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compliance-scanner-agent/compliance-agent/src/api/auth_middleware.rs
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Sharang Parnerkar 05c01ea547
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feat(m7.1): wire tenant claims, status enforcement, and db scoping helper
Lays the platform-wide multi-tenancy infrastructure on top of the
existing Keycloak signature validation. JWTs now carry tenant_id,
tenant_slug, org_roles, products, plan, and tenant_status; the
middleware decodes them into a TenantContext and attaches it to the
request extensions. A TenantCtx Axum extractor exposes the context to
handlers, and a tenant_status middleware enforces the §5c lifecycle
(frozen tenants are 402 on writes; archived tenants are 410 on every
method).

A db::tenant_filter helper in compliance-core gives every future
collection a single grep-able pattern for tenant-scoped queries.
Per-collection wiring (adding tenant_id to each model + threading the
filter through every find/update/delete call) lands in a follow-up.

Tests: 6 inline unit tests for claims→context mapping, 2 for the
extractor, 6 integration tests for status middleware, 3 for db
filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:10:42 +02:00

306 lines
9.7 KiB
Rust

//! M7.1 — JWT validation + tenant context propagation.
//!
//! `require_jwt_auth` validates a Bearer JWT against Keycloak's JWKS and
//! attaches a `TenantContext` to the request extensions. Downstream
//! middleware (`require_tenant_status`) and Axum extractors (`TenantCtx`)
//! read it from there.
//!
//! Skipped paths:
//! * `/api/v1/health` — Kubernetes liveness; never authenticated.
//!
//! Failure modes:
//! * No `JwksState` extension → pass-through (single-tenant dev mode).
//! * Missing / malformed Bearer header → 401.
//! * Signature / expiry invalid → 401.
//! * Claims present but tenant_id missing → 401 (treated as a malformed
//! token; the realm must always issue tenant_id).
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::{
extract::Request,
http::Method,
middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use compliance_core::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};
use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, jwk::JwkSet, DecodingKey, Validation};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use serde::Deserialize;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
/// Cached JWKS from Keycloak for token validation.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct JwksState {
pub jwks: Arc<RwLock<Option<JwkSet>>>,
pub jwks_url: String,
}
/// Raw shape of the JWT payload — matches the breakpilot-dev realm's
/// protocol-mapper output. Missing fields default to "" / empty so a
/// realm that hasn't been fully wired yet still validates.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct Claims {
sub: String,
#[serde(default)]
name: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
preferred_username: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
tenant_id: String,
#[serde(default)]
tenant_slug: String,
#[serde(default)]
org_roles: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)]
products: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)]
plan: String,
#[serde(default)]
tenant_status: Option<TenantStatus>,
}
const PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/health"];
/// Middleware that validates Bearer JWT tokens against Keycloak's JWKS
/// and attaches a `TenantContext` extension on success.
///
/// Skips validation for the health endpoint.
/// If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak not configured), requests
/// pass through and downstream code must handle the missing context.
pub async fn require_jwt_auth(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let path = request.uri().path();
if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) {
return next.run(request).await;
}
let jwks_state = match request.extensions().get::<JwksState>() {
Some(s) => s.clone(),
None => return next.run(request).await,
};
let auth_header = match request.headers().get("authorization") {
Some(h) => h,
None => return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing authorization header").into_response(),
};
let token = match auth_header.to_str() {
Ok(s) if s.starts_with("Bearer ") => &s[7..],
_ => return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid authorization header").into_response(),
};
match validate_token(token, &jwks_state).await {
Ok(ctx) => {
request.extensions_mut().insert(ctx);
next.run(request).await
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("JWT validation failed: {e}");
(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token").into_response()
}
}
}
/// Middleware that enforces the M7.1 `tenant_status` contract.
///
/// * `Active` / `Trial` / `Demo` — pass through.
/// * `Frozen` — read-only after cancel / non-payment. Writes return 402.
/// * `Archived` — data-retention window closed. Every request returns 410.
///
/// Pass-through when no `TenantContext` is present (single-tenant dev or
/// the upstream JWT middleware ran without `JwksState`).
