feat(m7.3): cross-tenant admin HTTP endpoints

Adds two cross-tenant operator endpoints on top of the M7.2-D
DatabasePool primitives:
- GET    /api/v1/admin/tenants              → list tenant DBs
- DELETE /api/v1/admin/tenants/{tenant_id}  → drop (GDPR delete)

Auth is a static bearer (ADMIN_API_TOKEN env), explicitly NOT a
Keycloak JWT — the whole point is to operate across tenants and a
customer JWT always carries a single tenant_id, which would be a
semantic conflict. Comparison is constant-time to avoid byte-level
timing probes.

Design
- ADMIN_API_TOKEN env on the agent. When unset, the admin routes
  aren't mounted at all (404 rather than 401). An operator who
  hasn't opted in can't fingerprint the surface.
- Admin sub-router is built in start_api_server when the token is
  configured, then merged into the main router with its own
  require_admin_token middleware.
- compliance-core::auth gains a PUBLIC_PREFIXES list. Paths under
  /api/v1/admin/ bypass require_jwt_auth so the customer JWT path
  and the admin token path never collide.
- require_tenant_status passes through naturally — admin requests
  carry no TenantContext.

Files
- compliance-core/src/auth.rs — PUBLIC_PREFIXES + prefix-aware skip.
- compliance-core/src/config.rs — admin_api_token + tenant_registry_url
  fields on AgentConfig. tenant_registry_url is added now so the
  scheduler→registry PR doesn't have to bump the config shape again.
- compliance-agent/src/config.rs — env wiring for both.
- compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/admin.rs (new) — list_tenant_dbs,
  drop_tenant_db, require_admin_token middleware, tokens_eq helper
  with a small test.
- compliance-agent/src/api/server.rs — conditional admin sub-router
  + merge.
- Test harness fixtures updated for the two new config fields.

Test plan
- cargo fmt --all clean
- cargo clippy --workspace --exclude compliance-dashboard
  -- -D warnings clean
- cargo test -p compliance-core --lib — 7 pass
- cargo test -p compliance-agent --lib — 229 pass (+1 new for
  tokens_eq)

Production
- Set ADMIN_API_TOKEN in orca-infra (per-secret, NOT committed) when
  ready to expose these endpoints. Without the env, the routes
  literally don't exist on the binary.
- Long-term: replace the static bearer with a dedicated admin realm
  in Keycloak. Token rotation is just an env change + restart for
  now; revocation responsiveness is zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.lock

@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "jsonwebtoken",
  "mongodb",
  "octocrab",
- "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "reqwest",
  "secrecy",
@@ -819,15 +818,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "bson",
  "chrono",
  "compliance-core",
- "dashmap",
  "dotenvy",
- "hex",
  "mongodb",
  "rmcp",
  "schemars 1.2.1",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
- "sha2",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
  "tower-http",

Cargo.toml

@@ -34,5 +34,3 @@ zip = { version = "2", features = ["aes-crypto", "deflate"] }
 dashmap = "6"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 aes-gcm = "0.10"
-rand = "0.9"
-base64 = "0.22"

compliance-agent/Cargo.toml

@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ tokio-tungstenite = { version = "0.26", features = ["rustls-tls-webpki-roots"] }
 futures-core = "0.3"
 dashmap = { workspace = true }
 tokio-stream = { workspace = true }
-rand = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] }

