feat(smoke): add compliance-smoke crate + scripts/smoke.sh tenant-gating harness

A minimal Axum binary that mounts compliance-core's M7.1 middleware on
three endpoints (public health, protected GET echo, protected POST echo)
so we can prove the tenant-gating contract end-to-end against a live KC
before any auth-path PR merges.

scripts/smoke.sh drives the binary against the five test users defined
in the certifai realm (admin/user → active, trial/frozen/archived) and
asserts the exact response code per (user × method × endpoint). Run it
once before touching auth, tenant_status, or org_roles code.

Validated locally — 15/15 assertions pass:
* anon/bogus → 401 on protected, 200 on /health
* active/trial → 200 on read + write
* frozen → 200 read, 402 write (read-after-cancel gate)
* archived → 410 read + 410 write (retention window closed)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.lock

@@ -700,19 +700,23 @@ dependencies = [
 name = "compliance-core"
 version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
+ "axum",
  "bson",
  "chrono",
  "hex",
+ "jsonwebtoken",
  "mongodb",
  "opentelemetry",
  "opentelemetry-appender-tracing",
  "opentelemetry-otlp",
  "opentelemetry_sdk",
+ "reqwest",
  "secrecy",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sha2",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "tokio",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-opentelemetry",
  "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -826,6 +830,20 @@ dependencies = [
  "tracing-subscriber",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "compliance-smoke"
+version = "0.1.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "axum",
+ "compliance-core",
+ "reqwest",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+ "tokio",
+ "tracing",
+ "tracing-subscriber",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "console_error_panic_hook"
 version = "0.1.7"

Cargo.toml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ members = [
     "compliance-graph",
     "compliance-dast",
     "compliance-mcp",
+    "compliance-smoke",
 ]
 resolver = "2"
 

compliance-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ telemetry = [
     "dep:tracing-subscriber",
     "dep:tracing",
 ]
+# Pulls in the M7.1 Axum middleware + extractor. Consumers that don't
+# embed an HTTP server (e.g. the wasm dashboard frontend) leave it off.
+axum = [
+    "dep:axum",
+    "dep:jsonwebtoken",
+    "dep:reqwest",
+    "dep:tokio",
+    "dep:tracing",
+]
 
 [dependencies]
 serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -37,3 +46,7 @@ opentelemetry-appender-tracing = { version = "0.29", optional = true }
 tracing-opentelemetry = { version = "0.30", optional = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+axum = { version = "0.8", optional = true }
+jsonwebtoken = { version = "9", optional = true }
+reqwest = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+tokio = { workspace = true, optional = true }

