fix(ai-sdk): national-law subsidiarity in authority rerank (DSGVO > BDSG for general questions)

The authority reranker (wired in legal_rag_client.go:168) had no national-subsidiarity dimension, so a general BDSG paragraph could outrank the primary DSGVO article. Surfaced by the KB-2026.1 BDSG pilot (dp_05/08/11 + cr_07). - authorityScore: DE binding_law in an EU-primary domain WITHOUT a co-primary topic match -> soft demote (subsidiarityPen 0.18), not exclusion. National special rules stay co-primary via the topic ontology (DSB Art.37+§38, special categories Art.9+§22, ...). - queryDomain: fall back to a regulation-name mention (DSGVO/BDSG/CRA) so a question phrased around the act is domain-scoped even without a topical keyword (fixes cr_07: BDSG Teil-3 §64). - data_protection keyword stem 'auftragsverarbeit' (catches Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag). Pure ranking logic, no data manipulation; soft demotes keep national rules visible. Build result (DSGVO+BDSG): degraded=0, must_not=0. go build/vet/test ./... green; 6 new table tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(ucca): CM-7 repo_scan is required evidence for attack_surface_minimization
2026-06-26 21:28:12 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 09:42:12 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 09:35:46 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 09:35:46 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 09:29:44 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 01:09:16 +02:00
29 changed files with 7803 additions and 11 deletions
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ COPY migrations/ ./migrations/
 # Copy policy files (YAML rules)
 COPY policies/ ./policies/

+# Copy Compliance Execution Graph data (file-backed: Registry join-key copy + accepted control
+# mappings + evidence requirements) consumed by GET /sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status.
+# data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json is a synced copy of the repo-root Registry contract
+# (the Obligation Registry owns the canonical file) — re-sync it when the Registry grows.
+COPY data/control_mappings/ ./data/control_mappings/
+COPY data/evidence_requirements/ ./data/evidence_requirements/
+COPY data/obligations/ ./data/obligations/
+
 # Create non-root user
 RUN adduser -D -u 1000 appuser
 USER appuser
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+// Control-Mapping: CRA Annex I -> NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. Eine Zeile = ein Mapping (Schema: ControlMapping).
+// Reviewt 2026-06-25 (benjamin): 3 accepted, mapping_type=primary_implementation (kanonische Primaer-Control je Anforderung).
+// Heimat der OWASP-Rejects (2)(e)/(2)(l)/(2)(i): dort war OWASP nicht der Zielstandard ("Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich").
+// related-Controls (SC-3(3), RA-5, AC-6, SI-16, ...) folgen separat als mapping_type=supports — hier nur der kanonische Einstieg.
+// obligation_id (Registry-Handoff #4 adoptiert, #6 auf CORE re-pointet 2026-06-26): SI-7->software_integrity_protection (CORE (2)(f)), SI-2->provide_security_updates, CM-7->attack_surface_minimization (CORE (2)(j)). Join exakt. Die domaenen-scoped IDs (signed_update_integrity, remote_access_attack_surface_min) bleiben gueltige Obligations und zeigen per specializes->CORE auf diese Ziele.
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "SI-7", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST SI-7 = Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity — kanonische Integritaetskontrolle (Signaturpruefung, Manipulationserkennung).", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Primaere Implementierung der CRA-Integritaetsanforderung; OWASP war hier kein passender Treffer. Related (spaeter, supports): SA-10, CM-14.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "software_integrity_protection"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "SI-2", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST SI-2 = Flaw Remediation — kanonische Update-/Patch-Kontrolle.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Primaere Implementierung der CRA-Update-Anforderung. Related (spaeter, supports): RA-5, CM-3, SA-11.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "provide_security_updates"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "CM-7", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST CM-7 = Least Functionality — Deaktivierung nicht benoetigter Ports/Dienste/Funktionen.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "CM-7 als Primaer-Control fuer Angriffsflaeche (nicht SC-3(3)). Related (spaeter, supports): SC-3(3), AC-6, SI-16.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "attack_surface_minimization"}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// Evidence-Requirements je NIST-SP-800-53-Control (Schema: EvidenceRequirement). Eine Zeile = eine geforderte Evidenz.
+// WICHTIG: evidence_type ist FRAMEWORK-AGNOSTISCH (geteilter Katalog config_export/test_report/repo_scan/sbom/...) —
+// dieselben Typen tragen CRA, NIST, ISO 27001, IEC 62443, BSI. (framework, control) ist nur der Verweis, nicht der Typ.
+// Stand 2026-06-25, Basis: die 3 accepted CRA->NIST primary_implementation-Mappings (SI-7 Integritaet, SI-2 Updates, CM-7 Angriffsflaeche).
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7", "evidence_type": "sbom", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "SBOM weist die Integritaet/Herkunft der Software-Bestandteile nach (bekannte, unmanipulierte Komponenten).", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Secure-Boot-/Code-Signing-Konfiguration als Nachweis der Integritaetspruefung.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Konfiguration des sicheren Update-/Patch-Mechanismus (signierte/automatische Updates) als technischer Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2", "evidence_type": "test_report", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Update-/Patch-Verifikationstest (CI) belegt, dass Sicherheitsupdates greifen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Konfiguration deaktivierter Ports/Dienste/Funktionen als Nachweis minimierter Angriffsflaeche.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7", "evidence_type": "repo_scan", "evidence_source": "scanner", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Angriffsflaechen-Scan (offene Ports/Dienste) als Nachweis tatsaechlich minimierter Angriffsflaeche.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
@@ -0,0 +1,846 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_join_keys_v1",
+ "contract": "obligation_id ist der stabile Join-Key. Legal Knowledge Graph haengt citation_spans an obligation_id; Compliance Execution Graph mappt control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id. Interim-Bruecke = citation_units. obligation_id NIE neu vergeben (re-link).",
+ "count": 95,
+ "obligation_ids": [
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_creation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_dependency_coverage",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 3(36) i.V.m. Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_format_standard",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_maintenance_update",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_completeness_verification",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_tooling_automation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_access_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_authority_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31 / Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_confidentiality",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31(4)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_supply_chain_contracts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_technical_documentation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31 i.V.m. Annex VII"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "EVIDENCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_identification_inventory",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_assessment_prioritization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_remediation_patching",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (2) & (8)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_handling_process",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Article 13(8) & Annex VII"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "coordinated_vulnerability_disclosure",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (5)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "exploited_vuln_reporting_authorities",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Article 14 & Article 16"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_info_dissemination_users",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (4) & (6)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(j)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "user_authentication_required",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "authentication_policy_documented",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "auth_exceptions_documented",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "mfa_required",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "step_up_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "privileged_op_reauth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "strong_crypto_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "credential_lifecycle_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "credential_confidentiality_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "password_policy",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "no_default_credentials",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(a)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "account_lockout_failed_attempts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "server_side_validation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "session_binding_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "reauth_after_inactivity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "token_validation_lifecycle",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "mutual_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "revocation_check",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "encrypted_auth_channel",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "tls_certificate_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "service_to_service_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "auth_key_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "biometric_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "federated_auth_assertions",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "separate_authn_authz",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "supplier_access_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "personal_admin_accounts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "firmware_software_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "access_control_event_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "audit_trail_admin_actions",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_integrity_immutability",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_access_control_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_retention_archival",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "centralized_log_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_monitoring_alerting",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_data_minimization_privacy",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_format_standardization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_timestamp_synchronization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_availability_resilience",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_thread_safety_correctness",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_library_supply_chain",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_config_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_governance_roles",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "incident_response_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_transmission_security",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "network_traffic_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_control_least_privilege",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_confidentiality_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(b)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_session_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_mfa",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_encryption",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "reject_insecure_remote_protocols",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_logging_audit",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(g)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_user_validation_ot",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_training",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_architecture_design",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(a)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_vuln_patch_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_threat_detection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_maintenance_governance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "temporary_remote_access_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_data_export_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "component_remote_interface_security",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_fallback_concept",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "provide_security_updates",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)",
+    "Art. 13"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "support_period_maintenance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 13(8)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "signed_update_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "trusted_update_source",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_testing_validation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_rollback",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "automatic_updates_optout",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_risk_assessment",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "secure_modification_control",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+
+	"github.com/breakpilot/ai-compliance-sdk/internal/ucca"
+)
+
+// ComplianceGraphHandlers serves the read-only Compliance Execution Graph
+// (Regulation -> Obligation -> Control -> Evidence) over the file-backed bridge artifacts.
+// It is intentionally SEPARATE from the DB-backed ObligationsHandlers: this is the curated
+// cross-session graph (Registry join keys + accepted control mappings + evidence requirements),
+// loaded once at startup. Fail-closed: if the graph could not load, every request answers 503.
+type ComplianceGraphHandlers struct {
+	joins    *ucca.ObligationJoinKeys
+	mappings *ucca.ControlMappingSet
+	evidence *ucca.EvidenceRequirementSet
+	loadErr  error
+}
+
+// NewComplianceGraphHandlers loads the graph once. Construction never fails; a load error is
+// retained and surfaced as 503 per request (matches the codebase's load-warn-continue startup).
+func NewComplianceGraphHandlers() *ComplianceGraphHandlers {
+	joins, mappings, evidence, err := ucca.LoadComplianceGraph()
+	return &ComplianceGraphHandlers{joins: joins, mappings: mappings, evidence: evidence, loadErr: err}
+}
+
+// LoadError exposes a startup load failure so the wiring can log a warning.
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) LoadError() error { return h.loadErr }
+
+// RegisterRoutes mounts the compliance-graph routes under /compliance.
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) RegisterRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
+	g := r.Group("/compliance")
+	g.GET("/obligation-status", h.ObligationStatus)
+}
+
+type cgControlDTO struct {
+	Framework        string   `json:"framework"`
+	Control          string   `json:"control"`
+	MappingType      string   `json:"mapping_type"`
+	EvidenceRequired []string `json:"evidence_required"`
+	EvidenceStatus   string   `json:"evidence_status"` // missing | partial | present | none_required
+}
+
+type cgStatusResponse struct {
+	ObligationID  string         `json:"obligation_id"`
+	OverallStatus string         `json:"overall_status"` // unknown_obligation | unmapped | not_assessed | open | met
+	LegalBasis    []string       `json:"legal_basis,omitempty"`
+	CitationSpans string         `json:"citation_spans"` // "pending" until the Legal-KG attaches spans
+	Controls      []cgControlDTO `json:"controls"`
+	Note          string         `json:"note,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ObligationStatus answers GET /sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status?obligation_id=...
+//
+// It NEVER asserts fulfillment automatically. With no evidence collection wired (MVP), a mapped
+// obligation is "not_assessed" and every required evidence is "missing" — the honest picture is
+// "required vs present evidence", not "a document exists". Fail-closed otherwise:
+//   - no obligation_id          -> 400
+//   - graph not loaded          -> 503
+//   - id not in the Registry    -> 200 overall_status=unknown_obligation
+//   - mapped but no control yet  -> 200 overall_status=unmapped
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) ObligationStatus(c *gin.Context) {
+	if h.loadErr != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "compliance graph unavailable", "detail": h.loadErr.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	obID := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("obligation_id"))
+	if obID == "" {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "obligation_id query parameter required"})
+		return
+	}
+	resp := cgStatusResponse{ObligationID: obID, CitationSpans: "pending", Controls: []cgControlDTO{}}
+
+	if h.joins.FindObligation(obID) == nil {
+		resp.OverallStatus = "unknown_obligation"
+		resp.Note = "obligation_id not in the Registry join-key contract"
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// MVP: hasEvidence=nil -> no collection wired -> all required evidence counts as missing.
+	st := ucca.AssessObligationStatus(h.joins, h.mappings, h.evidence, obID, nil)
+	resp.LegalBasis = st.LegalBasis
+
+	if len(st.Controls) == 0 {
+		resp.OverallStatus = "unmapped"
+		resp.Note = "no accepted control maps to this obligation yet"
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, cs := range st.Controls {
+		types := make([]string, 0, len(cs.RequiredEvidence))
+		for _, e := range cs.RequiredEvidence {
+			types = append(types, e.EvidenceType)
+		}
+		resp.Controls = append(resp.Controls, cgControlDTO{
+			Framework:        cs.Framework,
+			Control:          cs.Control,
+			MappingType:      cs.MappingType,
+			EvidenceRequired: types,
+			EvidenceStatus:   cgEvidenceStatus(len(cs.RequiredEvidence), len(cs.MissingEvidence)),
+		})
+	}
+	// No fulfillment claim without real evidence collection.
+	resp.OverallStatus = "not_assessed"
+	resp.Note = "evidence collection not wired (MVP) — fulfillment not asserted"
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+}
+
+func cgEvidenceStatus(required, missing int) string {
+	switch {
+	case required == 0:
+		return "none_required"
+	case missing == 0:
+		return "present"
+	case missing == required:
+		return "missing"
+	default:
+		return "partial"
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+func newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t *testing.T) *gin.Engine {
+	t.Helper()
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	h := NewComplianceGraphHandlers()
+	if err := h.LoadError(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("compliance graph failed to load (candidate paths): %v", err)
+	}
+	r := gin.New()
+	h.RegisterRoutes(r.Group("/sdk/v1"))
+	return r
+}
+
+func getObligationStatus(t *testing.T, r *gin.Engine, query string) (int, cgStatusResponse) {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status"+query, nil)
+	r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	var resp cgStatusResponse
+	if w.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode body %q: %v", w.Body.String(), err)
+		}
+	}
+	return w.Code, resp
+}
+
+func TestObligationStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name         string
+		query        string
+		wantHTTP     int
+		wantOverall  string
+		wantControls bool // expect >=1 control
+	}{
+		{"missing param -> 400", "", http.StatusBadRequest, "", false},
+		{"unknown id -> unknown_obligation", "?obligation_id=does_not_exist", http.StatusOK, "unknown_obligation", false},
+		{"mapped (OWASP V6) -> not_assessed", "?obligation_id=user_authentication_required", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"NIST adopted (SI-2) -> not_assessed", "?obligation_id=provide_security_updates", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"CORE attack_surface_minimization -> CM-7", "?obligation_id=attack_surface_minimization", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"CORE software_integrity_protection -> SI-7", "?obligation_id=software_integrity_protection", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"in registry, no control -> unmapped", "?obligation_id=sbom_creation", http.StatusOK, "unmapped", false},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			code, resp := getObligationStatus(t, r, tt.query)
+			if code != tt.wantHTTP {
+				t.Fatalf("http %d, want %d", code, tt.wantHTTP)
+			}
+			if tt.wantHTTP != http.StatusOK {
+				return
+			}
+			if resp.OverallStatus != tt.wantOverall {
+				t.Errorf("overall_status=%q, want %q", resp.OverallStatus, tt.wantOverall)
+			}
+			if tt.wantControls && len(resp.Controls) == 0 {
+				t.Error("expected >=1 control")
+			}
+			if !tt.wantControls && len(resp.Controls) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("expected 0 controls, got %d", len(resp.Controls))
+			}
+			if resp.CitationSpans != "pending" {
+				t.Errorf("citation_spans=%q, want pending", resp.CitationSpans)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The MVP must NEVER auto-assert fulfillment: with no evidence collection wired, every required
+// evidence is "missing" and the overall status stays "not_assessed".
