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compliance-scanner-agent/compliance-agent/rules/cra_semgrep.yaml
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Sharang ParnerkarandClaude Fable 5 563d8afb2a
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feat(controls): B1 — custom semgrep detectors for 4 CRA controls
Covers the pattern-expressible slice of the needs_tooling bucket that no
off-the-shelf ruleset digs out, keeping detection deterministic (LLM only
FP-filters downstream, never detects):

- cra-ai-1  Secure-by-Default: flask/django debug, TLS verify=False, CORS '*'
- cra-ai-7  Strong auth: password/secret hashed with md5/sha1 (metavar-gated)
- cra-ai-10 Session mgmt: Secure/HttpOnly = false cookies (py + express)
- cra-ai-14 Data at rest: ECB/DES/3DES + node createCipher

Rules ship in the binary (include_str!) and stage to a temp file at scan time,
added as a second --config alongside --config=auto (no deploy/volume change).

Wiring: control-map gains controls_for_finding (match by CWE and/or rule id);
custom controls bind by rule id with cwe:[] so a broad CWE can't over-attribute
and let the judge FP-drop a genuine finding. rule_id_matches tolerates semgrep's
path prefix on local check_ids. Triage now maps by rule id too (a custom finding
carries no LUT CWE). LUT: cra-ai-1,7,10,14 needs_tooling->covered (covered 9->13).

Validated: all 9 rules fire on positive fixtures, 0 on clean. ControlCheckSpec
gains Serialize/Deserialize (unrelated-safe; already used by the index cache).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 14:21:34 +02:00

118 lines
4.8 KiB
YAML

# Custom semgrep rules for CRA controls that no off-the-shelf ruleset digs out.
# Each rule id is `cra-ai-<n>-<slug>` and is keyed back to its control via the
# `control-map` LUT (by rule-id suffix, so semgrep's path prefix on check_id does
# not matter). Detection here is deterministic; the grounded LLM judge downstream
# only confirms/refutes — it never detects. Keep patterns tight: a false positive
# that the judge refutes marks the whole finding a false positive.
rules:
# --- cra-ai-1: Secure-by-Default-Konfiguration -------------------------------
- id: cra-ai-1-flask-debug-enabled
languages: [python]
severity: WARNING
message: Flask app started with debug=True — ships an interactive debugger / code execution in production (secure-by-default violation).
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-489: Active Debug Code"]
control: cra-ai-1
patterns:
- pattern: '$APP.run(..., debug=True, ...)'
- id: cra-ai-1-django-debug-true
languages: [python]
severity: WARNING
message: Django DEBUG = True — leaks stack traces / settings in production (secure-by-default violation).
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-489: Active Debug Code"]
control: cra-ai-1
patterns:
- pattern: 'DEBUG = True'
- id: cra-ai-1-tls-verify-disabled
languages: [python]
severity: ERROR
message: TLS certificate verification disabled (verify=False) — defeats transport security by default.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation"]
control: cra-ai-1
patterns:
- pattern: 'requests.$M(..., verify=False, ...)'
- id: cra-ai-1-cors-wildcard
languages: [javascript, typescript]
severity: WARNING
message: CORS Access-Control-Allow-Origin set to "*" — opens the API to any origin by default.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains"]
control: cra-ai-1
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: '$RES.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")'
- pattern: '$RES.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")'
# --- cra-ai-7: Starke Authentifizierung (weak password hashing) --------------
- id: cra-ai-7-weak-password-hash
languages: [python]
severity: ERROR
message: Password/secret hashed with a fast, broken digest (md5/sha1) — use a password KDF (bcrypt/scrypt/argon2).
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-916: Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort"]
control: cra-ai-7
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: 'hashlib.md5($PW)'
- pattern: 'hashlib.sha1($PW)'
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $PW
regex: '(?i).*(pass|pwd|secret|cred|token).*'
# --- cra-ai-10: Sitzungsmanagement (insecure session cookies) ----------------
- id: cra-ai-10-session-cookie-insecure
languages: [python]
severity: ERROR
message: Session cookie hardened flag explicitly disabled (Secure/HttpOnly = False) — session token exposed to theft.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-614: Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute"]
control: cra-ai-10
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: 'SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False'
- pattern: 'SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = False'
- id: cra-ai-10-express-cookie-insecure
languages: [javascript, typescript]
severity: ERROR
message: Express cookie set with secure/httpOnly = false — session token exposed to interception / XSS theft.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-614: Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute"]
control: cra-ai-10
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: '$RES.cookie($NAME, $VAL, {..., secure: false, ...})'
- pattern: '$RES.cookie($NAME, $VAL, {..., httpOnly: false, ...})'
# --- cra-ai-14: Speicher-Schutz / Data at Rest (weak cipher) -----------------
- id: cra-ai-14-python-weak-cipher
languages: [python]
severity: ERROR
message: Data-at-rest encrypted with a broken cipher/mode (ECB, DES, 3DES) — provides no real confidentiality.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"]
control: cra-ai-14
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: 'AES.new($K, AES.MODE_ECB, ...)'
- pattern: 'DES.new(...)'
- pattern: 'DES3.new(...)'
- id: cra-ai-14-node-weak-cipher
languages: [javascript, typescript]
severity: ERROR
message: Data-at-rest encrypted with a broken cipher (DES / deprecated createCipher) — provides no real confidentiality.
metadata:
cwe: ["CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"]
control: cra-ai-14
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: 'crypto.createCipheriv("des-ecb", ...)'
- pattern: 'crypto.createCipheriv("des", ...)'
- pattern: 'crypto.createCipher(...)'