compliance-core/src/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+//! M7.1 — JWT validation + tenant context propagation.
+//!
+//! `require_jwt_auth` validates a Bearer JWT against Keycloak's JWKS and
+//! attaches a [`TenantContext`] to the request extensions. Downstream
+//! middleware ([`require_tenant_status`]) and Axum extractors
+//! ([`crate::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx`]) read it from there.
+//!
+//! Skipped paths:
+//! * `/api/v1/health` — Kubernetes liveness; never authenticated.
+//!
+//! Failure modes:
+//! * No `JwksState` extension → pass-through (single-tenant dev mode).
+//! * Missing / malformed Bearer header → 401.
+//! * Signature / expiry invalid → 401.
+//! * Claims present but tenant_id missing → 401 (treated as a malformed
+//!   token; the realm must always issue tenant_id).
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use axum::{
+    extract::Request,
+    http::Method,
+    middleware::Next,
+    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
+};
+use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, jwk::JwkSet, DecodingKey, Validation};
+use reqwest::StatusCode;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use tokio::sync::RwLock;
+
+use crate::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};
+
+/// Cached JWKS from Keycloak for token validation.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct JwksState {
+    pub jwks: Arc<RwLock<Option<JwkSet>>>,
+    pub jwks_url: String,
+}
+
+/// Raw shape of the JWT payload — matches the breakpilot-dev realm's
+/// protocol-mapper output. Missing fields default to "" / empty so a
+/// realm that hasn't been fully wired yet still validates.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+struct Claims {
+    sub: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    preferred_username: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    tenant_id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    tenant_slug: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    org_roles: Vec<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    products: Vec<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    plan: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    tenant_status: Option<TenantStatus>,
+}
+
+const PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/health"];
+
+/// Middleware that validates Bearer JWT tokens against Keycloak's JWKS
+/// and attaches a `TenantContext` extension on success.
+///
+/// Skips validation for the health endpoint.
+/// If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak not configured), requests
+/// pass through and downstream code must handle the missing context.
+pub async fn require_jwt_auth(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let path = request.uri().path();
+
+    if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) {
+        return next.run(request).await;
+    }
+
+    let jwks_state = match request.extensions().get::<JwksState>() {
+        Some(s) => s.clone(),
+        None => return next.run(request).await,
+    };
+
+    let auth_header = match request.headers().get("authorization") {
+        Some(h) => h,
+        None => return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing authorization header").into_response(),
+    };
+
+    let token = match auth_header.to_str() {
+        Ok(s) if s.starts_with("Bearer ") => &s[7..],
+        _ => return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid authorization header").into_response(),
+    };
+
+    match validate_token(token, &jwks_state).await {
+        Ok(ctx) => {
+            request.extensions_mut().insert(ctx);
+            next.run(request).await
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!("JWT validation failed: {e}");
+            (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token").into_response()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Middleware that enforces the M7.1 `tenant_status` contract.
+///
+/// * `Active` / `Trial` / `Demo` — pass through.
+/// * `Frozen` — read-only after cancel / non-payment. Writes return 402.
+/// * `Archived` — data-retention window closed. Every request returns 410.
+///
+/// Pass-through when no `TenantContext` is present (single-tenant dev or
+/// the upstream JWT middleware ran without `JwksState`).
+pub async fn require_tenant_status(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let ctx = match request.extensions().get::<TenantContext>() {
+        Some(c) => c.clone(),
+        None => return next.run(request).await,
+    };
+
+    if ctx.status.is_archived() {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::GONE,
+            "Tenant archived — data retention window closed",
+        )
+            .into_response();
+    }
+
+    if ctx.status.is_frozen() && is_write(request.method()) {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED,
+            "Tenant frozen — read-only. Re-activate to resume writes.",
+        )
+            .into_response();
+    }
+
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
+/// Treat anything other than GET/HEAD/OPTIONS as a write. Good enough for
+/// REST. The few exceptions (e.g. read-side POSTs) can opt out at the
+/// handler level once we have them.
+fn is_write(m: &Method) -> bool {
+    !matches!(m, &Method::GET | &Method::HEAD | &Method::OPTIONS)
+}
+
