feat(matrix): PlcSps as a composite device target (SBOM/CVE/DAST/pentest)
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A PLC/SPS device is two layers — the control application and the device it runs on (firmware/OS + reachable runtime services). Previously PlcSps offered only PlcControlLogic, so a CODESYS-on-Yocto device's firmware and network attack surface was invisible. - scan_matrix: PlcSps now offers FirmwareStatic + Sbom + Cve (require a firmware image) and Dast (require a running endpoint, e.g. WebVisu), and supports_pentest(PlcSps) is now true. Control-logic stays default-on; the device-level scans are offered but opt-in (default-off) — firmware-image SBOM/CVE execution is shared with the firmware families and still landing (#151/#128), so they must not silently auto-run. - orchestrator: the PLC branch no longer early-returns, so a PLC device with a reachable endpoint also runs DAST (the wired path) after the control-logic scan. Part of the CODESYS-on-Yocto coverage tracker (#167). Closes #164. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
afa5c985ee
commit
78cf3237d5
@@ -450,37 +450,44 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
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self.ensure_dast_target(target, &plan).await;
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// PLC control-logic analysis for PLC/SPS targets (a PlcProject artifact).
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// A PLC/SPS device is a composite target: after the control-logic scan we
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// fall through so a reachable device (WebVisu / exposed services) still
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// gets DAST, rather than early-returning on the PLC scan alone.
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let mut new_count = 0u32;
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if plan.has(ScanType::PlcControlLogic) {
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return self.run_plc_scan(target, &target_id, scan_run_id).await;
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new_count += self.run_plc_scan(target, &target_id, scan_run_id).await?;
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}
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match target.code_artifact() {
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Some(code) if code.kind == ArtifactKind::GitRepo => {
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let repo = RepoView::from_target(target, code);
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let new_count = self.run_pipeline(&repo, scan_run_id).await?;
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self.finalize_target(target, &repo, new_count).await?;
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Ok(new_count)
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let n = {
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let repo = RepoView::from_target(target, code);
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let n = self.run_pipeline(&repo, scan_run_id).await?;
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self.finalize_target(target, &repo, n).await?;
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n
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};
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new_count += n;
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}
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Some(_) => {
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tracing::warn!(
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target_id = %target_id,
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"Unified pipeline: source-archive scanning not yet wired; skipping"
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);
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Ok(0)
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}
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None => {
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// No code to scan. Firmware/PLC/mobile static scanners land in
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// #128/#129/#130; DAST for a running URL still works when a
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// DastTarget row exists (migrated targets).
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// No code to scan (a PLC device or a migrated DAST target).
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// Firmware/mobile static scanners land in #128/#129; DAST for a
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// running URL works when a DastTarget row exists (provisioned above
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// from a LiveUrl, or from a migrated target).
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tracing::info!(
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target_id = %target_id,
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"Unified pipeline: no code artifact; attempting DAST only"
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"Unified pipeline: no code artifact; attempting DAST"
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);
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self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "dast_scanning").await;
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self.maybe_trigger_dast(&target_id, scan_run_id).await;
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Ok(0)
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}
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}
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Ok(new_count)
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}
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/// Analyze a PLC/SPS project (Structured Text / PLCopen XML) for
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@@ -207,12 +207,52 @@ pub fn rules_for(target_type: TargetType) -> Vec<ScanRule> {
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));
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r
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}
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TargetType::PlcSps => vec![ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::PlcControlLogic,
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true,
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"Control-logic security rules over the PLC program",
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Plc,
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)],
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TargetType::PlcSps => {
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// A PLC/SPS device is a composite: the control application *and* the
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// device it runs on (firmware/OS + reachable runtime services). The
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// control-logic scan runs on the PLC project; the firmware and DAST
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// scans light up only when a firmware image / running endpoint is
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// attached (e.g. a CODESYS runtime on a Yocto image with WebVisu).
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// Firmware-image SBOM/CVE *execution* is shared with the firmware
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// families and tracked in #151/#128; DAST over a WebVisu/OPC-UA
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// endpoint uses the existing DAST path.
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vec![
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ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::PlcControlLogic,
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true,
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"Control-logic security rules over the PLC program",
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Plc,
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),
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// Device-level scans are offered but opt-in (default-off): they
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// apply only when a firmware image is attached, and firmware-image
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// SBOM/CVE *execution* is shared with the firmware families and
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// still landing (#151/#128), so they must not silently auto-run.
