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feat(ics): dynamic Modbus/TCP probe for PLC/SPS devices (#172)
2026-07-16 16:25:04 +00:00

4.5 KiB

PLC / SPS Projects (CODESYS)

Certifai analyzes industrial control logic (IEC 61131-3) for PLC/SPS targets such as CODESYS projects. A single PLC/SPS target is treated as a composite device: the control application and the device it runs on.

What you provide What Certifai does
PLC project (PLCopen XML / ST, or a .projectarchive) Control-logic SAST — semantic security rules over ST and graphical FBD/LD
A .projectarchive Control-app SBOM — the referenced CODESYS libraries + the runtime version, matched against known CVEs
A device firmware image Firmware SBOM / CVE (opt-in)
A reachable endpoint (WebVisu, OPC UA) DAST / pentest (opt-in)

Two ways to deliver the project

You can either upload the project when onboarding, or point Certifai at a git repository (recommended — every scan is just a git pull, no re-upload).

Option A — Upload

On the onboarding wizard, choose target type PLC / SPS, then attach a PLC project artifact and pick its format:

  • PLCopen XML (.xml) — export from CODESYS via Project → Export PLCopenXML.
  • Structured Text (.st) — a raw ST file.
  • Project archive (.projectarchive) — File → Project Archive → Save/Send Archive… with "Referenced libraries" ticked. This is the only form that also yields the library + runtime SBOM.

Attach a Git repository artifact to the PLC/SPS target. Certifai clones it and runs the control-logic scan over the exported source in the repo.

Best-case git repository layout

Because the binary .project does not diff or merge in git, commit textual exports for review-friendly SAST, and include the .projectarchive so the library/runtime SBOM is available too:

my-plc-project/
├── src/
│   ├── PLC_PRG.xml          # PLCopen XML export (ST or FBD/LD) — one per POU
│   ├── PumpController.xml
│   ├── SafetyInterlock.xml
│   └── GVL.xml              # global variable lists, also as PLCopen XML
├── PumpStation.projectarchive   # optional but recommended → library + runtime SBOM
└── README.md

Guidelines

  • Export to PLCopen XML (Project → Export PLCopenXML), one file per POU, and commit those. ST, and graphical FBD/LD, are both analyzed.
  • Alternatively commit raw .st / .exp / .scl files — also analyzed.
  • Do not commit only the binary .project — it cannot be parsed (and does not diff). If you want the library SBOM, commit the .projectarchive as well.
  • CODESYS's built-in Git integration, which stores an exported representation, works too — as long as the committed form is PLCopen XML / textual.

::: tip What unlocks what

  • Control-logic SAST needs textual source in the repo (PLCopen XML or .st).
  • Library + runtime SBOM needs a .projectarchive — PLCopen XML exports do not carry the referenced libraries. :::

What the scanner finds

The control-logic rules are CWE-mapped and include: hardcoded credentials (CWE-798), default/weak passwords (CWE-1393), safety interlock / watchdog bypass (CWE-1384), unchecked array indexing (CWE-129), division-by-zero (CWE-369, guard-aware), cleartext/insecure communication (CWE-319), insecure protocol ports (CWE-319, e.g. Modbus 502, FTP 21, Telnet 23), and unstructured jumps (CWE-691).

The SBOM view lists the CODESYS libraries (pkg:codesys/<name>@<version>) and the runtime; matching runtime components (e.g. the Cmp* / 3SLicense libraries) surface real CODESYS advisories as CVE alerts.

Dynamic testing — ICS protocol probe

Beyond the static analysis, Certifai can probe the running device over industrial protocols. Attach a Live URL artifact (the device host / WebVisu URL) to the PLC/SPS target and enable the ICS Probe scan.

The probe is read-only — it never writes to the live process. It currently speaks Modbus/TCP (port 502): it confirms whether the device answers unauthenticated Modbus requests and reads its device identity (vendor / product / revision). Because Modbus/TCP has no authentication or encryption in the protocol, a reachable endpoint that answers is reported as an exposed control interface (CWE-306). OPC UA and EtherNet/IP probes are planned.

::: warning The ICS probe connects to the live device. It is opt-in (off by default) and should only be run against targets you are authorized to test. It performs reads only, never writes. :::