+async fn validate_token(token: &str, state: &JwksState) -> Result<TenantContext, String> {
+    let header = decode_header(token).map_err(|e| format!("failed to decode JWT header: {e}"))?;
+
+    let kid = header
+        .kid
+        .ok_or_else(|| "JWT missing kid header".to_string())?;
+
+    let jwks = fetch_or_get_jwks(state).await?;
+
+    let jwk = jwks
+        .keys
+        .iter()
+        .find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(&kid))
+        .ok_or_else(|| "no matching key found in JWKS".to_string())?;
+
+    let decoding_key =
+        DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).map_err(|e| format!("failed to create decoding key: {e}"))?;
+
+    let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg);
+    validation.validate_exp = true;
+    validation.validate_aud = false;
+
+    let data = decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("token validation failed: {e}"))?;
+
+    claims_to_context(data.claims)
+}
+
+/// Map the decoded JWT payload into the platform-wide `TenantContext`.
+/// Pulled out for unit testing — no I/O.
+fn claims_to_context(c: Claims) -> Result<TenantContext, String> {
+    if c.tenant_id.is_empty() {
+        return Err("JWT is missing tenant_id claim".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let status = c.tenant_status.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            "JWT missing tenant_status claim for tenant {} — defaulting to Trial",
+            c.tenant_id
+        );
+        TenantStatus::Trial
+    });
+
+    Ok(TenantContext {
+        tenant_id: c.tenant_id,
+        tenant_slug: c.tenant_slug,
+        org_roles: c.org_roles.iter().map(|r| OrgRole::parse(r)).collect(),
+        products: c.products,
+        plan: c.plan,
+        status,
+        user_id: c.sub,
+        user_name: c.name.or(c.preferred_username),
+    })
+}
+
+async fn fetch_or_get_jwks(state: &JwksState) -> Result<JwkSet, String> {
+    {
+        let cached = state.jwks.read().await;
+        if let Some(ref jwks) = *cached {
+            return Ok(jwks.clone());
+        }
+    }
+
+    let resp = reqwest::get(&state.jwks_url)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("failed to fetch JWKS: {e}"))?;
+
+    let jwks: JwkSet = resp
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse JWKS: {e}"))?;
+
+    let mut cached = state.jwks.write().await;
+    *cached = Some(jwks.clone());
+
+    Ok(jwks)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn base_claims() -> Claims {
+        Claims {
+            sub: "user-123".to_string(),
+            name: Some("Alice Acme".to_string()),
+            preferred_username: None,
+            tenant_id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001".to_string(),
+            tenant_slug: "acme".to_string(),
+            org_roles: vec!["IT_ADMIN".to_string()],
+            products: vec!["compliance".to_string()],
+            plan: "professional".to_string(),
+            tenant_status: Some(TenantStatus::Active),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_to_context_happy_path() {
+        let ctx = claims_to_context(base_claims()).expect("should map");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.tenant_id, "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.tenant_slug, "acme");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.org_roles, vec![OrgRole::ItAdmin]);
+        assert_eq!(ctx.products, vec!["compliance"]);
+        assert_eq!(ctx.plan, "professional");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.status, TenantStatus::Active);
+        assert_eq!(ctx.user_id, "user-123");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.user_name.as_deref(), Some("Alice Acme"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_to_context_rejects_missing_tenant_id() {
+        let mut c = base_claims();
+        c.tenant_id = "".to_string();
+        let err = claims_to_context(c).expect_err("should reject");
+        assert!(err.contains("tenant_id"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_to_context_defaults_status_when_missing() {
+        let mut c = base_claims();
+        c.tenant_status = None;
+        let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.status, TenantStatus::Trial);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_to_context_falls_back_to_preferred_username() {
+        let mut c = base_claims();
+        c.name = None;
+        c.preferred_username = Some("alice@acme.dev".to_string());
+        let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
+        assert_eq!(ctx.user_name.as_deref(), Some("alice@acme.dev"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_to_context_parses_multiple_roles() {
+        let mut c = base_claims();
+        c.org_roles = vec![
+            "IT_ADMIN".to_string(),
+            "CXO".to_string(),
+            "GARBAGE".to_string(),
+        ];
+        let ctx = claims_to_context(c).expect("should map");
+        assert_eq!(
+            ctx.org_roles,
+            vec![OrgRole::ItAdmin, OrgRole::Cxo, OrgRole::Unknown]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_write_detects_methods() {
+        assert!(!is_write(&Method::GET));
+        assert!(!is_write(&Method::HEAD));
+        assert!(!is_write(&Method::OPTIONS));
+        assert!(is_write(&Method::POST));
+        assert!(is_write(&Method::PUT));
+        assert!(is_write(&Method::PATCH));
+        assert!(is_write(&Method::DELETE));
+    }
+}