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/admin.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+//! Cross-tenant admin endpoints (`/api/v1/admin/*`).
+//!
+//! Operator-only. Auth is a **static bearer token** (`ADMIN_API_TOKEN`
+//! env on the agent) — explicitly NOT a Keycloak JWT, because the
+//! whole point of these endpoints is to operate ACROSS tenants. A
+//! customer JWT (which always carries a single tenant_id) has no
+//! business mounting them.
+//!
+//! Routes are only registered when `ADMIN_API_TOKEN` is set. With no
+//! token, the endpoints don't exist at all (404), which is a stronger
+//! guarantee than "401 if you guess the path".
+//!
+//! Operations:
+//! - `GET    /api/v1/admin/tenants`              — list tenant DBs
+//! - `DELETE /api/v1/admin/tenants/{tenant_id}`  — GDPR delete
+//!
+//! Tenant ids in URLs are passed as-is to `DatabasePool::drop_tenant`,
+//! which sanitises them the same way it does for creation. Listing
+//! returns the raw DB names from `list_tenant_db_names` — operators
+//! can reverse-derive the tenant_id from the prefix.
+
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Request};
+use axum::http::{header, StatusCode};
+use axum::middleware::Next;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::Json;
+use secrecy::ExposeSecret;
+use serde::Serialize;
+
+use super::dto::AgentExt;
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub struct ListTenantDbsResponse {
+    pub tenant_db_names: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
+pub async fn list_tenant_dbs(
+    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
+) -> Result<Json<ListTenantDbsResponse>, StatusCode> {
+    let names = agent.db_pool.list_tenant_db_names().await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!("admin: list_tenant_db_names failed: {e}");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    Ok(Json(ListTenantDbsResponse {
+        tenant_db_names: names,
+    }))
+}
+
+#[tracing::instrument(skip_all, fields(tenant_id = %tenant_id))]
+pub async fn drop_tenant_db(
+    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
+    Path(tenant_id): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, StatusCode> {
+    agent.db_pool.drop_tenant(&tenant_id).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!("admin: drop_tenant failed: {e}");
+        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+    })?;
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "status": "dropped" })))
+}
+
+/// Constant-time-ish comparison of the configured admin token against
+/// the incoming bearer. Uses `subtle`-style byte equality so timing
+/// attacks can't probe the token character by character.
+fn tokens_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    if a.len() != b.len() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let mut diff = 0u8;
+    for (x, y) in a.bytes().zip(b.bytes()) {
+        diff |= x ^ y;
+    }
+    diff == 0
+}
+
+/// Middleware enforcing the static `ADMIN_API_TOKEN`. Mounted only on
+/// the admin sub-router, so this never runs on customer routes.
+pub async fn require_admin_token(
+    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
+    let Some(expected) = agent.config.admin_api_token.as_ref() else {
+        // Belt-and-braces — if the routes were somehow mounted without
+        // a token configured, refuse rather than no-op-pass.
+        return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "admin disabled").into_response();
+    };
+    let presented = request
+        .headers()
+        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
+        .map(|s| s.trim());
+    let Some(presented) = presented.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
+        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing bearer token").into_response();
+    };
+    if !tokens_eq(presented, expected.expose_secret()) {
+        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid admin token").into_response();
+    }
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tokens_eq_basic() {
+        assert!(tokens_eq("abc", "abc"));
+        assert!(!tokens_eq("abc", "abd"));
+        assert!(!tokens_eq("abc", "abcd"));
+        assert!(!tokens_eq("", "x"));
+        assert!(tokens_eq("", ""));
+    }
+}

