feat(controls): B1 — custom semgrep detectors for 4 CRA controls

Covers the pattern-expressible slice of the needs_tooling bucket that no
off-the-shelf ruleset digs out, keeping detection deterministic (LLM only
FP-filters downstream, never detects):

- cra-ai-1  Secure-by-Default: flask/django debug, TLS verify=False, CORS '*'
- cra-ai-7  Strong auth: password/secret hashed with md5/sha1 (metavar-gated)
- cra-ai-10 Session mgmt: Secure/HttpOnly = false cookies (py + express)
- cra-ai-14 Data at rest: ECB/DES/3DES + node createCipher

Rules ship in the binary (include_str!) and stage to a temp file at scan time,
added as a second --config alongside --config=auto (no deploy/volume change).

Wiring: control-map gains controls_for_finding (match by CWE and/or rule id);
custom controls bind by rule id with cwe:[] so a broad CWE can't over-attribute
and let the judge FP-drop a genuine finding. rule_id_matches tolerates semgrep's
path prefix on local check_ids. Triage now maps by rule id too (a custom finding
carries no LUT CWE). LUT: cra-ai-1,7,10,14 needs_tooling->covered (covered 9->13).

Validated: all 9 rules fire on positive fixtures, 0 on clean. ControlCheckSpec
gains Serialize/Deserialize (unrelated-safe; already used by the index cache).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -206,13 +206,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-agent
-          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-agent
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.agent -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy agent"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -232,13 +230,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-dashboard
-          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-dashboard
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.dashboard -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy dashboard"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -256,12 +252,10 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-docs
-          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-docs
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           docker build -f Dockerfile.docs -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy docs"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"
@@ -281,13 +275,11 @@ jobs:
           apk add --no-cache git curl openssl
           git init && git remote add origin "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
           git fetch --depth=1 origin "${GITHUB_SHA}" && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
-          IMAGE=repo.meghsakha.com/certifai/compliance-mcp
-          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login repo.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
+          IMAGE=registry.meghsakha.com/compliance-mcp
+          echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login registry.meghsakha.com -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" --password-stdin
           DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=tramiton_token,env=TRAMITON_FETCH_TOKEN \
             -f Dockerfile.mcp -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}" .
           docker push "$IMAGE:latest" && docker push "$IMAGE:${GITHUB_SHA}"
-          command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 || { curl -sSfLo /usr/local/bin/cosign https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v2.4.3/cosign-linux-amd64 && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign; }
-          cosign sign --yes --key env://COSIGN_KEY "$IMAGE:latest" || echo "::warning::cosign failed"
           PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"ref":"refs/heads/main","repository":{"full_name":"sharang/compliance-scanner-agent"},"head_commit":{"id":"%s","message":"deploy mcp"}}' "${GITHUB_SHA}")
           SIG=$(printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "${{ secrets.ORCA_WEBHOOK_SECRET }}" | awk '{print $2}')
           RESP=$(curl -fsS -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" -X POST "http://46.225.100.82:6880/api/v1/webhooks/github" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=$SIG" -d "$PAYLOAD"); echo "$RESP"

compliance-agent/src/config.rs

@@ -103,8 +103,5 @@ fn load_breakpilot_config() -> BreakpilotConfig {
         semantic_mapping: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING")
             .map(|v| v == "1" || v.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true"))
             .unwrap_or(d.semantic_mapping),
-        grounded_control_checks: env_var_opt("BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS")
-            .map(|v| v == "1" || v.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true"))
-            .unwrap_or(d.grounded_control_checks),
     }
 }

compliance-agent/src/controls/mod.rs

@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@ mod judge;
 mod oscal_provider;
 mod scan_triage;
 mod semantic;
-mod surface;
 mod triage;
 
 pub use checker::GroundedControlChecker;
 pub use index::ControlIndex;
 pub use judge::{ControlJudge, LlmControlJudge, PROMPT_VERSION};
 pub use oscal_provider::OscalControlsProvider;
-pub use scan_triage::{grounded_surface_findings, semantic_stamp_findings, triage_repo_findings};
+pub use scan_triage::{semantic_stamp_findings, triage_repo_findings};
 pub use semantic::SemanticControlChecker;
 pub use triage::{ControlTriage, TriageOutcome};

compliance-agent/src/controls/scan_triage.rs

@@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ use compliance_core::models::onboarding::ComplianceFramework;
 use compliance_core::AgentConfig;
 use control_map::ControlMap;
 
-use super::surface;
 use super::{
-    ControlIndex, ControlTriage, GroundedControlChecker, LlmControlJudge, OscalControlsProvider,
-    SemanticControlChecker, TriageOutcome,
+    ControlIndex, ControlTriage, LlmControlJudge, OscalControlsProvider, SemanticControlChecker,
+    TriageOutcome,
 };
 use crate::llm::LlmClient;
 
@@ -106,50 +105,6 @@ async fn build_specs(provider: &OscalControlsProvider) -> HashMap<String, Contro
     specs
 }
 