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ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::FirmwareStatic,
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false,
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"Static analysis of the device firmware image (OS + runtime)",
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Firmware,
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),
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ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::Sbom,
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false,
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"SBOM from the device firmware image (OS packages + CODESYS runtime)",
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Firmware,
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),
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ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::Cve,
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false,
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"Match device firmware components against known CVEs",
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Firmware,
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),
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ScanRule::new(
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ScanType::Dast,
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false,
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"Dynamic scan of the running device (WebVisu / exposed services)",
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RunningUrl,
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),
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]
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -229,6 +269,9 @@ pub fn supports_pentest(target_type: TargetType) -> bool {
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| TargetType::AndroidApp
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| TargetType::IosApp
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| TargetType::EmbeddedLinuxYocto
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// A PLC/SPS device exposes reachable runtime services (WebVisu, OPC UA,
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// the CODESYS programming protocol), so an active pentest applies.
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| TargetType::PlcSps
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)
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}
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@@ -340,22 +383,68 @@ mod tests {
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}
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#[test]
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fn plc_offers_only_control_logic() {
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fn plc_control_logic_is_default_on_and_device_scans_block_without_artifacts() {
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// A PLC project alone: control-logic runs; the device-level scans are
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// offered but blocked until a firmware image / running endpoint is added.
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let t = target_with(
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TargetType::PlcSps,
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vec![Artifact::plc_project("p.xml", PlcFormat::PlcopenXml)],
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);
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let opts = applicable_scans(&t);
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assert_eq!(opts.len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(opts[0].scan, ScanType::PlcControlLogic);
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assert!(opts[0].default_on);
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let plc = option(&opts, ScanType::PlcControlLogic).expect("control-logic offered");
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assert!(plc.default_on && plc.blocked_reason.is_none());
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for scan in [ScanType::FirmwareStatic, ScanType::Sbom, ScanType::Cve] {
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let o = option(&opts, scan).expect("device scan offered");
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assert!(
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!o.default_on,
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"{scan} must not pre-select without a firmware image"
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);
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assert!(o.blocked_reason.is_some());
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}
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let dast = option(&opts, ScanType::Dast).expect("dast offered");
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assert!(!dast.default_on);
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assert!(dast.blocked_reason.is_some());
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}
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#[test]
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fn plc_composite_lights_up_device_scans_with_firmware_and_url() {
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// A CODESYS-on-Yocto device: PLC project + firmware image + WebVisu URL.
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let t = target_with(
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TargetType::PlcSps,
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vec![
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Artifact::plc_project("p.xml", PlcFormat::PlcopenXml),
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Artifact::firmware_image("device.img"),
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Artifact::live_url("http://plc.local/webvisu"),
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],
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);
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let opts = applicable_scans(&t);
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for scan in [
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ScanType::PlcControlLogic,
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ScanType::FirmwareStatic,
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ScanType::Sbom,
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ScanType::Cve,
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] {
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let o = option(&opts, scan).expect("scan offered");
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assert!(o.blocked_reason.is_none(), "{scan} should be unblocked");
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}
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// Control-logic auto-runs; the device-level scans are unblocked but opt-in
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// (default-off) until firmware-image execution lands (#151/#128).
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assert!(option(&opts, ScanType::PlcControlLogic).unwrap().default_on);
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assert!(!option(&opts, ScanType::Sbom).unwrap().default_on);
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assert!(!option(&opts, ScanType::Dast).unwrap().default_on);
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assert!(option(&opts, ScanType::Dast)
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.unwrap()
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.blocked_reason
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.is_none());
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}
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#[test]
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fn pentest_support_matches_reachable_families() {
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assert!(supports_pentest(TargetType::WebApp));
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assert!(supports_pentest(TargetType::BackendService));
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assert!(!supports_pentest(TargetType::PlcSps));
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assert!(supports_pentest(TargetType::EmbeddedLinuxYocto));
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// A PLC/SPS device is network-reachable (WebVisu / OPC UA / 11740).
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assert!(supports_pentest(TargetType::PlcSps));
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assert!(!supports_pentest(TargetType::FirmwareBareMetal));
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assert!(!supports_pentest(TargetType::DesktopApp));
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}
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