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mcp_tokens.rs

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-//! `/api/v1/mcp-tokens` — per-tenant API tokens for the MCP server.
-//!
-//! These are opaque static bearers issued via the dashboard (or a
-//! direct curl with a KC JWT) and copied into LLM clients (Claude
-//! Desktop / Cursor / ChatGPT). The MCP server hashes incoming bearers
-//! and looks them up in the cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`
-//! collection to derive the tenant_id for routing.
-//!
-//! The raw token is shown to the caller exactly once at creation; the
-//! database only ever stores the SHA-256 hash. Revocation is a soft
-//! delete (sets `revoked: true`) so the audit log keeps the record.
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path};
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::Json;
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _};
-use compliance_core::models::{McpToken, McpTokenView};
-use compliance_core::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx;
-use mongodb::bson::doc;
-use rand::RngCore;
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-
-use super::dto::{AgentExt, ApiResponse};
-
-/// Mongo collection name inside the admin DB.
-const COLLECTION: &str = "mcp_tokens";
-
-/// Token prefix the MCP server expects on every bearer.
-const TOKEN_PREFIX: &str = "mcpt_";
-
-/// Bytes of randomness behind each token. 32 → ~256 bits.
-/// Encoded as URL-safe base64 without padding → 43 chars.
-/// Combined with `mcpt_` → 48-char tokens.
-const TOKEN_RAND_BYTES: usize = 32;
-
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-pub struct CreateMcpTokenRequest {
-    pub name: String,
-}
-
-/// Returned exactly once at creation. The `token` field is gone from
-/// the listing endpoint — the user must save it now.
-#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
-pub struct CreateMcpTokenResponse {
-    pub token: String,
-    pub view: McpTokenView,
-}
-
-/// `POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens` — mint a new token for the caller's tenant.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
-pub async fn create_mcp_token(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-    Json(req): Json<CreateMcpTokenRequest>,
-) -> Result<Json<CreateMcpTokenResponse>, StatusCode> {
-    if req.name.trim().is_empty() {
-        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-    }
-    let raw = generate_token();
-    let token_hash = sha256_hex(&raw);
-    let token_prefix: String = raw.chars().take(12).collect();
-
-    let mut token = McpToken {
-        id: None,
-        token_hash,
-        token_prefix,
-        tenant_id: tenant.0.tenant_id.clone(),
-        name: req.name.trim().to_string(),
-        created_by: tenant.0.user_id.clone(),
-        created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
-        last_used_at: None,
-        revoked: false,
-    };
-
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let res = col.insert_one(&token).await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!("Failed to insert MCP token: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })?;
-    token.id = res.inserted_id.as_object_id();
-
-    Ok(Json(CreateMcpTokenResponse {
-        view: McpTokenView::from(&token),
-        token: raw,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// `GET /api/v1/mcp-tokens` — list tokens for the caller's tenant.
-/// Hash is never returned; only metadata + the 12-char prefix so the
-/// user can identify which row is which.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
-pub async fn list_mcp_tokens(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-) -> Result<Json<ApiResponse<Vec<McpTokenView>>>, StatusCode> {
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let mut cursor = col
-        .find(doc! { "tenant_id": &tenant.0.tenant_id })
-        .sort(doc! { "created_at": -1 })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            tracing::error!("Failed to list MCP tokens: {e}");
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        })?;
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    while cursor.advance().await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::warn!("MCP tokens cursor advance failed: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })? {
-        match cursor.deserialize_current() {
-            Ok(t) => out.push(McpTokenView::from(&t)),
-            Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Failed to deserialize MCP token: {e}"),
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(Json(ApiResponse {
-        data: out,
-        total: None,
-        page: None,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// `DELETE /api/v1/mcp-tokens/{id}` — revoke (soft delete).
-/// Scoped to the caller's tenant: a user can't revoke another tenant's
-/// token even if they guess its id.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all, fields(id = %id))]
-pub async fn revoke_mcp_token(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-    Path(id): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, StatusCode> {
-    let oid = mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId::parse_str(&id).map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let result = col
-        .update_one(
-            doc! { "_id": oid, "tenant_id": &tenant.0.tenant_id },
-            doc! { "$set": { "revoked": true } },
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            tracing::error!("Failed to revoke MCP token: {e}");
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        })?;
-    if result.matched_count == 0 {
-        return Err(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
-    }
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "status": "revoked" })))
-}
-
-/// 32 bytes random → URL-safe base64 → 43 chars, no padding.
-/// Prefixed with `mcpt_` so the MCP server can sniff the format
-/// before bothering with the DB lookup.
-fn generate_token() -> String {
-    let mut bytes = [0u8; TOKEN_RAND_BYTES];
-    rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
-    format!("{TOKEN_PREFIX}{}", URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes))
-}
-
-fn sha256_hex(s: &str) -> String {
-    let mut h = Sha256::new();
-    h.update(s.as_bytes());
-    hex::encode(h.finalize())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn generated_tokens_are_unique_and_prefixed() {
-        let a = generate_token();
-        let b = generate_token();
-        assert_ne!(a, b);
-        assert!(a.starts_with(TOKEN_PREFIX));
-        assert!(b.starts_with(TOKEN_PREFIX));
-        // 5 + 43 = 48 chars
-        assert_eq!(a.len(), 5 + 43);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sha256_is_stable_and_64_hex() {
-        let h = sha256_hex("mcpt_abc");
-        assert_eq!(h.len(), 64);
-        assert!(h.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
-        assert_eq!(sha256_hex("mcpt_abc"), h);
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mod.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+pub mod admin;
 pub mod chat;
 pub mod dast;
 pub mod dto;
@@ -6,7 +7,6 @@ pub mod graph;
 pub mod health;
 pub mod help_chat;
 pub mod issues;
-pub mod mcp_tokens;
 pub mod notifications;
 pub mod pentest_handlers;
 pub use pentest_handlers as pentest;

compliance-agent/src/api/routes.rs

@@ -47,15 +47,6 @@ pub fn build_router() -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/sbom/diff", get(handlers::sbom_diff))
         .route("/api/v1/issues", get(handlers::list_issues))
         .route("/api/v1/scan-runs", get(handlers::list_scan_runs))
-        // MCP token management (per-tenant API tokens for the MCP server)
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/mcp-tokens",
-            get(handlers::mcp_tokens::list_mcp_tokens).post(handlers::mcp_tokens::create_mcp_token),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/mcp-tokens/{id}",
-            delete(handlers::mcp_tokens::revoke_mcp_token),
-        )
         // Graph API endpoints
         .route("/api/v1/graph/{repo_id}", get(handlers::graph::get_graph))
         .route(

compliance-agent/src/api/server.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ use axum::extract::Request;
 use axum::http::HeaderValue;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::Response;
-use axum::{middleware, Extension};
+use axum::routing::{delete, get};
+use axum::{middleware, Extension, Router};
 use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 use tower_http::cors::CorsLayer;
 use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ use compliance_core::auth::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState};
 use compliance_core::{TenantContext, TenantStatus};
 
 use crate::agent::ComplianceAgent;
+use crate::api::handlers;
 use crate::api::routes;
 use crate::error::AgentError;
 