-/// Absence-based control pass (the grounded half of the hybrid coverage): for each
-/// control with a [`surface`] definition, deterministically retrieve the code
-/// surfaces it governs (login routes, logging setup, update/download code) and have
-/// the grounded judge decide whether the control holds there. Returns net-new
-/// findings, each already tagged with its control and grounded to a real snippet.
-///
-/// Gated: the orchestrator runs this only when `breakpilot.grounded_control_checks`
-/// is set. Absence detection is the least deterministic path (the judge decides
-/// presence/absence, not a syntactic pattern), so it stays off until tuned live.
-pub async fn grounded_surface_findings(
-    config: &AgentConfig,
-    llm: Arc<LlmClient>,
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    repo_id: &str,
-) -> Vec<Finding> {
-    let Some(base_url) = config.breakpilot.base_url.clone() else {
-        return Vec::new();
-    };
-    let provider = OscalControlsProvider::new(
-        reqwest::Client::new(),
-        base_url,
-        config.breakpilot.token.clone(),
-        &config.breakpilot.snapshot_dir,
-    );
-    let specs = build_specs(&provider).await;
-    if specs.is_empty() {
-        return Vec::new();
-    }
-    let checker = GroundedControlChecker::new(LlmControlJudge::new(llm));
-
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    for surf in surface::SURFACES {
-        let Some(spec) = specs.get(surf.control_id) else {
-            continue; // catalog doesn't carry this control
-        };
-        let regions = surface::retrieve(repo_path, surf.terms);
-        if regions.is_empty() {
-            continue;
-        }
-        out.extend(checker.check(spec, &regions, repo_id).await);
-    }
-    out
-}
-
 /// Read a window of lines around `line` (1-based) from `repo_path/file`.
 fn fetch_region(repo_path: &Path, file: &str, line: u32) -> Option<CandidateRegion> {
     let content = std::fs::read_to_string(repo_path.join(file)).ok()?;
@@ -234,22 +189,13 @@ pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
         let Some(region) = fetch_region(repo_path, &file, line) else {
             continue;
         };
-        // Retrieve on the finding's intent + the code, not the region alone: two
-        // findings in one file share overlapping windows and otherwise embed alike,
-        // collapsing onto the same controls. The finding's title/description carry
-        // the discriminating signal (e.g. "brute-force protection" vs "weak hash").
-        // The raw `region` still goes to the judge for snippet grounding.
-        let query = format!(
-            "{}\n{}\n\n{}",
-            finding.title, finding.description, region.content
-        );
-        let query_emb = match llm.embed(vec![query]).await {
+        let region_emb = match llm.embed(vec![region.content.clone()]).await {
             Ok(mut embs) => match embs.pop() {
                 Some(v) => v,
                 None => continue,
             },
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "query embed failed; skipping finding");
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "region embed failed; skipping finding");
                 continue;
             }
         };
@@ -257,7 +203,7 @@ pub async fn semantic_stamp_findings(
             .check(
                 &index,
                 &region,
-                &query_emb,
+                &region_emb,
                 SEMANTIC_TOP_K,
                 &finding.repo_id,
             )

compliance-agent/src/controls/semantic.rs

@@ -22,20 +22,18 @@ impl<J: ControlJudge> SemanticControlChecker<J> {
         Self { judge }
     }
 
-    /// Map a code region to the controls it violates. `query_embedding` is the
-    /// caller-supplied retrieval embedding — typically the finding's intent
-    /// (title/description) plus the region, so retrieval keys on what the finding
-    /// is *about*, not just the ambient code. The top-`k` nearest controls in
-    /// `index` are then judged against the raw `region` and grounded.
+    /// Map a code region to the controls it violates. `region_embedding` is the
+    /// region's embedding (the caller computes it via the LLM); the top-`k`
+    /// nearest controls in `index` are judged and grounded.
     pub async fn check(
         &self,
         index: &ControlIndex,
         region: &CandidateRegion,
-        query_embedding: &[f64],
+        region_embedding: &[f64],
         k: usize,
         repo_id: &str,
     ) -> Vec<Finding> {
-        let candidates = index.nearest(query_embedding, k);
+        let candidates = index.nearest(region_embedding, k);
         let mut findings = Vec::new();
         for spec in &candidates {
             let verdict = self.judge.judge(spec, region).await;

