dedup against existing findings: insert first-seen ones, and refresh the
// control mappings on ones we've seen before.
// Dedup against existing findings and insert new ones
let mut new_count = 0u32;
let mut refreshed_count = 0u32;
let mut new_findings: Vec<Finding> = Vec::new();
for mut finding in all_findings {
finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
@@ -295,25 +293,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
finding.id = result.inserted_id.as_object_id();
new_findings.push(finding);
new_count += 1;
} else if !finding.control_refs.is_empty() {
// Re-scan refresh: a mapping pass (newly enabled or tuned) computed
// control_refs for a finding first seen before mapping ran. Persist
// them onto the existing row — the insert path alone never would.
self.db
.findings()
.update_one(
doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint },
doc! { "$set": { "control_refs": finding.control_refs.clone() } },
)
.await?;
refreshed_count += 1;
}
}
if refreshed_count > 0 {
tracing::info!(
"[{repo_id}] Refreshed control_refs on {refreshed_count} existing findings"
);
}
// Remove stale SBOM entries for this repo before reinserting
if !sbom_entries.is_empty() {
@@ -586,21 +567,7 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
let Some(path) = ingest_set.get(&a.id).and_then(|ia| ia.working_path.clone()) else {
continue;
};
let mut source_findings = crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id);
// Control mapping for the PLC path (run_plc_scan is separate from
// run_pipeline, which does its own mapping). PLC findings carry
// file_path/line/cwe, so the semantic pass reads each region under this
// source's `path` and stamps master-control refs. The LUT + grounded
// surface passes are code-pattern / CRA-specific and don't apply to
// IEC 61131-3 control logic, so only the semantic pass runs here.
crate::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(
&self.config,
self.llm.clone(),
&path,
&mut source_findings,
)
.await;
all_findings.extend(source_findings);
all_findings.extend(crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id));
// Control-application SBOM: CODESYS libraries + runtime from a
// `.projectarchive` (uploaded, or committed in the working tree).
let archive = a
+4 -13
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@@ -108,25 +108,16 @@ Every finding maps to its exact control family, with the most specific control o
- **Generic catch-all controls co-occur.** `mc-20890 secure_development_security_code_review` appears in the top-K for many code-security findings because it is semantically near almost all of them. It's harmless (the judge grounds it, and it never crowds out the specific controls — the SQLi example didn't get it) but is a candidate for future down-weighting.
- **Corpus classification noise.** The master-controls `verification_method` classification is imperfect — e.g. a documentation control (`eu_declaration_accuracy`) is currently tagged `source_code`. That's a corpus-side data-quality issue, separate from the mapping engine.
## Emitting over MCP — closing the loop
Findings don't just land in the dashboard; they flow to breakpilot-compliance as OSCAL over the scanner's MCP server, so the compliance report is assembled from real, control-tagged findings.
- The MCP server exposes an **`oscal_assessment`** tool: given a `repo_id`, it emits a standard OSCAL 1.1 assessment-results document for that repo's findings — mapped findings target their controls via the stamped `control_refs`, and unmapped findings are reported **as-is** (as observations), so nothing is lost.
- breakpilot pulls it: `POST /v1/cra/oscal-from-scanner` calls `oscal_assessment` over MCP (Streamable HTTP + bearer) and consumes the pre-computed OSCAL — rather than pulling raw findings and re-assessing.
**Operational note — tenant context over HTTP.** The MCP server is multi-tenant; the bearer token resolves a tenant whose per-tenant database the tools query. rmcp's Streamable HTTP transport runs each session's tool calls in a `tokio::spawn`ed task, and `task_local`s do **not** cross a spawn — so binding the tenant in a per-request middleware `task_local` leaves tool handlers with no context (every call fails `no tenant context`). The fix is to bind the tenant to the **per-session server instance** at creation (the factory runs in the request scope before the spawn), not to a per-request task_local. Until this was fixed, the loop silently failed over HTTP and consumers fell back to demo data.
## Configuration
| Variable | Effect |
| --- | --- |
| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + all mapping passes. **Unset disables all control mapping** — findings are produced without `control_refs`. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). **Default on** (validated live). |
| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). **Default on** (validated live). |
| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + Stage 5b. Unset disables all control mapping. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Enables Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). Default off. |
| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Enables Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). Default off. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SNAPSHOT_DIR` | Where OSCAL catalog snapshots and the cached control-embedding index live. |
The semantic and grounded passes default **on** now that both are validated live; each is still a no-op if `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` is unset or the catalog is unreachable, so they only ever add coverage. The live verifications live in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` and `grounded_surface_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
The semantic and grounded passes are gated because they are the heavier, less deterministic paths; they stay off until verified live against a deployed catalog. The live verification lives in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
## Appendix — the master-controls data pipeline