@@ -50,7 +52,28 @@ pub async fn inject_dev_tenant(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
 }
 
 pub async fn start_api_server(agent: ComplianceAgent, port: u16) -> Result<(), AgentError> {
+    // Admin sub-router. Routes are only mounted when ADMIN_API_TOKEN is
+    // configured — without it, the paths don't exist at all (404 rather
+    // than 401), so an operator who hasn't opted in can't fingerprint
+    // the surface area.
+    let admin_router: Router = if agent.config.admin_api_token.is_some() {
+        tracing::info!("Admin API enabled — /api/v1/admin/* mounted behind ADMIN_API_TOKEN bearer");
+        Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/admin/tenants",
+                get(handlers::admin::list_tenant_dbs),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/admin/tenants/{tenant_id}",
+                delete(handlers::admin::drop_tenant_db),
+            )
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(handlers::admin::require_admin_token))
+    } else {
+        Router::new()
+    };
+
     let mut app = routes::build_router()
+        .merge(admin_router)
         .layer(Extension(Arc::new(agent.clone())))
         .layer(CorsLayer::permissive())
         .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())

compliance-agent/src/config.rs

@@ -59,5 +59,7 @@ pub fn load_config() -> Result<AgentConfig, AgentError> {
             .unwrap_or(true),
         pentest_imap_username: env_var_opt("PENTEST_IMAP_USERNAME"),
         pentest_imap_password: env_secret_opt("PENTEST_IMAP_PASSWORD"),
+        admin_api_token: env_secret_opt("ADMIN_API_TOKEN"),
+        tenant_registry_url: env_var_opt("TENANT_REGISTRY_URL"),
     })
 }

compliance-agent/src/database.rs

@@ -141,25 +141,6 @@ impl DatabasePool {
         &self.client
     }
 
-    /// Cross-tenant admin database used by features that intentionally
-    /// span tenants (today: MCP bearer tokens — each token row carries
-    /// a `tenant_id` and the MCP server reads them to route requests).
-    ///
-    /// The name `<db_prefix>__admin` (double underscore) is reserved —
-    /// the sanitizer never produces it for a normal tenant DB because
-    /// the natural format is `<db_prefix>_<sanitized_tenant_id>` (one
-    /// underscore) and tenant_ids would have to start with `_admin` to
-    /// collide. New tenant provisioning should reject such ids.
-    pub fn admin_db(&self) -> mongodb::Database {
-        self.client.database(&self.admin_db_name())
-    }
-
-    /// Name of the admin database — public so tests / operators can
-    /// drop it via the raw client.
-    pub fn admin_db_name(&self) -> String {
-        format!("{}__admin", self.db_prefix)
-    }
-
     /// List every Mongo database currently belonging to this pool,
     /// identified by the `<db_prefix>_` prefix. The result is the raw
     /// database names — opening one for offboarding/cleanup goes

compliance-agent/src/pentest/cleanup.rs

@@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ mod tests {
             pentest_imap_tls: true,
             pentest_imap_username: None,
             pentest_imap_password: None,
+            admin_api_token: None,
+            tenant_registry_url: None,
         }
     }
 

compliance-agent/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ impl TestServer {
             pentest_imap_tls: false,
             pentest_imap_username: None,
             pentest_imap_password: None,
+            admin_api_token: None,
+            tenant_registry_url: None,
         };
 
         let agent = ComplianceAgent::new(config, db_pool);

compliance-core/src/auth.rs

@@ -63,16 +63,24 @@ struct Claims {
 
 const PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/health"];
 
+/// Path prefixes that bypass JWT validation. The admin sub-router
+/// (`/api/v1/admin/*`) has its own static-bearer middleware and must
+/// not be routed through the customer-JWT path — a Keycloak token
+/// always carries a single tenant_id and would semantically conflict
+/// with cross-tenant admin operations.
+const PUBLIC_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/admin/"];
+
 /// Middleware that validates Bearer JWT tokens against Keycloak's JWKS
 /// and attaches a `TenantContext` extension on success.
 ///
-/// Skips validation for the health endpoint.
-/// If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak not configured), requests
-/// pass through and downstream code must handle the missing context.
+/// Skips validation for the health endpoint and any path under one of
+/// the [`PUBLIC_PREFIXES`]. If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak
+/// not configured), requests pass through and downstream code must
+/// handle the missing context.
 pub async fn require_jwt_auth(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     let path = request.uri().path();
 