pub async fn require_tenant_status(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let ctx = match request.extensions().get::<TenantContext>() {
Some(c) => c.clone(),
None => return next.run(request).await,
};
if ctx.status.is_archived() {
return (
StatusCode::GONE,
"Tenant archived — data retention window closed",
)
.into_response();
}
if ctx.status.is_frozen() && is_write(request.method()) {
return (
StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED,
"Tenant frozen — read-only. Re-activate to resume writes.",
)
.into_response();
}
next.run(request).await
}
/// Treat anything other than GET/HEAD/OPTIONS as a write. Good enough for
/// REST. The few exceptions (e.g. read-side POSTs) can opt out at the
/// handler level once we have them.
fn is_write(m: &Method) -> bool {
!matches!(m, &Method::GET | &Method::HEAD | &Method::OPTIONS)
}
async fn validate_token(token: &str, state: &JwksState) -> Result<TenantContext, String> {
let header = decode_header(token).map_err(|e| format!("failed to decode JWT header: {e}"))?;
let kid = header
.kid
.ok_or_else(|| "JWT missing kid header".to_string())?;
let jwks = fetch_or_get_jwks(state).await?;
let jwk = jwks
.keys
.iter()
.find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(&kid))
.ok_or_else(|| "no matching key found in JWKS".to_string())?;
let decoding_key =
DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).map_err(|e| format!("failed to create decoding key: {e}"))?;
let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg);
validation.validate_exp = true;
validation.validate_aud = false;
let data = decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| format!("token validation failed: {e}"))?;
claims_to_context(data.claims)
}
/// Map the decoded JWT payload into the platform-wide `TenantContext`.
/// Pulled out for unit testing — no I/O.
fn claims_to_context(c: Claims) -> Result<TenantContext, String> {
if c.tenant_id.is_empty() {
return Err("JWT is missing tenant_id claim".to_string());
}
let status = c.tenant_status.unwrap_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(
"JWT missing tenant_status claim for tenant {} — defaulting to Trial",
c.tenant_id
);
TenantStatus::Trial
});
Ok(TenantContext {
tenant_id: c.tenant_id,
tenant_slug: c.tenant_slug,
org_roles: c.org_roles.iter().map(|r| OrgRole::parse(r)).collect(),
products: c.products,
plan: c.plan,
status,
user_id: c.sub,
user_name: c.name.or(c.preferred_username),
})
}
async fn fetch_or_get_jwks(state: &JwksState) -> Result<JwkSet, String> {
{
let cached = state.jwks.read().await;
if let Some(ref jwks) = *cached {
return Ok(jwks.clone());
}
}
let resp = reqwest::get(&state.jwks_url)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to fetch JWKS: {e}"))?;
let jwks: JwkSet = resp
.json()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse JWKS: {e}"))?;
let mut cached = state.jwks.write().await;
*cached = Some(jwks.clone());
Ok(jwks)
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn base_claims() -> Claims {
Claims {
sub: "user-123".to_string(),
name: Some("Alice Acme".to_string()),
preferred_username: None,
tenant_id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001".to_string(),
tenant_slug: "acme".to_string(),
org_roles: vec!["IT_ADMIN".to_string()],
products: vec!["compliance".to_string()],
plan: "professional".to_string(),
tenant_status: Some(TenantStatus::Active),
}
}
#[test]
fn claims_to_context_happy_path() {
let ctx = claims_to_context(base_claims()).expect("should map");
assert_eq!(ctx.tenant_id, "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001");
assert_eq!(ctx.tenant_slug, "acme");
assert_eq!(ctx.org_roles, vec![OrgRole::ItAdmin]);
assert_eq!(ctx.products, vec!["compliance"]);
assert_eq!(ctx.plan, "professional");
assert_eq!(ctx.status, TenantStatus::Active);
assert_eq!(ctx.user_id, "user-123");
assert_eq!(ctx.user_name.as_deref(), Some("Alice Acme"));
}
#[test]
fn claims_to_context_rejects_missing_tenant_id() {
let mut c = base_claims();
c.tenant_id = "".to_string();
let err = claims_to_context(c).expect_err("should reject");
assert!(err.contains("tenant_id"));
}
#[test]
fn claims_to_context_defaults_status_when_missing() {
let mut c = base_claims();
c.tenant_status = None;
let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
assert_eq!(ctx.status, TenantStatus::Trial);
}
#[test]
fn claims_to_context_falls_back_to_preferred_username() {
let mut c = base_claims();
c.name = None;
c.preferred_username = Some("alice@acme.dev".to_string());
let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
assert_eq!(ctx.user_name.as_deref(), Some("alice@acme.dev"));
}
#[test]
fn claims_to_context_parses_multiple_roles() {
let mut c = base_claims();
c.org_roles = vec![
"IT_ADMIN".to_string(),
"CXO".to_string(),
"GARBAGE".to_string(),
];
let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
assert_eq!(
ctx.org_roles,
vec![OrgRole::ItAdmin, OrgRole::Cxo, OrgRole::Unknown]
);
}
#[test]
fn is_write_detects_methods() {
assert!(!is_write(&Method::GET));
assert!(!is_write(&Method::HEAD));
assert!(!is_write(&Method::OPTIONS));
assert!(is_write(&Method::POST));
assert!(is_write(&Method::PUT));
assert!(is_write(&Method::PATCH));
assert!(is_write(&Method::DELETE));
}
}