compliance-agent/src/controls/surface.rs

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-//! Surface retrieval for absence-based controls.
-//!
-//! Some CRA controls are violated by an *absence* — no rate limiting on login, no
-//! security logging, no signature check on an update — so there's no offending
-//! pattern for semgrep to match. Instead we deterministically locate the code
-//! *surface* the control governs (a login route, a logging setup, update/download
-//! code) by identifier/route terms, then hand each surface region to the grounded
-//! judge, which decides whether the control is satisfied there. The resulting
-//! finding grounds to the surface snippet, so nothing fabricated survives.
-//!
-//! Retrieval is intentionally cheap and bounded: keyword match + a fixed window,
-//! capped per control to keep the downstream LLM cost predictable.
-
-use std::path::Path;
-
-use compliance_core::control_check::CandidateRegion;
-
-/// An absence-based control and the case-insensitive terms that mark the code
-/// surface it governs.
-pub struct Surface {
-    pub control_id: &'static str,
-    pub terms: &'static [&'static str],
-}
-
-/// The absence-based CRA controls we retrieve surfaces for — the grounded half of
-/// the hybrid coverage (the pattern-expressible half is custom semgrep rules).
-pub const SURFACES: &[Surface] = &[
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-6", // Integritaetspruefung
-        terms: &[
-            "checksum",
-            "sha256",
-            "signature",
-            "hmac",
-            "integrity",
-            "verify",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-11", // Brute-Force-Schutz
-        terms: &[
-            "login",
-            "signin",
-            "authenticate",
-            "/auth",
-            "password",
-            "ratelimit",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-12", // Rollenbasierte Autorisierung (RBAC)
-        terms: &[
-            "authorize",
-            "permission",
-            "role",
-            "rbac",
-            "require_role",
-            "has_role",
-        ],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-24", // Security-Logging
-        terms: &["login", "authorize", "permission", "role", "admin", "audit"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-27", // Log-Integritaet und -Aufbewahrung
-        terms: &["logging", "logger", "getlogger", "audit_log"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-28", // Sichere Update-Mechanismen
-        terms: &["update", "upgrade", "download", "firmware"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-29", // Update-Authentizitaet
-        terms: &["update", "signature", "verify", "pubkey", "certificate"],
-    },
-    Surface {
-        control_id: "cra-ai-30", // Update-Integritaet
-        terms: &["update", "checksum", "digest", "integrity", "verify"],
-    },
-];
-
-/// Source file extensions worth reading (skip binaries/assets/lockfiles).
-const CODE_EXTS: &[&str] = &[
-    "py", "js", "ts", "tsx", "jsx", "go", "java", "rb", "php", "rs", "cs", "kt",
-];
-/// Directories never worth walking.
-const SKIP_DIRS: &[&str] = &[
-    ".git",
-    "node_modules",
-    "target",
-    "vendor",
-    ".venv",
-    "__pycache__",
-    "dist",
-    "build",
-];
-/// Lines of context on each side of a hit.
-const WINDOW: usize = 6;
-/// Cap on regions per control, to bound downstream LLM calls.
-const MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL: usize = 8;
-/// Skip files larger than this (generated/minified).
-const MAX_FILE_BYTES: u64 = 512 * 1024;
-
-/// Deterministically retrieve up to [`MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL`] code regions in
-/// `repo_path` whose lines mention any of `terms`. Hits close together within a
-/// file are merged into one region; results are capped to bound LLM cost.
-pub fn retrieve(repo_path: &Path, terms: &[&str]) -> Vec<CandidateRegion> {
-    let lowered: Vec<String> = terms.iter().map(|t| t.to_lowercase()).collect();
-    let mut regions = Vec::new();
-    for entry in walk(repo_path) {
-        if regions.len() >= MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL {
-            break;
-        }
-        let path = entry.path();
-        if !has_code_ext(path) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Ok(meta) = entry.metadata() else { continue };
-        if !meta.is_file() || meta.len() > MAX_FILE_BYTES {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let rel = path
-            .strip_prefix(repo_path)
-            .unwrap_or(path)
-            .to_string_lossy()
-            .to_string();
-        let lines: Vec<&str> = content.lines().collect();
-        let hits: Vec<usize> = lines
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .filter(|(_, line)| {
-                let ll = line.to_lowercase();
-                lowered.iter().any(|t| ll.contains(t.as_str()))
-            })
-            .map(|(i, _)| i)
-            .collect();
-        for center in merge_centers(&hits) {
-            if regions.len() >= MAX_REGIONS_PER_CONTROL {
-                break;
-            }
-            let start = center.saturating_sub(WINDOW);
-            let end = (center + WINDOW + 1).min(lines.len());
-            regions.push(CandidateRegion {
-                file: rel.clone(),
-                start_line: (start as u32) + 1,
-                content: lines[start..end].join("\n"),
-            });
-        }
-    }
-    regions
-}
-
-/// Collapse ascending hit indices that fall within one window into a single
-/// representative center, so overlapping regions aren't judged repeatedly.
-fn merge_centers(hits: &[usize]) -> Vec<usize> {
-    let mut out: Vec<usize> = Vec::new();
-    for &h in hits {
-        match out.last() {
-            Some(&last) if h.saturating_sub(last) <= WINDOW => {}
-            _ => out.push(h),
-        }
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-fn has_code_ext(path: &Path) -> bool {
-    path.extension()
-        .and_then(|e| e.to_str())
-        .is_some_and(|e| CODE_EXTS.contains(&e))
-}
-
-fn walk(root: &Path) -> Vec<walkdir::DirEntry> {
-    walkdir::WalkDir::new(root)
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter_entry(|e| {
-            let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy();
-            !SKIP_DIRS.contains(&name.as_ref())
-        })
-        .filter_map(|e| e.ok())
-        .collect()
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    fn write(dir: &Path, rel: &str, body: &str) {
-        let p = dir.join(rel);
-        if let Some(parent) = p.parent() {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).unwrap();
-        }
-        std::fs::write(p, body).unwrap();
-    }
-
-    fn terms_for(control_id: &str) -> &'static [&'static str] {
-        SURFACES
-            .iter()
-            .find(|s| s.control_id == control_id)
-            .unwrap()
-            .terms
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn surfaces_cover_the_absence_based_controls() {
-        assert_eq!(SURFACES.len(), 8);
-        for id in [
-            "cra-ai-6",
-            "cra-ai-11",
-            "cra-ai-12",
-            "cra-ai-24",
-            "cra-ai-27",
-            "cra-ai-28",
-            "cra-ai-29",
-            "cra-ai-30",
-        ] {
-            assert!(SURFACES.iter().any(|s| s.control_id == id), "{id} missing");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn retrieves_matching_region_with_context() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("surface-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
-        write(
-            &dir,
-            "app/auth.py",
-            "import x\n\n\n\n\n\n\ndef login(u, p):\n    return check(u, p)\n",
-        );
-        let regions = retrieve(&dir, terms_for("cra-ai-11"));
-        assert_eq!(regions.len(), 1);
-        assert!(regions[0].content.contains("def login"));
-        assert_eq!(regions[0].file, "app/auth.py");
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn skips_non_code_and_vendored() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("surface-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
-        write(&dir, "README.md", "login and password and audit\n"); // not code ext
-        write(&dir, "node_modules/pkg/index.js", "function login() {}\n"); // vendored
-        assert!(retrieve(&dir, terms_for("cra-ai-11")).is_empty());
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn merges_adjacent_hits_into_one_region() {
-        // Two hits one line apart collapse to a single center/region.
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[10, 11, 30]), vec![10, 30]);
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[]), Vec::<usize>::new());
-        assert_eq!(merge_centers(&[5]), vec![5]);
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/llm/embedding.rs

