feat(agent): C4 — semantic_stamp_findings + provider load_master_controls

Wires the semantic mapping into a callable scan pass:
- OscalControlsProvider: token-based fetch refactor + load_master_controls()
  (pulls ?framework=master-controls)
- semantic_stamp_findings(): build the ControlIndex from the master-controls
  catalog, then per finding embed its code region, retrieve the top-K nearest
  master controls, grounded-judge confirm, and stamp the confirmed ids onto
  control_refs (alongside the CRA CWE-LUT refs).

Opt-in — the orchestrator doesn't auto-run it, and it rebuilds the corpus index
per call (production should cache it). Live-verifiable once breakpilot #129 deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@ on:
   pull_request:
 
 env:
-  # registry + cosign creds via env, NOT inline ${{ }}: the Harbor robot
-  # username contains '$', which sh expands when interpolated into the
-  # script (robot$ci-push -> robot-push) => docker login unauthorized.
-  REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
-  REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
-  COSIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.COSIGN_KEY }}
-  COSIGN_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.COSIGN_PASSWORD }}
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
   RUSTFLAGS: "-D warnings"
   # Compile cache: sccache -> Hetzner S3 (breakpilot-sccache), runner-independent
@@ -72,7 +65,7 @@ jobs:
             echo '[source.crates-io]'
             echo 'replace-with = "kellnr"'
             echo '[registries.kellnr]'
-            echo 'index = "sparse+https://crates.breakpilot.com/api/v1/cratesio/"'
+            echo 'index = "sparse+https://crates.meghsakha.com/api/v1/cratesio/"'
           } >> "$CARGO_HOME/config.toml"
         env:
           RUSTC_WRAPPER: ""
@@ -94,8 +87,8 @@ jobs:
       - name: Configure git auth for private tramiton dependency
         run: |
           git config --global \
-            url."https://sharang:${{ secrets.TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN }}@git.breakpilot.com/".insteadOf \
-            "ssh://git@git.breakpilot.com:22222/"
+            url."https://sharang:${{ secrets.TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN }}@gitea.meghsakha.com/".insteadOf \
+            "ssh://git@gitea.meghsakha.com:22222/"
         env:
           RUSTC_WRAPPER: ""
 
@@ -213,14 +206,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.breakpilot.com/certifai/compliance-agent
-          echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.breakpilot.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-agent
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.agent -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          { command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
-          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy agent"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -240,14 +230,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.breakpilot.com/certifai/compliance-dashboard
-          echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.breakpilot.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-dashboard
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.dashboard -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          { command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
-          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy dashboard"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -265,13 +252,10 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.breakpilot.com/certifai/compliance-docs
-          echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.breakpilot.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-docs
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           docker build -f Dockerfile.docs -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          { command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
-          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy docs"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -291,14 +275,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.breakpilot.com/certifai/compliance-mcp
-          echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login repo.breakpilot.com -u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-mcp
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.mcp -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          { command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 || wget -qO /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64; } || echo "::warning::cosign fetch failed"
-          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign 2>/dev/null || true
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy mcp"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"

Dockerfile.agent

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ COPY . .
 RUN --mount=type=secret,id=tramiton_token \
     if [ -s /run/secrets/tramiton_token ]; then \
       git config --global \
-        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@git.breakpilot.com/".insteadOf \
-        "ssh://git@git.breakpilot.com:22222/"; \
+        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@gitea.meghsakha.com/".insteadOf \
+        "ssh://git@gitea.meghsakha.com:22222/"; \
     fi && \
     CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true cargo build --release -p compliance-agent
 

Dockerfile.dashboard

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ ENV DOCS_URL=${DOCS_URL}
 RUN --mount=type=secret,id=tramiton_token \
     if [ -s /run/secrets/tramiton_token ]; then \
       git config --global \
-        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@git.breakpilot.com/".insteadOf \
-        "ssh://git@git.breakpilot.com:22222/"; \
+        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@gitea.meghsakha.com/".insteadOf \
+        "ssh://git@gitea.meghsakha.com:22222/"; \
     fi && \
     CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true dx build --release --package compliance-dashboard
 

Dockerfile.mcp

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ COPY . .
 RUN --mount=type=secret,id=tramiton_token \
     if [ -s /run/secrets/tramiton_token ]; then \
       git config --global \
-        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@git.breakpilot.com/".insteadOf \
-        "ssh://git@git.breakpilot.com:22222/"; \
+        url."https://sharang:$(cat /run/secrets/tramiton_token)@gitea.meghsakha.com/".insteadOf \
+        "ssh://git@gitea.meghsakha.com:22222/"; \
     fi && \
     CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true cargo build --release -p compliance-mcp
 

compliance-agent/rules/cra_semgrep.yaml

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-# Custom semgrep rules for CRA controls that no off-the-shelf ruleset digs out.
-# Each rule id is `cra-ai-<n>-<slug>` and is keyed back to its control via the
-# `control-map` LUT (by rule-id suffix, so semgrep's path prefix on check_id does
-# not matter). Detection here is deterministic; the grounded LLM judge downstream
-# only confirms/refutes — it never detects. Keep patterns tight: a false positive
-# that the judge refutes marks the whole finding a false positive.
-rules:
-  # --- cra-ai-1: Secure-by-Default-Konfiguration -------------------------------
-  - id: cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: WARNING
-    message: Flask app started with debug=True — ships an interactive debugger / code execution in production (secure-by-default violation).
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-489: Active Debug Code"]
-      control: cra-ai-1
-    patterns:
-      - pattern: '$APP.run(..., debug=True, ...)'
-
-  - id: cra-ai-1-django-debug-true
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: WARNING
-    message: Django DEBUG = True — leaks stack traces / settings in production (secure-by-default violation).
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-489: Active Debug Code"]
-      control: cra-ai-1
-    patterns:
-      - pattern: 'DEBUG = True'
-
-  - id: cra-ai-1-tls-verify-disabled
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: TLS certificate verification disabled (verify=False) — defeats transport security by default.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation"]
-      control: cra-ai-1
-    patterns:
-      - pattern: 'requests.$M(..., verify=False, ...)'
-
-  - id: cra-ai-1-cors-wildcard
-    languages: [javascript, typescript]
-    severity: WARNING
-    message: CORS Access-Control-Allow-Origin set to "*" — opens the API to any origin by default.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains"]
-      control: cra-ai-1
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: '$RES.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")'
-          - pattern: '$RES.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")'
-
-  # --- cra-ai-7: Starke Authentifizierung (weak password hashing) --------------
-  - id: cra-ai-7-weak-password-hash
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: Password/secret hashed with a fast, broken digest (md5/sha1) — use a password KDF (bcrypt/scrypt/argon2).
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-916: Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort"]
-      control: cra-ai-7
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: 'hashlib.md5($PW)'
-          - pattern: 'hashlib.sha1($PW)'
-      - metavariable-regex:
-          metavariable: $PW
-          regex: '(?i).*(pass|pwd|secret|cred|token).*'
-
-  # --- cra-ai-10: Sitzungsmanagement (insecure session cookies) ----------------
-  - id: cra-ai-10-session-cookie-insecure
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: Session cookie hardened flag explicitly disabled (Secure/HttpOnly = False) — session token exposed to theft.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-614: Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute"]
-      control: cra-ai-10
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: 'SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False'
-          - pattern: 'SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = False'
-
-  - id: cra-ai-10-express-cookie-insecure
-    languages: [javascript, typescript]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: Express cookie set with secure/httpOnly = false — session token exposed to interception / XSS theft.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-614: Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute"]
-      control: cra-ai-10
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: '$RES.cookie($NAME, $VAL, {..., secure: false, ...})'
-          - pattern: '$RES.cookie($NAME, $VAL, {..., httpOnly: false, ...})'
-
-  # --- cra-ai-14: Speicher-Schutz / Data at Rest (weak cipher) -----------------
-  - id: cra-ai-14-python-weak-cipher
-    languages: [python]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: Data-at-rest encrypted with a broken cipher/mode (ECB, DES, 3DES) — provides no real confidentiality.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"]
-      control: cra-ai-14
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: 'AES.new($K, AES.MODE_ECB, ...)'
-          - pattern: 'DES.new(...)'
-          - pattern: 'DES3.new(...)'
-
-  - id: cra-ai-14-node-weak-cipher
-    languages: [javascript, typescript]
-    severity: ERROR
-    message: Data-at-rest encrypted with a broken cipher (DES / deprecated createCipher) — provides no real confidentiality.
-    metadata:
-      cwe: ["CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"]
-      control: cra-ai-14
-    patterns:
-      - pattern-either:
-          - pattern: 'crypto.createCipheriv("des-ecb", ...)'
-          - pattern: 'crypto.createCipheriv("des", ...)'
-          - pattern: 'crypto.createCipher(...)'

compliance-agent/src/config.rs

@@ -100,11 +100,5 @@ fn load_breakpilot_config() -> BreakpilotConfig {
         base_url: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL"),
         token: env_secret_opt("BREAKPILOT_TOKEN"),
         snapshot_dir: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_SNAPSHOT_DIR").unwrap_or(d.snapshot_dir),
-        semantic_mapping: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING")
-            .map(|v| v == "1" || v.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true"))
-            .unwrap_or(d.semantic_mapping),
-        grounded_control_checks: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS")
-            .map(|v| v == "1" || v.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true"))
-            .unwrap_or(d.grounded_control_checks),
     }
 }

compliance-agent/src/controls/index.rs

@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@
 //! requirement text once, then for a code region pull the top-K nearest controls
 //! to hand to the grounded judge. This is the retrieval half of the semantic path.
 