compliance-core/src/db.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+//! Database helpers shared across the workspace.
+//!
+//! `tenant_filter` returns the BSON filter that every query and update
+//! against a tenant-scoped collection MUST include. Centralising it here
+//! makes the rule grep-able and keeps query call-sites from accidentally
+//! omitting it.
+//!
+//! Future work (M7.2+): each collection model grows a `tenant_id` field
+//! and every `find` / `update_*` / `delete_*` call gets this filter
+//! merged in. The migration to per-collection scoping is tracked
+//! separately — this helper is the building block.
+
+use bson::{doc, Document};
+
+use crate::TenantContext;
+
+/// Returns `{ "tenant_id": <ctx.tenant_id> }`. Merge this into every
+/// query filter against a tenant-scoped collection.
+///
+/// Use [`tenant_filter_merge`] when you need to combine it with other
+/// query conditions — it preserves both halves without overwriting.
+pub fn tenant_filter(ctx: &TenantContext) -> Document {
+    doc! { "tenant_id": &ctx.tenant_id }
+}
+
+/// Returns the tenant filter merged with caller-supplied conditions.
+/// The tenant_id always wins on key conflict — callers cannot
+/// accidentally override the scoping.
+pub fn tenant_filter_merge(ctx: &TenantContext, mut extra: Document) -> Document {
+    extra.insert("tenant_id", &ctx.tenant_id);
+    extra
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::TenantStatus;
+
+    fn ctx() -> TenantContext {
+        TenantContext {
+            tenant_id: "t-abc".to_string(),
+            tenant_slug: "acme".to_string(),
+            org_roles: vec![],
+            products: vec![],
+            plan: "starter".to_string(),
+            status: TenantStatus::Active,
+            user_id: "u-1".to_string(),
+            user_name: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn produces_tenant_id_filter() {
+        let f = tenant_filter(&ctx());
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("tenant_id"), Ok("t-abc"));
+        assert_eq!(f.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_preserves_extra_conditions() {
+        let extra = doc! { "status": "open", "severity": "high" };
+        let f = tenant_filter_merge(&ctx(), extra);
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("tenant_id"), Ok("t-abc"));
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("status"), Ok("open"));
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("severity"), Ok("high"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_overrides_caller_tenant_id() {
+        let extra = doc! { "tenant_id": "evil-other", "status": "open" };
+        let f = tenant_filter_merge(&ctx(), extra);
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("tenant_id"), Ok("t-abc"));
+        assert_eq!(f.get_str("status"), Ok("open"));
+    }
+}

