fix(audit): bump quinn-proto + ignore rmcp DNS-rebinding advisory (#97)

RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (quinn-proto 0.11.14): patch-bump to 0.11.15. RUSTSEC-2026-0189 (rmcp 0.16 DNS rebinding): added to ignore with public-hostname + bearer-auth threat-model justification; rmcp 0.16->2.x migration tracked as a separate multi-hour PR.
2026-06-30 16:07:01 +00:00
parent a3a96fe2cc
commit e9536b6d98
2 changed files with 15 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -7,4 +7,17 @@ ignore = [
    # not a realistic attack surface here. Revisit when mongodb bumps hickory.
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # NSEC3 loop, no fix available upstream
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # O(n²) name compression, fixed in hickory-proto >=0.26.1
+
+    # rmcp 0.16.0 — DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport (missing
+    # Host header validation). Patched in rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API
+    # version jump from our pin; rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months
+    # and the migration touches every tool handler + the auth middleware we
+    # just landed in #92. Threat model in our deployment: the MCP server is
+    # exposed at a public hostname (comp-mcp-dev.meghsakha.com) behind orca's
+    # TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth — the attack model
+    # (browser DNS-rebinding into localhost MCP server) doesn't directly apply.
+    # Defense-in-depth Host-header check is still a worthwhile follow-up.
+    # FOLLOW-UP: bump rmcp to 2.x in a dedicated PR (M7.3 follow-up, sized
+    # multi-hour due to API surface change).
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0189",
 ]