-use std::path::Path;
-
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-
 use compliance_core::control_check::ControlCheckSpec;
 use compliance_core::error::CoreError;
 
@@ -21,34 +16,6 @@ pub struct ControlIndex {
     entries: Vec<(ControlCheckSpec, Vec<f64>)>,
 }
 
-/// On-disk form of the index: the corpus identity hash plus every spec+embedding.
-/// The hash lets a later scan reuse the embeddings only if the corpus is unchanged.
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct PersistedIndex {
-    corpus_hash: String,
-    entries: Vec<PersistedEntry>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct PersistedEntry {
-    spec: ControlCheckSpec,
-    embedding: Vec<f64>,
-}
-
-/// Stable hash of the corpus identity (each control's id + requirement text, in
-/// order). Same catalog → same hash → the cached embeddings are reused instead of
-/// re-embedding the whole corpus.
-fn corpus_hash(specs: &[ControlCheckSpec]) -> String {
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-    for s in specs {
-        hasher.update(s.control_id.as_bytes());
-        hasher.update([0u8]);
-        hasher.update(s.requirement.as_bytes());
-        hasher.update([0u8]);
-    }
-    format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
-}
-
 impl ControlIndex {
     /// Build directly from precomputed embeddings (used by tests + callers that
     /// already embedded the corpus).
@@ -56,70 +23,6 @@ impl ControlIndex {
         Self { entries }
     }
 
-    /// Load the index from `cache_path` if it still matches the current corpus,
-    /// otherwise embed the corpus and persist it there. This turns the per-scan
-    /// re-embed of the whole (~13.6k) master-control corpus into a one-time cost
-    /// that survives across scans; the cache self-invalidates when the catalog
-    /// changes (its [`corpus_hash`] no longer matches).
-    pub async fn load_or_build(
-        llm: &LlmClient,
-        specs: Vec<ControlCheckSpec>,
-        cache_path: &Path,
-    ) -> Result<Self, CoreError> {
-        let hash = corpus_hash(&specs);
-        if let Some(index) = Self::load_cache(cache_path, &hash).await {
-            tracing::debug!(
-                controls = index.len(),
-                "reusing cached control embedding index"
-            );
-            return Ok(index);
-        }
-        let index = Self::build(llm, specs).await?;
-        if let Err(e) = index.write_cache(cache_path, &hash).await {
-            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to persist control embedding index");
-        }
-        Ok(index)
-    }
-
-    /// Read a persisted index, returning it only if its corpus hash matches.
-    async fn load_cache(path: &Path, hash: &str) -> Option<Self> {
-        let raw = tokio::fs::read(path).await.ok()?;
-        let persisted: PersistedIndex = serde_json::from_slice(&raw).ok()?;
-        if persisted.corpus_hash != hash {
-            return None;
-        }
-        Some(Self {
-            entries: persisted
-                .entries
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|e| (e.spec, e.embedding))
-                .collect(),
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Persist the index atomically (temp file + rename) keyed by corpus hash.
-    async fn write_cache(&self, path: &Path, hash: &str) -> Result<(), CoreError> {
-        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
-            tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
-        }
-        let persisted = PersistedIndex {
-            corpus_hash: hash.to_string(),
-            entries: self
-                .entries
-                .iter()
-                .map(|(spec, emb)| PersistedEntry {
-                    spec: spec.clone(),
-                    embedding: emb.clone(),
-                })
-                .collect(),
-        };
-        let raw = serde_json::to_vec(&persisted)?;
-        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
-        tokio::fs::write(&tmp, &raw).await?;
-        tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, path).await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
     /// Build by embedding each control's requirement text.
     pub async fn build(llm: &LlmClient, specs: Vec<ControlCheckSpec>) -> Result<Self, CoreError> {
         if specs.is_empty() {
@@ -204,42 +107,4 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(cosine(&[0.0, 0.0], &[1.0, 1.0]), 0.0); // zero vector
         assert!((cosine(&[1.0, 0.0], &[1.0, 0.0]) - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9); // identical
     }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn corpus_hash_is_stable_and_identity_sensitive() {
-        let a = corpus_hash(&[spec("x"), spec("y")]);
-        assert_eq!(a, corpus_hash(&[spec("x"), spec("y")])); // same corpus → same hash
-        assert_ne!(a, corpus_hash(&[spec("y"), spec("x")])); // reorder → different
-        assert_ne!(a, corpus_hash(&[spec("x")])); // fewer controls → different
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-    async fn cache_round_trips_and_misses_on_corpus_change() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("cidx-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
-        let path = dir.join("control-index.json");
-        let specs = [spec("a"), spec("b")];
-        let hash = corpus_hash(&specs);
-        let index = ControlIndex::from_embeddings(vec![
-            (spec("a"), vec![1.0, 0.0]),
-            (spec("b"), vec![0.0, 1.0]),
-        ]);
-        index.write_cache(&path, &hash).await.unwrap();
-
-        // matching corpus hash → hit
-        let loaded = ControlIndex::load_cache(&path, &hash).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(loaded.nearest(&[0.9, 0.1], 1)[0].control_id, "a");
-        // corpus changed → miss (forces a rebuild)
-        assert!(ControlIndex::load_cache(&path, "differenthash")
-            .await
-            .is_none());
-        // absent file → miss, not an error
-        assert!(
-            ControlIndex::load_cache(dir.join("nope.json").as_path(), &hash)
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
-    }
 }

compliance-agent/src/controls/mod.rs

@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@ mod judge;
 mod oscal_provider;
 mod scan_triage;
 mod semantic;
-mod surface;
 mod triage;
 
 pub use checker::GroundedControlChecker;
 pub use index::ControlIndex;
 pub use judge::{ControlJudge, LlmControlJudge, PROMPT_VERSION};
 pub use oscal_provider::OscalControlsProvider;
-pub use scan_triage::{grounded_surface_findings, semantic_stamp_findings, triage_repo_findings};
+pub use scan_triage::{semantic_stamp_findings, triage_repo_findings};
 pub use semantic::SemanticControlChecker;
 pub use triage::{ControlTriage, TriageOutcome};

compliance-agent/src/controls/scan_triage.rs

@@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ use compliance_core::models::onboarding::ComplianceFramework;
 use compliance_core::AgentConfig;
 use control_map::ControlMap;
 
-use super::surface;
 use super::{
-    ControlIndex, ControlTriage, GroundedControlChecker, LlmControlJudge, OscalControlsProvider,
-    SemanticControlChecker, TriageOutcome,
+    ControlIndex, ControlTriage, LlmControlJudge, OscalControlsProvider, SemanticControlChecker,
+    TriageOutcome,
 };
 use crate::llm::LlmClient;
 
@@ -106,50 +105,6 @@ async fn build_specs(provider: &OscalControlsProvider) -> HashMap<String, Contro
     specs
 }
 
-/// Absence-based control pass (the grounded half of the hybrid coverage): for each
-/// control with a [`surface`] definition, deterministically retrieve the code
-/// surfaces it governs (login routes, logging setup, update/download code) and have
-/// the grounded judge decide whether the control holds there. Returns net-new
-/// findings, each already tagged with its control and grounded to a real snippet.
-///
-/// The orchestrator runs this when `breakpilot.grounded_control_checks` is set
-/// (on by default). Validated live; it covers the 8 absence-based CRA controls
-/// (the judge decides presence/absence, grounded to a real snippet).
-pub async fn grounded_surface_findings(
-    config: &AgentConfig,
-    llm: Arc<LlmClient>,
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    repo_id: &str,
-) -> Vec<Finding> {
-    let Some(base_url) = config.breakpilot.base_url.clone() else {
-        return Vec::new();
-    };
-    let provider = OscalControlsProvider::new(
-        reqwest::Client::new(),
-        base_url,
-        config.breakpilot.token.clone(),
-        &config.breakpilot.snapshot_dir,
-    );
-    let specs = build_specs(&provider).await;
-    if specs.is_empty() {
-        return Vec::new();
-    }
-    let checker = GroundedControlChecker::new(LlmControlJudge::new(llm));
-
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    for surf in surface::SURFACES {
-        let Some(spec) = specs.get(surf.control_id) else {
-            continue; // catalog doesn't carry this control
-        };
-        let regions = surface::retrieve(repo_path, surf.terms);
-        if regions.is_empty() {
-            continue;
-        }
-        out.extend(checker.check(spec, &regions, repo_id).await);
-    }
-    out
-}
-
 /// Read a window of lines around `line` (1-based) from `repo_path/file`.
 fn fetch_region(repo_path: &Path, file: &str, line: u32) -> Option<CandidateRegion> {
     let content = std::fs::read_to_string(repo_path.join(file)).ok()?;
@@ -173,10 +128,9 @@ fn fetch_region(repo_path: &Path, file: &str, line: u32) -> Option<CandidateRegi
 /// ~13.6k master-control corpus (which has no CWE to LUT on). Returns the number
 /// of findings that gained a master-control ref.
 ///
-/// The orchestrator runs this when `breakpilot.semantic_mapping` is set (on by
-/// default). The control embedding index is built once and cached to
-/// `snapshot_dir` keyed by corpus hash ([`ControlIndex::load_or_build`]), so only
-/// the first scan after a catalog change pays the embedding cost.
+/// Opt-in: the orchestrator does not run this yet. It builds the control embedding
+/// index per call (embeds the whole corpus) — production should cache/persist that
+/// index rather than rebuild it each scan.
 pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
     config: &AgentConfig,
     llm: Arc<LlmClient>,
@@ -210,9 +164,7 @@ pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
             severity: Severity::Medium,
         })
         .collect();
-    let cache_path =
-        Path::new(&config.breakpilot.snapshot_dir).join("control-index-master-controls.json");
-    let index = match ControlIndex::load_or_build(&llm, specs, &cache_path).await {
+    let index = match ControlIndex::build(&llm, specs).await {
         Ok(i) if !i.is_empty() => i,
         Ok(_) => return 0,
         Err(e) => {
@@ -233,22 +185,13 @@ pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
         let Some(region) = fetch_region(repo_path, &file, line) else {
             continue;
         };
-        // Retrieve on the finding's intent + the code, not the region alone: two
-        // findings in one file share overlapping windows and otherwise embed alike,
-        // collapsing onto the same controls. The finding's title/description carry
-        // the discriminating signal (e.g. "brute-force protection" vs "weak hash").
-        // The raw `region` still goes to the judge for snippet grounding.
-        let query = format!(
-            "{}\n{}\n\n{}",
-            finding.title, finding.description, region.content
-        );
-        let query_emb = match llm.embed(vec![query]).await {
+        let region_emb = match llm.embed(vec![region.content.clone()]).await {
             Ok(mut embs) => match embs.pop() {
                 Some(v) => v,
                 None => continue,
             },
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "query embed failed; skipping finding");
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "region embed failed; skipping finding");
                 continue;
             }
         };
@@ -256,7 +199,7 @@ pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
             .check(
                 &index,
                 &region,
-                &query_emb,
+                &region_emb,
                 SEMANTIC_TOP_K,
                 &finding.repo_id,
             )

compliance-agent/src/controls/semantic.rs

@@ -22,20 +22,18 @@ impl<J: ControlJudge> SemanticControlChecker<J> {
         Self { judge }
     }
 