+func TestObligationStatus_NoFulfillmentClaim(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t)
+	code, resp := getObligationStatus(t, r, "?obligation_id=user_authentication_required")
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("http %d", code)
+	}
+	if resp.OverallStatus == "met" || resp.OverallStatus == "erfuellt" {
+		t.Fatalf("MVP must not assert fulfillment, got overall_status=%q", resp.OverallStatus)
+	}
+	for _, ctl := range resp.Controls {
+		if len(ctl.EvidenceRequired) > 0 && ctl.EvidenceStatus != "missing" {
+			t.Errorf("control %s/%s evidence_status=%q, want missing (no collection wired)", ctl.Framework, ctl.Control, ctl.EvidenceStatus)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Pin the curated evidence_required set per NIST obligation. A required:false row silently
+// drops from evidence_required, which the table test above (control-count only) would miss.
+func TestObligationStatus_NISTEvidenceTypes(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t)
+	want := map[string][]string{
+		"attack_surface_minimization":   {"config_export", "repo_scan"},
+		"software_integrity_protection": {"sbom", "config_export"},
+		"provide_security_updates":      {"config_export", "test_report"},
+	}
+	for ob, exp := range want {
+		_, resp := getObligationStatus(t, r, "?obligation_id="+ob)
+		if len(resp.Controls) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: want 1 control, got %d", ob, len(resp.Controls))
+		}
+		if got := resp.Controls[0].EvidenceRequired; !sameStringSet(got, exp) {
+			t.Errorf("%s evidence_required = %v, want %v", ob, got, exp)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func sameStringSet(a, b []string) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	m := make(map[string]bool, len(a))
+	for _, x := range a {
+		m[x] = true
+	}
+	for _, x := range b {
+		if !m[x] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ func buildRouter(cfg *config.Config, pool *pgxpool.Pool) *gin.Engine {
 	ragHandlers := handlers.NewRAGHandlers(corpusVersionStore)
 	obligationsHandlers := handlers.NewObligationsHandlersWithStore(obligationsStore)

+	// Compliance Execution Graph (file-backed: Registry join keys + accepted control mappings + evidence)
+	complianceGraphHandlers := handlers.NewComplianceGraphHandlers()
+	if err := complianceGraphHandlers.LoadError(); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("WARNING: compliance graph not loaded (obligation-status -> 503): %v", err)
+	}
+
 	// Regulatory News
 	allV2Regs, err := ucca.LoadAllV2Regulations()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -201,7 +207,8 @@ func buildRouter(cfg *config.Config, pool *pgxpool.Pool) *gin.Engine {
 		uccaHandlers, escalationHandlers, obligationsHandlers, ragHandlers,
 		roadmapHandlers, workshopHandlers, portfolioHandlers,
 		academyHandlers, trainingHandlers, whistleblowerHandlers, iaceHandler,
-		gapHandler, maximizerHandlers, regulatoryNewsHandlers, useCaseHandler)
+		gapHandler, maximizerHandlers, regulatoryNewsHandlers, useCaseHandler,
+		complianceGraphHandlers)

 	return router
 }
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ func registerRoutes(
 	maximizerHandlers *handlers.MaximizerHandlers,
 	regulatoryNewsHandlers *handlers.RegulatoryNewsHandlers,
 	useCaseHandler *handlers.UseCaseHandler,
+	complianceGraphHandlers *handlers.ComplianceGraphHandlers,
 ) {
 	v1 := router.Group("/sdk/v1")
 	{
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ func registerRoutes(
 		registerMaximizerRoutes(v1, maximizerHandlers)
 		registerUseCaseRoutes(v1, useCaseHandler)
 		v1.GET("/regulatory-news", regulatoryNewsHandlers.GetNews)
+		complianceGraphHandlers.RegisterRoutes(v1)
 	}
 }

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ var domains = []domainDef{
 	{"data_protection",
 		[]string{"DSGVO", "GDPR", "BDSG", "EDPB", "DSK", "BfDI", "BayLfD", "DPF"},
 		[]string{"personenbezogen", "betroffene", "datenschutz", "datenschutzbeauftrag", "dsb",
-			"datenpanne", "auskunft", "loesch", "lösch", "einwilligung", "besondere kategorien", "auftragsverarbeiter"}},
+			"datenpanne", "auskunft", "loesch", "lösch", "einwilligung", "besondere kategorien", "auftragsverarbeit"}},
 	{"cyber",
 		[]string{"CRA", "NIS2", "NIS-2", "ENISA", "DORA", "EUCC"},
 		[]string{"security update", "sicherheitsupdate", "sicherheitsaktualisierung", "schwachstelle", "sbom",
@@ -126,6 +126,16 @@ var domains = []domainDef{
 		nil},
 }

+// euPrimaryDomains are domains whose PRIMARY binding act is an EU regulation/directive
+// (DSGVO, CRA/NIS2, AI Act, MaschinenVO). In these domains a NATIONAL implementing law
+// (e.g. BDSG) is subsidiary for general questions — see nationalSubsidiarityPenalty.
+var euPrimaryDomains = map[string]bool{
+	"data_protection": true,
+	"cyber":           true,
+	"ai":              true,
+	"product_safety":  true,
+}
+
 func queryDomain(query string) string {
 	ql := strings.ToLower(query)
 	for _, d := range domains {
@@ -135,6 +145,16 @@ func queryDomain(query string) string {
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	// Fallback: an explicit regulation mention (e.g. "DSGVO", "BDSG", "CRA") also signals the
+	// domain — so a question phrased around the act ("... gilt die DSGVO ...") is scoped even
+	// without a topical keyword. Keyword match wins first (more specific).
+	for _, d := range domains {
+		for _, reg := range d.regs {
+			if strings.Contains(ql, strings.ToLower(reg)) {
+				return d.name
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	return ""
 }

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const (
 	domainMatchGain   = 0.15
 	offDomainPenalty  = 0.10 // off-domain binding (demoted, not removed)
 	scopePenalty      = 0.25 // BDSG Teil 3 (law enforcement) on a general DP question
+	subsidiarityPen   = 0.18 // national implementing law (BDSG) on a general EU-primary question: SOFT demote, not exclusion
 	topicGain         = 0.18 // amplifier only
 	supersededPenalty = 0.50 // superseded Alt-Quelle (pre-eu-v1): demoted, nicht versteckt
 	intentLiftGain    = 0.10 // epsilon a qualifying interpretative source is lifted ABOVE the best binding
@@ -102,6 +103,15 @@ func authorityScore(query string, r LegalSearchResult, qDomain string, qForeign
 	if qDomain == "data_protection" && scopeClass(r) == "law_enforcement" {
 		score -= scopePenalty
 	}
+	// Subsidiarity: a national implementing law (DE binding, e.g. BDSG) is subsidiary to the
+	// primary EU act for GENERAL questions in an EU-primary domain — UNLESS the query hits a
+	// topic where the national norm is co-primary (DSB §38, special categories §22, ...). The
+	// topic boost below lifts those; here we only SOFT-demote the non-topic national norm, so
+	// it stays visible and can still win on a strongly matching topic. No hard exclusion.
+	if euPrimaryDomains[qDomain] && info.sourceClass == "binding_law" &&
+		info.jurisdiction == "DE" && !resultMatchesTopic(query, r) {
+		score -= subsidiarityPen
+	}
 	if resultMatchesTopic(query, r) {
 		score += topicGain // Verstaerker, kein Override
 	}
@@ -72,6 +72,73 @@ func TestRerankByAuthority_Acceptance(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})

+	// Subsidiarity (KB-2026.1 BDSG-pilot regression): a national implementing § that is NOT a
+	// co-primary topic norm must not outrank the primary DSGVO article on a general question.
+	t.Run("subsidiarity dp_05: BDSG §23 below DSGVO Art.6 (Rechtsgrundlage)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		in := []LegalSearchResult{
+			bindingRes("§ 23 BDSG", "BDSG", "DE", 0.70),
+			bindingRes("Art. 6 DSGVO", "DSGVO", "EU", 0.66),
+		}
+		out := rerankByAuthority("Welche Rechtsgrundlagen erlauben eine Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten?", in)
+		if out[0].RegulationShort != "DSGVO" {
+			t.Fatalf("DSGVO Art.6 must beat general BDSG §, got %q", out[0].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+		if len(out) != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("BDSG must stay visible (soft demote), got len=%d", len(out))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("subsidiarity dp_08: BDSG §70 below DSGVO Art.28 (Auftragsverarbeitung)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		in := []LegalSearchResult{
+			bindingRes("§ 70 BDSG", "BDSG", "DE", 0.70), // Teil 3 → scope + subsidiarity
+			bindingRes("Art. 28 DSGVO", "DSGVO", "EU", 0.66),
+		}
+		out := rerankByAuthority("Was muss ein Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag enthalten?", in)
+		if out[0].RegulationShort != "DSGVO" {
+			t.Fatalf("DSGVO Art.28 must beat BDSG §70, got %q", out[0].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("subsidiarity dp_11: BDSG §22 below DSGVO Art.32 on a TOM question", func(t *testing.T) {
+		in := []LegalSearchResult{
+			bindingRes("§ 22 BDSG", "BDSG", "DE", 0.70),
+			bindingRes("Art. 32 DSGVO", "DSGVO", "EU", 0.66),
+		}
+		out := rerankByAuthority("Welche technischen und organisatorischen Massnahmen verlangt das Datenschutzrecht?", in)
+		if out[0].RegulationShort != "DSGVO" {
+			t.Fatalf("DSGVO Art.32 must beat BDSG §22 on a non-topic TOM question, got %q", out[0].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("cr_07: a 'DSGVO' mention scopes the domain so BDSG Teil-3 §64 is demoted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		in := []LegalSearchResult{
+			bindingRes("§ 64 BDSG", "BDSG", "DE", 0.70), // Teil 3 (law enforcement)
+			bindingRes("Art. 32 DSGVO", "DSGVO", "EU", 0.66),
+		}
+		// Query has no DP keyword but names the DSGVO → domain fallback scopes it data_protection,
+		// so scope+subsidiarity demote the law-enforcement § below the primary norm.
+		out := rerankByAuthority("Welche rechtliche Grundlage gilt fuer technische und organisatorische Massnahmen - DSGVO oder ein Standard?", in)
+		if out[0].RegulationShort != "DSGVO" {
+			t.Fatalf("DSGVO must win on a DSGVO-mention question, got %q", out[0].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("co-primary dp_01: BDSG §38 stays top on a DSB question (national special rule)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		in := []LegalSearchResult{
+			bindingRes("§ 38 BDSG", "BDSG", "DE", 0.66),
+			bindingRes("Art. 37 DSGVO", "DSGVO", "EU", 0.64),
+		}
+		out := rerankByAuthority("Ab wann muss ein Datenschutzbeauftragter benannt werden?", in)
+		// DSB topic → §38 is co-primary (topic-matched, NOT subsidiarity-demoted) and keeps its
+		// semantic lead; Art. 37 stays a close second. Both remain top-2.
+		if out[0].RegulationShort != "BDSG" {
+			t.Fatalf("BDSG §38 (DSB co-primary) must stay top, got %q", out[0].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+		if out[1].RegulationShort != "DSGVO" {
+			t.Fatalf("Art. 37 DSGVO must stay co-primary second, got %q", out[1].ArticleLabel)
+		}
+	})
+
 	t.Run("nothing is dropped and topic amplifies", func(t *testing.T) {
 		in := []LegalSearchResult{
 			guidanceRes("ENISA", "ENISA", 0.72),
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+)
+
+// graphCallerRel resolves a path relative to THIS source file (build-time location), so the
+// graph data is findable under `go test` (cwd = package dir) regardless of working directory.
+// In a built container the source is gone, so cwd-relative candidates carry the load instead.
+func graphCallerRel(rel string) string {
+	_, file, _, ok := runtime.Caller(0)
+	if !ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(file), rel)
+}
+
+// firstExisting returns the first candidate path that exists with the requested kind (dir vs
+// file). Empty candidates (e.g. unset env overrides) are skipped.
+func firstExisting(candidates []string, wantDir bool) string {
+	for _, p := range candidates {
+		if p == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := os.Stat(p)
+		if err != nil || info.IsDir() != wantDir {
+			continue
+		}
+		return p
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// LoadComplianceGraph loads the file-backed Compliance Execution Graph: the Registry join-key
+// contract (obligations/obligation_join_keys.json — owned by the Obligation session) + our
+// curated, accepted control mappings + evidence requirements. Locations are resolved across
+// three layouts: dev (cwd = ai-compliance-sdk/, canonical contract at ../obligations), container
+// (WORKDIR /app, data/ copied in incl. a synced data/obligations/ copy) and `go test`
+// (cwd = package dir, via graphCallerRel). Fail-closed: a missing/invalid source returns an
+// error so the handler serves 503 — never a half-built graph.