compliance-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,17 @@
 pub mod config;
+pub mod db;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod models;
 #[cfg(feature = "telemetry")]
 pub mod telemetry;
+pub mod tenant;
 pub mod traits;
 
+#[cfg(feature = "axum")]
+pub mod auth;
+#[cfg(feature = "axum")]
+pub mod tenant_ctx;
+
 pub use config::{AgentConfig, DashboardConfig};
 pub use error::CoreError;
+pub use tenant::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};

compliance-core/src/tenant.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+//! Tenant context propagated through every authenticated request.
+//!
+//! M7.1 single source of truth for "who is this request for". Claims come
+//! from a Keycloak-issued JWT and land here via [`crate::auth::require_jwt_auth`]
+//! (enabled with the `axum` feature). Handlers reach into the request
+//! extensions with the [`crate::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx`] extractor.
+//!
+//! The shape mirrors the JWT claim names the breakpilot-platform realm
+//! emits (see `platform/orca-platform/dev/keycloak/realm-export.json`).
+//! Stable contract — adding fields is fine; renaming is a breaking
+//! change for every downstream product.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// Tenant lifecycle status from `PLATFORM_ARCHITECTURE.md §5c`.
+///
+/// Drives the `tenant_status` middleware:
+/// * `Demo` / `Trial` / `Active` — full access.
+/// * `Frozen` — read-only after cancel / non-payment. Mutating endpoints
+///   return 402.
+/// * `Archived` — data-retention window closed. Every endpoint returns 410.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
+pub enum TenantStatus {
+    Demo,
+    Trial,
+    Active,
+    Frozen,
+    Archived,
+}
+
+impl TenantStatus {
+    /// True for statuses that block write paths.
+    pub fn is_frozen(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, TenantStatus::Frozen)
+    }
+    /// True for statuses that block every request.
+    pub fn is_archived(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, TenantStatus::Archived)
+    }
+    /// True for the shared demo tenant — metering, billing, and audit
+    /// export are skipped.
+    pub fn is_demo(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, TenantStatus::Demo)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for TenantStatus {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Demo => write!(f, "demo"),
+            Self::Trial => write!(f, "trial"),
+            Self::Active => write!(f, "active"),
+            Self::Frozen => write!(f, "frozen"),
+            Self::Archived => write!(f, "archived"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Org-level role baked into the JWT by the realm's protocol mapper.
+/// `PLATFORM_ARCHITECTURE.md §6` is the canonical list.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "UPPERCASE")]
+pub enum OrgRole {
+    ItAdmin,
+    Cxo,
+    Finance,
+    Legal,
+    User,
+    /// Anything we haven't enumerated yet — forwards-compatible.
+    #[serde(other)]
+    Unknown,
+}
+
+impl OrgRole {
+    /// Parses a single role string (Keycloak emits these as `IT_ADMIN`,
+    /// `CXO`, etc.). Round-trips with the JSON layer.
+    pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Self {
+        match s {
+            "IT_ADMIN" => OrgRole::ItAdmin,
+            "CXO" => OrgRole::Cxo,
+            "FINANCE" => OrgRole::Finance,
+            "LEGAL" => OrgRole::Legal,
+            "USER" => OrgRole::User,
+            _ => OrgRole::Unknown,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Everything we know about the requesting tenant at the moment a request
+/// lands. Cheap to clone (every field is owned + small).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TenantContext {
+    /// `tenants.id` from the platform's tenant-registry (UUID).
+    pub tenant_id: String,
+    /// Lowercase URL-safe slug. Useful for log lines + audit emit.
+    pub tenant_slug: String,
+    /// Org-level roles the authenticated user holds inside this tenant.
+    /// Drives the per-handler RBAC in `M7.1-followup` PRs.
+    pub org_roles: Vec<OrgRole>,
+    /// Products this tenant is currently entitled to. Used to short-circuit
+    /// MCP / API calls for unsubscribed products.
+    pub products: Vec<String>,
+    /// Customer plan (`starter` / `professional` / `enterprise`) — gates
+    /// per-plan feature flags (e.g., MCP server is enterprise-only).
+    pub plan: String,
+    /// Lifecycle status — read by `require_tenant_status` middleware.
+    pub status: TenantStatus,
+    /// Keycloak user id of the requester (`sub` claim). Required for audit
+    /// emit so we know WHO did the thing, not just WHICH tenant.
+    pub user_id: String,
+    /// Optional user-facing name from the `name` / `preferred_username`
+    /// claim. Only used in audit + log lines.
+    pub user_name: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl TenantContext {
+    /// True if the caller holds at least one of the listed roles.
+    pub fn has_any_role(&self, roles: &[OrgRole]) -> bool {
+        self.org_roles.iter().any(|r| roles.contains(r))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn org_role_parses_known_values() {
+        assert_eq!(OrgRole::parse("IT_ADMIN"), OrgRole::ItAdmin);
+        assert_eq!(OrgRole::parse("CXO"), OrgRole::Cxo);
+        assert_eq!(OrgRole::parse("USER"), OrgRole::User);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn org_role_unknown_is_forward_compat() {
+        assert_eq!(OrgRole::parse("FUTURE_ROLE"), OrgRole::Unknown);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tenant_status_predicates() {
+        assert!(TenantStatus::Frozen.is_frozen());
+        assert!(!TenantStatus::Active.is_frozen());
+        assert!(TenantStatus::Archived.is_archived());
+        assert!(TenantStatus::Demo.is_demo());
+        assert!(!TenantStatus::Active.is_demo());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn has_any_role_matches() {
+        let ctx = TenantContext {
+            tenant_id: "t1".into(),
+            tenant_slug: "acme".into(),
+            org_roles: vec![OrgRole::ItAdmin],
+            products: vec![],
+            plan: "professional".into(),
+            status: TenantStatus::Active,
+            user_id: "u".into(),
+            user_name: None,
+        };
+        assert!(ctx.has_any_role(&[OrgRole::ItAdmin]));
+        assert!(ctx.has_any_role(&[OrgRole::Cxo, OrgRole::ItAdmin]));
+        assert!(!ctx.has_any_role(&[OrgRole::User, OrgRole::Cxo]));
+    }
+}