-    /// Map a code region to the controls it violates. `query_embedding` is the
-    /// caller-supplied retrieval embedding — typically the finding's intent
-    /// (title/description) plus the region, so retrieval keys on what the finding
-    /// is *about*, not just the ambient code. The top-`k` nearest controls in
-    /// `index` are then judged against the raw `region` and grounded.
+    /// Map a code region to the controls it violates. `region_embedding` is the
+    /// region's embedding (the caller computes it via the LLM); the top-`k`
+    /// nearest controls in `index` are judged and grounded.
     pub async fn check(
         &self,
         index: &ControlIndex,
         region: &CandidateRegion,
-        query_embedding: &[f64],
+        region_embedding: &[f64],
         k: usize,
         repo_id: &str,
     ) -> Vec<Finding> {
-        let candidates = index.nearest(query_embedding, k);
+        let candidates = index.nearest(region_embedding, k);
         let mut findings = Vec::new();
         for spec in &candidates {
             let verdict = self.judge.judge(spec, region).await;

compliance-agent/src/controls/surface.rs

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-//! Surface retrieval for absence-based controls.
-//!
-//! Some CRA controls are violated by an *absence* — no rate limiting on login, no
-//! security logging, no signature check on an update — so there's no offending
-//! pattern for semgrep to match. Instead we deterministically locate the code
-//! *surface* the control governs (a login route, a logging setup, update/download
-//! code) by identifier/route terms, then hand each surface region to the grounded
-//! judge, which decides whether the control is satisfied there. The resulting
-//! finding grounds to the surface snippet, so nothing fabricated survives.
-//!
-//! Retrieval is intentionally cheap and bounded: keyword match + a fixed window,
-//! capped per control to keep the downstream LLM cost predictable.
-
-use std::path::Path;
-
-use compliance_core::control_check::CandidateRegion;
-
-/// An absence-based control and the case-insensitive terms that mark the code
-/// surface it governs.
-pub struct Surface {
-    pub control_id: &'static str,
-    pub terms: &'static [&'static str],
-}
-
-/// The absence-based CRA controls we retrieve surfaces for — the grounded half of
-/// the hybrid coverage (the pattern-expressible half is custom semgrep rules).
-pub const SURFACES: &[Surface] = &[
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-6", // Integritaetspruefung
-        terms: &[
-            "checksum",
-            "sha256",
-            "signature",
-            "hmac",
-            "integrity",
-            "verify",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-11", // Brute-Force-Schutz
-        terms: &[
-            "login",
-            "signin",
-            "authenticate",
-            "/auth",
-            "password",
-            "ratelimit",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-12", // Rollenbasierte Autorisierung (RBAC)
-        terms: &[
-            "authorize",
-            "permission",
-            "role",
-            "rbac",
-            "require_role",
-            "has_role",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-24", // Security-Logging
-        terms: &["login", "authorize", "permission", "role", "admin", "audit"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-27", // Log-Integritaet und -Aufbewahrung
-        terms: &["logging", "logger", "getlogger", "audit_log"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-28", // Sichere Update-Mechanismen
-        terms: &["update", "upgrade", "download", "firmware"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-29", // Update-Authentizitaet
-        terms: &["update", "signature", "verify", "pubkey", "certificate"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-30", // Update-Integritaet
-        terms: &["update", "checksum", "digest", "integrity", "verify"],
-    },
-];
-
-/// Source file extensions worth reading (skip binaries/assets/lockfiles).
-const CODE_EXTS: &[&str] = &[
-    "py", "js", "ts", "tsx", "jsx", "go", "java", "rb", "php", "rs", "cs", "kt",
-];
-/// Directories never worth walking.
-const SKIP_DIRS: &[&str] = &[
-    ".git",
-    "node_modules",
-    "target",
-    "vendor",
-    ".venv",
-    "__pycache__",
-    "dist",
-    "build",
-];
-/// Lines of context on each side of a hit.
-const WINDOW: usize = 6;
-/// Cap on regions per control, to bound downstream LLM calls.
-const MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL: usize = 8;
-/// Skip files larger than this (generated/minified).
-const MAX_FILE_BYTES: u64 = 512 * 1024;
-
-/// Deterministically retrieve up to [`MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL`] code regions in
-/// `repo_path` whose lines mention any of `terms`. Hits close together within a
-/// file are merged into one region; results are capped to bound LLM cost.
-pub fn retrieve(repo_path: &Path, terms: &[&str]) -> Vec<CandidateRegion> {
-    let lowered: Vec<String> = terms.iter().map(|t| t.to_lowercase()).collect();
-    let mut regions = Vec::new();
-    for entry in walk(repo_path) {
-        if regions.len() >= MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL {
-            break;
-        }
-        let path = entry.path();
-        if !has_code_ext(path) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Ok(meta) = entry.metadata() else { continue };
-        if !meta.is_file() || meta.len() > MAX_FILE_BYTES {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let rel = path
-            .strip_prefix(repo_path)
-            .unwrap_or(path)
-            .to_string_lossy()
-            .to_string();
-        let lines: Vec<&str> = content.lines().collect();
-        let hits: Vec<usize> = lines
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .filter(|(_, line)| {
-                let ll = line.to_lowercase();
-                lowered.iter().any(|t| ll.contains(t.as_str()))
-            })
-            .map(|(i, _)| i)
-            .collect();
-        for center in merge_centers(&hits) {
-            if regions.len() >= MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL {
-                break;
-            }
-            let start = center.saturating_sub(WINDOW);
-            let end = (center + WINDOW + 1).min(lines.len());
-            regions.push(CandidateRegion {
-                file: rel.clone(),
-                start_line: (start as u32) + 1,
-                content: lines[start..end].join("\n"),
-            });
-        }
-    }
-    regions
-}
-
-/// Collapse ascending hit indices that fall within one window into a single
-/// representative center, so overlapping regions aren't judged repeatedly.
-fn merge_centers(hits: &[usize]) -> Vec<usize> {
-    let mut out: Vec<usize> = Vec::new();
-    for &h in hits {
-        match out.last() {
-            Some(&last) if h.saturating_sub(last) <= WINDOW => {}
-            _ => out.push(h),
-        }
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-fn has_code_ext(path: &Path) -> bool {
-    path.extension()
-        .and_then(|e| e.to_str())
-        .is_some_and(|e| CODE_EXTS.contains(&e))
-}
-
-fn walk(root: &Path) -> Vec<walkdir::DirEntry> {
-    walkdir::WalkDir::new(root)
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter_entry(|e| {
-            let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy();
-            !SKIP_DIRS.contains(&name.as_ref())
-        })
-        .filter_map(|e| e.ok())
-        .collect()
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    fn write(dir: &Path, rel: &str, body: &str) {
-        let p = dir.join(rel);
-        if let Some(parent) = p.parent() {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).unwrap();
-        }
-        std::fs::write(p, body).unwrap();
-    }
-
-    fn terms_for(control_id: &str) -> &'static [&'static str] {
-        SURFACES
-            .iter()
-            .find(|s| s.control_id == control_id)
-            .unwrap()
-            .terms
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn surfaces_cover_the_absence_based_controls() {
-        assert_eq!(SURFACES.len(), 8);
-        for id in [
-            "cra-ai-6",
-            "cra-ai-11",
-            "cra-ai-12",
-            "cra-ai-24",
-            "cra-ai-27",
-            "cra-ai-28",
-            "cra-ai-29",
-            "cra-ai-30",
-        ] {
-            assert!(SURFACES.iter().any(|s| s.control_id == id), "{id} missing");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn retrieves_matching_region_with_context() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("surface-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
-        write(
-            &dir,
-            "app/auth.py",
-            "import x\n\n\n\n\n\n\ndef login(u, p):\n    return check(u, p)\n",
-        );
-        let regions = retrieve(&dir, terms_for("cra-ai-11"));
-        assert_eq!(regions.len(), 1);
-        assert!(regions[0].content.contains("def login"));
-        assert_eq!(regions[0].file, "app/auth.py");
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn skips_non_code_and_vendored() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("surface-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
-        write(&dir, "README.md", "login and password and audit\n"); // not code ext
-        write(&dir, "node_modules/pkg/index.js", "function login() {}\n"); // vendored
-        assert!(retrieve(&dir, terms_for("cra-ai-11")).is_empty());
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn merges_adjacent_hits_into_one_region() {
-        // Two hits one line apart collapse to a single center/region.
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[10, 11, 30]), vec![10, 30]);
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[]), Vec::<usize>::new());
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[5]), vec![5]);
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/controls/triage.rs

