Sharang Parnerkar
628f346529
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LLM clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, ChatGPT) can't run a Keycloak
OIDC flow, so the MCP server can't use JWTs for auth. This PR
introduces opaque static bearer tokens minted per-tenant via new
agent endpoints, validated by the MCP server, and used to route
incoming MCP requests to the caller's per-tenant database.
Until now, the MCP server connected to a single shared MongoDB DB
with no auth and no tenant awareness — every tool (list_findings,
list_sbom_packages, etc.) returned data across all tenants. After
M7.2 made the agent per-tenant, MCP was the lone cross-tenant data
leak. This closes it.
Design summary
- Token format: `mcpt_<43 url-safe random chars>` (48 chars total).
Opaque, never embeds tenant_id, never stored in plaintext.
- Storage: cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens` collection,
keyed by SHA-256 hash. Each row carries the tenant_id, name,
created_by, created_at, last_used_at, revoked flag.
- Agent endpoints (tenant-scoped via TenantCtx):
POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens → mint (returns raw token ONCE)
GET /api/v1/mcp-tokens → list (metadata + 12-char prefix,
never the hash)
DELETE /api/v1/mcp-tokens/id → soft revoke
- MCP middleware: extract `Authorization: Bearer mcpt_...`, sniff
the prefix, SHA-256 → lookup in admin DB → reject if missing or
revoked. Updates last_used_at fire-and-forget so it never blocks.
Sets `tokio::task_local!` TENANT_ID for the inner service call;
the rmcp tool handlers read it and resolve the per-tenant DB.
- task_local is scoped via TENANT_ID.scope(...) around next.run(req)
so the rmcp tool handlers downstream see the tenant_id without
modifying their (macro-generated) signatures.
Files
- compliance-core/src/models/mcp_token.rs (new) — McpToken +
McpTokenView (public projection without the hash).
- compliance-agent/src/database.rs — DatabasePool::admin_db() +
admin_db_name(): cross-tenant access for token storage.
- compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mcp_tokens.rs (new) — three
endpoints. Token generation: 32 random bytes → URL-safe base64,
no padding. SHA-256 hex stored.
- compliance-mcp/src/database.rs — replaced single Database with
DatabasePool. Tenant-scoped Database constructed per request.
Same sanitization + 63-byte cap + hash fallback as the agent.
- compliance-mcp/src/auth.rs (new) — bearer middleware + task_local.
Includes a SHA-256 round-trip test against a known vector.
- compliance-mcp/src/main.rs — HTTP transport: bearer middleware
layered on /mcp (not /health, so orca's container probe still
works). stdio transport: falls back to STDIO_TENANT_ID env (defaults
to "dev") so local development still works; logged loudly as
not-for-production.
- compliance-mcp/src/server.rs — each of the 12 tool handlers
resolves the per-tenant DB via task_local before calling its tool
fn. Tool fns themselves are unchanged.
Token UX
- Generated by the dashboard (or curl + KC JWT) — user sees raw
token exactly once, copies it into their LLM client config.
- Dashboard UI for management is a follow-up; can use curl in the
meantime:
curl -X POST https://comp-dev.../api/v1/mcp-tokens \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KC_JWT" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Claude Desktop"}'
Test plan
- cargo fmt --all clean
- cargo clippy --workspace --exclude compliance-dashboard
-- -D warnings clean
- cargo test -p compliance-core --lib — 7 pass
- cargo test -p compliance-agent --lib — 230 pass (+2 new for
token generation + sha256 stability)
- cargo test -p compliance-agent --test tenant_isolation — 6 pass
- cargo test -p compliance-mcp — 34 pass (+1 new sha256 vector)
What's deferred
- Dashboard UI for managing tokens (page + create modal + list/
revoke). Trivial once the API is live.
- Token expiry + per-tool scope (today every token grants access
to all 12 tools for its tenant).
- Lifting DatabasePool into compliance-core (duplicated for now
in compliance-mcp to keep this PR focused; lift if a third
consumer appears).
Production
- The `<prefix>__admin` DB needs to NOT collide with a tenant
DB. Sanitized tenant_id never starts with `_admin` for any
current tenant_id shape (UUIDs); flagged in the database.rs
docstring so tenant provisioning can reject `_admin*` ids
proactively.
- orca-infra MCP service block already has MONGODB_URI /
MONGODB_DATABASE — no new env needed. No KC creds since MCP
doesn't use Keycloak for its own auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
39 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
[workspace]
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members = [
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"compliance-core",
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"compliance-agent",
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"compliance-dashboard",
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"compliance-graph",
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"compliance-dast",
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"compliance-mcp",
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"compliance-smoke",
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]
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resolver = "2"
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[workspace.lints.clippy]
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unwrap_used = "deny"
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expect_used = "deny"
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[workspace.dependencies]
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compliance-core = { path = "compliance-core", default-features = false }
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serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
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serde_json = "1"
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tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
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tracing = "0.1"
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tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
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chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
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mongodb = { version = "3", features = ["rustls-tls", "compat-3-0-0"] }
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reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["json", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
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thiserror = "2"
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sha2 = "0.10"
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hex = "0.4"
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uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
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secrecy = { version = "0.10", features = ["serde"] }
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regex = "1"
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zip = { version = "2", features = ["aes-crypto", "deflate"] }
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dashmap = "6"
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tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
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aes-gcm = "0.10"
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rand = "0.9"
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base64 = "0.22"
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