compliance-core/src/tenant_ctx.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+//! Axum extractor for the per-request `TenantContext`.
+//!
+//! Handlers consume it as a normal extractor argument:
+//!
+//! ```ignore
+//! async fn list_findings(TenantCtx(ctx): TenantCtx) -> Json<...> {
+//!     let filter = compliance_core::db::tenant_filter(&ctx);
+//!     ...
+//! }
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The middleware ([`crate::auth::require_jwt_auth`]) is responsible for
+//! inserting the context into the request extensions. If it's missing on
+//! a route that uses this extractor, that's a bug in the wiring — we
+//! return 401 so the caller sees an auth failure rather than a 500.
+
+use axum::{
+    extract::FromRequestParts,
+    http::{request::Parts, StatusCode},
+    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
+};
+
+use crate::TenantContext;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct TenantCtx(pub TenantContext);
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct TenantCtxRejection;
+
+impl IntoResponse for TenantCtxRejection {
+    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "Missing tenant context — request was not authenticated",
+        )
+            .into_response()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<S> FromRequestParts<S> for TenantCtx
+where
+    S: Send + Sync,
+{
+    type Rejection = TenantCtxRejection;
+
+    async fn from_request_parts(parts: &mut Parts, _state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        parts
+            .extensions
+            .get::<TenantContext>()
+            .cloned()
+            .map(TenantCtx)
+            .ok_or(TenantCtxRejection)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::TenantStatus;
+    use axum::http::Request;
+
+    fn ctx() -> TenantContext {
+        TenantContext {
+            tenant_id: "t-1".to_string(),
+            tenant_slug: "acme".to_string(),
+            org_roles: vec![],
+            products: vec![],
+            plan: "starter".to_string(),
+            status: TenantStatus::Active,
+            user_id: "u-1".to_string(),
+            user_name: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn extracts_context_when_present() {
+        let mut req = Request::new(());
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ctx());
+        let (mut parts, _) = req.into_parts();
+        let TenantCtx(found) = TenantCtx::from_request_parts(&mut parts, &())
+            .await
+            .expect("extractor should succeed");
+        assert_eq!(found.tenant_id, "t-1");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rejects_when_missing() {
+        let req: Request<()> = Request::new(());
+        let (mut parts, _) = req.into_parts();
+        let err = TenantCtx::from_request_parts(&mut parts, &()).await;
+        assert!(err.is_err());
+    }
+}

compliance-smoke/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[package]
+name = "compliance-smoke"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+description = "Tiny Axum service exercising compliance-core M7.1 tenant gating. Run smoke.sh against it before merging anything that touches the auth/tenant path."
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "compliance-smoke"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["axum"] }
+axum = "0.8"
+tokio = { workspace = true }
+tracing = { workspace = true }
+tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
+serde = { workspace = true }
+serde_json = { workspace = true }
+reqwest = { workspace = true }