@@ -44,14 +44,10 @@ impl<J: ControlJudge> ControlTriage<J> {
     /// Triage one tool finding. `region` is the code around the finding, used as
     /// the grounding evidence for the judge.
     pub async fn triage(&self, finding: &Finding, region: &CandidateRegion) -> TriageOutcome {
-        // Match by CWE (off-the-shelf findings) and/or rule id (our custom
-        // detectors, which carry no LUT-bound CWE). A finding with neither is
-        // simply unmapped.
-        let mapped = self.map.controls_for_finding(
-            &finding.scanner,
-            finding.cwe.as_deref(),
-            finding.rule_id.as_deref(),
-        );
+        let Some(cwe) = finding.cwe.as_deref() else {
+            return TriageOutcome::Unmapped;
+        };
+        let mapped = self.map.controls_for(&finding.scanner, cwe);
         if mapped.is_empty() {
             return TriageOutcome::Unmapped;
         }
@@ -166,52 +162,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(out, TriageOutcome::FalsePositive);
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn custom_rule_finding_without_cwe_is_confirmed() {
-        // A custom detector finding carries a rule id but no LUT-bound CWE; it must
-        // still map (by rule id) and confirm.
-        let mut specs = specs();
-        specs.insert(
-            "cra-ai-1".to_string(),
-            ControlCheckSpec {
-                control_id: "cra-ai-1".into(),
-                title: "Secure-by-Default".into(),
-                requirement: "Ship secure defaults".into(),
-                default_cwe: None,
-                severity: Severity::Medium,
-            },
-        );
-        let triage = ControlTriage::new(
-            StubJudge {
-                verdict: LlmVerdict {
-                    violates: true,
-                    snippet: "app.run(debug=True)".into(),
-                    cwe: None,
-                    confidence: 0.9,
-                },
-            },
-            ControlMap::cra().unwrap(),
-            specs,
-        );
-        let mut f = Finding::new(
-            "repo".into(),
-            "fp".into(),
-            "semgrep".into(),
-            ScanType::Sast,
-            "flask debug".into(),
-            "desc".into(),
-            Severity::Medium,
-        );
-        f.rule_id = Some("tmp.x.cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled".into()); // no cwe
-        let region = CandidateRegion {
-            file: "app.py".into(),
-            start_line: 1,
-            content: "app.run(debug=True)\n".into(),
-        };
-        let out = triage.triage(&f, &region).await;
-        assert_eq!(out, TriageOutcome::Confirmed(vec!["cra-ai-1".to_string()]));
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn unmapped_cwe_is_left_untagged() {
         let triage = ControlTriage::new(

compliance-agent/src/llm/embedding.rs

@@ -22,11 +22,6 @@ struct EmbeddingData {
     index: usize,
 }
 
-/// Max inputs per embedding request. The bge/OpenAI-like backends cap the input
-/// array (bge-multilingual-gemma2 rejects >25 with "batch size overflow"), so we
-/// chunk larger corpora — a whole control catalog (~1.8k) would otherwise 500.
-const EMBED_BATCH_SIZE: usize = 16;
-
 // ── Embedding implementation ───────────────────────────────────
 
 impl LlmClient {
@@ -34,21 +29,8 @@ impl LlmClient {
         &self.embed_model
     }
 
-    /// Generate embeddings for a batch of texts, chunking into backend-sized
-    /// requests and preserving input order across chunks.
+    /// Generate embeddings for a batch of texts
     pub async fn embed(&self, texts: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<f64>>, AgentError> {
-        if texts.is_empty() {
-            return Ok(Vec::new());
-        }
-        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(texts.len());
-        for chunk in texts.chunks(EMBED_BATCH_SIZE) {
-            out.extend(self.embed_batch(chunk.to_vec()).await?);
-        }
-        Ok(out)
-    }
-
-    /// Embed one backend-sized batch (≤ [`EMBED_BATCH_SIZE`]) in a single request.
-    async fn embed_batch(&self, texts: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<f64>>, AgentError> {
         let url = format!("{}/v1/embeddings", self.base_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
 
         let request_body = EmbeddingRequest {
@@ -90,33 +72,3 @@ impl LlmClient {
         Ok(data.into_iter().map(|d| d.embedding).collect())
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-    fn client() -> LlmClient {
-        LlmClient::new(
-            "http://unused".into(),
-            SecretString::from(String::new()),
-            "m".into(),
-            "e".into(),
-        )
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn empty_input_makes_no_request() {
-        // Must short-circuit before any HTTP call (base_url is unroutable).
-        let out = client().embed(Vec::new()).await.unwrap();
-        assert!(out.is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn batch_size_is_within_backend_cap() {
-        assert!(
-            EMBED_BATCH_SIZE <= 25,
-            "must stay under the bge 25-input cap"
-        );
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/pipeline/orchestrator.rs

@@ -230,57 +230,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
             tracing::info!("[{repo_id}] Control triage tagged {tagged} findings with control refs");
         }
 
-        // Stage 5c: semantic control mapping — scale path for the master-controls
-        // corpus (no CWE to LUT on): embed each finding's region, retrieve the
-        // nearest master controls, grounded-judge, and stamp confirmed refs. On by
-        // default (validated live); the corpus embedding is cached so only the
-        // first scan after a catalog change pays it.
-        if self.config.breakpilot.semantic_mapping {
-            self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "semantic_control_mapping")
-                .await;
-            let sem = crate::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(
-                &self.config,
-                self.llm.clone(),
-                &repo_path,
-                &mut all_findings,
-            )
-            .await;
-            if sem > 0 {
-                tracing::info!(
-                    "[{repo_id}] Semantic mapping tagged {sem} findings with master-control refs"
-                );
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Stage 5d: grounded surface checks — the absence-based controls (no
-        // rate limiting, no security logging, no update-signature check) have no
-        // syntactic pattern to match, so we retrieve the code surface each governs
-        // and let the grounded judge decide whether it holds, producing net-new
-        // findings already tagged + grounded. On by default (validated live); it
-        // covers the 8 absence-based CRA controls.
-        if self.config.breakpilot.grounded_control_checks {
-            self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "grounded_control_checks")
-                .await;
-            let grounded = crate::controls::grounded_surface_findings(
-                &self.config,
-                self.llm.clone(),
-                &repo_path,
-                &repo_id,
-            )
-            .await;
-            if !grounded.is_empty() {
-                tracing::info!(
-                    "[{repo_id}] Grounded surface checks raised {} control findings",
-                    grounded.len()
-                );
-                all_findings.extend(grounded);
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Dedup against existing findings: insert first-seen ones, and refresh the
-        // control mappings on ones we've seen before.
+        // Dedup against existing findings and insert new ones
         let mut new_count = 0u32;
-        let mut refreshed_count = 0u32;
         let mut new_findings: Vec<Finding> = Vec::new();
         for mut finding in all_findings {
             finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
@@ -295,25 +246,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
                 finding.id = result.inserted_id.as_object_id();
                 new_findings.push(finding);
                 new_count += 1;
-            } else if !finding.control_refs.is_empty() {
-                // Re-scan refresh: a mapping pass (newly enabled or tuned) computed
-                // control_refs for a finding first seen before mapping ran. Persist
-                // them onto the existing row — the insert path alone never would.
-                self.db
-                    .findings()
-                    .update_one(
-                        doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint },
-                        doc! { "$set": { "control_refs": finding.control_refs.clone() } },
-                    )
-                    .await?;
-                refreshed_count += 1;
             }
         }
-        if refreshed_count > 0 {
-            tracing::info!(
-                "[{repo_id}] Refreshed control_refs on {refreshed_count} existing findings"
-            );
-        }
 
         // Remove stale SBOM entries for this repo before reinserting
         if !sbom_entries.is_empty() {
@@ -586,21 +520,7 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
             let Some(path) = ingest_set.get(&a.id).and_then(|ia| ia.working_path.clone()) else {
                 continue;
             };
-            let mut source_findings = crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id);
-            // Control mapping for the PLC path (run_plc_scan is separate from
-            // run_pipeline, which does its own mapping). PLC findings carry
-            // file_path/line/cwe, so the semantic pass reads each region under this
-            // source's `path` and stamps master-control refs. The LUT + grounded
-            // surface passes are code-pattern / CRA-specific and don't apply to
-            // IEC 61131-3 control logic, so only the semantic pass runs here.
-            crate::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(
-                &self.config,
-                self.llm.clone(),
-                &path,
-                &mut source_findings,
-            )
-            .await;
-            all_findings.extend(source_findings);
+            all_findings.extend(crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id));
             // Control-application SBOM: CODESYS libraries + runtime from a
             // `.projectarchive` (uploaded, or committed in the working tree).
             let archive = a
@@ -625,7 +545,6 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
         );
 
         let mut new_count = 0u32;
-        let mut refreshed_count = 0u32;
         for mut finding in all_findings {
             finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
             if self
@@ -637,27 +556,8 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
             {
                 self.db.findings().insert_one(&finding).await?;
                 new_count += 1;
-            } else if !finding.control_refs.is_empty() {
-                // Re-scan refresh: mirror run_pipeline — persist newly-computed
-                // control_refs onto a PLC finding first seen before the semantic
-                // pass ran. The insert path alone never would, so without this a
-                // PLC re-scan can only pick up mappings via a delete + re-add.
-                self.db
-                    .findings()
-                    .update_one(
-                        doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint },
-                        doc! { "$set": { "control_refs": finding.control_refs.clone() } },
-                    )
-                    .await?;
-                refreshed_count += 1;
             }
         }
-        if refreshed_count > 0 {
-            tracing::info!(
-                target_id,
-                "Refreshed control_refs on {refreshed_count} existing PLC findings"
-            );
-        }
 
         if !all_sbom.is_empty() {
             if let Err(e) = self

compliance-agent/src/pipeline/semgrep.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::path::Path;
 
 use compliance_core::models::{Finding, ScanType, Severity};
 use compliance_core::traits::{ScanOutput, Scanner};
@@ -6,30 +6,6 @@ use compliance_core::CoreError;
 
 use crate::pipeline::dedup;
 