-    if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) {
+    if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) || PUBLIC_PREFIXES.iter().any(|p| path.starts_with(p)) {
         return next.run(request).await;
     }
 

compliance-core/src/config.rs

@@ -37,6 +37,15 @@ pub struct AgentConfig {
     pub pentest_imap_tls: bool,
     pub pentest_imap_username: Option<String>,
     pub pentest_imap_password: Option<SecretString>,
+    /// Static bearer for the cross-tenant admin endpoints under
+    /// `/api/v1/admin/*`. When `None`, those endpoints are not
+    /// mounted at all (defense-in-depth: ops endpoints never reach
+    /// any auth path if no operator has explicitly opted in).
+    pub admin_api_token: Option<SecretString>,
+    /// Live tenant-registry URL the scheduler consults for the list
+    /// of tenants to iterate. When `None` or unreachable, scheduler
+    /// falls back to `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS` env (M7.2-C).
+    pub tenant_registry_url: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]

compliance-core/src/models/mcp_token.rs

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-//! Per-tenant API tokens used by `compliance-mcp` to authenticate MCP
-//! HTTP requests on behalf of LLM clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor,
-//! ChatGPT, etc.) that can't run a Keycloak OIDC flow.
-//!
-//! Tokens are opaque strings of the form `mcpt_<44 url-safe random
-//! chars>`. The raw value is shown to the user exactly once at
-//! creation; the database only ever sees the SHA-256 hash. Lookups go
-//! through the cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens` collection
-//! and return the `tenant_id` the MCP server should route to.
-
-use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-/// Persisted token metadata. `token_hash` is the SHA-256 hex of the
-/// raw token; the raw token itself is never stored.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct McpToken {
-    #[serde(rename = "_id", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    pub id: Option<bson::oid::ObjectId>,
-    /// SHA-256 hex of the raw token. Unique index in the collection.
-    pub token_hash: String,
-    /// First 8 chars of the raw token — purely for UI display so users
-    /// can identify which token is which without re-issuing.
-    pub token_prefix: String,
-    /// Routes to `<db_prefix>_<tenant_id>` on MCP requests.
-    pub tenant_id: String,
-    /// User-given label, e.g. "Claude Desktop" or "Sharang's laptop".
-    pub name: String,
-    /// Keycloak `sub` of the user who created this token, for audit.
-    pub created_by: String,
-    #[serde(with = "super::serde_helpers::bson_datetime")]
-    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
-    #[serde(default, with = "super::serde_helpers::opt_bson_datetime")]
-    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    /// Soft-delete flag. A revoked token doc stays around for audit
-    /// but never authenticates.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub revoked: bool,
-}
-
-/// Public projection of a token — never includes the hash.
-/// Returned by `GET /api/v1/mcp-tokens`.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct McpTokenView {
-    pub id: String,
-    pub name: String,
-    /// `mcpt_xxxx…` so the user can identify which row is which.
-    pub token_prefix: String,
-    pub created_by: String,
-    #[serde(with = "super::serde_helpers::bson_datetime")]
-    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
-    #[serde(default, with = "super::serde_helpers::opt_bson_datetime")]
-    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub revoked: bool,
-}
-
-impl From<&McpToken> for McpTokenView {
-    fn from(t: &McpToken) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            id: t.id.map(|o| o.to_hex()).unwrap_or_default(),
-            name: t.name.clone(),
-            token_prefix: t.token_prefix.clone(),
-            created_by: t.created_by.clone(),
-            created_at: t.created_at,
-            last_used_at: t.last_used_at,
-            revoked: t.revoked,
-        }
-    }
-}

compliance-core/src/models/mod.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ pub mod finding;
 pub mod graph;
 pub mod issue;
 pub mod mcp;
-pub mod mcp_token;
 pub mod notification;
 pub mod pentest;
 pub mod repository;
@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ pub use graph::{
 };
 pub use issue::{IssueStatus, TrackerIssue, TrackerType};
 pub use mcp::{McpServerConfig, McpServerStatus, McpTransport};
-pub use mcp_token::{McpToken, McpTokenView};
 pub use notification::{CveNotification, NotificationSeverity, NotificationStatus};
 pub use pentest::{
     AttackChainNode, AttackNodeStatus, AuthMode, CodeContextHint, Environment, IdentityProvider,