@@ -22,11 +22,6 @@ struct EmbeddingData {
     index: usize,
 }
 
-/// Max inputs per embedding request. The bge/OpenAI-like backends cap the input
-/// array (bge-multilingual-gemma2 rejects >25 with "batch size overflow"), so we
-/// chunk larger corpora — a whole control catalog (~1.8k) would otherwise 500.
-const EMBED_BATCH_SIZE: usize = 16;
-
 // ── Embedding implementation ───────────────────────────────────
 
 impl LlmClient {
@@ -34,21 +29,8 @@ impl LlmClient {
         &self.embed_model
     }
 
-    /// Generate embeddings for a batch of texts, chunking into backend-sized
-    /// requests and preserving input order across chunks.
+    /// Generate embeddings for a batch of texts
     pub async fn embed(&self, texts: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<f64>>, AgentError> {
-        if texts.is_empty() {
-            return Ok(Vec::new());
-        }
-        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(texts.len());
-        for chunk in texts.chunks(EMBED_BATCH_SIZE) {
-            out.extend(self.embed_batch(chunk.to_vec()).await?);
-        }
-        Ok(out)
-    }
-
-    /// Embed one backend-sized batch (≤ [`EMBED_BATCH_SIZE`]) in a single request.
-    async fn embed_batch(&self, texts: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<f64>>, AgentError> {
         let url = format!("{}/v1/embeddings", self.base_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
 
         let request_body = EmbeddingRequest {
@@ -90,33 +72,3 @@ impl LlmClient {
         Ok(data.into_iter().map(|d| d.embedding).collect())
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-    fn client() -> LlmClient {
-        LlmClient::new(
-            "http://unused".into(),
-            SecretString::from(String::new()),
-            "m".into(),
-            "e".into(),
-        )
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn empty_input_makes_no_request() {
-        // Must short-circuit before any HTTP call (base_url is unroutable).
-        let out = client().embed(Vec::new()).await.unwrap();
-        assert!(out.is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn batch_size_is_within_backend_cap() {
-        assert!(
-            EMBED_BATCH_SIZE <= 25,
-            "must stay under the bge 25-input cap"
-        );
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/pipeline/orchestrator.rs

@@ -252,31 +252,6 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
             }
         }
 
-        // Stage 5d: grounded surface checks — the absence-based controls (no
-        // rate limiting, no security logging, no update-signature check) have no
-        // syntactic pattern to match, so we retrieve the code surface each governs
-        // and let the grounded judge decide whether it holds, producing net-new
-        // findings already tagged + grounded. Gated (default off): absence
-        // detection is the least deterministic path, kept off until tuned live.
-        if self.config.breakpilot.grounded_control_checks {
-            self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "grounded_control_checks")
-                .await;
-            let grounded = crate::controls::grounded_surface_findings(
-                &self.config,
-                self.llm.clone(),
-                &repo_path,
-                &repo_id,
-            )
-            .await;
-            if !grounded.is_empty() {
-                tracing::info!(
-                    "[{repo_id}] Grounded surface checks raised {} control findings",
-                    grounded.len()
-                );
-                all_findings.extend(grounded);
-            }
-        }
-
         // Dedup against existing findings and insert new ones
         let mut new_count = 0u32;
         let mut new_findings: Vec<Finding> = Vec::new();

compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-//! C5 live verification — the semantic master-controls path end to end against the
-//! deployed api-dev catalog. Ignored (hits api-dev + LiteLLM). Run explicitly:
-//!
-//!   set -a; . ./.env; set +a
-//!   BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL=https://api-dev.breakpilot.ai \
-//!     cargo test -p compliance-agent --test c5_semantic_live -- --ignored --nocapture
-//!
-//! Pulls the live master-controls catalog, embeds the corpus (chunked), then for a
-//! couple of real vulnerable findings retrieves the nearest master controls and
-//! grounded-judges them, stamping master-control refs.
-
-mod common;
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use compliance_agent::llm::LlmClient;
-use compliance_core::config::BreakpilotConfig;
-use compliance_core::models::finding::{Finding, Severity};
-use compliance_core::models::scan::ScanType;
-use secrecy::SecretString;
-
-fn env(k: &str) -> String {
-    std::env::var(k).unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("env {k} must be set for the live C5 test"))
-}
-
-fn mk_finding(file: &str, line: u32, title: &str) -> Finding {
-    let mut f = Finding::new(
-        "repo-c5".into(),
-        format!("{file}:{line}"),
-        "semgrep".into(),
-        ScanType::Sast,
-        title.into(),
-        title.into(),
-        Severity::High,
-    );
-    f.file_path = Some(file.into());
-    f.line_number = Some(line);
-    f
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: requires deployed api-dev master-controls (fetch+parse only, no LLM)"]
-async fn c5_ingest_master_controls_catalog() {
-    use compliance_agent::controls::OscalControlsProvider;
-
-    let provider = OscalControlsProvider::new(
-        reqwest::Client::new(),
-        env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL"),
-        None,
-        std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-ingest-snap"),
-    );
-    let doc = provider
-        .load_master_controls()
-        .await
-        .expect("pull + parse master-controls catalog");
-    let controls = doc.to_controls();
-    println!(
-        "\n=== C5 ingest: {} master controls parsed ===",
-        controls.len()
-    );
-    for c in controls.iter().take(4) {
-        let text: String = c.text.chars().take(90).collect();
-        println!("  {} | {} | {}", c.id, c.title, text);
-    }
-    assert!(
-        !controls.is_empty(),
-        "expected a non-empty master-control corpus"
-    );
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[ignore = "live: requires deployed api-dev master-controls + LiteLLM"]
-async fn c5_semantic_stamps_master_control_refs() {
-    let llm = Arc::new(LlmClient::new(
-        env("LITELLM_URL"),
-        SecretString::from(env("LITELLM_API_KEY")),
-        env("LITELLM_MODEL"),
-        env("LITELLM_EMBED_MODEL"),
-    ));
-
-    let mut config = common::dev_config("mongodb://unused".into(), "c5".into());
-    let snapshot = std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-oscal-snap");
-    config.breakpilot = BreakpilotConfig {
-        base_url: Some(env("BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL")),
-        token: None,
-        snapshot_dir: snapshot.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
-        semantic_mapping: true,
-        grounded_control_checks: false,
-    };
-
-    // Fixture repo with recognizable code-checkable surfaces.
-    let repo = std::env::temp_dir().join("c5-fixture-repo");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(repo.join("app")).expect("mkdir");
-    std::fs::write(
-        repo.join("app/auth.py"),
-        concat!(
-            "import hashlib\n",
-            "\n",
-            "def store_password(user, password):\n",
-            "    # weak, unsalted password hashing\n",
-            "    digest = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()\n",
-            "    db.save(user, digest)\n",
-            "\n",
-            "@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])\n",
-            "def login():\n",
-            "    u = request.form['username']\n",
-            "    p = request.form['password']\n",
-            "    return 'ok' if check(u, p) else ('bad', 401)\n",
-        ),
-    )
-    .expect("write fixture");
-
-    let mut findings = vec![
-        mk_finding("app/auth.py", 5, "Weak password hash (md5, unsalted)"),
-        mk_finding(
-            "app/auth.py",
-            9,
-            "Login endpoint without brute-force protection",
-        ),
-    ];
-
-    let tagged =
-        compliance_agent::controls::semantic_stamp_findings(&config, llm, &repo, &mut findings)
-            .await;
-
-    println!("\n=== C5 semantic master-controls stamping ===");
-    for f in &findings {
-        println!(
-            "  {:50} {}:{:?} -> {:?}",
-            f.title,
-            f.file_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
-            f.line_number,
-            f.control_refs
-        );
-    }
-    println!("findings that gained >=1 master-control ref: {tagged}");
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&repo);
-
-    // Live corpus — assert only that the path runs and stamps at least one ref.
-    assert!(
-        tagged >= 1,
-        "expected at least one finding to gain a master-control ref"
-    );
-}