-/// Custom CRA-control detectors bundled into the binary and staged to a temp file
-/// at scan time so semgrep can `--config` them alongside the auto ruleset. These
-/// cover controls no off-the-shelf rule digs out (secure defaults, weak password
-/// hashing, insecure session cookies, weak data-at-rest ciphers); each rule id is
-/// keyed back to its control by the `control-map` LUT.
-const CRA_RULES: &str = include_str!("../../rules/cra_semgrep.yaml");
-
-/// Write the bundled CRA rules to a stable temp path (atomic: unique tmp +
-/// rename). Returns `None` on failure — the scan then runs with auto rules only.
-async fn stage_cra_rules() -> Option<PathBuf> {
-    let dir = std::env::temp_dir();
-    let path = dir.join("compliance-cra-semgrep.yaml");
-    let tmp = dir.join(format!("compliance-cra-semgrep.{}.tmp", std::process::id()));
-    if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::write(&tmp, CRA_RULES).await {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to stage custom CRA semgrep rules; using auto rules only");
-        return None;
-    }
-    if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, &path).await {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "failed to stage custom CRA semgrep rules; using auto rules only");
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(path)
-}
-
 pub struct SemgrepScanner;
 
 impl Scanner for SemgrepScanner {
@@ -43,26 +19,30 @@ impl Scanner for SemgrepScanner {
 
     #[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
     async fn scan(&self, repo_path: &Path, repo_id: &str) -> Result<ScanOutput, CoreError> {
-        let cra_rules = stage_cra_rules().await;
-        let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new("semgrep");
-        command.arg("--config=auto");
-        if let Some(path) = &cra_rules {
-            command.arg(format!("--config={}", path.display()));
-        }
-        command
-            .args(["--json", "--quiet", "--max-memory", "500", "--jobs", "1"])
-            .arg(repo_path);
-
-        let output = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600), command.output())
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| CoreError::Scanner {
-                scanner: "semgrep".to_string(),
-                source: "timed out after 10 minutes".into(),
-            })?
-            .map_err(|e| CoreError::Scanner {
-                scanner: "semgrep".to_string(),
-                source: Box::new(e),
-            })?;
+        let output = tokio::time::timeout(
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(600),
+            tokio::process::Command::new("semgrep")
+                .args([
+                    "--config=auto",
+                    "--json",
+                    "--quiet",
+                    "--max-memory",
+                    "500",
+                    "--jobs",
+                    "1",
+                ])
+                .arg(repo_path)
+                .output(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| CoreError::Scanner {
+            scanner: "semgrep".to_string(),
+            source: "timed out after 10 minutes".into(),
+        })?
+        .map_err(|e| CoreError::Scanner {
+            scanner: "semgrep".to_string(),
+            source: Box::new(e),
+        })?;
 
         if !output.status.success() && output.stdout.is_empty() {
             let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);

compliance-agent/tests/c5_example2.rs

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-//! C5 example 2 — exploratory (not a committed regression test). Four topically
-//! distinct findings, to see whether tuned semantic retrieval maps each to the
-//! right master-control family. Run:
-//!   export ... (LITELLM_* + BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL)
-//!   cargo test -p compliance-agent --test c5_example2 -- --ignored --nocapture
-
-mod common;
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use compliance_agent::llm::LlmClient;
-use compliance_core::config::BreakpilotConfig;
-use compliance_core::models::finding::{Finding, Severity};
-use compliance_core::models::scan::ScanType;
-use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-fn env(k: &str) -> String {
-    std::env::var(k).unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("env {k} must be set"))
-}
-
-fn mk(file: &str, line: u32, title: &str, desc: &str) -> Finding {
-    let mut f = Finding::new(
-        "repo-c5b".into(),
-        format!("{file}:{line}"),
-        "semgrep".into(),
-        ScanType::Sast,
-        title.into(),
-        desc.into(),
-        Severity::High,
-    );
-    f.file_path = Some(file.into());
-    f.line_number = Some(line);
-    f
-}
-
-fn write(repo: &std::path::Path, rel: &str, body: &str) {
-    let p = repo.join(rel);
-    if let Some(parent) = p.parent() {
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).unwrap();
-    }
-    std::fs::write(p, body).unwrap();
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: api-dev + LiteLLM"]
-async fn c5b_varied_findings() {
-    let llm = Arc::new(LlmClient::new(
-        env("LITELLM_URL"),
-        SecretString::from(env("LITELLM_API_KEY")),
-        env("LITELLM_MODEL"),
-        env("LITELLM_EMBED_MODEL"),
-    ));
-    let mut config = common::dev_config("mongodb://unused".into(), "c5b".into());
-    config.breakpilot = BreakpilotConfig {
-        base_url: Some(env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL")),
-        token: None,
-        snapshot_dir: std::env::temp_dir()
-            .join("c5-oscal-snap")
-            .to_string_lossy()
-            .into_owned(),
-        semantic_mapping: true,
-        grounded_control_checks: false,
-    };
-
-    let repo = std::env::temp_dir().join("c5b-fixture-repo");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/db.py",
-        "import sqlite3\n\ndef get_user(username):\n    q = \"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '\" + username + \"'\"\n    return conn.execute(q)\n",
-    );
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/config.py",
-        "# service config\nAPI_KEY = \"sk_live_51H8xYz3kQ9v2bNmR7wT4uSpQ\"\nDB_HOST = \"db.internal\"\n",
-    );
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/net.py",
-        "import requests\n\ndef fetch(url):\n    return requests.get(url, verify=False, timeout=5)\n",
-    );
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/ser.py",
-        "import pickle\n\ndef load_state(blob):\n    return pickle.loads(blob)\n",
-    );
-
-    let mut findings = vec![
-        mk(
-            "app/db.py",
-            4,
-            "SQL injection via string-concatenated query",
-            "User input is concatenated directly into a SQL statement, allowing SQL injection.",
-        ),
-        mk(
-            "app/config.py",
-            2,
-            "Hardcoded API credential in source",
-            "A live API key is hardcoded in source code instead of a secret store.",
-        ),
-        mk(
-            "app/net.py",
-            4,
-            "TLS certificate verification disabled",
-            "requests is called with verify=False, disabling TLS certificate validation.",
-        ),
-        mk(
-            "app/ser.py",
-            3,
-            "Insecure deserialization with pickle.loads",
-            "Untrusted data is deserialized with pickle.loads, allowing remote code execution.",
-        ),
-    ];
-
-    let tagged =
-        compliance_agent::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(&config, llm, &repo, &mut findings)
-            .await;
-    println!("\n=== C5 example 2: varied findings ===");
-    for f in &findings {
-        println!("  {:52} -> {:?}", f.title, f.control_refs);
-    }
-    println!("tagged: {tagged}/4");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-    assert!(tagged >= 1);
-}

compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-//! C5 live verification — the semantic master-controls path end to end against the
-//! deployed api-dev catalog. Ignored (hits api-dev + LiteLLM). Run explicitly:
-//!
-//!   set -a; . ./.env; set +a
-//!   BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL=https://api-dev.breakpilot.ai \
-//!     cargo test -p compliance-agent --test c5_semantic_live -- --ignored --nocapture
-//!
-//! Pulls the live master-controls catalog, embeds the corpus (chunked), then for a
-//! couple of real vulnerable findings retrieves the nearest master controls and
-//! grounded-judges them, stamping master-control refs.
-
-mod common;
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use compliance_agent::llm::LlmClient;
-use compliance_core::config::BreakpilotConfig;
-use compliance_core::models::finding::{Finding, Severity};
-use compliance_core::models::scan::ScanType;
-use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-fn env(k: &str) -> String {
-    std::env::var(k).unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("env {k} must be set for the live C5 test"))
-}
-
-fn mk_finding(file: &str, line: u32, title: &str) -> Finding {
-    let mut f = Finding::new(
-        "repo-c5".into(),
-        format!("{file}:{line}"),
-        "semgrep".into(),
-        ScanType::Sast,
-        title.into(),
-        title.into(),
-        Severity::High,
-    );
-    f.file_path = Some(file.into());
-    f.line_number = Some(line);
-    f
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: requires deployed api-dev master-controls (fetch+parse only, no LLM)"]
-async fn c5_ingest_master_controls_catalog() {
-    use compliance_agent::controls::OscalControlsProvider;
-
-    let provider = OscalControlsProvider::new(
-        reqwest::Client::new(),
-        env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL"),
-        None,
-        std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-ingest-snap"),
-    );
-    let doc = provider
-        .load_master_controls()
-        .await
-        .expect("pull + parse master-controls catalog");
-    let controls = doc.to_controls();
-    println!(
-        "\n=== C5 ingest: {} master controls parsed ===",
-        controls.len()
-    );
-    for c in controls.iter().take(4) {
-        let text: String = c.text.chars().take(90).collect();
-        println!("  {} | {} | {}", c.id, c.title, text);
-    }
-    assert!(
-        !controls.is_empty(),
-        "expected a non-empty master-control corpus"
-    );
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: requires deployed api-dev master-controls + LiteLLM"]
-async fn c5_semantic_stamps_master_control_refs() {
-    let llm = Arc::new(LlmClient::new(
-        env("LITELLM_URL"),
-        SecretString::from(env("LITELLM_API_KEY")),
-        env("LITELLM_MODEL"),
-        env("LITELLM_EMBED_MODEL"),
-    ));
-
-    let mut config = common::dev_config("mongodb://unused".into(), "c5".into());
-    let snapshot = std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-oscal-snap");
-    config.breakpilot = BreakpilotConfig {
-        base_url: Some(env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL")),
-        token: None,
-        snapshot_dir: snapshot.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
-        semantic_mapping: true,
-        grounded_control_checks: false,
-    };
-
-    // Fixture repo with recognizable code-checkable surfaces.
-    let repo = std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-fixture-repo");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(repo.join("app")).expect("mkdir");
-    std::fs::write(
-        repo.join("app/auth.py"),
-        concat!(
-            "import hashlib\n",
-            "\n",
-            "def store_password(user, password):\n",
-            "    # weak, unsalted password hashing\n",
-            "    digest = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()\n",
-            "    db.save(user, digest)\n",
-            "\n",
-            "@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])\n",
-            "def login():\n",
-            "    u = request.form['username']\n",
-            "    p = request.form['password']\n",
-            "    return 'ok' if check(u, p) else ('bad', 401)\n",
-        ),
-    )
-    .expect("write fixture");
-
-    let mut findings = vec![
-        mk_finding("app/auth.py", 5, "Weak password hash (md5, unsalted)"),
-        mk_finding(
-            "app/auth.py",
-            9,
-            "Login endpoint without brute-force protection",
-        ),
-    ];
-
-    let tagged =
-        compliance_agent::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(&config, llm, &repo, &mut findings)
-            .await;
-
-    println!("\n=== C5 semantic master-controls stamping ===");
-    for f in &findings {
-        println!(
-            "  {:50} {}:{:?} -> {:?}",
-            f.title,
-            f.file_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
-            f.line_number,
-            f.control_refs
-        );
-    }
-    println!("findings that gained >=1 master-control ref: {tagged}");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-
-    // Live corpus — assert only that the path runs and stamps at least one ref.
-    assert!(
-        tagged >= 1,
-        "expected at least one finding to gain a master-control ref"
-    );
-}