+//
+// NOTE: data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json is a SYNCED COPY of the repo-root contract
+// (the canonical owner is the Obligation session). Re-sync it when the Registry grows; dev/test
+// prefer the canonical repo-root path, only the container falls back to the copy.
+func LoadComplianceGraph() (*ObligationJoinKeys, *ControlMappingSet, *EvidenceRequirementSet, error) {
+	joinPath := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_OBLIGATION_JOIN_KEYS"),
+		"../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json",
+		graphCallerRel("../../../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json"),
+		"data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json"),
+	}, false)
+	if joinPath == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("obligation_join_keys.json not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+	mapDir := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_CONTROL_MAPPINGS_DIR"),
+		"data/control_mappings",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/control_mappings"),
+	}, true)
+	if mapDir == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("control_mappings dir not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+	evDir := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_EVIDENCE_DIR"),
+		"data/evidence_requirements",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/evidence_requirements"),
+	}, true)
+	if evDir == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("evidence_requirements dir not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+
+	joins, err := LoadObligationJoinKeys(joinPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load join keys (%s): %w", joinPath, err)
+	}
+	mappings, err := LoadControlMappings(mapDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load control mappings (%s): %w", mapDir, err)
+	}
+	evidence, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements(evDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load evidence (%s): %w", evDir, err)
+	}
+	return joins, mappings, evidence, nil
+}
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ type ControlMapping struct {
 	SourceRole      string `json:"source_role"`             // source_role of the norm (operational_requirement, ...)
 	TargetFramework string `json:"target_framework"`        // e.g. "OWASP ASVS"
 	TargetControl   string `json:"target_control"`          // e.g. "V6.3.1"
-	MappingType     string `json:"mapping_type"`            // supports | partially_supports | implements | related | contradicts
+	MappingType     string `json:"mapping_type"`            // primary_implementation | implements | supports | partially_supports | related | contradicts
 	MappingStatus   string `json:"mapping_status"`          // candidate | accepted | rejected | superseded
 	Provenance      string `json:"provenance"`              // retriever_candidate | human_curated | rule_based
 	ObligationID    string `json:"obligation_id,omitempty"` // stable cross-session join key (Obligation Registry); empty until adopted, citation_unit is the interim bridge
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ type ControlMapping struct {

 // Allowed enum values — the deterministic "rule" layer that keeps the curated store clean.
 var (
-	mappingTypeValues   = map[string]bool{"supports": true, "partially_supports": true, "implements": true, "related": true, "contradicts": true}
+	mappingTypeValues   = map[string]bool{"primary_implementation": true, "implements": true, "supports": true, "partially_supports": true, "related": true, "contradicts": true}
 	mappingStatusValues = map[string]bool{"candidate": true, "accepted": true, "rejected": true, "superseded": true}
 	provenanceValues    = map[string]bool{"retriever_candidate": true, "human_curated": true, "rule_based": true}
 )
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+# Capability Model v1 — Objektarten & Beziehungstypen (Schema-Papier, NICHT materialisiert)
+
+Status: **OFFEN / Entscheidung erforderlich (2026-06-26).** Dies ist Schritt **#5a** (Papier).
+Schritt **#5b** (Materialisierung: `capabilities.json`, Migration, Obligation→Capability-Links,
+Guidance-Mapping, Runtime) ist **GEGATED** auf die Annahme dieses Papiers. **Es wurde noch keine
+Zeile Daten verschoben.**
+
+Baut auf [legal_obligation_layer_v1.md](legal_obligation_layer_v1.md),
+[obligation_registry_v1.md](obligation_registry_v1.md) und dem Cross-Domain-Review
+(`obligations/cross_domain_relationships.json`, Commit `ed31fdc0`).
+
+---
+
+## 0. Warum ein Papier statt `capabilities.json`
+
+Die Plattform hat drei empirische Architektur-Sprünge gemacht:
+1. **Control ≠ Wissensobjekt** → Legal Obligation (sofort implementiert, datenbestätigt).
+2. **Procedure ist eigenständig** (implementiert: `cra_procedures.json`).
+3. **Capabilities tauchen domänenübergreifend wieder auf** (Cross-Domain-Review).
+
+(1) und (2) waren breit datenbelegt → sofort umgesetzt. Bei (3) ist die **Objektart selbst noch
+nicht definiert.** Wir wissen NICHT genau, was eine Capability ist. Materialisieren wir jetzt,
+riskieren wir, in drei Wochen festzustellen: „Attack Surface war gar keine Capability" → Umbau.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Der Auslöser: die 8 „Capabilities" sind NICHT eine Objektart
+
+Der Cross-Domain-Review fand 16 `SHARED_CAPABILITY`-Paare → 8 Cluster. Bei Inspektion zerfallen
+sie in **zwei verschiedene Objektarten**:
+
+| Cluster (Opus-Benennung) | Art | Begründung |
+|---|---|---|
+| `mfa` | **Capability** | implementierbar als Funktion |
+| `session_management` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `transport_encryption` (tls/mutual_tls/cert) | **Capability** | implementierbar (vom Klassifikator fein gesplittet → 1 Capability) |
+| `code_signing` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `anomaly_detection` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `access_control` | **Ziel** (schwach) | abstraktes Ziel, kein Baustein — eher OVERLAP (siehe Konsolidierung) |
+
+Dazu die **zwei Gap-„Obligations" aus Handoff #4** (NIST SI-7/CM-7 waren breiter als jeder
+einzelne Treffer):
+
+| Kandidat | Art | Begründung |
+|---|---|---|
+| `software_integrity_protection` (SI-7) | **Sicherheitsziel** | wird NICHT direkt gebaut; erreicht durch code_signing + hash_verification + secure_boot |
+| `attack_surface_minimization` (CM-7) | **Sicherheitsziel** | erreicht durch least_functionality + Port-Deaktivierung + Interface-Reduktion |
+
+**Kernbeobachtung (User):** Es gibt **Typ 1 — technische Fähigkeiten** (implementierbar) und
+**Typ 2 — Sicherheitsziele** (nicht direkt implementierbar, durch mehrere Capabilities erreicht).
+Sie in eine `capabilities.json` zu werfen wäre der Fehler.
+
+```
+Integrity Protection (Ziel)            Access Protection (Ziel)
+   ↑ erreicht durch                       ↑ erreicht durch
+code_signing · hash_verification ·     mfa · session_management ·
+secure_boot (Capabilities)             credential_storage (Capabilities)
+```
+
+Das erklärt rückwirkend auch das **systematische Synth-Über-Tiering** (Auth 14→6, Remote 14→5):
+das LLM mischte ziel-nahe Obligations mit fähigkeits-nahen Mechanismen, weil die Modellsprache
+die Ebenen nicht trennte.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Kandidat-Objektarten
+
+| Objektart | Definition | Diskriminator-Test |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Regulation** | Rechtsakt (CRA, NIS2, DSGVO, MaschVO) | „Ist es ein Gesetz/VO?" |
+| **Legal Obligation** | rechtlich verankerte Pflicht. **CORE** (abstrakt, oft = Sicherheitsziel) ⊇ **DOMAIN** (spezialisiert) — die CORE/DOMAIN-Achse existiert bereits (portability). | „Steht das so (sinngemäß) im Recht? Kann ein Prüfer FEHLT/ERFÜLLT sagen?" |
+| **Capability** *(NEU)* | implementierbare, **regulierungs-agnostische** technische Funktion, als Einheit baubar & testbar | „Kann ein Hersteller GENAU DAS bauen/konfigurieren?" → ja |
+| **Procedure** | wiederholbarer operativer Prozess, der eine Capability ausbringt/erhält (bereits modelliert) | „Ist es eine Tätigkeit/ein Ablauf?" |
+| **Control** | testbare Prüfanweisung | „Kann man es prüfen (pass/fail)?" |
+| **Evidence** | Nachweis-Artefakt (Audit-Log, SBOM, Release Notes) | „Ist es ein Beleg-Dokument/Datum?" |
+| **Guidance** *(quer)* | externe Empfehlung WIE (NIST/OWASP/ENISA/BSI). **Nicht-bindend.** | „Beschreibt es eine empfohlene Umsetzung, kein Primärrecht?" |
+
+---
+
+## 3. DER ZENTRALE KNACKPUNKT: Ist „Security Objective" eine eigene Klasse?
+
+### Modell A — flach (Objektive = Obligations)
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation → Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+```
+Sicherheitsziele sind einfach **CORE Legal Obligations**; domänen-scoped Pflichten sind DOMAIN-
+Obligations, die per `specializes` an die CORE hängen.
+
+### Modell B — mit eigener Security-Objective-Klasse
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation → Security Objective → Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+```
+
+### Modell C — hybrid (Capability als einzige neue Klasse) ← **EMPFEHLUNG**
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation (CORE ⊇ DOMAIN) --realized_by--> Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+                                   ▲                                  ▲
+                                   └── specializes (DOMAIN→CORE)      └── described_by ── Guidance (NIST/OWASP/…)
+```
+
+**Empfehlung: Modell C.** Begründung aus den Daten:
+- Die „Sicherheitsziele" (`software_integrity_protection`, `attack_surface_minimization`, CIA,
+  access-protection) **SIND im CRA bindende Pflichten** (Annex I (2)(a–m) ist Primärrecht). Ein
+  Sicherheitsziel ist also eine **CORE Legal Obligation**, kein neuer Objekttyp.
+- Die **CORE/DOMAIN-Achse existiert schon** (portability_core ⊇ health/data_act). `attack_surface_
+  minimization` (CORE) ⊇ `remote_access_attack_surface_min` (DOMAIN) ist exakt dasselbe Muster.
+  → keine neue Klasse, nur konsequente Nutzung des Vorhandenen.
+- **Genau EINE** wirklich neue Klasse (**Capability**) ist sparsam und niedrig-risiko.
+- Modell B verdoppelt die normative Ebene (Obligation vs Objective), die im CRA 1:1 zusammenfällt
+  → Klasse, die niemand sauber befüllt.
+
+**Konsequenz für die #4-Gap:** `software_integrity_protection` + `attack_surface_minimization`
+werden als **CORE Legal Obligations** angelegt (nicht als Capabilities), und die domänen-scoped
+Treffer (`signed_update_integrity`, `remote_access_attack_surface_min`) `specializes` → CORE.
+NIST SI-7/CM-7 mappen dann `primary_implementation` auf die CORE.
+
+**Offen für den User:** Modell C akzeptieren? Oder ist die regulierungs-AGNOSTISCHE Vereinheitlichung
+(eine „confidentiality" über CRA+NIS2+ISO) so wertvoll, dass „Security Objective" doch eine eigene
+Klasse verdient (Modell B)? Das ist die einzige wirklich offene Architekturentscheidung.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Beziehungstypen — das Modell ist ein GRAPH, keine flache Ebene
+
+Der Review fand **vier distinkte Cross-Domain-Strukturrelationen** (nicht eine):
+`SUPPORTED_BY` 23 · `SHARED_CAPABILITY` 16 · `SHARED_EVIDENCE` 7 · `SHARED_PROCEDURE` 5 (+ 1 Merge).
+Das ist kein Baum. Vorgeschlagenes gerichtetes Kanten-Vokabular:
+
+| Kante | von → nach | aus Review-Relation |
+|---|---|---|
+| `specializes` | DOMAIN-Obligation → CORE-Obligation | (SUPPORTED_BY, Spezialfall) |
+| `contributes_to` | Obligation → Obligation | (SUPPORTED_BY, Beitrag) |
+| `realized_by` | Obligation → Capability | (SHARED_CAPABILITY ⇒ 2 Obl. teilen 1 Capability) |
+| `deployed_via` | Capability → Procedure | (SHARED_PROCEDURE) |
+| `verified_by` | Procedure/Capability → Control | — |
+| `produces` | Procedure → Evidence | (SHARED_EVIDENCE ⇒ 2 Obl. teilen 1 Nachweis) |
+| `described_by` | Capability → Guidance | (guidance_basis) |
+| `same_as` | Obligation ↔ Obligation | (SAME_OBLIGATION, Merge) |
+
+`SHARED_CAPABILITY`/`SHARED_EVIDENCE`/`SHARED_PROCEDURE` sind also **keine Obligation-Obligation-
+Kanten**, sondern Belege, dass zwei Obligations **denselben Knoten einer tieferen Ebene** teilen
+(Capability / Evidence / Procedure). Genau das ist der Mehrwert gegenüber „sieht ähnlich aus".
+
+---
+
+## 5. Die 8 offenen Fragen (Antwort + Tradeoff)
+
+1. **Was ist eine Capability?** Eine implementierbare, regulierungs-agnostische technische Funktion,
+   als Einheit baubar/konfigurierbar/testbar (MFA, TLS, Code Signing, Session-Mgmt, Anomaly-Detection).
+2. **Unterschied zur Obligation?** Obligation = rechtliche Pflicht (WAS das Recht verlangt, regulierungs-
+   verankert, normativ). Capability = technisches Mittel (WIE man sie erfüllt, agnostisch). n:m.
+3. **Unterschied zum Security Objective?** Ziel = erwünschter Sicherheitszustand (CIA, attack-surface-min);
+   Capability = Mittel dorthin. **Empfehlung (Modell C):** das Ziel ist eine CORE Obligation, kein
+   eigener Typ → Unterschied reduziert sich auf Obligation(abstrakt) vs Capability(Mittel).
+4. **Wann Guidance?** Wenn es eine **nicht-bindende externe Empfehlung zur Umsetzung** ist (NIST AC-12,
+   OWASP ASVS V6). Hängt an der **Capability** (meist) bzw. Procedure — NIE als `legal_basis` einer
+   LEGAL_MINIMUM-Obligation (Primärrecht-Regel bleibt).
+5. **Wann Procedure?** Wenn es ein **wiederholbarer operativer Ablauf** ist, der eine Capability
+   ausbringt/erhält (MFA konfigurieren, Schlüssel rotieren, Patch-Zyklus fahren).
+6. **Capability → mehrere Obligations?** **JA, belegt:** `mfa` erfüllt 6 Obligations (auth+remote),
+   `code_signing` 2 (auth+updates). n:m.