compliance-core/src/config.rs

@@ -80,11 +80,6 @@ pub struct BreakpilotConfig {
     /// scale path and stays gated until verified live against a deployed
     /// master-controls catalog.
     pub semantic_mapping: bool,
-    /// Enable the **grounded surface** pass for absence-based controls (retrieve
-    /// the code surface a control governs, judge whether it holds). Off by
-    /// default: absence detection is the least deterministic path and stays gated
-    /// until tuned against live scans.
-    pub grounded_control_checks: bool,
 }
 
 impl Default for BreakpilotConfig {
@@ -94,7 +89,6 @@ impl Default for BreakpilotConfig {
             token: None,
             snapshot_dir: "/data/compliance-scanner/oscal".to_string(),
             semantic_mapping: false,
-            grounded_control_checks: false,
         }
     }
 }

control-map/data/cra_control_map.json

@@ -25,35 +25,35 @@
       "control": "cra-ai-2",
       "title": "Minimale Angriffsflaeche",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (minimal attack surface) — not derivable from local code patterns; architecture/threat-model review",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-3",
       "title": "Sichere Systemarchitektur",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (secure system architecture) — architecture review, not statically code-checkable",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-4",
       "title": "Least-Privilege-Prinzip",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (least-privilege) — deployment/IAM & architecture review, not a local code pattern",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-5",
       "title": "Manipulationsschutz",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "design property (tamper protection) — hardware/runtime & operational control, not statically code-checkable",
-      "status": "not_code_checkable"
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
+      "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-6",
       "title": "Integritaetspruefung",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
@@ -139,14 +139,14 @@
       "control": "cra-ai-11",
       "title": "Brute-Force-Schutz",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-12",
       "title": "Rollenbasierte Autorisierung",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
       "control": "cra-ai-24",
       "title": "Security-Logging",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
@@ -329,28 +329,28 @@
       "control": "cra-ai-27",
       "title": "Log-Integritaet und -Aufbewahrung",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-28",
       "title": "Sichere Update-Mechanismen",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-29",
       "title": "Update-Authentizitaet",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {
       "control": "cra-ai-30",
       "title": "Update-Integritaet",
       "scans": [],
-      "note": "absence-based — no syntactic pattern; covered by the grounded surface check (retrieve surface + LLM judge), gated (BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS) pending live tuning",
+      "note": "code-checkable but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — author a detector (custom semgrep rule / check)",
       "status": "needs_tooling"
     },
     {

control-map/src/lib.rs

@@ -214,27 +214,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(hits.iter().any(|c| c.control == "cra-ai-1"));
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn coverage_reflects_the_b_track_split() {
-        let s = ControlMap::cra().unwrap().summary();
-        // 9 already tool-covered + B1's 4 custom-semgrep controls.
-        assert_eq!(s.covered, 13);
-        // The 8 grounded surface controls stay needs_tooling until live-tuned.
-        assert_eq!(s.needs_tooling, 8);
-        // B3 marked the 4 pure-architectural controls not code-checkable.
-        assert_eq!(s.not_code_checkable, 19);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn architectural_controls_are_not_code_checkable() {
-        let map = ControlMap::cra().unwrap();
-        for id in ["cra-ai-2", "cra-ai-3", "cra-ai-4", "cra-ai-5"] {
-            let c = map.coverage(id).unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(c.status, Coverage::NotCodeCheckable, "{id}");
-            assert!(c.scans.is_empty(), "{id} should carry no scan bindings");
-        }
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn custom_rule_controls_do_not_bind_by_broad_cwe() {
         let map = ControlMap::cra().unwrap();

docs/.vitepress/config.mts

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ export default withMermaid(defineConfig({
           { text: 'Pentest Architecture', link: '/features/pentest-architecture' },
           { text: 'AI Chat', link: '/features/ai-chat' },
           { text: 'Code Knowledge Graph', link: '/features/graph' },
-          { text: 'Compliance Control Mapping', link: '/features/control-mapping' },
           { text: 'MCP Integration', link: '/features/mcp-server' },
         ],
       },

