.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -7,4 +7,17 @@ ignore = [
     # not a realistic attack surface here. Revisit when mongodb bumps hickory.
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # NSEC3 loop, no fix available upstream
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # O(n²) name compression, fixed in hickory-proto >=0.26.1
+
+    # rmcp 0.16.0 — DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport (missing
+    # Host header validation). Patched in rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API
+    # version jump from our pin; rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months
+    # and the migration touches every tool handler + the auth middleware we
+    # just landed in #92. Threat model in our deployment: the MCP server is
+    # exposed at a public hostname (comp-mcp-dev.meghsakha.com) behind orca's
+    # TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth — the attack model
+    # (browser DNS-rebinding into localhost MCP server) doesn't directly apply.
+    # Defense-in-depth Host-header check is still a worthwhile follow-up.
+    # FOLLOW-UP: bump rmcp to 2.x in a dedicated PR (M7.3 follow-up, sized
+    # multi-hour due to API surface change).
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0189",
 ]

Cargo.lock

@@ -4282,9 +4282,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn-proto"
-version = "0.11.14"
+version = "0.11.15"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "434b42fec591c96ef50e21e886936e66d3cc3f737104fdb9b737c40ffb94c098"
+checksum = "4fcb935c5bec503c2f0e306bdd3e58bb9029dcb14fa8d9ac76e3a5256ac0763e"
 dependencies = [
  "bytes",
  "getrandom 0.3.4",