compliance-agent/tests/grounded_surface_live.rs

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-//! Live validation of the grounded surface path (Stage 5d) for absence-based CRA
-//! controls. Ignored (hits api-dev CRA catalog + LiteLLM). Run:
-//!   export ... (LITELLM_* + BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL)
-//!   cargo test -p compliance-agent --test grounded_surface_live -- --ignored --nocapture
-//!
-//! Builds a fixture whose code surfaces trigger several absence-based controls
-//! (no rate limiting, no security logging, unverified update) and checks that the
-//! grounded checker produces control-tagged findings.
-
-mod common;
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use compliance_agent::llm::LlmClient;
-use compliance_core::config::BreakpilotConfig;
-use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-fn env(k: &str) -> String {
-    std::env::var(k).unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("env {k} must be set"))
-}
-
-fn write(repo: &std::path::Path, rel: &str, body: &str) {
-    let p = repo.join(rel);
-    if let Some(parent) = p.parent() {
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).unwrap();
-    }
-    std::fs::write(p, body).unwrap();
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: api-dev CRA catalog + LiteLLM"]
-async fn grounded_surface_flags_absence_controls() {
-    let llm = Arc::new(LlmClient::new(
-        env("LITELLM_URL"),
-        SecretString::from(env("LITELLM_API_KEY")),
-        env("LITELLM_MODEL"),
-        env("LITELLM_EMBED_MODEL"),
-    ));
-    let mut config = common::dev_config("mongodb://unused".into(), "grounded".into());
-    config.breakpilot = BreakpilotConfig {
-        base_url: Some(env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL")),
-        token: None,
-        snapshot_dir: std::env::temp_dir()
-            .join("grounded-snap")
-            .to_string_lossy()
-            .into_owned(),
-        semantic_mapping: false,
-        grounded_control_checks: true,
-    };
-
-    let repo = std::env::temp_dir().join("grounded-fixture-repo");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-    // cra-ai-11: login endpoint with no rate limiting / lockout
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/auth.py",
-        "@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])\ndef login():\n    u = request.form['username']\n    p = request.form['password']\n    if authenticate(u, p):\n        return redirect('/')\n    return 'bad credentials', 401\n",
-    );
-    // cra-ai-24: privileged admin action with no security/audit logging
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/admin.py",
-        "@app.route('/admin/delete_user', methods=['POST'])\ndef admin_delete_user():\n    uid = request.form['uid']\n    db.users.delete_one({'_id': uid})\n    return 'ok', 200\n",
-    );
-    // cra-ai-28/29/30: firmware update applied without signature / checksum verification
-    write(
-        &repo,
-        "app/updater.py",
-        "def apply_firmware_update(url):\n    blob = download(url)\n    install_firmware(blob)\n    reboot_device()\n",
-    );
-
-    let findings =
-        compliance_agent::controls::grounded_surface_findings(&config, llm, &repo, "repo-grounded")
-            .await;
-
-    println!("\n=== Grounded surface findings ({}) ===", findings.len());
-    for f in &findings {
-        println!(
-            "  {:24} {}:{:?}  {}",
-            f.control_refs.join(","),
-            f.file_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
-            f.line_number,
-            f.title
-        );
-    }
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-
-    assert!(
-        !findings.is_empty(),
-        "expected the grounded pass to flag at least one absence-based control"
-    );
-}

compliance-core/src/config.rs

@@ -75,17 +75,6 @@ pub struct BreakpilotConfig {
     pub token: Option<SecretString>,
     /// Directory for catalog snapshots.
     pub snapshot_dir: String,
-    /// Enable the master-controls **semantic** mapping pass (embed regions,
-    /// Enable the master-controls **semantic** mapping pass (embed regions,
-    /// retrieve nearest controls, grounded-judge). On by default — validated live
-    /// against the deployed master-controls catalog. Still a no-op unless
-    /// `base_url` is set and the catalog is reachable.
-    pub semantic_mapping: bool,
-    /// Enable the **grounded surface** pass for absence-based controls (retrieve
-    /// the code surface a control governs, judge whether it holds). On by default
-    /// — validated live; it covers the 8 absence-based CRA controls that no
-    /// syntactic rule can.
-    pub grounded_control_checks: bool,
 }
 
 impl Default for BreakpilotConfig {
@@ -94,8 +83,6 @@ impl Default for BreakpilotConfig {
             base_url: None,
             token: None,
             snapshot_dir: "/data/compliance-scanner/oscal".to_string(),
-            semantic_mapping: true,
-            grounded_control_checks: true,
         }
     }
 }

compliance-core/src/control_check.rs

@@ -14,14 +14,13 @@
 //! The LLM supplies cross-language / cross-stack pattern recognition; this module
 //! supplies the determinism.
 
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
 
 use crate::models::finding::{Finding, Severity};
 use crate::models::scan::ScanType;
 
 /// A control rendered as a check the LLM judges code against.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct ControlCheckSpec {
     /// Stable control id, e.g. `"cra-ai-8"`.
     pub control_id: String,

compliance-mcp/src/main.rs

@@ -42,19 +42,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
 
         let pool_for_factory = pool.clone();
         let service = StreamableHttpService::new(
-            move || {
-                // The factory runs in the request task, still inside the bearer
-                // middleware's `TENANT_ID` scope, and BEFORE rmcp spawns the
-                // session task (which would lose the task_local). So bind the
-                // tenant into the session's server instance here, once.
-                let tenant_id = auth::current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
-                    std::io::Error::other("no tenant context when creating MCP session")
-                })?;
-                Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(
-                    pool_for_factory.clone(),
-                    tenant_id,
-                ))
-            },
+            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool_for_factory.clone())),
             Arc::new(LocalSessionManager::default()),
             StreamableHttpServerConfig::default(),
         );
@@ -81,11 +69,16 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
             tenant_id = %synth_tenant,
             "stdio transport — using synthetic tenant id; DO NOT use in production"
         );
-        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool, synth_tenant);
+        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool);
         let transport = rmcp::transport::stdio();
         use rmcp::ServiceExt;
-        let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
-        handle.waiting().await?;
+        auth::TENANT_ID
+            .scope(synth_tenant, async {
+                let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
+                handle.waiting().await?;
+                Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())
+            })
+            .await?;
     }
 
     Ok(())

compliance-mcp/src/server.rs

@@ -2,33 +2,37 @@ use rmcp::{
     handler::server::wrapper::Parameters, model::*, tool, tool_handler, tool_router, ServerHandler,
 };
 
+use crate::auth::current_tenant_id;
 use crate::database::{Database, DatabasePool};
 use crate::tools::{dast, findings, oscal, pentest, sbom};
 
 pub struct ComplianceMcpServer {
     pool: DatabasePool,
-    /// Tenant this session serves. Bound once at session creation (the HTTP
-    /// factory reads the bearer-set tenant while still in the request scope;
-    /// stdio passes a synthetic id) — NOT a per-request `task_local`, which is
-    /// lost across the `tokio::spawn` that runs the Streamable-HTTP session.
-    tenant_id: String,
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<Self>,
 }
 
 impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    /// The per-tenant `Database` for this session.
+    /// Resolve the per-tenant `Database` from the bearer-set
+    /// `task_local`. Every tool handler calls this; missing context
+    /// surfaces as `internal_error` because it means the auth
+    /// middleware was misconfigured (handler ran without scope).
     fn tenant_db(&self) -> Result<Database, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&self.tenant_id))
+        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
+            rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
+                "no tenant context — bearer middleware not in chain".to_string(),
+                None,
+            )
+        })?;
+        Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&tenant_id))
     }
 }
 
