Sharang Parnerkar
fce9f1cbf1
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Two new RUSTSEC advisories landed between 2026-06-18 and 2026-06-30 that started failing every PR's `cargo audit` step: - RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (quinn-proto 0.11.14): remote memory exhaustion via unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly. Patched in 0.11.15 (semver- compatible). `cargo update -p quinn-proto`, no API change. - RUSTSEC-2026-0189 (rmcp 0.16.0): DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport due to missing Host-header validation. Patched in rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API jump from our pin (rmcp shipped 0.x -> 1.x -> 2.x in three months and the migration touches every tool handler + the auth middleware just landed in #92). Added to ignore with justification: our MCP server is exposed at a public hostname behind orca's TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth. The attack model (browser DNS-rebinding into a victim's localhost MCP server) doesn't apply to a public-hostname deployment. Defense-in-depth Host-header validation remains worthwhile, tracked as a multi-hour M7.3 follow-up to migrate rmcp 0.16 -> 2.x. Unblocks #96 and #94.
24 lines
1.4 KiB
TOML
24 lines
1.4 KiB
TOML
[advisories]
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ignore = [
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# hickory-proto 0.25.x pulled in transitively via mongodb → hickory-resolver.
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# MongoDB 3.x has not yet released with hickory-resolver 0.26.x, so we cannot
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# upgrade past this without a mongodb release. Both are DNS-layer DoS vectors
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# requiring a MITM/controlled DNS server against MongoDB's hostname resolution —
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# not a realistic attack surface here. Revisit when mongodb bumps hickory.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # NSEC3 loop, no fix available upstream
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # O(n²) name compression, fixed in hickory-proto >=0.26.1
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# rmcp 0.16.0 — DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport (missing
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# Host header validation). Patched in rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API
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# version jump from our pin; rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months
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# and the migration touches every tool handler + the auth middleware we
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# just landed in #92. Threat model in our deployment: the MCP server is
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# exposed at a public hostname (comp-mcp-dev.meghsakha.com) behind orca's
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# TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth — the attack model
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# (browser DNS-rebinding into localhost MCP server) doesn't directly apply.
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# Defense-in-depth Host-header check is still a worthwhile follow-up.
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# FOLLOW-UP: bump rmcp to 2.x in a dedicated PR (M7.3 follow-up, sized
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# multi-hour due to API surface change).
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0189",
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]
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