docs/features/control-mapping.md

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-# Compliance Control Mapping
-
-Control mapping connects the scanner's raw output — deterministic tool findings and the code itself — to the **compliance controls** each piece of evidence supports. A hardcoded credential stops being just "CWE-798 from semgrep" and becomes evidence for *"cra-ai-8: no default passwords"* and, at scale, master control *`mc-31761` hardcoded_secrets_detection*. Findings carry those references (`control_refs`) into the dashboard and out over the MCP server as OSCAL, so the compliance report is built from real, grounded findings rather than a questionnaire.
-
-## The core principle: tools detect, the LLM judges
-
-The design has one rule, borrowed from the ZeroFalse / IRIS line of research: **deterministic tools are the detectors; the LLM is only ever a grounded false-positive filter, never the thing that finds the issue.**
-
-- A tool (semgrep, gitleaks, syft/osv, ZAP, nuclei) detects deterministically.
-- An **authored, human-reviewed lookup table** (`control-map`) maps that detection to the control(s) it's evidence for.
-- The LLM enters last, to *confirm or refute* the mapping against the actual code — and every surviving verdict is anchored to a verbatim snippet by the grounding gate.
-
-This keeps hallucination out of detection. The LLM supplies cross-language, cross-stack pattern *recognition*; the surrounding machinery supplies determinism.
-
-## Coverage model
-
-Every control lands in one of three buckets, recorded in the `control-map` LUT (`control-map/data/cra_control_map.json`) and never decided by an LLM:
-
-| Bucket | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `covered` | An existing tool's scan surfaces findings for this control |
-| `needs_tooling` | Code-checkable, but no off-the-shelf tool digs it out — we author a detector or use the grounded surface check |
-| `not_code_checkable` | A design/process property — out of static-scan scope |
-
-For the **CRA** framework (40 controls) the split is **13 covered · 8 needs_tooling · 19 not_code_checkable**. The 16 originally-uncovered controls were resolved as a hybrid:
-
-- **4 custom semgrep detectors** (`cra-ai-1`, `7`, `10`, `14`) — secure-by-default, weak password hashing, insecure session cookies, weak data-at-rest ciphers. Shipped in the binary and matched back to controls **by rule id** so a broad CWE can't over-attribute.
-- **8 grounded surface checks** (`cra-ai-6`, `11`, `12`, `24`, `27`, `28`, `29`, `30`) — the absence-based controls (no rate limiting, no security logging, no update-signature check…) that have no syntactic pattern.
-- **4 marked not_code_checkable** (`cra-ai-2`, `3`, `4`, `5`) — minimal attack surface, secure architecture, least privilege, tamper protection.
-
-At scale, the **master-controls** corpus (breakpilot's deduped clusters, exported as OSCAL) currently provides **~2,882 code-checkable controls** (2,143 `network` + 739 `source_code`), matched semantically.
-
-## The three mapping paths
-
-```mermaid
-flowchart TD
-    T[Deterministic tools\nsemgrep · gitleaks · syft/osv · ZAP] --> F[Findings]
-    F --> B["Stage 5b — LUT triage\ncontrols_for(tool, cwe / rule_id)"]
-    F --> C["Stage 5c — Semantic\nembed region+intent → top-K master controls"]
-    R[Repo source] --> D["Stage 5d — Grounded surface\nretrieve surface for absence-based controls"]
-    B --> J{{Grounded LLM judge\ntemp 0 · verbatim snippet}}
-    C --> J
-    D --> J
-    J -->|snippet grounds in region| S[Stamp control_refs]
-    J -->|refuted / ungrounded| X[Dropped]
-```
-
-All three paths converge on the same **grounded judge** and the same **grounding gate**. They differ only in how candidate (finding/region, control) pairs are produced.
-
-### Stage 5b — deterministic LUT triage
-
-The default path. A tool finding is matched to controls via `control_map.controls_for_finding(tool, cwe, rule_id)`; the judge then confirms each mapped control against the code region. Outcomes: `Confirmed([ids])` (stamp them), `FalsePositive` (drop the finding), or `Unmapped` (keep it untagged). Runs whenever `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` is set.
-
-### Stage 5c — semantic retrieval (master-controls scale)
-
-Master controls carry no CWE, so they can't be LUT-mapped. Instead we map by *similarity*: embed every control's requirement text once (cached), then for each finding retrieve the top-K nearest controls and hand them to the judge. Gated behind `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` (default off). See [Semantic retrieval](#semantic-retrieval-in-detail).
-
-### Stage 5d — grounded surface checks (absence-based controls)
-
-Some controls are violated by an *absence* — no rate limiting on login, no security logging, no signature check on an update. There's no pattern for semgrep to match, so we deterministically retrieve the code **surface** the control governs (a login route, a logging setup, update/download code) by identifier/route terms, and let the judge decide whether the control holds there. Produces net-new, already-grounded findings. Gated behind `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` (default off).
-
-## The grounding gate
-
-No matter the path, a verdict becomes a finding only if it survives `compliance_core::control_check::ground`:
-
-1. The judge runs at **temperature 0** with a closed prompt and must quote the offending code **verbatim** into `snippet`.
-2. That snippet must appear **literally** in the retrieved region — otherwise the verdict is dropped.
-3. The finding's line is **recomputed from the match**; the model's own line number is never trusted.
-4. Verdicts are cached by content hash, so re-scans reproduce.
-
-The model is allowed to be smart; it is never trusted.
-
-## Semantic retrieval in detail
-