+7. **Obligation → mehrere Capabilities?** **JA, belegt:** access-protection ← mfa + session_management
+   + credential_storage. n:m.
+8. **Wo hängen NIST/OWASP/ENISA/BSI?** Primär an der **Capability** (sie beschreiben deren Umsetzung),
+   teils an Procedure. **Das erklärt, warum die über-getierten BP-Obligations `guidance_basis` trugen:
+   sie waren in Wahrheit Capabilities.** Sauberer Sitz von `guidance_basis` = Capability.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Worked Examples (4 Domänen, echte IDs)
+
+**Authentication** — `user_authentication_required` (Obl, CORE: access-protection)
+`--realized_by-->` { `mfa`, `session_management`, `credential_storage` } (Capabilities)
+`--described_by-->` NIST IA-2 / OWASP ASVS V6 (Guidance).
+
+**Updates** — `provide_security_updates` (Obl, LEGAL_MINIMUM) `--realized_by-->`
+{ `code_signing` (= signed_update_integrity-Capability), `automatic_update_delivery`, `rollback` }
+— exakt die `capability_candidate`-Marker aus `cra_updates.json`.
+
+**Remote Access** — CORE `attack_surface_minimization` (NEU, = CM-7-Ziel) `⊇ specializes ⊇`
+`remote_access_attack_surface_min` (DOMAIN) `--realized_by-->` { `least_functionality`, `port_disabling` }.
+
+**SBOM** — Sonderfall: die SBOM-Familie ist im Cross-Review der **Evidence-/Procedure-Input** für
+`vuln_identification_inventory` (5× SUPPORTED_BY-Hub), weniger Capability. → bestätigt, dass nicht
+jede Domäne primär Capabilities beisteuert; manche liefern **Evidence**. Stützt den Graph-Charakter.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Entscheidung, die ich vom User brauche (vor #5b)
+
+1. **Modell C** (Capability = einzige neue Klasse; Sicherheitsziele = CORE-Obligations) — akzeptiert?
+   Oder Modell B (Security Objective als eigene Klasse für regulierungs-agnostische Vereinheitlichung)?
+2. **Kanten-Vokabular** aus §4 — so einfrieren?
+3. **`guidance_basis` wandert konzeptionell an die Capability** — einverstanden? (Bricht nichts sofort;
+   die Obligations behalten den Verweis bis #5b.)
+4. Erst danach **#5b**: `capabilities.json` (capability_id, fulfills_obligations[] via `realized_by`,
+   guidance_basis hochgezogen), die 2 CORE-Gap-Obligations, der Merge (`vuln_remediation_patching` ≈
+   `provide_security_updates`), und die 2 Remote-Grenzfälle final tiern.
+
+## 8. Bewusst NICHT in #5a (gegated)
+
+Keine `capabilities.json`, keine Migration, kein Obligation-Rewrite, kein Guidance-Move, kein Runtime.
+Erst Modell-Annahme, dann Daten. „Erst das Schema, dann verschieben."
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Compliance Operating System — Meta Model v1.0 (FROZEN)
+
+> **STATUS: EINGEFROREN (2026-06-26). ARCHITEKTUR-FREEZE IN KRAFT.**
+> Ab v1.0 dürfen neue Regulierungen das Modell **nicht mehr verändern** — sie müssen sich
+> **einfügen**. Das Modell wird nur wieder geöffnet, wenn eine Regulierung **nachweislich
+> scheitert** (eine Anforderung lässt sich ohne neue Objektklasse nicht abbilden).
+> Validiert gegen 5 Regulierungsarten: DSGVO · CRA · MaschVO · Data Act · NIS2.
+
+Konsolidiert + friert ein: [legal_obligation_layer_v1.md](legal_obligation_layer_v1.md),
+[capability_model_v1.md](capability_model_v1.md) (Modell C), [meta_model_validation_v1.md](meta_model_validation_v1.md).
+Was hier eingefroren wird, ist **ausschließlich die Meta-Semantik** — NICHT die Registry, NICHT die
+Capabilities-Liste, NICHT die Procedures (diese wachsen als Daten weiter).
+
+## 1. Objektklassen (6 + Guidance) — eingefroren
+
+| Klasse | Was | Regulierungs-Bindung |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Regulation** | Rechtsakt | — |
+| **Legal Obligation** | rechtlich verankerte Pflicht; **CORE ⊇ DOMAIN** | regulierungs-anchored |
+| **Capability** | implementierbare technische Faehigkeit (OPTIONAL für eine Obligation) | **agnostisch** (n:m über Regulierungen) |
+| **Procedure** | wiederholbarer operativer Prozess | agnostisch |
+| **Control** | testbare Prüfanweisung | agnostisch |
+| **Evidence** | Nachweis-Artefakt | agnostisch |
+| **Guidance** *(quer)* | externe nicht-bindende Empfehlung (NIST/OWASP/ISO/BSI) — hängt an der **Capability** | agnostisch |
+
+## 2. Die Kette + kanonisches Kanten-Vokabular — eingefroren
+
+```
+Regulation
+   ↓ definiert
+Legal Obligation  (CORE ⊇ DOMAIN)
+   ↓ realized_by      (OPTIONAL — rein prozessuale/dokumentarische Obligations überspringen Capability)
+Capability
+   ↓ deployed_via     (alias: operationalized_by)
+Procedure
+   ↓ verified_by
+Control
+   ↓ produces         (alias: produces_evidence_for)
+Evidence
+   → Produktstatus
+```
+
+Kanten (gerichtet, eingefroren):
+`specializes` (DOMAIN→CORE) · `realized_by` (Obligation→Capability) · `deployed_via` (Capability→Procedure) ·
+`verified_by` (Procedure/Capability→Control) · `produces` (Procedure→Evidence) · `described_by` (Capability→Guidance) ·
+`supports` / `depends_on` / `contributes_to` (Obligation↔Obligation) · `same_as` (Merge/Alias).
+**Das Modell ist ein GRAPH, kein Baum** (n:m an realized_by, supports, produces).
+
+## 3. Attribute (KEINE Klassen) — eingefroren
+
+`applicability` · `tier` (LEGAL_MINIMUM/BEST_PRACTICE) · `legal_basis` (Primärrecht) ·
+`guidance_basis` (NIST/OWASP/…, kanonisch an der Capability) · `objective_tags`
+(integrity/confidentiality/attack_surface/… — Vorwärts-Kompat zu einer späteren Security-Objective-
+Klasse) · `risk_level` · `deadline` · **`hazard` (Attribut, KEINE Klasse)**.
+
+**Watch-Point (bewusste Nicht-Klasse):** `Hazard/Threat` bleibt ein Risiko-Treiber-Attribut. Es wird
+*erst dann* eine eigene Klasse, wenn quantitatives Risiko (FMEA: Hazard→Risiko→Maßnahme) als
+First-Class-Graph-Knoten modelliert werden soll — das ist die einzige bekannte künftige Öffnungs-Ursache.
+
+## 4. Architektur-Freeze-Policy
+
+1. **Neue Regulierung = Daten, nicht Architektur.** Sie läuft durch `Parser → Discovery-Pipeline →
+   Review → Registry` und fügt Obligations/Capabilities/Procedures/Evidence hinzu.
+2. **Eine neue Objektklasse ist eine Architektur-Änderung** und erfordert explizite Wieder-Öffnung +
+   Begründung (nachgewiesenes Scheitern der Abbildung). Default-Erwartung: **0 neue Klassen.**
+3. Verfeinerungen an Attributen (neues `*_tag`, neues risk-Attribut) sind erlaubt, solange keine
+   neue Klasse entsteht.
+
+## 5. Reuse-Metrik (KPI je neuer Regulierung) — der Wissens-Akkumulations-Beweis
+
+Für jede neue Regulierung gemessen (Baseline = der jeweils vorhandene Bestand):
+
+| Kennzahl | Soll/Bedeutung |
+|---|---|
+| **Neue Objektklassen** | **= 0** (Invariante; sonst Freeze gebrochen) |
+| Neue Capabilities | additiv (z.B. +8) |
+| **Wiederverwendete Capabilities %** | Kern-KPI (z.B. NIS2 ~70–80 % erwartet) |
+| Wiederverwendete Procedures % | (z.B. 58 %) |
+| Wiederverwendete Evidence % | (z.B. 81 %) |
+| Neue Obligations | additiv (z.B. +42) |
+
+Zielaussage: *„Beim AI Act: 0 neue Objektklassen, 12 neue Capabilities, 41 neue Obligations,
+78 % der vorhandenen Capabilities wiederverwendet."* → belegt, dass das System **Wissen akkumuliert**,
+statt je Regulierung neu gebaut zu werden. (Tool zur Berechnung folgt mit dem ersten Live-Durchlauf.)
+
+## 6. Der Burggraben (warum das mehr ist als ein Advisor / RAG)
+
+Der Kunde denkt nicht in Artikeln, sondern: *„Wir haben Remote-Updates / signierte Firmware / einen
+Vuln-Prozess."* Über die Capability-Schicht bildet das System diese Aussagen auf **alle betroffenen
+Obligations mehrerer Regulierungen** ab und beantwortet die eigentliche Frage aus dem Kundengespräch:
+> **„Habe ich das Gesetz richtig verstanden, und reicht das, was wir umgesetzt haben?"**
+
+Das ist regel-/wissensgestütztes Reasoning über ein gemeinsames Modell — keine RAG-Aufgabe.
+(Die Reasoning-Session hält dabei die Welt-Grenze: `ClaimCoverage` „potenziell relevant" ⊥
+`ComplianceStatus` „erfüllt aus Nachweisen".)
+
+## 7. Was NICHT eingefroren ist (wächst weiter als Daten)
+
+Registry-Inhalte (Obligations je Regulierung), die Capabilities-Liste, Procedures, Evidence-Typen,
+Applicability-Prädikate, Citation-Spans. Diese Schicht ist **Wissensaufbau** — explizit erwünschtes
+Wachstum gegen das eingefrorene Modell.
+
+## 8. Erster Live-Durchlauf (User-Priorität nach Informationswert)
+
+1. **MaschVO** ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ — beweist „Compliance-OS ≠ Cybersecurity" (physische Safety, CE, Restgefahren).
+2. **NIS2** ⭐⭐⭐⭐ — misst maximalen Capability-Reuse (erwartet 70–80 %).
+3. **AI Act** ⭐⭐⭐⭐ — Risikoklassifizierung/Governance, vermutlich 0 neue Klassen.
+4. **Data Act** ⭐⭐⭐ — bestätigt „Capability optional".
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+# Meta-Model Validation v1 — Ist das Modell regulierungsunabhängig?
+
+Status: **Phase 6 — Meta-Validierung (2026-06-26). KEIN neues Coding, KEINE Regulierung ingestiert.**
+Dieses Dokument ist der Stresstest VOR der nächsten Regulierung. Baut auf
+[capability_model_v1.md](capability_model_v1.md) (Modell C, #5b materialisiert) +
+[legal_obligation_layer_v1.md](legal_obligation_layer_v1.md).
+
+## Die eigentliche Frage
+
+Nicht „welche Regulierung kommt als nächstes?", sondern:
+
+> **Kann eine völlig neue Regulierung in dieses Modell eingeordnet werden, OHNE eine neue
+> Objektklasse einzuführen?**
+
+Wenn ja für MaschVO + Data Act + AI Act + NIS2 → das ist kein CRA-Graph mehr, sondern ein
+**Compliance Meta Model**. Ab dann bringt jede Regulierung primär *Daten*, nicht *Architektur*.
+
+## Das zu testende Modell (6 Klassen + Attribute, KEINE weitere Klasse erlaubt)
+
+```
+Regulation
+   ↓ definiert
+Legal Obligation   (CORE ⊇ DOMAIN; tier=LEGAL_MINIMUM/BEST_PRACTICE; objective_tags[]; applicability)
+   ↓ realized_by   (OPTIONAL)
+Capability         (regulierungs-agnostische technische Faehigkeit; guidance_basis hier)
+   ↓ deployed_via
+Procedure
+   ↓ verified_by
+Control
+   ↓ produces
+Evidence
+```
+Quer: **Guidance** (NIST/OWASP/ISO/BSI) hängt an der Capability. **Attribute** (keine Klassen):
+`tier`, `objective_tags`, `applicability`, später `deadline`/`risk_level`/`severity`.
+Kanten: realized_by · specializes · contributes_to · deployed_via · verified_by · produces · described_by · same_as.
+
+---
+
+## Test 1 — Maschinenverordnung (EU) 2023/1230
+
+| Modell-Klasse | MaschVO-Inhalt |
+|---|---|
+| Legal Obligation (CORE) | `hazard_minimization` (Sicherheits-Analogon zu attack_surface_minimization), `safe_control_systems`, `machine_risk_assessment`, `ce_conformity`, `instructions_for_use` — exakt die `machine_*`-Obligations, die die Reasoning-Session bereits unabhängig geprägt hat. |
+| Capability | **physische Sicherheitsfunktionen**: `emergency_stop`, `safety_interlock`, `two_hand_control`, `guarding`, `safe_torque_off`. → die **Capability-Klasse generalisiert von Cyber auf physische Safety** (gleiche Klasse, andere Domäne). |
+| Procedure | Risikobeurteilung (ISO 12100), CE-Konformitätsbewertung. |
+| Evidence | Technische Unterlagen, Risikobeurteilungsbericht, Konformitätserklärung. |
+
+**Stress-Punkt:** „**Hazard**" (mechanisch/elektrisch/thermisch) = Schadensquelle — weder Obligation
+noch Capability. Kandidat für eine neue Klasse? → **Nein, für die Repräsentation:** ein Hazard ist
+ein *Risiko-Treiber* (Attribut/Applicability der Risikobeurteilungs-Procedure); eine Capability
+*mitigiert* einen Hazard, genau wie eine Cyber-Capability eine (implizite) Bedrohung kontert. `PL/SIL`
+= Attribut (wie `tier`). **Hazard wird erst dann eine Klasse, wenn ihr quantitatives FMEA-Risiko als
+First-Class-Graph-Knoten wollt** (vgl. [[project-fmea-safety-direction]]) — nicht für Compliance-Abbildung.
