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Author SHA1 Message Date
Sharang ParnerkarandClaude Fable 5 32abbfb7bb feat(controls): promote grounded controls to covered + enable LLM passes by default
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The grounded surface path (Stage 5d) is validated live: against an absence-vuln
fixture it flags cra-ai-11 (unprotected login), cra-ai-24 (unlogged admin action),
and cra-ai-28/29/30 (unverified firmware update), each grounded + control-tagged.

- LUT: promote the 8 absence-based controls (cra-ai-6,11,12,24,27,28,29,30)
  needs_tooling -> covered (grounded-control-check binding). CRA coverage is now
  21 covered / 0 needs_tooling / 19 not_code_checkable.
- Enable both advanced LLM passes by default: semantic_mapping (validated in C5)
  and grounded_control_checks (validated here). Both were gated only for cost /
  verification; the GPU is in-house so cost isn't a constraint. Still no-ops
  unless breakpilot base_url is set and the catalog is reachable.
- Gated regression tests (ignored, not run by CI --lib): c5_example2.rs (semantic,
  4 varied vulns) and grounded_surface_live.rs (Stage 5d validation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 09:42:06 +02:00
5 changed files with 36 additions and 92 deletions
+8 -19
View File
@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@ on:
pull_request:
env:
# registry + cosign creds via env, NOT inline ${{ }}: the Harbor robot
# username contains '$', which sh expands when interpolated into the
# script (robot$ci-push -> robot-push) => docker login unauthorized.
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
COSIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.COSIGN_KEY }}
COSIGN_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.COSIGN_PASSWORD }}
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
RUSTFLAGS: "-D warnings"
# Compile cache: sccache -> Hetzner S3 (breakpilot-sccache), runner-independent
@@ -214,12 +207,11 @@ jobs:
git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-agent
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
-f Dockerfile.agent -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
{ command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy agent"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
@@ -241,12 +233,11 @@ jobs:
git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-dashboard
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
-f Dockerfile.dashboard -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
{ command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy dashboard"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
@@ -266,11 +257,10 @@ jobs:
git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-docs
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
docker build -f Dockerfile.docs -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
{ command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy docs"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
@@ -292,12 +282,11 @@ jobs:
git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-mcp
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
-f Dockerfile.mcp -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
{ command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy mcp"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
+2 -35
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@@ -277,10 +277,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
}
}
// Dedup against existing findings: insert first-seen ones, and refresh the
// control mappings on ones we've seen before.
// Dedup against existing findings and insert new ones
let mut new_count = 0u32;
let mut refreshed_count = 0u32;
let mut new_findings: Vec<Finding> = Vec::new();
for mut finding in all_findings {
finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
@@ -295,25 +293,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
finding.id = result.inserted_id.as_object_id();
new_findings.push(finding);
new_count += 1;
} else if !finding.control_refs.is_empty() {
// Re-scan refresh: a mapping pass (newly enabled or tuned) computed
// control_refs for a finding first seen before mapping ran. Persist
// them onto the existing row — the insert path alone never would.
self.db
.findings()
.update_one(
doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint },
doc! { "$set": { "control_refs": finding.control_refs.clone() } },
)
.await?;
refreshed_count += 1;
}
}
if refreshed_count > 0 {
tracing::info!(
"[{repo_id}] Refreshed control_refs on {refreshed_count} existing findings"
);
}
// Remove stale SBOM entries for this repo before reinserting
if !sbom_entries.is_empty() {
@@ -586,21 +567,7 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
let Some(path) = ingest_set.get(&a.id).and_then(|ia| ia.working_path.clone()) else {
continue;
};
let mut source_findings = crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id);
// Control mapping for the PLC path (run_plc_scan is separate from
// run_pipeline, which does its own mapping). PLC findings carry
// file_path/line/cwe, so the semantic pass reads each region under this
// source's `path` and stamps master-control refs. The LUT + grounded
// surface passes are code-pattern / CRA-specific and don't apply to
// IEC 61131-3 control logic, so only the semantic pass runs here.
crate::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(
&self.config,
self.llm.clone(),
&path,
&mut source_findings,
)
.await;
all_findings.extend(source_findings);
all_findings.extend(crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id));
// Control-application SBOM: CODESYS libraries + runtime from a
// `.projectarchive` (uploaded, or committed in the working tree).
let archive = a
+9 -16
View File
@@ -42,19 +42,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let pool_for_factory = pool.clone();
let service = StreamableHttpService::new(
move || {
// The factory runs in the request task, still inside the bearer
// middleware's `TENANT_ID` scope, and BEFORE rmcp spawns the
// session task (which would lose the task_local). So bind the
// tenant into the session's server instance here, once.