 #[tool_router]
 impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool, tenant_id: String) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool) -> Self {
         Self {
             pool,
-            tenant_id,
             tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
         }
     }

control-map/data/cra_control_map.json

@@ -5,79 +5,51 @@
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-1",
       "title": "Secure-by-Default-Konfiguration",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "semgrep",
-          "scan_type": "sast",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": [
-            "cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled",
-            "cra-ai-1-django-debug-true",
-            "cra-ai-1-tls-verify-disabled",
-            "cra-ai-1-cors-wildcard"
-          ]
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": null,
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-2",
       "title": "Minimale Angriffsflaeche",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (minimal attack surface) — not derivable from local code patterns; architecture/threat-model review",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-3",
       "title": "Sichere Systemarchitektur",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (secure system architecture) — architecture review, not statically code-checkable",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-4",
       "title": "Least-Privilege-Prinzip",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (least-privilege) — deployment/IAM & architecture review, not a local code pattern",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-5",
       "title": "Manipulationsschutz",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (tamper protection) — hardware/runtime & operational control, not statically code-checkable",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-6",
       "title": "Integritaetspruefung",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-7",
       "title": "Starke Authentifizierung",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "semgrep",
-          "scan_type": "sast",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": [
-            "cra-ai-7-weak-password-hash"
-          ]
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": null,
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-8",
@@ -128,47 +100,23 @@
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-10",
       "title": "Sitzungsmanagement",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "semgrep",
-          "scan_type": "sast",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": [
-            "cra-ai-10-session-cookie-insecure",
-            "cra-ai-10-express-cookie-insecure"
-          ]
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": null,
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-11",
       "title": "Brute-Force-Schutz",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-12",
       "title": "Rollenbasierte Autorisierung",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-13",
@@ -190,19 +138,9 @@
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-14",
       "title": "Speicher-Schutz (Data at Rest)",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "semgrep",
-          "scan_type": "sast",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": [
-            "cra-ai-14-python-weak-cipher",
-            "cra-ai-14-node-weak-cipher"
-          ]
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": null,
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-15",
@@ -328,16 +266,9 @@
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-24",
       "title": "Security-Logging",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-25",
@@ -356,58 +287,30 @@
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-27",
       "title": "Log-Integritaet und -Aufbewahrung",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-28",
       "title": "Sichere Update-Mechanismen",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-29",
       "title": "Update-Authentizitaet",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-30",
       "title": "Update-Integritaet",
-      "scans": [
-        {
-          "tool": "grounded-control-check",
-          "scan_type": "code_review",
-          "cwe": [],
-          "rules": []
-        }
-      ],
-      "note": "covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve code surface + grounded LLM judge decides presence/absence); validated live",
-      "status": "covered"
+      "scans": [],
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-31",

control-map/src/lib.rs

@@ -66,14 +66,6 @@ pub struct ControlMap {
 
 const CRA_MAP_JSON: &str = include_str!("../data/cra_control_map.json");
 
-/// Whether an authored rule id `bound` matches a scanner's emitted rule id
-/// `actual`. semgrep prefixes local-rule check_ids with a path
-/// (`tmp.compliance-cra-semgrep.cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled`), so match the final
-/// id segment rather than requiring exact equality.
-fn rule_id_matches(bound: &str, actual: &str) -> bool {
-    actual == bound || actual.ends_with(&format!(".{bound}"))
-}
-
 impl ControlMap {
     /// Load the built-in CRA control map (the embedded, authored LUT).
     pub fn cra() -> Result<Self, MapError> {
@@ -88,28 +80,12 @@ impl ControlMap {
     /// Controls whose bindings include the given `tool` + `cwe` — used to attach a
     /// raw tool finding back to the control(s) it's evidence for.
     pub fn controls_for(&self, tool: &str, cwe: &str) -> Vec<&ControlEntry> {
-        self.controls_for_finding(tool, Some(cwe), None)
-    }
-
-    /// Controls a tool finding is evidence for, matched by CWE and/or the specific
-    /// rule id that fired. Off-the-shelf findings bind by CWE; our custom detectors
-    /// bind by rule id (precise — a broad CWE would over-attribute and then the
-    /// grounded judge could drop a genuine finding as a control false positive).
-    pub fn controls_for_finding(
-        &self,
-        tool: &str,
-        cwe: Option<&str>,
-        rule_id: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> Vec<&ControlEntry> {
         self.controls
             .iter()
             .filter(|c| {
-                c.scans.iter().any(|s| {
-                    s.tool == tool
-                        && (cwe.is_some_and(|w| s.cwe.iter().any(|x| x == w))
-                            || rule_id
-                                .is_some_and(|r| s.rules.iter().any(|b| rule_id_matches(b, r))))
-                })
+                c.scans
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|s| s.tool == tool && s.cwe.iter().any(|w| w == cwe))
             })
             .collect()
     }
@@ -178,77 +154,10 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn covered_and_not_checkable_are_populated() {
+    fn every_bucket_is_represented() {
         let s = ControlMap::cra().unwrap().summary();
         assert!(s.covered > 0);
+        assert!(s.needs_tooling > 0);
         assert!(s.not_code_checkable > 0);
-        // needs_tooling is now empty: every code-checkable control is either
-        // tool-covered or covered by the grounded surface pass.
-        assert_eq!(s.needs_tooling, 0);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rule_id_matching_handles_semgrep_path_prefix() {
-        let bound = "cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled";
-        assert!(rule_id_matches(bound, bound)); // exact
-        assert!(rule_id_matches(
-            bound,
-            "tmp.compliance-cra-semgrep.cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled"
-        )); // semgrep path prefix
-        assert!(!rule_id_matches(
-            bound,
-            "cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled-extra"
-        )); // not a suffix segment
-        assert!(!rule_id_matches(
-            bound,
-            "python.lang.security.exec-detected"
-        )); // unrelated
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn custom_rule_finding_attaches_to_control_by_rule_id() {
-        let map = ControlMap::cra().unwrap();
-        // cra-ai-1 is now tool-covered by custom rules.
-        assert_eq!(map.coverage("cra-ai-1").unwrap().status, Coverage::Covered);
-        // A prefixed check_id still maps back to cra-ai-1 by rule id.
-        let hits =
-            map.controls_for_finding("semgrep", None, Some("tmp.x.cra-ai-1-tls-verify-disabled"));
-        assert!(hits.iter().any(|c| c.control == "cra-ai-1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn coverage_after_grounded_promotion() {
-        let s = ControlMap::cra().unwrap().summary();
-        // 9 off-the-shelf + 4 custom-semgrep + 8 grounded surface controls (promoted
-        // after the grounded path was validated live).
-        assert_eq!(s.covered, 21);
-        // Nothing left as needs_tooling — every code-checkable control is covered.
-        assert_eq!(s.needs_tooling, 0);
-        // The 4 pure-architectural controls remain not code-checkable.
-        assert_eq!(s.not_code_checkable, 19);
-        assert_eq!(s.total(), 40);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn architectural_controls_are_not_code_checkable() {
-        let map = ControlMap::cra().unwrap();
-        for id in ["cra-ai-2", "cra-ai-3", "cra-ai-4", "cra-ai-5"] {
-            let c = map.coverage(id).unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(c.status, Coverage::NotCodeCheckable, "{id}");
-            assert!(c.scans.is_empty(), "{id} should carry no scan bindings");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn custom_rule_controls_do_not_bind_by_broad_cwe() {
-        let map = ControlMap::cra().unwrap();
-        // cra-ai-1 rules emit CWE-489 in metadata, but the LUT binds by rule id
-        // only (cwe: []) — so a stray CWE-489 finding must NOT attach to it.
-        assert!(map.controls_for("semgrep", "CWE-489").is_empty());
-        // The CWE path for off-the-shelf findings is unchanged.
-        assert!(map
-            .controls_for("semgrep", "CWE-798")
-            .iter()
-            .any(|c| c.control == "cra-ai-8"));
     }
 }

docs/.vitepress/config.mts

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ export default withMermaid(defineConfig({
           { text: 'Pentest Architecture', link: '/features/pentest-architecture' },
           { text: 'AI Chat', link: '/features/ai-chat' },
           { text: 'Code Knowledge Graph', link: '/features/graph' },
-          { text: 'Compliance Control Mapping', link: '/features/control-mapping' },
           { text: 'MCP Integration', link: '/features/mcp-server' },
         ],
       },