compliance-smoke/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+//! M7.1 smoke service.
+//!
+//! A standalone Axum binary whose only job is to host the
+//! [`compliance_core::auth`] middleware + [`compliance_core::tenant_ctx`]
+//! extractor on three endpoints, so `scripts/smoke.sh` can prove the
+//! tenant-gating contract end-to-end before any auth-path PR merges.
+//!
+//! Endpoints:
+//! * `GET  /api/v1/health` — public, never authenticated.
+//! * `GET  /api/v1/echo`   — protected read; returns the [`TenantContext`].
+//! * `POST /api/v1/echo`   — protected write; exercises the `Frozen → 402`
+//!   gate on the same handler.
+//!
+//! Configuration (env):
+//! * `KEYCLOAK_URL`   — e.g. `http://localhost:8080`. Required.
+//! * `KEYCLOAK_REALM` — e.g. `certifai`. Required.
+//! * `SMOKE_PORT`     — defaults to `3010`.
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use axum::{middleware, routing::get, Extension, Json, Router};
+use compliance_core::{
+    auth::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState},
+    tenant_ctx::TenantCtx,
+};
+use serde::Serialize;
+use tokio::sync::RwLock;
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+struct EchoResponse {
+    method: &'static str,
+    tenant_id: String,
+    tenant_slug: String,
+    plan: String,
+    status: String,
+    products: Vec<String>,
+    org_roles: Vec<String>,
+    user_id: String,
+    user_name: Option<String>,
+}
+
+async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true }))
+}
+
+async fn echo_read(TenantCtx(ctx): TenantCtx) -> Json<EchoResponse> {
+    Json(echo(ctx, "GET"))
+}
+
+async fn echo_write(TenantCtx(ctx): TenantCtx) -> Json<EchoResponse> {
+    Json(echo(ctx, "POST"))
+}
+
+fn echo(ctx: compliance_core::TenantContext, method: &'static str) -> EchoResponse {
+    EchoResponse {
+        method,
+        tenant_id: ctx.tenant_id,
+        tenant_slug: ctx.tenant_slug,
+        plan: ctx.plan,
+        status: ctx.status.to_string(),
+        products: ctx.products,
+        org_roles: ctx.org_roles.iter().map(|r| format!("{r:?}")).collect(),
+        user_id: ctx.user_id,
+        user_name: ctx.user_name,
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+        .with_env_filter(
+            tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
+        )
+        .init();
+
+    let kc_url = std::env::var("KEYCLOAK_URL")
+        .map_err(|_| "KEYCLOAK_URL is required (e.g. http://localhost:8080)")?;
+    let kc_realm = std::env::var("KEYCLOAK_REALM")
+        .map_err(|_| "KEYCLOAK_REALM is required (e.g. certifai)")?;
+    let port: u16 = std::env::var("SMOKE_PORT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(3010);
+
+    let jwks_url = format!("{kc_url}/realms/{kc_realm}/protocol/openid-connect/certs");
+    let jwks_state = JwksState {
+        jwks: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
+        jwks_url: jwks_url.clone(),
+    };
+
+    // Layers execute outermost-first. The Extension must be registered
+    // before `require_jwt_auth` so the middleware can read JwksState; the
+    // status gate must run after JWT so `TenantContext` is in extensions.
+    let app = Router::new()
+        .route("/api/v1/health", get(health))
+        .route("/api/v1/echo", get(echo_read).post(echo_write))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_tenant_status))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_jwt_auth))
+        .layer(Extension(jwks_state));
+
+    let addr = format!("0.0.0.0:{port}");
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(&addr).await?;
+    tracing::info!(
+        port,
+        jwks = %jwks_url,
+        "compliance-smoke listening — try `scripts/smoke.sh`"
+    );
+    axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
+    Ok(())
+}

