Two new RUSTSEC advisories landed between 2026-06-18 (last green CI run on M7.3 branches) and 2026-06-30 that started failing every PR's cargo audit step. This PR unblocks the M7.3 merge train (#96, #94).
Changes
RUSTSEC-2026-0185 — quinn-proto 0.11.14 → 0.11.15 via cargo update -p quinn-proto. Patch release, no API change.
RUSTSEC-2026-0189 — rmcp 0.16.0 DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport. Patched in >= 1.4.0 but that's a major API jump (rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months). Added to .cargo/audit.toml ignore list with the threat-model justification: our MCP server is a public-hostname deployment behind orca's TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth (just landed in #92). Browser DNS-rebinding into a victim's localhost MCP server doesn't apply here.
Follow-up
A dedicated PR will migrate rmcp 0.16 → 2.x and remove RUSTSEC-2026-0189 from the ignore list. Sized multi-hour due to API surface change — not blocking M7.3 close.
Test plan
cargo audit clean locally — no error: N vulnerabilities found, 8 allowed warnings (unchanged)
## Summary
Two new RUSTSEC advisories landed between 2026-06-18 (last green CI run on M7.3 branches) and 2026-06-30 that started failing every PR's `cargo audit` step. This PR unblocks the M7.3 merge train (#96, #94).
## Changes
- **RUSTSEC-2026-0185** — `quinn-proto 0.11.14` → `0.11.15` via `cargo update -p quinn-proto`. Patch release, no API change.
- **RUSTSEC-2026-0189** — `rmcp 0.16.0` DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport. Patched in `>= 1.4.0` but that's a major API jump (rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months). Added to `.cargo/audit.toml` ignore list with the threat-model justification: our MCP server is a public-hostname deployment behind orca's TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth (just landed in #92). Browser DNS-rebinding into a victim's localhost MCP server doesn't apply here.
## Follow-up
A dedicated PR will migrate `rmcp 0.16 → 2.x` and remove RUSTSEC-2026-0189 from the ignore list. Sized multi-hour due to API surface change — not blocking M7.3 close.
## Test plan
- [x] `cargo audit` clean locally — no `error: N vulnerabilities found`, 8 allowed warnings (unchanged)
- [x] No code changes; existing test suite unaffected
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Two new RUSTSEC advisories landed between 2026-06-18 and 2026-06-30
that started failing every PR's `cargo audit` step:
- RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (quinn-proto 0.11.14): remote memory exhaustion via
unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly. Patched in 0.11.15 (semver-
compatible). `cargo update -p quinn-proto`, no API change.
- RUSTSEC-2026-0189 (rmcp 0.16.0): DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP
server transport due to missing Host-header validation. Patched in
rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API jump from our pin (rmcp shipped
0.x -> 1.x -> 2.x in three months and the migration touches every
tool handler + the auth middleware just landed in #92).
Added to ignore with justification: our MCP server is exposed at a
public hostname behind orca's TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant
bearer auth. The attack model (browser DNS-rebinding into a victim's
localhost MCP server) doesn't apply to a public-hostname deployment.
Defense-in-depth Host-header validation remains worthwhile, tracked
as a multi-hour M7.3 follow-up to migrate rmcp 0.16 -> 2.x.
Unblocks #96 and #94.
sharang
merged commit e9536b6d98 into main2026-06-30 16:07:01 +00:00
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Summary
Two new RUSTSEC advisories landed between 2026-06-18 (last green CI run on M7.3 branches) and 2026-06-30 that started failing every PR's
cargo auditstep. This PR unblocks the M7.3 merge train (#96, #94).Changes
quinn-proto 0.11.14→0.11.15viacargo update -p quinn-proto. Patch release, no API change.rmcp 0.16.0DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport. Patched in>= 1.4.0but that's a major API jump (rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months). Added to.cargo/audit.tomlignore list with the threat-model justification: our MCP server is a public-hostname deployment behind orca's TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth (just landed in #92). Browser DNS-rebinding into a victim's localhost MCP server doesn't apply here.Follow-up
A dedicated PR will migrate
rmcp 0.16 → 2.xand remove RUSTSEC-2026-0189 from the ignore list. Sized multi-hour due to API surface change — not blocking M7.3 close.Test plan
cargo auditclean locally — noerror: N vulnerabilities found, 8 allowed warnings (unchanged)🤖 Generated with Claude Code