-1. **Embed the corpus once.** Each control's requirement text is embedded with `bge-multilingual-gemma2` (3584-dim — multilingual matters, the master controls are in German while code is English). The embedding backend caps input arrays at 25 per request, so `embed()` chunks at 16; the whole `ControlIndex` is persisted to `snapshot_dir` keyed by a **corpus hash**, so only the first scan after a catalog change pays the embedding cost.
-2. **Build the query from the finding's intent, not just the code.** The retrieval query is `finding.title + finding.description + region`, not the raw region. This is the single most important tuning: two findings in one file share overlapping windows and, on the code alone, embed alike and collapse onto the same controls. The finding's own words ("brute-force protection" vs "weak hash") carry the discriminating signal. The raw region still goes to the judge for grounding.
-3. **Retrieve → judge → ground.** Top-K nearest by cosine, each judged against the region, each grounded.
-
-## Worked examples
-
-Both examples are from the live end-to-end verification (`c5_semantic_live.rs`) against the real ~2,882-control corpus.
-
-### Example 1 — a small auth file (the tuning story)
-
-Two findings in one `auth.py`: a weak `hashlib.md5(password)` hash and a login endpoint with no brute-force protection.
-
-| Finding | Region-only retrieval | Intent-enriched retrieval |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Weak md5 hash | 19874, 20683, 23149, 29985 | **`mc-23149`** (eliminate weak unsalted hashes) at rank 1, + `mc-21634` salted hashing |
-| Login w/o brute-force protection | *identical 4, reordered* | newly surfaces **`mc-19984`** brute_force_protection + **`mc-23186`** account_lockout |
-
-Region-only retrieval gave both findings the *same* four password-hashing controls — the brute-force finding never found its real controls because its window is saturated with `password` tokens. Enriching the query with the finding's intent fixed it: the brute-force finding now pulls the correct rate-limiting / lockout controls out of the 2,882.
-
-### Example 2 — four topically distinct vulnerabilities
-
-| Finding | Top matched controls | Family |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| SQL injection (string-concat query) | `sql_injection_prevention`, `sql_injection`, `parameterized_queries`, input_sanitization | input-validation ✓ |
-| Hardcoded API credential | `hardcoded_secrets_detection`, credential_scanning, secrets_detection | credentials ✓ |
-| TLS verification disabled (`verify=False`) | `https_enforcement`, `configuration_verification`, transport config | transport-encryption ✓ |
-| Insecure deserialization (`pickle.loads`) | `deserialization`, `deserialization_testing`, `deserialization_security` | deserialization ✓ |
-
-Every finding maps to its exact control family, with the most specific control often at the top, and the four sets are distinct.
-
-## Known limitations
-
-- **Absence findings are weak for semantic retrieval.** Similarity matches what code *is about*, not what it *lacks*; a "missing rate limiting" finding embeds like login code. This is exactly why the grounded surface path (Stage 5d) exists — it decides presence/absence at a retrieved surface rather than by embedding distance.
-- **Generic catch-all controls co-occur.** `mc-20890 secure_development_security_code_review` appears in the top-K for many code-security findings because it is semantically near almost all of them. It's harmless (the judge grounds it, and it never crowds out the specific controls — the SQLi example didn't get it) but is a candidate for future down-weighting.
-- **Corpus classification noise.** The master-controls `verification_method` classification is imperfect — e.g. a documentation control (`eu_declaration_accuracy`) is currently tagged `source_code`. That's a corpus-side data-quality issue, separate from the mapping engine.
-
-## Configuration
-
-| Variable | Effect |
-| --- | --- |
-| `BREAKPILOT_BASE_URL` | breakpilot-compliance root; enables control ingest + Stage 5b. Unset disables all control mapping. |
-| `BREAKPILOT_SEMANTIC_MAPPING` | Enables Stage 5c (semantic master-controls mapping). Default off. |
-| `BREAKPILOT_GROUNDED_CHECKS` | Enables Stage 5d (grounded surface checks). Default off. |
-| `BREAKPILOT_SNAPSHOT_DIR` | Where OSCAL catalog snapshots and the cached control-embedding index live. |
-
-The semantic and grounded passes are gated because they are the heavier, less deterministic paths; they stay off until verified live against a deployed catalog. The live verification lives in `compliance-agent/tests/c5_semantic_live.rs` (ignored; run with `--ignored`).
-
-## Appendix — the master-controls data pipeline
-
-The master-controls corpus is produced by breakpilot-compliance and pulled as an OSCAL catalog from `GET /api/compliance/v1/oscal/catalog?framework=master-controls`. Two operational lessons are worth recording, because they cost real time to diagnose:
-
-- **The catalog is served from `breakpilot_db`, not `postgres`.** Diagnostics run against the wrong database will look clean while the app serves something else entirely. Confirm the app's datname (`pg_stat_activity`) before trusting any count or `EXPLAIN`.
-- **A constraint-less dump triplicated the master-control tables.** Restored without their PK/unique constraints, `master_controls` / `mc_verification` / `master_control_members` accumulated identical rows 3× (the same artifact migration `158` fixed for `doc_check_controls`). That inflated the catalog to ~26k dup'd controls and, with the indexes also missing, drove the export query to a >120s / 502. The fix (breakpilot migration `160`) ctid-dedups each table by its natural key and restores the constraints + indexes so it can't recur; the export query was also rewritten set-based (a single windowed pass instead of a per-row correlated subquery). After dedup: 41,850 → 13,950 master controls, catalog **25,938 → 2,882** code-checkable, endpoint **502 → 200 in ~3s**.