scripts/smoke.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# M7.1 tenant-gating smoke test.
+#
+# Drives compliance-smoke against a live Keycloak realm with five test
+# users (one per tenant_status), asserts the response code on each
+# endpoint, and exits non-zero on any mismatch.
+#
+# Pre-reqs (one-time):
+#   * KC up at $KC_URL with realm $KC_REALM
+#   * Client $KC_CLIENT has direct-access-grants enabled
+#   * Users + tenant_status mappers per certifai/keycloak/realm-export.json
+#   * compliance-smoke binary running and reachable at $SMOKE_URL
+#
+# Usage:
+#   scripts/smoke.sh              # uses defaults below
+#   SMOKE_URL=... scripts/smoke.sh
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+KC_URL="${KC_URL:-http://localhost:8080}"
+KC_REALM="${KC_REALM:-certifai}"
+KC_CLIENT="${KC_CLIENT:-certifai-dashboard}"
+SMOKE_URL="${SMOKE_URL:-http://localhost:3010}"
+
+readonly TOKEN_ENDPOINT="${KC_URL}/realms/${KC_REALM}/protocol/openid-connect/token"
+
+PASS=0
+FAIL=0
+
+red()    { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
+green()  { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
+yellow() { printf '\033[33m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
+
+# Fetches an access token via direct access grant. Echoes the raw token.
+get_token() {
+    local user="$1" pass="$2"
+    curl -sS -X POST "$TOKEN_ENDPOINT" \
+        -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
+        -d "grant_type=password" \
+        -d "client_id=${KC_CLIENT}" \
+        -d "username=${user}" \
+        -d "password=${pass}" \
+        -d "scope=openid" \
+        | sed -n 's/.*"access_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
+}
+
+# Hits SMOKE_URL$path with the given method and (optional) bearer token,
+# asserts the response status code matches $want.
+assert_status() {
+    local label="$1" method="$2" path="$3" want="$4" token="${5:-}"
+    local args=(-sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "${SMOKE_URL}${path}")
+    if [[ -n "$token" ]]; then
+        args+=(-H "Authorization: Bearer ${token}")
+    fi
+    local got
+    got=$(curl "${args[@]}")
+    if [[ "$got" == "$want" ]]; then
+        printf '  %s %s %-4s %-15s → %s\n' "$(green PASS)" "$label" "$method" "$path" "$got"
+        PASS=$((PASS + 1))
+    else
+        printf '  %s %s %-4s %-15s → got %s, want %s\n' "$(red FAIL)" "$label" "$method" "$path" "$got" "$want"
+        FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
+    fi
+}
+
+header() {
+    printf '\n%s %s\n' "$(yellow '##')" "$1"
+}
+
+# ---- Pre-flight ----------------------------------------------------------
+header "Pre-flight"
+if ! curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${SMOKE_URL}/api/v1/health" | grep -q '^200$'; then
+    printf '  %s smoke service not reachable at %s\n' "$(red ERR)" "$SMOKE_URL"
+    exit 2
+fi
+if ! curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${KC_URL}/realms/${KC_REALM}/.well-known/openid-configuration" | grep -q '^200$'; then
+    printf '  %s Keycloak realm %s not reachable at %s\n' "$(red ERR)" "$KC_REALM" "$KC_URL"
+    exit 2
+fi
+printf '  %s smoke service + Keycloak both up\n' "$(green OK)"
+
+# ---- Public endpoint --------------------------------------------------
+header "Public endpoint (no auth required)"
+assert_status anon GET  /api/v1/health 200
+
+# ---- Anonymous access to protected endpoints ----------------------------
+header "Anonymous → 401 on protected endpoints"
+assert_status anon GET  /api/v1/echo   401
+assert_status anon POST /api/v1/echo   401
+
+# ---- Bad token ----------------------------------------------------------
+header "Bad token → 401"
+assert_status bogus GET  /api/v1/echo  401 "not-a-real-jwt"
+assert_status bogus POST /api/v1/echo  401 "not-a-real-jwt"
+
+# ---- Active tenant (admin user) -----------------------------------------
+header "admin@certifai.local (active) → full access"
+TOKEN=$(get_token admin@certifai.local admin)
+if [[ -z "$TOKEN" ]]; then
+    printf '  %s failed to fetch token for admin\n' "$(red ERR)"
+    exit 2
+fi
+assert_status active GET  /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+assert_status active POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+
+# ---- Active tenant (USER role) ------------------------------------------
+header "user@certifai.local (active) → full access"
+TOKEN=$(get_token user@certifai.local user)
+assert_status active GET  /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+assert_status active POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+
+# ---- Trial tenant -------------------------------------------------------
+header "trial@acme.local (trial) → full access"
+TOKEN=$(get_token trial@acme.local trial)
+assert_status trial  GET  /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+assert_status trial  POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+
+# ---- Frozen tenant ------------------------------------------------------
+header "frozen@acme.local (frozen) → read-only, writes 402"
+TOKEN=$(get_token frozen@acme.local frozen)
+assert_status frozen GET  /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
+assert_status frozen POST /api/v1/echo 402 "$TOKEN"
+
+# ---- Archived tenant ----------------------------------------------------
+header "archived@acme.local (archived) → 410 everywhere"
+TOKEN=$(get_token archived@acme.local archived)
+assert_status archived GET  /api/v1/echo 410 "$TOKEN"
+assert_status archived POST /api/v1/echo 410 "$TOKEN"
+
+# ---- Summary ------------------------------------------------------------
+printf '\n'
+if [[ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]]; then
+    printf '%s %d passed, %d failed\n' "$(red FAIL)" "$PASS" "$FAIL"
+    exit 1
+fi
+printf '%s %d/%d assertions passed\n' "$(green PASS)" "$PASS" "$PASS"