compliance-mcp/Cargo.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [dependencies]
-compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] }
+compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb"] }
 rmcp = { version = "0.16", features = ["server", "macros", "transport-io", "transport-streamable-http-server"] }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -19,6 +19,3 @@ bson = { version = "2", features = ["chrono-0_4"] }
 schemars = "1.0"
 axum = "0.8"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] }
-sha2 = { workspace = true }
-hex = { workspace = true }
-dashmap = { workspace = true }

compliance-mcp/src/auth.rs

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-//! Bearer-token authentication for incoming MCP HTTP requests.
-//!
-//! LLM clients (Claude Desktop / Cursor / ChatGPT / etc.) can't run
-//! Keycloak OIDC, so the MCP server uses opaque static tokens minted
-//! per-tenant via the agent's `POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens` endpoint.
-//!
-//! Flow per request:
-//! 1. Extract `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Missing → 401.
-//! 2. SHA-256 hash the token.
-//! 3. Look up the hash in `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`. Missing or
-//!    revoked → 401.
-//! 4. Fire-and-forget update of `last_used_at` so the dashboard can
-//!    show staleness without blocking the handler.
-//! 5. Stash the tenant_id in [`TENANT_ID`] (a `tokio::task_local`) so
-//!    the MCP tool handlers can read it without modifying rmcp's
-//!    handler signatures.
-//!
-//! The `task_local` is scoped around the inner service call via
-//! [`bearer_auth`], so every handler invoked downstream sees the
-//! tenant_id without us having to thread it through the macro-
-//! generated tool router.
-
-use axum::body::Body;
-use axum::extract::{Request, State};
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::middleware::Next;
-use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
-use mongodb::bson::doc;
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-
-use crate::database::DatabasePool;
-
-tokio::task_local! {
-    /// Tenant id resolved from the bearer for this request. Set by
-    /// [`bearer_auth`] before the inner service runs; read by the
-    /// MCP tool handlers via [`current_tenant_id`].
-    pub static TENANT_ID: String;
-}
-
-/// Mongo collection name in `<prefix>__admin`.
-const COLLECTION: &str = "mcp_tokens";
-
-/// Returns the tenant_id set by the auth middleware. `None` outside a
-/// request scope (e.g. unit tests that bypass the middleware).
-pub fn current_tenant_id() -> Option<String> {
-    TENANT_ID.try_with(|s| s.clone()).ok()
-}
-
-/// Axum middleware: validate bearer → set [`TENANT_ID`] → call inner.
-pub async fn bearer_auth(
-    State(pool): State<DatabasePool>,
-    request: Request,
-    next: Next,
-) -> Response {
-    let Some(token) = extract_bearer(&request) else {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing bearer token").into_response();
-    };
-    if !token.starts_with("mcpt_") {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token format").into_response();
-    }
-    let token_hash = sha256_hex(&token);
-
-    let col = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
-    let found = match col
-        .find_one(doc! { "token_hash": &token_hash, "revoked": false })
-        .await
-    {
-        Ok(Some(t)) => t,
-        Ok(None) => {
-            return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid or revoked token").into_response();
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::error!("MCP token lookup failed: {e}");
-            return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Token lookup error").into_response();
-        }
-    };
-
-    // Fire-and-forget last_used_at update — never block the handler.
-    let col2 = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
-    let hash_for_update = token_hash.clone();
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let _ = col2
-            .update_one(
-                doc! { "token_hash": &hash_for_update },
-                doc! { "$set": { "last_used_at": mongodb::bson::DateTime::now() } },
-            )
-            .await;
-    });
-
-    let tenant_id = found.tenant_id;
-    let inner = next.run(request);
-    TENANT_ID.scope(tenant_id, inner).await
-}
-
-/// Bare-bones projection — we don't need the whole `McpToken` here,
-/// just enough to route and confirm validity.
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-struct TokenLookup {
-    tenant_id: String,
-}
-
-fn extract_bearer(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
-    req.headers()
-        .get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
-        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-}
-
-fn sha256_hex(s: &str) -> String {
-    let mut h = Sha256::new();
-    h.update(s.as_bytes());
-    hex::encode(h.finalize())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sha256_known_value() {
-        // python -c 'import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256(b"mcpt_known").hexdigest())'
-        assert_eq!(
-            sha256_hex("mcpt_known"),
-            "27cf6cf678a44244106863c1c031be8e57b84c2b3019d742f755f8e7afa75dfd"
-        );
-    }
-}