+
+**Verdikt: KEINE neue Klasse.** (Stärkstes Ergebnis: die Capability-Klasse trägt von Cyber zu Safety.)
+
+---
+
+## Test 2 — Data Act (EU) 2023/2854
+
+| Modell-Klasse | Data-Act-Inhalt |
+|---|---|
+| Legal Obligation | `data_act_data_access_by_design`, `data_act_user_data_access`, `data_portability_switching`, `fair_contract_terms` (FRAND), `interoperability` — deckt sich mit den `data_act_*`-Obligations der Reasoning-Session. |
+| Capability | `data_export_api`, `interoperability_interface`, `access_control` (**Reuse**). ABER: `fair_contract_terms` hat **KEINE technische Capability**. |
+| Procedure | FRAND-Klauseln entwerfen; Switching-Prozess. |
+| Evidence | Vertrag/Klauselwerk, API-Doku. |
+
+**Stress-Punkt:** **vertraglich-rechtliche Pflichten** (FRAND, Verbot unfairer Klauseln) haben kein
+technisches Mittel. → Beleg, dass **`realized_by Capability` OPTIONAL ist**: manche Obligations werden
+rein über **Procedure (Entwurf) + Evidence (Vertrag)** erfüllt. Das ist KEINE neue Klasse — wir haben
+es schon gesehen (SBOM-Familie war Evidence-/Procedure-lastig, kaum Capability).
+
+**Verdikt: KEINE neue Klasse.** Verfeinerung: Capability ist optional (Obligation → Procedure → Evidence
+ohne Capability ist gültig).
+
+---
+
+## Test 3 — AI Act (EU) 2024/1689
+
+| Modell-Klasse | AI-Act-Inhalt |
+|---|---|
+| Legal Obligation | `ai_risk_management_system`, `ai_data_governance`, `ai_technical_documentation`, `ai_transparency_disclosure`, `human_oversight`, `accuracy_robustness`, `fundamental_rights_assessment`. |
+| Capability | `event_logging` (**Reuse**!), `bias_detection`, `accuracy_testing`, `human_oversight_mechanism`, `ai_transparency_notice`. |
+| Procedure | Risikomanagement-Prozess; FRIA-Durchführung; Human-Oversight-Prozess. |
+| Evidence | Technische Dokumentation, FRIA-Bericht, Logs. |
+
+**Stress-Punkt:** **Risiko-Klassifikation** (unacceptable/high/limited/minimal) bestimmt, WELCHE
+Obligations gelten. → das ist **Applicability** (existiert bereits; analog zu CRA-Produktklasse).
+`human_oversight` = Procedure + Capability (Oversight-UI). `transparency` = Disclosure (Capability/Evidence,
+wie Cookie/DSE-Offenlegung). `FRIA` = Procedure + Evidence.
+
+**Verdikt: KEINE neue Klasse.** Verfeinerung: Risiko-Tier = Applicability-Attribut (vorhanden).
+
+---
+
+## Test 4 — NIS2 (EU) 2022/2555
+
+| Modell-Klasse | NIS2-Inhalt |
+|---|---|
+| Legal Obligation | `nis2_risk_management_measures`, `nis2_incident_reporting`, `supply_chain_security`, `governance_accountability`, `business_continuity`. |
+| Capability | **MFA, transport_encryption, security_monitoring_alerting, patch/update, backup** — **dieselben Capabilities wie CRA**. Das ist die Auszahlung: NIS2-Obligations `realized_by` die bereits gebaute Capability-Schicht. |
+| Procedure | Incident-Response-Prozess; Lieferketten-Audit; Governance-Prozess. |
+| Evidence | Incident-Reports, Audit-Logs, Vorstandsprotokolle. |
+
+**Stress-Punkt:** **Meldefristen** (24h/72h/1 Monat) = zeitgebundene Procedure → `deadline` = Attribut.
+`governance_accountability` (Management-Haftung) = organisatorische Obligation → Procedure + Evidence.
+
+**Verdikt: KEINE neue Klasse.** Stärkster Reuse-Fall (teilt die CRA-Capability-Schicht vollständig).
+
+---
+
+## Ergebnis: 4 × NEIN → das Metamodell steht
+
+Alle vier Regulierungen passen in die 6 Klassen **ohne neue Objektklasse** — unter zwei
+Verfeinerungen, die der Test selbst aufdeckt (beide sind KEINE neuen Klassen):
+
+1. **`realized_by Capability` ist OPTIONAL.** Vertraglich/dokumentarisch/prozessuale Obligations
+   (Data-Act-FRAND, NIS2-Governance, AI-Act-FRIA) werden rein über Procedure + Evidence erfüllt.
+2. **Risiko-Niveau / Frist / Hazard-Schwere / Risiko-Tier sind ATTRIBUTE**, keine Klassen
+   (`tier`-Muster: `deadline`, `risk_level`, `severity`, `risk_tier`).
+
+**Der einzige Watch-Point:** **Hazard / Threat.** Heute implizit (Obligations existieren, um sie zu
+kontern). Eine eigene Klasse wird *erst* nötig, wenn ihr **quantitatives Risiko first-class** modelliert
+(FMEA: Hazard→Risiko→Maßnahme als Graph-Knoten). Für die reine Compliance-Abbildung: nicht nötig.
+→ Das ist die präzise Antwort auf „wo wäre erstmals eine neue Klasse nötig?".
+
+## Empirische Stütze (nicht nur Theorie)
+
+Die 3. Session (Reasoning Engine) hat **unabhängig** `proposed=True`-Obligations für MaschVO
+(`machine_*`) und Data Act (`data_act_*`) geprägt — und brauchte dafür **keine neue Objektklasse**,
+nur Obligation-IDs. Zwei Sessions kommen unabhängig zum selben Schluss.
+
+## Konsequenz für die Reasoning-Schicht (Produktvision)
+
+Heute: `Product → Applicable Regulations → Applicable Obligations`.
+Mit der Capability-Schicht wird daraus:
+```
+Applicable Capabilities → Required Procedures → Expected Evidence
+```
+Antwort auf die Kundenaussage „Ich habe X umgesetzt" ist dann nicht „CRA Artikel …", sondern:
+```
+✓ Capability A   ✓ Capability B   ✗ Capability C
+   ↓
+erfüllt CRA, MaschVO, NIS2  (teilweise)
+```
+Eine Capability erfüllt Obligations über *mehrere Regulierungen* (n:m) → eine Umsetzung wird gegen
+das gesamte Regelwerk bewertet. Das ist qualitativ ein anderes Produkt als RAG.
+
+## Entscheidung / nächster Schritt
+
+Wenn dieses Dokument akzeptiert ist („keine weitere Klasse nötig"), verschiebt sich die Arbeit von
+**Architektur** zu **Wissensaufbau**: jede neue Regulierung läuft durch
+`Parser → Discovery-Pipeline → Review → Registry` (vorhandene Tooling), statt das Modell zu ändern.
+Offen für den User: (a) Metamodell als stabil einfrieren? (b) den Hazard/Threat-Watch-Point als
+bewusste Nicht-Klasse dokumentieren (bis FMEA-Quantifizierung)? (c) dann erste Regulierung als DATEN.
+
+## Bewusst NICHT in diesem Schritt
+
+Kein Code, keine Regulierung ingestiert, keine neue Klasse angelegt. Reiner Modell-Stresstest.
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "capability_layer_v1",
+ "model": "Modell C (docs-src/development/capability_model_v1.md)",
+ "note": "Capability = technische Faehigkeit (regulierungs-agnostisch). realized_by = Obligations, die sie erfuellt (n:m). guidance_basis hier KANONISCH hochgezogen aus den realisierten Obligations (die Obligation-Kopien bleiben vorerst als Legacy; Strip = Folge-Cleanup). Sicherheitsziele sind KEINE Capabilities -> cra_core.json.",
+ "dropped": {
+  "access_control": "OVERLAP (credential_confidentiality <-> sbom_confidentiality), nicht materialisiert"
+ },
+ "candidate_capabilities_followup": [
+  "automatic_update_delivery",
+  "update_rollback",
+  "trusted_update_source",
+  "hash_verification",
+  "secure_boot",
+  "least_functionality",
+  "credential_storage"
+ ],
+ "capabilities": [
+  {
+   "capability_id": "multi_factor_authentication",
+   "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication",
+   "description": "Mehrfaktor-Authentisierung als technische Faehigkeit (Besitz/Wissen/Inhaerenz).",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "mfa_required",
+    "privileged_op_reauth",
+    "remote_access_authentication",
+    "remote_access_mfa",
+    "remote_access_user_validation_ot",
+    "supplier_access_auth"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 6,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-63B",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "Out-of-Band-Authentifizierung",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "out_of_band_authentication"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "Hardware-basierte Authentifizierung (AAL3)",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "hardware_authenticators"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "E-Mail-Authentifizierungsmechanismen (SPF/DKIM/DMARC)",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "email_authentication"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-02",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-02(1)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AC-17",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-53 IA-2",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "ICS Security Kompendium",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "ISO",
+     "anchor": "ISO 27001 A.5.19",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "session_management",
+   "name": "Session Management",
+   "description": "Sichere Sitzungsverwaltung: Timeouts, Bindung, Re-Auth, Beendigung.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "reauth_after_inactivity",
+    "remote_session_management",
+    "session_binding_management",
+    "temporary_remote_access_mgmt"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 4,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-63B 4.3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-53 AC-12",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "OWASP",
+     "anchor": "ASVS V3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AC-2(5)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "transport_encryption",
+   "name": "Transport Encryption",
+   "description": "Verschluesselter Transport (TLS, mutual-TLS, Zertifikats-Auth, VPN/Tunnel).",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "encrypted_auth_channel",
+    "mutual_authentication",
+    "reject_insecure_remote_protocols",
+    "remote_access_confidentiality_integrity",
+    "remote_access_encryption",
+    "service_to_service_auth",
+    "tls_certificate_auth"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 7,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "TR-02102-2",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-03",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SC-8",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "IT-Grundschutz NET.3.3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "OWASP",
+     "anchor": "API Security Top 10",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-05(2)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "code_signing",
+   "name": "Code & Update Signing",
+   "description": "Digitale Signatur + Integritaets-/Authentizitaetspruefung von Firmware/Software/Updates.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "firmware_software_authentication",
+    "signed_update_integrity"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 2,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SI-07",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-147 BIOS Protection",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "updates"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "security_monitoring_alerting",
+   "name": "Security Monitoring & Alerting",
+   "description": "Anomalie-/Bedrohungserkennung und Alarmierung aus Logs/Telemetrie.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "log_monitoring_alerting",
+    "remote_access_threat_detection"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 2,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AU-6/SI-4",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-94",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "logging",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 {
 "schema_version": "controls_for_obligation_mapping_v1",
- "purpose": "Accepted CRA->OWASP controls (Compliance Execution Graph) for the Obligation Registry to propose the SEMANTIC control->obligation_id, replacing the coarse citation_unit interim join. Fill proposed_obligation_id per control, then we adopt it into control_mapping.obligation_id.",
- "source": "ai-compliance-sdk control_mappings, mapping_status=accepted, reviewed_by=benjamin 2026-06-25",
- "filled_by": "obligation-registry-session 2026-06-25 (alle 7/7: 4 auth/crypto + 3 logging via cra_logging.json)",
+ "purpose": "Accepted CRA->Framework controls (Compliance Execution Graph) for the Obligation Registry to propose the SEMANTIC control->obligation_id, replacing the coarse citation_unit interim join. Fill proposed_obligation_id per control, then we adopt it into control_mapping.obligation_id.",
+ "source": "ai-compliance-sdk control_mappings, mapping_status=accepted, reviewed_by=benjamin 2026-06-25. OWASP ASVS (7, gefuellt) + NIST SP 800-53 (3, pending).",
+ "filled_by": "obligation-registry-session 2026-06-25. OWASP 7/7 (4 auth/crypto + 3 logging). NIST 3/3 GEFUELLT (Obligation-Session): SI-2->provide_security_updates (stark, (2)(c)/Art.13) · SI-7->signed_update_integrity (update-scoped; SI-7 breiter) · CM-7->remote_access_attack_surface_min (remote-scoped; CM-7 breiter). GAP-BEFUND (Cross-Domain-Review): generische Parent-Obligations software_integrity_protection + attack_surface_minimization FEHLEN — SI-7/CM-7 sind breiter als die domaenen-scoped Treffer. Kandidaten fuer neue generische Obligations (User-Entscheidung). Damit 10/10 proposed_obligation_id gefuellt.",
 "join_principle": "SEMANTISCH via obligation_id, NICHT via citation_unit/legal_basis-Anker. Die CRA-Anker sind im Registry teils approximativ (siehe anchor_quality_note) — daher ist obligation_id der stabile Primaerschluessel, nicht der Anker.",
 "anchor_quality_note": "Registry-legal_basis-Anker sind teils CRA-Part-I-fehlzugeordnet (Opus-Synthese): user_authentication_required steht auf (2)(d) statt (2)(c); Crypto-Obligations auf (2)(e) statt (2)(d). CRA Annex I Part I: (2)(c)=Zugriffsschutz, (2)(d)=Vertraulichkeit, (2)(e)=Integritaet. Korrektur kommt mit dem zitierfaehigen Re-Ingest (span-genau). Deshalb: NICHT auf Anker joinen. ABER: der Logging-Cut (V16.*) ist korrekt auf (2)(k) verankert (echte Logging-Subsektion, kein Fehl-Anker).",
- "count": 7,
+ "mapping_type_note": "NEU: mapping_type=primary_implementation = die kanonische Primaer-Control einer Anforderung (genau eine), staerker als implements/supports. related-Controls (SC-3(3), RA-5, AC-6, SI-16, SA-10, ...) folgen separat als supports. Eine Obligation kann mehrere Controls haben, aber genau einen primary_implementation-Einstieg.",
+ "count": 10,
 "controls": [
  {
   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.3.1",
@@ -62,6 +63,30 @@
   "proposed_obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
   "mapping_method": "semantic",
   "mapping_note": "V16.1 = allgemeine Logging-Anforderung -> Umbrella-LM event_logging_security_events. Hohe Konfidenz."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(e)", "family": "integrity", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST SI-7 = Software/Firmware/Information Integrity (gesamte Produkt-Integritaet). #6 ADOPTIERT (2026-06-26) auf CORE software_integrity_protection (Annex I (2)(f)) — die in #5b materialisierte generische Integritaets-Obligation. Die domaenen-scoped signed_update_integrity (Update-Signatur, (1)(3)(f)) bleibt gueltig als DOMAIN, specializes->CORE. NICHT log_integrity_immutability (Audit-Log-Schutz, andere Ebene)."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(l)", "family": "update", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "provide_security_updates",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST SI-2 = Flaw Remediation. STARKER Treffer in eurer NEUEN updates-Familie (93-Stand): provide_security_updates (LEGAL_MINIMUM, Annex I (2)(c) + Art. 13) = DAS sichere-Update-LM. -> SI-2 primary_implementation = provide_security_updates. Verwandt (supports): vuln_remediation_patching (Part II Remediations-PROZESS), support_period_maintenance, update_testing_validation, update_rollback. Mein source_norm-Anker (2)(l) ist approximativ -> bitte (2)(c)/Art.13 via provide_security_updates nutzen."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(i)", "family": "attack_surface", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST CM-7 = Least Functionality (deaktivierte Ports/Dienste/Funktionen, GESAMTE Angriffsflaeche). #6 ADOPTIERT (2026-06-26) auf CORE attack_surface_minimization (Annex I (2)(j)) — die in #5b materialisierte generische Obligation. Die domaenen-scoped remote_access_attack_surface_min (nur Remote-Access-Flaeche) bleibt gueltig als DOMAIN, specializes->CORE. related (supports): SC-3(3)/AC-6/SI-16."
