feat(pipeline): PLC/SPS control-logic security scanner (IEC 61131-3) #162
@@ -153,4 +153,48 @@ mod tests {
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.count();
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assert_eq!(div0, 1, "only the unguarded division should be flagged");
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}
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/// The realistic OpenPLC-style traffic-light sample is mostly sound control
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/// logic: the scanner must surface its few genuine defects and stay quiet on
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/// the timed state machine and the guarded duty-cycle division.
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#[test]
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fn realistic_sample_flags_only_real_issues() {
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let all = analyze_tree(&demo_dir(), "demo-target");
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let tl: Vec<_> = all
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.iter()
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.filter(|f| {
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f.file_path
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.as_deref()
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.is_some_and(|p| p.ends_with("traffic_light.st"))
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})
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.collect();
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assert!(!tl.is_empty(), "traffic_light.st should produce findings");
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let rules: HashSet<&str> = tl.iter().filter_map(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref()).collect();
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// The three planted defects: hardcoded SCADA password, cleartext Modbus
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// master (no auth), and a maintenance mode that drops the PedPermit.
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for r in [
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"plc-hardcoded-credential",
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"plc-insecure-comm",
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"plc-safety-bypass",
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] {
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assert!(rules.contains(r), "expected rule {r}; got {rules:?}");
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}
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// Modbus/TCP on 502 is also an insecure-protocol port.
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assert!(rules.contains("plc-insecure-protocol-port"));
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// Low false positives: the guarded `IF LampCount <> 0` division and the
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// JMP-free state machine must not trip anything.
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assert_eq!(
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tl.iter()
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.filter(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref() == Some("plc-division-by-zero"))
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.count(),
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0,
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"the guarded duty-cycle division must not be flagged"
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);
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assert!(
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!rules.contains("plc-unstructured-jump"),
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"the CASE state machine uses no JMP"
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);
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
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(*
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* Pedestrian-crossing traffic-light controller.
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*
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* Structure adapted from the classic OpenPLC "traffic light" example
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* (github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v3 examples) — a timed state machine
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* driving vehicle + pedestrian lamps, extended with a SCADA/Modbus link
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* and a maintenance override so it reads like a real deployed program.
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*
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* The control logic itself is sound; the security-relevant defects are the
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* kind that slip into field code under deadline: a hardcoded SCADA password,
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* a cleartext Modbus/TCP master, and a maintenance mode that drops the
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* pedestrian safety permit. Everything else should stay quiet.
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*)
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PROGRAM TrafficLight
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VAR
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State : INT := 0; (* 0 GreenVeh, 1 Amber, 2 RedVeh/WalkPed, 3 FlashPed *)
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Tmr : TON;
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StateElapsed : TIME;
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CycleMs : DINT := 0;
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(* Lamp outputs *)
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VehGreen : BOOL := FALSE;
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VehAmber : BOOL := FALSE;
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VehRed : BOOL := FALSE;
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PedWalk : BOOL := FALSE;
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PedStop : BOOL := TRUE;
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(* Pedestrian safety permit — must be TRUE before the WALK phase asserts *)
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PedPermit : BOOL := TRUE;
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PedButton : BOOL := FALSE;
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(* SCADA / remote monitoring *)
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ScadaUser : STRING := 'operator';
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ScadaPassword : STRING := 'Tr@ffic2019'; (* hardcoded SCADA credential *)
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ModbusReady : BOOL := FALSE;
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(* Maintenance override *)
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MaintMode : BOOL := FALSE;
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LampCount : INT := 5;
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DutyPct : INT;
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END_VAR
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(* ---- SCADA uplink: publish state to the control room over Modbus/TCP ---- *)
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IF NOT ModbusReady THEN
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Modbus_TCP_Master(IP := '10.20.0.5', PORT := 502, AUTH := FALSE, USER := ScadaUser, PASS := ScadaPassword);
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ModbusReady := TRUE;
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END_IF;
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(* ---- Duty-cycle for the flashing pedestrian lamp (guarded division) ---- *)
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IF LampCount <> 0 THEN
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DutyPct := (CycleMs * 100) / LampCount;
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END_IF;
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(* ---- Maintenance override: flash amber, hand control to the technician ---- *)
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IF MaintMode THEN
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VehGreen := FALSE;
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VehRed := FALSE;
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VehAmber := NOT VehAmber;
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PedPermit := FALSE; (* drops the pedestrian safety permit in code *)
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PedWalk := FALSE;
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PedStop := TRUE;
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ELSE
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(* ---- Normal timed state machine ---- *)
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Tmr(IN := TRUE, PT := T#5s);
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StateElapsed := Tmr.ET;
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CASE State OF
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0: (* vehicles go, pedestrians stop *)
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VehGreen := TRUE; VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := FALSE;
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PedWalk := FALSE; PedStop := TRUE;
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IF PedButton AND Tmr.Q THEN
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State := 1; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
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END_IF;
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1: (* amber transition *)
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VehGreen := FALSE; VehAmber := TRUE;
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IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 2; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
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2: (* vehicles stop, pedestrians walk — only if permitted *)
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VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := TRUE;
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IF PedPermit THEN
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PedWalk := TRUE; PedStop := FALSE;
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END_IF;
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IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 3; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
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3: (* flashing don't-walk before returning to green *)
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PedWalk := NOT PedWalk;
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IF Tmr.Q THEN
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State := 0; PedButton := FALSE; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
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END_IF;
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ELSE
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State := 0;
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END_CASE;
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END_IF;
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END_PROGRAM
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