let tenant_id = auth::current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
std::io::Error::other("no tenant context when creating MCP session")
})?;
Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(
pool_for_factory.clone(),
tenant_id,
))
},
move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool_for_factory.clone())),
Arc::new(LocalSessionManager::default()),
StreamableHttpServerConfig::default(),
);
@@ -81,11 +69,16 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
tenant_id = %synth_tenant,
"stdio transport — using synthetic tenant id; DO NOT use in production"
);
let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool, synth_tenant);
let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool);
let transport = rmcp::transport::stdio();
use rmcp::ServiceExt;
let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
handle.waiting().await?;
auth::TENANT_ID
.scope(synth_tenant, async {
let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
handle.waiting().await?;
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())
})
.await?;
}
Ok(())
+13 -9
View File
@@ -2,33 +2,37 @@ use rmcp::{
handler::server::wrapper::Parameters, model::*, tool, tool_handler, tool_router, ServerHandler,
};
use crate::auth::current_tenant_id;
use crate::database::{Database, DatabasePool};
use crate::tools::{dast, findings, oscal, pentest, sbom};
pub struct ComplianceMcpServer {
pool: DatabasePool,
/// Tenant this session serves. Bound once at session creation (the HTTP
/// factory reads the bearer-set tenant while still in the request scope;
/// stdio passes a synthetic id) — NOT a per-request `task_local`, which is
/// lost across the `tokio::spawn` that runs the Streamable-HTTP session.
tenant_id: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<Self>,
}
impl ComplianceMcpServer {
/// The per-tenant `Database` for this session.
/// Resolve the per-tenant `Database` from the bearer-set
/// `task_local`. Every tool handler calls this; missing context
/// surfaces as `internal_error` because it means the auth
/// middleware was misconfigured (handler ran without scope).
fn tenant_db(&self) -> Result<Database, rmcp::ErrorData> {
Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&self.tenant_id))
let tenant_id = current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
"no tenant context — bearer middleware not in chain".to_string(),
None,
)
})?;
Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&tenant_id))
}
}
#[tool_router]
impl ComplianceMcpServer {
pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool, tenant_id: String) -> Self {
pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self {
pool,
tenant_id,
tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
}
}
+4 -13
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@@ -108,25 +108,16 @@ Every finding maps to its exact control family, with the most specific control o
- **Generic catch-all controls co-occur.** `mc-20890 secure_development_security_code_review` appears in the top-K for many code-security findings because it is semantically near almost all of them. It's harmless (the judge grounds it, and it never crowds out the specific controls — the SQLi example didn't get it) but is a candidate for future down-weighting.
- **Corpus classification noise.** The master-controls `verification_method` classification is imperfect — e.g. a documentation control (`eu_declaration_accuracy`) is currently tagged `source_code`. That's a corpus-side data-quality issue, separate from the mapping engine.
## Emitting over MCP — closing the loop
Findings don't just land in the dashboard; they flow to breakpilot-compliance as OSCAL over the scanner's MCP server, so the compliance report is assembled from real, control-tagged findings.
- The MCP server exposes an **`oscal_assessment`** tool: given a `repo_id`, it emits a standard OSCAL 1.1 assessment-results document for that repo's findings — mapped findings target their controls via the stamped `control_refs`, and unmapped findings are reported **as-is** (as observations), so nothing is lost.
- breakpilot pulls it: `POST /v1/cra/oscal-from-scanner` calls `oscal_assessment` over MCP (Streamable HTTP + bearer) and consumes the pre-computed OSCAL — rather than pulling raw findings and re-assessing.
**Operational note — tenant context over HTTP.** The MCP server is multi-tenant; the bearer token resolves a tenant whose per-tenant database the tools query. rmcp's Streamable HTTP transport runs each session's tool calls in a `tokio::spawn`ed task, and `task_local`s do **not** cross a spawn — so binding the tenant in a per-request middleware `task_local` leaves tool handlers with no context (every call fails `no tenant context`). The fix is to bind the tenant to the **per-session server instance** at creation (the factory runs in the request scope before the spawn), not to a per-request task_local. Until this was fixed, the loop silently failed over HTTP and consumers fell back to demo data.
## Configuration
| Variable | Effect |
| --- | --- |
| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + all mapping passes. **Unset disables all control mapping** — findings are produced without `control_refs`. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). **Default on** (validated live). |
| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). **Default on** (validated live). |
| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + Stage 5b. Unset disables all control mapping. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Enables Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). Default off. |
| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Enables Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). Default off. |
| `BREAKPILOT_SNAPSHOT_DIR` | Where OSCAL catalog snapshots and the cached control-embedding index live. |
The semantic and grounded passes default **on** now that both are validated live; each is still a no-op if `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` is unset or the catalog is unreachable, so they only ever add coverage. The live verifications live in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` and `grounded_surface_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
The semantic and grounded passes are gated because they are the heavier, less deterministic paths; they stay off until verified live against a deployed catalog. The live verification lives in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
## Appendix — the master-controls data pipeline