  }
 ]
 }
@@ -966,7 +966,10 @@
   "relationships": [],
   "citation_anchor_ids": [],
   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
-   "review_status": "draft"
+   "review_status": "draft",
+   "merged_into": "provide_security_updates",
+   "status": "deprecated_alias",
+   "merge_note": "SAME_OBLIGATION (Cross-Domain-Review). Kanonisch: provide_security_updates ((2)(c)/Art.13). ID bleibt als Alias aufloesbar; downstream provide_security_updates nutzen."
  },
  {
   "id": "vuln_handling_process",
@@ -10281,7 +10281,11 @@
    "cluster_size": 4,
    "llm_model": "claude-opus-4-8",
    "synthesis_version": "v1"
-   }
+   },
+   "specializes": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "integrity"
+   ]
  }
 ],
 "relationships": [
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_registry_v1",
+ "regulation": "CRA",
+ "regulation_code": "CRA",
+ "family": "core",
+ "theme": "CORE Security Objectives (CRA Annex I als regulierungs-agnostische Sicherheitsziele)",
+ "generated_by": "materialize_capabilities.py (#5b, Modell C)",
+ "note": "CORE Legal Obligations = Sicherheitsziele (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse). DOMAIN-Obligations specializes-en hierauf. objective_tags = Vorwaerts-Kompat zu Modell B.",
+ "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+ "obligations": [
+  {
+   "id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "name": "Minimierung der Angriffsflaeche",
+   "family": "core",
+   "description": "Das Produkt minimiert seine Angriffsflaeche: unnoetige Funktionen/Ports/Dienste/Schnittstellen sind deaktiviert (Least Functionality).",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS",
+   "applicability": "universal",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "attack_surface"
+   ],
+   "legal_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "CRA",
+     "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(j)",
+     "citation": "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"
+    }
+   ],
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "CM-7 Least Functionality",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "specialized_by": [
+    "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+    "component_remote_interface_security"
+   ],
+   "primary_implementation": "NIST CM-7",
+   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+   "review_status": "core_from_5b"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "name": "Schutz der Software-/Firmware-Integritaet",
+   "family": "core",
+   "description": "Das Produkt schuetzt Integritaet und Authentizitaet von Software/Firmware (Manipulationserkennung, Secure Boot, Signaturpruefung, Runtime-Integritaet).",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS",
+   "applicability": "universal",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "integrity"
+   ],
+   "legal_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "CRA",
+     "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(f)",
+     "citation": "protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or processed data, software and configuration"
+    }
+   ],
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "specialized_by": [
+    "signed_update_integrity",
+    "firmware_software_authentication"
+   ],
+   "realized_by_capabilities": [
+    "code_signing"
+   ],
+   "primary_implementation": "NIST SI-7",
+   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+   "review_status": "core_from_5b"
+  }
+ ],
+ "relationships": []
+}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
 "schema_version": "obligation_join_keys_v1",
 "contract": "obligation_id ist der stabile Join-Key. Legal Knowledge Graph haengt citation_spans an obligation_id; Compliance Execution Graph mappt control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id. Interim-Bruecke = citation_units. obligation_id NIE neu vergeben (re-link).",
- "count": 66,
+ "count": 95,
 "obligation_ids": [
  {
   "obligation_id": "sbom_creation",
@@ -175,6 +175,26 @@
   ],
   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(j)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
  {
   "obligation_id": "user_authentication_required",
   "regulation": "CRA",
@@ -582,6 +602,245 @@
   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
   "citation_units": [],
   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_control_least_privilege",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_confidentiality_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(b)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_session_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_mfa",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_encryption",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "reject_insecure_remote_protocols",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_logging_audit",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(g)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_user_validation_ot",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_training",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_architecture_design",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(a)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_vuln_patch_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_threat_detection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_maintenance_governance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "temporary_remote_access_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_data_export_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "component_remote_interface_security",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_fallback_concept",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "provide_security_updates",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)",
+    "Art. 13"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "support_period_maintenance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 13(8)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "signed_update_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "trusted_update_source",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_testing_validation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_rollback",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "automatic_updates_optout",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_risk_assessment",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "secure_modification_control",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
  }
 ]
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+"""Cross-Domain Relationship Discovery — Stufe 2: Opus klassifiziert jede Kandidaten-Beziehung
+in GENAU EINE Kategorie. Liefert das Rohmaterial der Compliance-Ontologie (insb. SHARED_CAPABILITY
+= Capability-Schicht). ANTHROPIC_API_KEY aus ENV (nie hartcodiert). Streaming.
+
+  ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=… python3 classify_relationships.py --pairs /tmp/cd_pairs.json \
+      --only-cross-family --out /tmp/cd_classified.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from collections import Counter
+
+SYS = """Du bist Compliance-Ontologe. Gegeben Paare von Legal Obligations (CRA), bestimme fuer
+JEDES Paar GENAU EINE Beziehung. Ziel ist NICHT Aehnlichkeit, sondern die STRUKTURELLE Beziehung.
+
+Kategorien (genau EINE; bei Mehrdeutigkeit gilt diese Prioritaet):
+1 SAME_OBLIGATION   — dieselbe rechtliche Pflicht, nur pro Domaene anders formuliert -> MERGE-Kandidat.
+2 SUPPORTED_BY      — A ist domaenenspezifische Auspraegung/Teilfall von B ODER A traegt zur Erfuellung von B bei. RICHTUNG angeben.
+3 SHARED_CAPABILITY — beide werden durch DIESELBE technische Faehigkeit erfuellt (z.B. MFA, TLS-Verschluesselung, digitale Signatur, Session-Management, Patch-Management, Logging-Pipeline). capability_name (snake_case) angeben.
+4 SHARED_PROCEDURE  — beide ueber denselben operativen Prozess erfuellt, ohne gemeinsames technisches Artefakt.
+5 SHARED_EVIDENCE   — beide erzeugen/nutzen denselben Nachweis (Audit-Log, SBOM, Release Notes). evidence_name angeben.
+6 SHARED_GUIDANCE   — beide berufen sich auf denselben externen Standard (NIST/OWASP/ISO), sonst distinkt.
+7 OVERLAP_ONLY      — nur oberflaechliche Wort-/Themenueberlappung, keine echte strukturelle Beziehung.
+8 UNRELATED         — Falsch-Positiv der Embedding-Naehe.
+
+Gib AUSSCHLIESSLICH JSON aus:
+{"results":[{"i":0,"relation":"SHARED_CAPABILITY","direction":"a->b|b->a|none","capability_name":"","evidence_name":"","reason":"max 18 Woerter"}]}
+Regeln: relation = genau eine der 8 Strings. direction nur bei SUPPORTED_BY, sonst "none".
+capability_name NUR bei SHARED_CAPABILITY (sonst ""), evidence_name NUR bei SHARED_EVIDENCE (sonst "").
+Sei streng: SHARED_GUIDANCE/OVERLAP_ONLY/UNRELATED grosszuegig nutzen; SAME_OBLIGATION nur bei echter Deckungsgleichheit.
+Gib fuer JEDES Paar (per Index i) genau ein Ergebnis."""
+
+
+def build_user(pairs: list[dict]) -> str:
+    lines = []
+    for i, p in enumerate(pairs):
+        lines.append(f'[{i}] A={p["a"]} ({p["fa"]}/{p["ta"]}): {p["da"]}\n'
+                     f'     B={p["b"]} ({p["fb"]}/{p["tb"]}): {p["db"]}  [sim={p["sim"]}]')
+    return "Paare:\n" + "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--pairs", required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--only-cross-family", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--min-sim", type=float, default=0.0)
+    ap.add_argument("--model", default="claude-opus-4-8")
+    ap.add_argument("--out", required=True)
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    d = json.load(open(a.pairs, encoding="utf-8"))
+    pairs = [p for p in d["pairs"]
+             if (not a.only_cross_family or p["cross_family"]) and p["sim"] >= a.min_sim]
+
+    import anthropic
+    client = anthropic.Anthropic(api_key=os.environ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"])
+    with client.messages.stream(model=a.model, max_tokens=24000, system=SYS,
+                                messages=[{"role": "user", "content": build_user(pairs)}]) as st:
+        msg = st.get_final_message()
+    txt = msg.content[0].text
+    m = re.search(r"\{.*\}", txt, re.DOTALL)
+    data = json.loads(m.group(0) if m else txt)
+
+    res = []
+    for r in data.get("results", []):
+        i = r.get("i")
+        if not isinstance(i, int) or i < 0 or i >= len(pairs):
+            continue
+        p = pairs[i]
+        res.append({"a": p["a"], "fa": p["fa"], "b": p["b"], "fb": p["fb"], "sim": p["sim"],
+                    "relation": r.get("relation", "?"), "direction": r.get("direction", "none"),
+                    "capability_name": r.get("capability_name", ""),
+                    "evidence_name": r.get("evidence_name", ""), "reason": r.get("reason", "")})
+    dist = Counter(r["relation"] for r in res)
+    out = {"n_pairs": len(pairs), "n_classified": len(res), "distribution": dict(dist),
+           "model": a.model, "results": res}
+    json.dump(out, open(a.out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+    print(f"classified {len(res)}/{len(pairs)} | {dict(dist)}")
+    print("written:", a.out)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Cross-Domain Relationship Discovery — Stufe 1 (key-frei, im bp-compliance-backend-Container).
+Alle Obligations mehrerer Registries -> BGE-M3-Embedding -> je Obligation Top-K Nachbarn ->
+Kandidaten-Paare (cross- UND same-family) >= min-sim. KEIN Urteil hier — nur Kandidaten.
+Stufe 2 (classify_relationships.py) klassifiziert die Beziehung per Opus.
+
+  python3 cross_domain_pairs.py /tmp/reg/cra.json /tmp/reg/cra_authentication.json ... \
+      --top-k 8 --min-sim 0.60 --out /tmp/cd_pairs.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from _core import cosine
+
+
+async def run(paths: list[str], top_k: int, min_sim: float, out: str) -> None:
+    from compliance.services.mc_embedding_matcher import _embed_texts
+
+    obls: list[dict] = []
+    for p in paths:
+        reg = json.load(open(p, encoding="utf-8"))
+        fam = reg.get("family", "")
+        for o in reg.get("obligations", []):
+            obls.append({"id": o["id"], "family": o.get("family", "") or fam,
+                         "tier": o.get("tier", ""), "name": o.get("name", ""),
+                         "desc": o.get("description", "")})
+    vecs = await _embed_texts([f'{o["name"]}. {o["desc"]}' for o in obls])
+    n = len(obls)
+    print(f"obligations={n}")
+
+    best: dict[tuple[int, int], float] = {}
+    for i in range(n):
+        nbrs = sorted(((cosine(vecs[i], vecs[j]), j) for j in range(n) if j != i), reverse=True)[:top_k]
+        for s, j in nbrs:
+            if s < min_sim:
+                continue
+            a, b = sorted((i, j))
+            if (a, b) not in best or s > best[(a, b)]:
+                best[(a, b)] = s
+
+    pairs = []
+    for (a, b), s in sorted(best.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1]):
+        pairs.append({
+            "a": obls[a]["id"], "fa": obls[a]["family"], "ta": obls[a]["tier"], "da": obls[a]["desc"][:220],
+            "b": obls[b]["id"], "fb": obls[b]["family"], "tb": obls[b]["tier"], "db": obls[b]["desc"][:220],
+            "sim": round(s, 3), "cross_family": obls[a]["family"] != obls[b]["family"]})
+    cf = sum(1 for p in pairs if p["cross_family"])
+    json.dump({"n_obligations": n, "n_pairs": len(pairs), "cross_family": cf, "pairs": pairs},
+              open(out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+    print(f"pairs={len(pairs)} (cross-family={cf}, same-family={len(pairs) - cf})  written: {out}")
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("registries", nargs="+")
+    ap.add_argument("--top-k", type=int, default=8)
+    ap.add_argument("--min-sim", type=float, default=0.60)
+    ap.add_argument("--out", default="/tmp/cd_pairs.json")
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    asyncio.run(run(a.registries, a.top_k, a.min_sim, a.out))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+"""#5b — Materialisierung der Capability-Schicht (Modell C, User-Entscheidung 2026-06-26).