compliance-mcp/src/database.rs

@@ -1,127 +1,19 @@
-//! Per-tenant Mongo broker for the MCP server.
-//!
-//! Mirror of the agent's `compliance_agent::database::DatabasePool` —
-//! duplicated here rather than lifted into `compliance-core` to keep
-//! this PR focused. If a third consumer ever needs it, lift then.
-//!
-//! Bearer tokens (validated by the auth middleware) carry a tenant_id
-//! and the handler resolves the per-tenant database via
-//! [`DatabasePool::for_tenant_id`]. The admin database
-//! (`<db_prefix>__admin`) holds the cross-tenant `mcp_tokens`
-//! collection that the middleware queries on every request.
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use dashmap::DashMap;
-use mongodb::{bson::doc, Client, Collection};
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use mongodb::{Client, Collection};
 
 use compliance_core::models::*;
 
-/// 63-byte Mongo db-name cap; same invariant as the agent's pool.
-const MAX_DB_NAME_LEN: usize = 63;
-/// 16-byte SHA-256 truncation, hex-encoded → 32 chars.
-const HASH_HEX_LEN: usize = 32;
-const MAX_PREFIX_LEN: usize = MAX_DB_NAME_LEN - 1 - HASH_HEX_LEN;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct DatabasePool {
-    client: Client,
-    db_prefix: String,
-    /// Tenants we've handed out a [`Database`] for. The MCP server
-    /// doesn't ensure indexes (the agent owns that side of the
-    /// schema), so the marker exists only to satisfy the parallel
-    /// shape — current code never reads it.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    seen: Arc<DashMap<String, ()>>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum DbError {
-    #[error("db_prefix '{prefix}' is {len} chars; max is {max} so the hash-fallback DB name fits Mongo's 63-byte cap")]
-    PrefixTooLong {
-        prefix: String,
-        len: usize,
-        max: usize,
-    },
-    #[error(transparent)]
-    Mongo(#[from] mongodb::error::Error),
-}
-
-impl DatabasePool {
-    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_prefix: &str) -> Result<Self, DbError> {
-        if db_prefix.len() > MAX_PREFIX_LEN {
-            return Err(DbError::PrefixTooLong {
-                prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
-                len: db_prefix.len(),
-                max: MAX_PREFIX_LEN,
-            });
-        }
-        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
-        client
-            .database("admin")
-            .run_command(doc! { "ping": 1 })
-            .await?;
-        tracing::info!(
-            "MCP MongoDB cluster reachable; per-tenant pool ready (db prefix '{db_prefix}')"
-        );
-        Ok(Self {
-            client,
-            db_prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
-            seen: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Read-only handle to the tenant's database. No indexes are
-    /// ensured here — the agent owns writes, MCP only reads.
-    pub fn for_tenant_id(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> Database {
-        let db_name = self.tenant_db_name(tenant_id);
-        self.seen.insert(tenant_id.to_string(), ());
-        Database::new(self.client.database(&db_name))
-    }
-
-    /// Cross-tenant admin DB — holds the `mcp_tokens` collection that
-    /// the auth middleware queries to map bearer → tenant_id.
-    pub fn admin_db(&self) -> mongodb::Database {
-        self.client.database(&format!("{}__admin", self.db_prefix))
-    }
-
-    pub fn tenant_db_name(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> String {
-        let sanitized = sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id);
-        let natural = format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, sanitized);
-        if natural.len() <= MAX_DB_NAME_LEN {
-            natural
-        } else {
-            let mut h = Sha256::new();
-            h.update(tenant_id.as_bytes());
-            let digest = h.finalize();
-            let suffix = hex::encode(&digest[..HASH_HEX_LEN / 2]);
-            format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, suffix)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id: &str) -> String {
-    tenant_id
-        .chars()
-        .map(|c| match c {
-            '/' | '\\' | '.' | '"' | '$' | ' ' | '\0' => '_',
-            c => c,
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-/// Typed accessors for the MCP-readable collections in a tenant DB.
-/// Matches the agent's `Database` shape but only exposes what the MCP
-/// tool handlers actually need.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct Database {
     inner: mongodb::Database,
 }
 
 impl Database {
-    pub(crate) fn new(inner: mongodb::Database) -> Self {
-        Self { inner }
+    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_name: &str) -> Result<Self, mongodb::error::Error> {
+        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
+        let db = client.database(db_name);
+        db.run_command(mongodb::bson::doc! { "ping": 1 }).await?;
+        tracing::info!("MCP server connected to MongoDB '{db_name}'");
+        Ok(Self { inner: db })
     }
 
     pub fn findings(&self) -> Collection<Finding> {

compliance-mcp/src/main.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
-mod auth;
 mod database;
 mod server;
 mod tools;
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-use database::DatabasePool;
+use database::Database;
 use rmcp::transport::{
     streamable_http_server::session::local::LocalSessionManager, StreamableHttpServerConfig,
     StreamableHttpService,
@@ -25,60 +24,36 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
 
     let mongo_uri =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_URI").unwrap_or_else(|_| "mongodb://localhost:27017".to_string());
-    // MONGODB_DATABASE is reused as the per-tenant DB-name prefix —
-    // same convention as the agent so `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`
-    // and `<prefix>_<tenant_id>` line up across services.
-    let db_prefix =
+    let db_name =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_DATABASE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "compliance_scanner".to_string());
 