docs/features/control-mapping.md

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-# Compliance Control Mapping
-
-Control mapping connects the scanner's raw output — deterministic tool findings and the code itself — to the **compliance controls** each piece of evidence supports. A hardcoded credential stops being just "CWE-798 from semgrep" and becomes evidence for *"cra-ai-8: no default passwords"* and, at scale, master control *`mc-31761` hardcoded_secrets_detection*. Findings carry those references (`control_refs`) into the dashboard and out over the MCP server as OSCAL, so the compliance report is built from real, grounded findings rather than a questionnaire.
-
-## The core principle: tools detect, the LLM judges
-
-The design has one rule, borrowed from the ZeroFalse / IRIS line of research: **deterministic tools are the detectors; the LLM is only ever a grounded false-positive filter, never the thing that finds the issue.**
-
-- A tool (semgrep, gitleaks, syft/osv, ZAP, nuclei) detects deterministically.
-- An **authored, human-reviewed lookup table** (`control-map`) maps that detection to the control(s) it's evidence for.
-- The LLM enters last, to *confirm or refute* the mapping against the actual code — and every surviving verdict is anchored to a verbatim snippet by the grounding gate.
-
-This keeps hallucination out of detection. The LLM supplies cross-language, cross-stack pattern *recognition*; the surrounding machinery supplies determinism.
-
-## Coverage model
-
-Every control lands in one of three buckets, recorded in the `control-map` LUT (`control-map/data/cra_control_map.json`) and never decided by an LLM:
-
-| Bucket | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `covered` | An existing tool's scan surfaces findings for this control |
-| `needs_tooling` | Code-checkable, but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — we author a detector or use the grounded surface check |
-| `not_code_checkable` | A design/process property — out of static-scan scope |
-
-For the **CRA** framework (40 controls) the split is **13 covered · 8 needs_tooling · 19 not_code_checkable**. The 16 originally-uncovered controls were resolved as a hybrid:
-
-- **4 custom semgrep detectors** (`cra-ai-1`, `7`, `10`, `14`) — secure-by-default, weak password hashing, insecure session cookies, weak data-at-rest ciphers. Shipped in the binary and matched back to controls **by rule id** so a broad CWE can't over-attribute.
-- **8 grounded surface checks** (`cra-ai-6`, `11`, `12`, `24`, `27`, `28`, `29`, `30`) — the absence-based controls (no rate limiting, no security logging, no update-signature check…) that have no syntactic pattern.
-- **4 marked not_code_checkable** (`cra-ai-2`, `3`, `4`, `5`) — minimal attack surface, secure architecture, least privilege, tamper protection.
-
-At scale, the **master-controls** corpus (breakpilot's deduped clusters, exported as OSCAL) currently provides **~2,882 code-checkable controls** (2,143 `network` + 739 `source_code`), matched semantically.
-
-## The three mapping paths
-
-```mermaid
-flowchart TD
-    T[Deterministic tools\nsemgrep · gitleaks · syft/osv · ZAP] --> F[Findings]
-    F --> B["Stage 5b — LUT triage\ncontrols_for(tool, cwe / rule_id)"]
-    F --> C["Stage 5c — Semantic\nembed region+intent → top-K master controls"]
-    R[Repo source] --> D["Stage 5d — Grounded surface\nretrieve surface for absence-based controls"]
-    B --> J{{Grounded LLM judge\ntemp 0 · verbatim snippet}}
-    C --> J
-    D --> J
-    J -->|snippet grounds in region| S[Stamp control_refs]
-    J -->|refuted / ungrounded| X[Dropped]
-```
-
-All three paths converge on the same **grounded judge** and the same **grounding gate**. They differ only in how candidate (finding/region, control) pairs are produced.
-
-### Stage 5b — deterministic LUT triage
-
-The default path. A tool finding is matched to controls via `control_map.controls_for_finding(tool, cwe, rule_id)`; the judge then confirms each mapped control against the code region. Outcomes: `Confirmed([ids])` (stamp them), `FalsePositive` (drop the finding), or `Unmapped` (keep it untagged). Runs whenever `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` is set.
-
-### Stage 5c — semantic retrieval (master-controls scale)
-
-Master controls carry no CWE, so they can't be LUT-mapped. Instead we map by *similarity*: embed every control's requirement text once (cached), then for each finding retrieve the top-K nearest controls and hand them to the judge. Gated behind `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` (default off). See [Semantic retrieval](#semantic-retrieval-in-detail).
-
-### Stage 5d — grounded surface checks (absence-based controls)
-
-Some controls are violated by an *absence* — no rate limiting on login, no security logging, no signature check on an update. There's no pattern for semgrep to match, so we deterministically retrieve the code **surface** the control governs (a login route, a logging setup, update/download code) by identifier/route terms, and let the judge decide whether the control holds there. Produces net-new, already-grounded findings. Gated behind `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` (default off).
-
-## The grounding gate
-
-No matter the path, a verdict becomes a finding only if it survives `compliance_core::control_check::ground`:
-
-1. The judge runs at **temperature 0** with a closed prompt and must quote the offending code **verbatim** into `snippet`.
-2. That snippet must appear **literally** in the retrieved region — otherwise the verdict is dropped.
-3. The finding's line is **recomputed from the match**; the model's own line number is never trusted.
-4. Verdicts are cached by content hash, so re-scans reproduce.
-
-The model is allowed to be smart; it is never trusted.
-
-## Semantic retrieval in detail
-
-1. **Embed the corpus once.** Each control's requirement text is embedded with `bge-multilingual-gemma2` (3584-dim — multilingual matters, the master controls are in German while code is English). The embedding backend caps input arrays at 25 per request, so `embed()` chunks at 16; the whole `ControlIndex` is persisted to `snapshot_dir` keyed by a **corpus hash**, so only the first scan after a catalog change pays the embedding cost.
-2. **Build the query from the finding's intent, not just the code.** The retrieval query is `finding.title + finding.description + region`, not the raw region. This is the single most important tuning: two findings in one file share overlapping windows and, on the code alone, embed alike and collapse onto the same controls. The finding's own words ("brute-force protection" vs "weak hash") carry the discriminating signal. The raw region still goes to the judge for grounding.
-3. **Retrieve → judge → ground.** Top-K nearest by cosine, each judged against the region, each grounded.
-
-## Worked examples
-
-Both examples are from the live end-to-end verification (`c5_semantic_live.rs`) against the real ~2,882-control corpus.
-
-### Example 1 — a small auth file (the tuning story)
-
-Two findings in one `auth.py`: a weak `hashlib.md5(password)` hash and a login endpoint with no brute-force protection.
-
-| Finding | Region-only retrieval | Intent-enriched retrieval |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Weak md5 hash | 19874, 20683, 23149, 29985 | **`mc-23149`** (eliminate weak unsalted hashes) at rank 1, + `mc-21634` salted hashing |
-| Login w/o brute-force protection | *identical 4, reordered* | newly surfaces **`mc-19984`** brute_force_protection + **`mc-23186`** account_lockout |
-
-Region-only retrieval gave both findings the *same* four password-hashing controls — the brute-force finding never found its real controls because its window is saturated with `password` tokens. Enriching the query with the finding's intent fixed it: the brute-force finding now pulls the correct rate-limiting / lockout controls out of the 2,882.
-
-### Example 2 — four topically distinct vulnerabilities
-
-| Finding | Top matched controls | Family |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| SQL injection (string-concat query) | `sql_injection_prevention`, `sql_injection`, `parameterized_queries`, input_sanitization | input-validation ✓ |
-| Hardcoded API credential | `hardcoded_secrets_detection`, credential_scanning, secrets_detection | credentials ✓ |
-| TLS verification disabled (`verify=False`) | `https_enforcement`, `configuration_verification`, transport config | transport-encryption ✓ |
-| Insecure deserialization (`pickle.loads`) | `deserialization`, `deserialization_testing`, `deserialization_security` | deserialization ✓ |
-
-Every finding maps to its exact control family, with the most specific control often at the top, and the four sets are distinct.
-
-## Known limitations
-
-- **Absence findings are weak for semantic retrieval.** Similarity matches what code *is about*, not what it *lacks*; a "missing rate limiting" finding embeds like login code. This is exactly why the grounded surface path (Stage 5d) exists — it decides presence/absence at a retrieved surface rather than by embedding distance.
-- **Generic catch-all controls co-occur.** `mc-20890 secure_development_security_code_review` appears in the top-K for many code-security findings because it is semantically near almost all of them. It's harmless (the judge grounds it, and it never crowds out the specific controls — the SQLi example didn't get it) but is a candidate for future down-weighting.
-- **Corpus classification noise.** The master-controls `verification_method` classification is imperfect — e.g. a documentation control (`eu_declaration_accuracy`) is currently tagged `source_code`. That's a corpus-side data-quality issue, separate from the mapping engine.
-
-## Emitting over MCP — closing the loop
-
-Findings don't just land in the dashboard; they flow to breakpilot-compliance as OSCAL over the scanner's MCP server, so the compliance report is assembled from real, control-tagged findings.
-
-- The MCP server exposes an **`oscal_assessment`** tool: given a `repo_id`, it emits a standard OSCAL 1.1 assessment-results document for that repo's findings — mapped findings target their controls via the stamped `control_refs`, and unmapped findings are reported **as-is** (as observations), so nothing is lost.
-- breakpilot pulls it: `POST /v1/cra/oscal-from-scanner` calls `oscal_assessment` over MCP (Streamable HTTP + bearer) and consumes the pre-computed OSCAL — rather than pulling raw findings and re-assessing.
-
-**Operational note — tenant context over HTTP.** The MCP server is multi-tenant; the bearer token resolves a tenant whose per-tenant database the tools query. rmcp's Streamable HTTP transport runs each session's tool calls in a `tokio::spawn`ed task, and `task_local`s do **not** cross a spawn — so binding the tenant in a per-request middleware `task_local` leaves tool handlers with no context (every call fails `no tenant context`). The fix is to bind the tenant to the **per-session server instance** at creation (the factory runs in the request scope before the spawn), not to a per-request task_local. Until this was fixed, the loop silently failed over HTTP and consumers fell back to demo data.
-
-## Configuration
-
-| Variable | Effect |
-| --- | --- |
-| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + all mapping passes. **Unset disables all control mapping** — findings are produced without `control_refs`. |
-| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). **Default on** (validated live). |
-| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). **Default on** (validated live). |
-| `BREAKPILOT_SNAPSHOT_DIR` | Where OSCAL catalog snapshots and the cached control-embedding index live. |
-
-The semantic and grounded passes default **on** now that both are validated live; each is still a no-op if `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` is unset or the catalog is unreachable, so they only ever add coverage. The live verifications live in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` and `grounded_surface_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
-
-## Appendix — the master-controls data pipeline
-
-The master-controls corpus is produced by breakpilot-compliance and pulled as an OSCAL catalog from `GET /api/compliance/v1/oscal/catalog?framework=master-controls`. Two operational lessons are worth recording, because they cost real time to diagnose:
-
-- **The catalog is served from `breakpilot_db`, not `postgres`.** Diagnostics run against the wrong database will look clean while the app serves something else entirely. Confirm the app's datname (`pg_stat_activity`) before trusting any count or `EXPLAIN`.
-- **A constraint-less dump triplicated the master-control tables.** Restored without their PK/unique constraints, `master_controls` / `mc_verification` / `master_control_members` accumulated identical rows 3× (the same artifact migration `158` fixed for `doc_check_controls`). That inflated the catalog to ~26k dup'd controls and, with the indexes also missing, drove the export query to a >120s / 502. The fix (breakpilot migration `160`) ctid-dedups each table by its natural key and restores the constraints + indexes so it can't recur; the export query was also rewritten set-based (a single windowed pass instead of a per-row correlated subquery). After dedup: 41,850 → 13,950 master controls, catalog **25,938 → 2,882** code-checkable, endpoint **502 → 200 in ~3s**.