+
+Aus `cross_domain_relationships.json` (SHARED_CAPABILITY) + den 6 CRA-P1-Registries:
+- `obligations/capabilities.json` — Capability-Knoten: realized_by (n:m) + guidance_basis hochgezogen.
+- `obligations/cra_core.json` — 2 CORE-Obligations (Sicherheitsziele): attack_surface_minimization,
+  software_integrity_protection (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse; das Ziel IST eine
+  abstrakte CORE-Pflicht).
+- patcht DOMAIN-Obligations in ihren Registries: `specializes` (→CORE) + `objective_tags` (Vorwärts-
+  Kompat zu Modell B: Tags, keine Klasse).
+- markiert `vuln_remediation_patching` als deprecated_alias von `provide_security_updates` (Merge).
+- `remote_access_data_export_protection` bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (Notiz: pending Data-Act-Scope).
+
+Deterministisch. Lokal lauffähig (nur json). Danach export_join_keys neu (inkl. cra_core).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+
+REG_FILES = ["obligations/cra.json", "obligations/cra_authentication.json",
+             "obligations/cra_logging.json", "obligations/cra_remote_access.json",
+             "obligations/cra_updates.json"]
+
+# Cluster-capability_name -> kanonische capability_id (access_control absichtlich gedroppt: zu schwach)
+CONSOLIDATE = {"mfa": "multi_factor_authentication", "session_management": "session_management",
+               "tls_encryption": "transport_encryption", "mutual_tls": "transport_encryption",
+               "tls_certificate_auth": "transport_encryption", "code_signing": "code_signing",
+               "anomaly_detection": "security_monitoring_alerting"}
+CAP_META = {
+    "multi_factor_authentication": ("Multi-Factor Authentication",
+        "Mehrfaktor-Authentisierung als technische Faehigkeit (Besitz/Wissen/Inhaerenz)."),
+    "session_management": ("Session Management",
+        "Sichere Sitzungsverwaltung: Timeouts, Bindung, Re-Auth, Beendigung."),
+    "transport_encryption": ("Transport Encryption",
+        "Verschluesselter Transport (TLS, mutual-TLS, Zertifikats-Auth, VPN/Tunnel)."),
+    "code_signing": ("Code & Update Signing",
+        "Digitale Signatur + Integritaets-/Authentizitaetspruefung von Firmware/Software/Updates."),
+    "security_monitoring_alerting": ("Security Monitoring & Alerting",
+        "Anomalie-/Bedrohungserkennung und Alarmierung aus Logs/Telemetrie."),
+}
+CAP_ORDER = ["multi_factor_authentication", "session_management", "transport_encryption",
+             "code_signing", "security_monitoring_alerting"]
+
+# DOMAIN-Obligation -> (CORE-Ziel, objective_tags)
+SPECIALIZES = {
+    "remote_access_attack_surface_min": ("attack_surface_minimization", ["attack_surface"]),
+    "component_remote_interface_security": ("attack_surface_minimization", ["attack_surface"]),
+    "signed_update_integrity": ("software_integrity_protection", ["integrity"]),
+    "firmware_software_authentication": ("software_integrity_protection", ["integrity"]),
+}
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    regs = {f: json.load(open(f, encoding="utf-8")) for f in REG_FILES}
+    idx = {}
+    for f, r in regs.items():
+        for o in r.get("obligations", []):
+            idx[o["id"]] = (f, o)
+
+    # realized_by aus dem Artefakt
+    art = json.load(open("obligations/cross_domain_relationships.json", encoding="utf-8"))
+    realized = {cid: set() for cid in CONSOLIDATE.values()}
+    for rr in art["raw_results"]:
+        if rr["relation"] == "SHARED_CAPABILITY" and rr.get("capability_name") in CONSOLIDATE:
+            cid = CONSOLIDATE[rr["capability_name"]]
+            realized[cid].update([rr["a"], rr["b"]])
+
+    def guidance_for(ids):
+        seen, out = set(), []
+        for oid in ids:
+            if oid in idx:
+                for g in idx[oid][1].get("guidance_basis", []):
+                    k = (g.get("source", ""), g.get("anchor", ""))
+                    if k not in seen:
+                        seen.add(k)
+                        out.append(g)
+        return out
+
+    caps = []
+    for cid in CAP_ORDER:
+        obls = sorted(realized[cid])
+        name, desc = CAP_META[cid]
+        caps.append({"capability_id": cid, "name": name, "description": desc,
+                     "type": "technical_capability", "realized_by": obls, "realizes_count": len(obls),
+                     "guidance_basis": guidance_for(obls),
+                     "domains": sorted({idx[o][1].get("family", "") for o in obls if o in idx}),
+                     "provenance": {"source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"}})
+
+    capabilities = {
+        "schema_version": "capability_layer_v1", "model": "Modell C (docs-src/development/capability_model_v1.md)",
+        "note": "Capability = technische Faehigkeit (regulierungs-agnostisch). realized_by = Obligations, "
+                "die sie erfuellt (n:m). guidance_basis hier KANONISCH hochgezogen aus den realisierten "
+                "Obligations (die Obligation-Kopien bleiben vorerst als Legacy; Strip = Folge-Cleanup). "
+                "Sicherheitsziele sind KEINE Capabilities -> cra_core.json.",
+        "dropped": {"access_control": "OVERLAP (credential_confidentiality <-> sbom_confidentiality), nicht materialisiert"},
+        "candidate_capabilities_followup": ["automatic_update_delivery", "update_rollback",
+            "trusted_update_source", "hash_verification", "secure_boot", "least_functionality",
+            "credential_storage"],
+        "capabilities": caps}
+    json.dump(capabilities, open("obligations/capabilities.json", "w", encoding="utf-8"),
+              ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    core = [
+        {"id": "attack_surface_minimization", "name": "Minimierung der Angriffsflaeche", "family": "core",
+         "description": "Das Produkt minimiert seine Angriffsflaeche: unnoetige Funktionen/Ports/Dienste/"
+                        "Schnittstellen sind deaktiviert (Least Functionality).",
+         "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM", "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS", "applicability": "universal",
+         "objective_tags": ["attack_surface"],
+         "legal_basis": [{"source": "CRA", "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(j)",
+                          "citation": "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"}],
+         "guidance_basis": [{"source": "NIST", "anchor": "CM-7 Least Functionality", "role": "best_practice"}],
+         "specialized_by": ["remote_access_attack_surface_min", "component_remote_interface_security"],
+         "primary_implementation": "NIST CM-7", "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+         "review_status": "core_from_5b"},
+        {"id": "software_integrity_protection", "name": "Schutz der Software-/Firmware-Integritaet", "family": "core",
+         "description": "Das Produkt schuetzt Integritaet und Authentizitaet von Software/Firmware "
+                        "(Manipulationserkennung, Secure Boot, Signaturpruefung, Runtime-Integritaet).",
+         "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM", "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS", "applicability": "universal",
+         "objective_tags": ["integrity"],
+         "legal_basis": [{"source": "CRA", "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(f)",
+                          "citation": "protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or processed data, software and configuration"}],
+         "guidance_basis": [{"source": "NIST", "anchor": "SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity", "role": "best_practice"}],
+         "specialized_by": ["signed_update_integrity", "firmware_software_authentication"],
+         "realized_by_capabilities": ["code_signing"],
+         "primary_implementation": "NIST SI-7", "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+         "review_status": "core_from_5b"},
+    ]
+    json.dump({"schema_version": "obligation_registry_v1", "regulation": "CRA", "regulation_code": "CRA",
+               "family": "core",
+               "theme": "CORE Security Objectives (CRA Annex I als regulierungs-agnostische Sicherheitsziele)",
+               "generated_by": "materialize_capabilities.py (#5b, Modell C)",
+               "note": "CORE Legal Obligations = Sicherheitsziele (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse). "
+                       "DOMAIN-Obligations specializes-en hierauf. objective_tags = Vorwaerts-Kompat zu Modell B.",
+               "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor", "obligations": core, "relationships": []},
+              open("obligations/cra_core.json", "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    dirty = set()
+    patched = []
+    for oid, (coreid, tags) in SPECIALIZES.items():
+        if oid in idx:
+            f, o = idx[oid]
+            o["specializes"] = coreid
+            o["objective_tags"] = tags
+            dirty.add(f)
+            patched.append(oid)
+    if "vuln_remediation_patching" in idx:
+        f, o = idx["vuln_remediation_patching"]
+        o["merged_into"] = "provide_security_updates"
+        o["status"] = "deprecated_alias"
+        o["merge_note"] = ("SAME_OBLIGATION (Cross-Domain-Review). Kanonisch: provide_security_updates "
+                           "((2)(c)/Art.13). ID bleibt als Alias aufloesbar; downstream provide_security_updates nutzen.")
+        dirty.add(f)
+    if "remote_access_data_export_protection" in idx:
+        f, o = idx["remote_access_data_export_protection"]
+        o["tier_note"] = ("Bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (NICHT LM) bis Data-Act/Export-Scope sauber ist (User #5b.6). "
+                          "Evtl. Capability-or-Procedure statt Obligation.")
+        dirty.add(f)
+    for f in dirty:
+        json.dump(regs[f], open(f, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    print("capabilities.json:", len(caps), "Capabilities")
+    for c in caps:
+        print(f"  {c['capability_id']:30s} realizes {c['realizes_count']:2d} | guidance {len(c['guidance_basis'])} | {c['domains']}")
+    print("cra_core.json: 2 CORE (attack_surface_minimization, software_integrity_protection)")
+    print("specializes gepatcht:", patched)
+    print("alias: vuln_remediation_patching -> provide_security_updates")
+    print("dirty registries:", sorted(dirty))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -22,6 +22,17 @@ SCOPES = {
    "logging": ["%logging%", "%protokollierung%", "%audit-log%", "%audit-trail%",
                "%ereignisprotokoll%", "%sicherheitsprotokoll%", "%audit-protokoll%",
                "%log-management%", "%sicherheitsereignis%protokoll%", "%audit-trail%"],
+    "remote_access": ["%fernwartung%", "%fernzugriff%", "%fernzugang%", "%fernwartungs%",
+                      "%remote access%", "%remote maintenance%", "%remote management%",
+                      "%remote-wartung%", "%remote-zugriff%", "%remote-zugang%",
+                      "%sichere fernwartung%", "%fernsteuerung%"],
+    "updates": ["%sicherheitsupdate%", "%security update%", "%sicherheits-update%",
+                "%security patch%", "%sicherheitspatch%", "%patch-management%",
+                "%patchmanagement%", "%patch management%", "%firmware-update%",
+                "%firmware update%", "%software-update%", "%software update%",
+                "%automatische aktualisierung%", "%update-mechanismus%",
+                "%update-bereitstellung%", "%bereitstellung von updates%",
+                "%sichere aktualisierung%", "%signierte update%", "%update-paket%"],
 }
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Benjamin Admin	623d80b6c8	fix(ai-sdk): national-law subsidiarity in authority rerank (DSGVO > BDSG for general questions) CI / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 11s Details CI / branch-name (pull_request) Successful in 2s Details CI / guardrail-integrity (pull_request) Successful in 9s Details CI / secret-scan (pull_request) Successful in 11s Details CI / dep-audit (pull_request) Failing after 54s Details CI / sbom-scan (pull_request) Failing after 59s Details CI / build-sha-integrity (pull_request) Successful in 8s Details CI / validate-canonical-controls (pull_request) Successful in 8s Details CI / loc-budget (pull_request) Successful in 23s Details CI / go-lint (pull_request) Successful in 57s Details CI / python-lint (pull_request) Failing after 16s Details CI / nodejs-lint (pull_request) Failing after 1m11s Details CI / nodejs-build (pull_request) Successful in 3m4s Details CI / test-go (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s Details CI / iace-gt-coverage (pull_request) Successful in 18s Details CI / test-python-backend (pull_request) Successful in 25s Details CI / test-python-document-crawler (pull_request) Successful in 14s Details CI / test-python-dsms-gateway (pull_request) Successful in 12s Details The authority reranker (wired in legal_rag_client.go:168) had no national-subsidiarity dimension, so a general BDSG paragraph could outrank the primary DSGVO article. Surfaced by the KB-2026.1 BDSG pilot (dp_05/08/11 + cr_07). - authorityScore: DE binding_law in an EU-primary domain WITHOUT a co-primary topic match -> soft demote (subsidiarityPen 0.18), not exclusion. National special rules stay co-primary via the topic ontology (DSB Art.37+§38, special categories Art.9+§22, ...). - queryDomain: fall back to a regulation-name mention (DSGVO/BDSG/CRA) so a question phrased around the act is domain-scoped even without a topical keyword (fixes cr_07: BDSG Teil-3 §64). - data_protection keyword stem 'auftragsverarbeit' (catches Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag). Pure ranking logic, no data manipulation; soft demotes keep national rules visible. Build result (DSGVO+BDSG): degraded=0, must_not=0. go build/vet/test ./... green; 6 new table tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 21:28:12 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	8609b696c9	fix(ucca): CM-7 repo_scan is required evidence for attack_surface_minimization CI / detect-changes (push) Successful in 12s Details CI / branch-name (push) Has been skipped Details CI / guardrail-integrity (push) Has been skipped Details CI / secret-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / dep-audit (push) Has been skipped Details CI / sbom-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / build-sha-integrity (push) Successful in 7s Details CI / validate-canonical-controls (push) Successful in 5s Details CI / loc-budget (push) Successful in 18s Details CI / go-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / python-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-build (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-go (push) Successful in 59s Details CI / iace-gt-coverage (push) Successful in 19s Details CI / test-python-backend (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-document-crawler (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-dsms-gateway (push) Has been skipped Details evidence_required lists only required:true rows; repo_scan was required:false so attack_surface_minimization surfaced config_export alone. An attack-surface scan IS required to evidence a minimized attack surface. Adds a test pinning the curated evidence_required set per NIST obligation (the table test only checked control count). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 09:42:12 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	207fc9cb56	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status	2026-06-26 09:35:46 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	fdaf547b06	feat(ucca): re-point NIST primary_implementation to CORE obligations (#6 ) Registry materialized the generic CORE security objectives (#5b, Modell C), so the two broad NIST controls now point at their canonical parents instead of the domain-scoped matches: SI-7 -> software_integrity_protection (CORE, Annex I (2)(f)) CM-7 -> attack_surface_minimization (CORE, Annex I (2)(j)) Non-breaking: the domain-scoped obligations stay valid and specialize the CORE. SI-7 evidence = sbom + config_export (SBOM evidences component/supply-chain integrity; config = signing/secure-boot). Export proposed_obligation_id + handler test (2 CORE cases) updated. go test green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 09:35:46 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	fa536f9714	docs: compliance_meta_model_v1.md — FROZEN v1.0 + Architektur-Freeze User-Entscheidung: Metamodell als v1.0 einfrieren (nur META-SEMANTIK: 6 Klassen + Kanten- Vokabular + Attribute; NICHT Registry/Capabilities/Procedures). Architektur-Freeze in Kraft: neue Regulierung = DATEN nicht Architektur; 0 neue Objektklassen erwartet; reopen nur bei nachgewiesenem Scheitern (Hazard/Threat = einzige bekannte künftige Öffnungs-Ursache, nur fuer FMEA). Reuse-Metrik-KPI definiert (Wissens-Akkumulations-Beweis). Validiert gegen 5 Regulierungsarten (DSGVO/CRA/MaschVO/Data-Act/NIS2). Erster Live-Durchlauf: MaschVO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 09:29:44 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	cba066f49b	Merge origin/main (`f85fff43`) in meta-model-validation	2026-06-26 01:09:16 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	75f7bd8de4	docs: meta_model_validation_v1.md (Phase 6) — Modell ist regulierungsunabhaengig User-Stresstest VOR der naechsten Regulierung: passt MaschVO/Data-Act/AI-Act/NIS2 ins 6-Klassen-Modell (Obligation/Capability/Procedure/Control/Evidence + Guidance) OHNE neue Objektklasse? Ergebnis 4x NEIN -> Compliance Meta Model steht. 2 Verfeinerungen (realized_by Capability OPTIONAL; Risiko-Niveau/Frist/Hazard-Schwere/Risiko-Tier = Attribute, keine Klassen). 1 Watch-Point: Hazard/Threat (erst noetig bei quantitativem FMEA-Risiko als First-Class-Knoten, nicht fuer Compliance-Abbildung). Kein Code, keine Regulierung ingestiert. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 01:08:57 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	f85fff4398	chore(ucca): re-sync data/obligations join-keys copy (93 -> 95) CI / detect-changes (push) Successful in 4s Details CI / branch-name (push) Has been skipped Details CI / guardrail-integrity (push) Has been skipped Details CI / secret-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / dep-audit (push) Has been skipped Details CI / sbom-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / build-sha-integrity (push) Successful in 4s Details CI / validate-canonical-controls (push) Successful in 4s Details CI / loc-budget (push) Successful in 17s Details CI / go-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / python-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-build (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-go (push) Successful in 59s Details CI / iace-gt-coverage (push) Successful in 17s Details CI / test-python-backend (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-document-crawler (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-dsms-gateway (push) Has been skipped Details Registry grew to 95 (Capability materialization #5b added CORE obligations). Keep the ai-sdk build-context copy current so obligation-status reflects the live registry contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 01:02:02 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	3bcffaf52c	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status	2026-06-26 01:01:16 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	3a19affb67	ci(compliance): re-trigger scoped ai-sdk build + doc synced join-keys copy Prior gitea push's build-ai-sdk failed on a transient registry push (arm64 built clean on macmini; amd64 cross-compile is green) and last-build/main got poisoned to that SHA, so a plain re-run scopes to nothing. A real touch in ai-compliance-sdk/ re-scopes the build. Also documents the synced-copy contract for data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 01:00:53 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	2b985ad526	Merge origin/main (`9aef5ecf`) in capability-materialization	2026-06-26 00:54:43 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	4e761c1363	feat: #5b materialize capability layer (Modell C) — capabilities.json + cra_core.json User-Entscheidung Modell C + objective_tags-Safeguard (Tags, keine Klasse). Deterministisch via materialize_capabilities.py: - obligations/capabilities.json: 5 Capabilities (multi_factor_authentication/session_management/ transport_encryption/code_signing/security_monitoring_alerting), realized_by (n:m) + guidance_basis KANONISCH hochgezogen. access_control gedroppt (OVERLAP). - obligations/cra_core.json: 2 CORE-Sicherheitsziele (attack_surface_minimization (2)(j)/CM-7 + software_integrity_protection (2)(f)/SI-7) -> fuellt den #4-NIST-Gap. - DOMAIN specializes->CORE (remote_access_attack_surface_min, component_remote_interface_security, signed_update_integrity, firmware_software_authentication) + objective_tags. - Merge: vuln_remediation_patching -> deprecated_alias von provide_security_updates. - remote_access_data_export_protection bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (pending Data-Act-Scope). - join_keys 93->95 (core 2). Bidirektional validiert. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 00:54:23 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	9aef5ecf6c	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status CI / detect-changes (push) Successful in 6s Details CI / branch-name (push) Has been skipped Details CI / guardrail-integrity (push) Has been skipped Details CI / secret-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / dep-audit (push) Has been skipped Details CI / sbom-scan (push) Has been skipped Details CI / build-sha-integrity (push) Successful in 7s Details CI / validate-canonical-controls (push) Successful in 5s Details CI / loc-budget (push) Successful in 18s Details CI / go-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / python-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-build (push) Has been skipped Details CI / nodejs-lint (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-go (push) Successful in 58s Details CI / iace-gt-coverage (push) Successful in 18s Details CI / test-python-backend (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-document-crawler (push) Has been skipped Details CI / test-python-dsms-gateway (push) Has been skipped Details	2026-06-26 00:26:56 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	f6c5f4e0a9	fix(ucca): SI-2 evidence = config_export + test_report Aligns provide_security_updates -> SI-2 evidence to the curated acceptance set: config_export (secure-update mechanism config) + test_report (patch verification). For "provide updates" the patch-verification test is more on-point than a vuln scan; repo_scan stays on CM-7 for attack-surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 00:26:29 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	c72fd3eb5a	Merge origin/main (Compliance endpoint+graph-loader `2341bda6`) in capability-model	2026-06-26 00:24:37 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	b0435f9885	docs: capability_model_v1.md (#5a) — Objektarten + Beziehungstypen, NICHT materialisiert Schema-Papier statt capabilities.json (User-Entscheidung). Befund: die 8 SHARED_CAPABILITY- Cluster zerfallen in Typ-1 (technische Capabilities: mfa/tls/code_signing/session/anomaly) und Typ-2 (Sicherheitsziele: attack_surface_min/software_integrity = die #4-Gaps). Empfehlung Modell C: Capability = EINZIGE neue Klasse; Sicherheitsziele = CORE Legal Obligations (CORE/DOMAIN existiert bereits). Kanten-Graph (realized_by/specializes/...). guidance_basis gehört konzeptionell an die Capability. 4 Entscheidungen offen (User). #5b Materialisierung GEGATED auf Modell-Annahme — keine Daten verschoben. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-26 00:24:09 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	2341bda621	feat(ucca): adopt NIST obligation_ids (Registry Handoff #4 , 10/10) Registry filled proposed_obligation_id for the 3 NIST primary_implementation controls: SI-7->signed_update_integrity, SI-2->provide_security_updates, CM-7->remote_access_attack_surface_min. Adopted onto cra_nist.jsonl so the join is now EXACT (obligation_id) instead of the coarse citation_unit fallback. obligation-status now surfaces SI-2 under provide_security_updates; test extended. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 19:37:14 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	4634cc09d0	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status	2026-06-25 19:31:20 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	d4df1e01df	feat(compliance): GET /sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status (file-backed graph) Vertical slice over the Compliance Execution Graph: obligation_id -> accepted controls -> required evidence -> status. NEVER auto-asserts fulfillment - with no evidence collection wired (MVP), a mapped obligation is "not_assessed" and every required evidence is "missing". Fail-closed: no id -> 400; unknown id -> unknown_obligation; mapped-but-no-control -> unmapped; graph not loaded -> 503. - ComplianceGraphHandlers (separate from the DB-backed ObligationsHandlers): loads Registry join keys + accepted control mappings + evidence once at start. - LoadComplianceGraph: candidate-path resolution across dev/container/test. - Data plumbing: Dockerfile now COPYs data/{control_mappings,evidence_requirements, obligations}; data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json is a SYNCED COPY of the repo-root Registry contract (re-sync on Registry growth). - Table-driven handler test (mapped/unmapped/unknown/400 + no-fulfillment-claim). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 19:29:37 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	ed31fdc0df	fill: NIST primary_implementation -> obligation_id (Handoff #4 , jetzt 10/10) SI-2 -> provide_security_updates (stark, (2)(c)/Art.13) · SI-7 -> signed_update_integrity (update-scoped) · CM-7 -> remote_access_attack_surface_min (remote-scoped). Validiert gegen Registries (join_keys 93). GAP-BEFUND (Cross-Domain-Review): generische Parent-Obligations software_integrity_protection + attack_surface_minimization fehlen (SI-7/CM-7 sind breiter als die domaenen-scoped Treffer) -> Kandidaten fuer neue Obligations (User-Entscheidung). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 19:15:49 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	5412bf0ba3	Merge origin/main (NIST-Export `e46e74dd`) in cross-domain-discovery	2026-06-25 19:13:21 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	8a9d5e7c4d	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status	2026-06-25 19:12:41 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	01956ee690	feat: cross-domain relationship discovery — Capability-Schicht-Entwurf (CRA P1) Stufe 1+2 der Ontologie-Entdeckung (User-Schaerfung #54): nicht Aehnlichkeit sondern STRUKTURELLE Beziehung. 93 Obligations -> BGE-M3 -> 101 cross-family Paare -> Opus klassifiziert in 8 Kategorien (genau eine je Paar). - scripts/obligation_discovery/cross_domain_pairs.py (Stufe 1, key-frei) - scripts/obligation_discovery/classify_relationships.py (Stufe 2, Opus) - obligations/cross_domain_relationships.json: 16 SHARED_CAPABILITY -> 8 Capabilities (mfa/session/transport-tls/code_signing/anomaly_detection), 23 SUPPORTED_BY (Hubs: vuln_identification_inventory<-SBOM-Familie 5x, vuln_remediation_patching 5x), 1 SAME_OBLIGATION (vuln_remediation_patching == provide_security_updates, MERGE-Kandidat), 42 OVERLAP_ONLY sauber verworfen. Erstentwurf der Capability-Schicht (Phase 4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 19:12:17 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	e46e74ddbb	feat(bridge): export 3 CRA->NIST controls (primary_implementation) for obligation_id Adds SI-7/SI-2/CM-7 to controls_for_obligation_mapping.json (7 OWASP -> 10), mapping_type=primary_implementation (the single canonical control per obligation). proposed_obligation_id left empty for the Registry to assign. Notes aligned to the updates family (join_keys 93): SI-2 -> provide_security_updates (strong), SI-7 -> signed_update_integrity (partial; SI-7 broader), CM-7 -> remote_access_attack_surface_min (partial; CM-7 broader). Origin-only (data/tooling; backend does not load obligations/* at runtime) -> no Orca. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 18:57:17 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	63d65af41b	feat(ucca): persist 3 CRA->NIST mappings (primary_implementation) + evidence CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e)/(2)(l)/(2)(i) had no clean OWASP target (rejected: "Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich"). Their NIST home, curated + accepted: (2)(e) Integritaet -> SI-7 (Software/Firmware/Information Integrity) (2)(l) Sichere Updates -> SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) (2)(i) Angriffsflaeche -> CM-7 (Least Functionality) New mapping_type=primary_implementation = the single canonical control per obligation (stronger than implements/supports); related controls (SC-3(3), RA-5, AC-6, SI-16, ...) follow later as supports. Evidence is framework-AGNOSTIC: SI-7/SI-2/CM-7 reuse the shared evidence_type catalog (config_export/test_report/repo_scan) - same types carry CRA, NIST, ISO 27001, IEC 62443, BSI. (framework,control) is only the link, not the type. obligation_id left empty: the Obligation Registry assigns it (exported via controls_for_obligation_mapping.json), then we adopt. go test ./internal/ucca green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 18:52:35 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	8937f105ea	feat(bridge): security-updates obligation cut (CRA Annex I (2)(c)/Art 13) — 9 obligations - obligations/cra_updates.json: 9 (6 LEGAL_MINIMUM + 3 BEST_PRACTICE), Beziehungen. Pipeline 670->318 micro->15 review-units -> Opus-Synthese. Synthese gut kalibriert -> light review (KEINE Hart-Re-Tier, vs Auth/Remote-Access). out_of_scope M4/M7. 5 capability_candidate-Marker (signed/trusted/automatic/rollback/testing) fuer Phase-4-Capability-Pruefung. Anker approximativ (curation.anchor_quality). - obligation_join_keys.json: 84 -> 93 (updates 9). Alle 6 CRA-P1-Domaenen abgedeckt. - precluster.py: updates-Scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 18:51:09 +02:00
Benjamin Admin	1584b8fb2f	feat(bridge): remote-access obligation cut (CRA Annex I) — 18 obligations - obligations/cra_remote_access.json: 18 (5 LEGAL_MINIMUM outcomes + 13 BEST_PRACTICE), 15 Beziehungen. Two-stage clustering 445->209 micro->27 review-units -> Opus-Synthese. Synthese vergab 14 LM -> key-free re-tier nach Auth-Regel (Mechanismen MFA/Session/VPN/ insecure-protocol/OT/Wartungs-Governance/temp/data-export/component -> BEST_PRACTICE + supports-Kante zur Eltern-LM). out_of_scope M5/M11 = physische Maschinen-Fernsteuerung (MaschinenVO 2023/1230). Anker approximativ (siehe curation.anchor_quality). - obligation_join_keys.json: 66 -> 84 (remote_access 18). - precluster.py: remote_access-Scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-25 18:37:10 +02:00