-    let pool = DatabasePool::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_prefix).await?;
+    let db = Database::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_name).await?;
 
-    // HTTP transport: bind a small axum router with bearer-auth in
-    // front of the rmcp service. `/health` stays public for orca's
-    // container probe.
+    // If MCP_PORT is set, run as Streamable HTTP server; otherwise use stdio.
     if let Ok(port_str) = std::env::var("MCP_PORT") {
         let port: u16 = port_str.parse()?;
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on HTTP port {port}");
 
-        let pool_for_factory = pool.clone();
+        let db_clone = db.clone();
         let service = StreamableHttpService::new(
-            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool_for_factory.clone())),
+            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(db_clone.clone())),
             Arc::new(LocalSessionManager::default()),
             StreamableHttpServerConfig::default(),
         );
 
         let router = axum::Router::new()
             .route("/health", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
-            .nest_service(
-                "/mcp",
-                axum::Router::new().fallback_service(service).layer(
-                    axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(pool.clone(), auth::bearer_auth),
-                ),
-            );
+            .nest_service("/mcp", service);
         let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
         tracing::info!("MCP HTTP server listening on 0.0.0.0:{port}");
         axum::serve(listener, router).await?;
     } else {
-        // stdio transport — used when run as a local MCP server next
-        // to the LLM client. There's no HTTP layer to do bearer auth,
-        // so we synthesize a tenant_id from STDIO_TENANT_ID for local
-        // development. NEVER use this in production.
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on stdio");
-        let synth_tenant = std::env::var("STDIO_TENANT_ID").unwrap_or_else(|_| "dev".to_string());
-        tracing::warn!(
-            tenant_id = %synth_tenant,
-            "stdio transport — using synthetic tenant id; DO NOT use in production"
-        );
-        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool);
+        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(db);
         let transport = rmcp::transport::stdio();
         use rmcp::ServiceExt;
-        auth::TENANT_ID
-            .scope(synth_tenant, async {
         let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
         handle.waiting().await?;
-                Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())
-            })
-            .await?;
     }
 
     Ok(())

compliance-mcp/src/server.rs

@@ -2,37 +2,20 @@ use rmcp::{
     handler::server::wrapper::Parameters, model::*, tool, tool_handler, tool_router, ServerHandler,
 };
 
-use crate::auth::current_tenant_id;
-use crate::database::{Database, DatabasePool};
+use crate::database::Database;
 use crate::tools::{dast, findings, pentest, sbom};
 
 pub struct ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pool: DatabasePool,
+    db: Database,
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<Self>,
 }
 
-impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    /// Resolve the per-tenant `Database` from the bearer-set
-    /// `task_local`. Every tool handler calls this; missing context
-    /// surfaces as `internal_error` because it means the auth
-    /// middleware was misconfigured (handler ran without scope).
-    fn tenant_db(&self) -> Result<Database, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
-            rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
-                "no tenant context — bearer middleware not in chain".to_string(),
-                None,
-            )
-        })?;
-        Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&tenant_id))
-    }
-}
-
 #[tool_router]
 impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(db: Database) -> Self {
         Self {
-            pool,
+            db,
             tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
         }
     }
@@ -46,8 +29,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::ListFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        findings::list_findings(&db, params).await
+        findings::list_findings(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single finding by its ID")]
@@ -55,8 +37,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::GetFindingParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        findings::get_finding(&db, params).await
+        findings::get_finding(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of findings counts grouped by severity and status")]
@@ -64,8 +45,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::FindingsSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        findings::findings_summary(&db, params).await
+        findings::findings_summary(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── SBOM ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -77,8 +57,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::ListSbomPackagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&db, params).await
+        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -88,8 +67,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::SbomVulnReportParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&db, params).await
+        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── DAST ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -101,8 +79,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::ListDastFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        dast::list_dast_findings(&db, params).await
+        dast::list_dast_findings(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of recent DAST scan runs and finding counts")]
@@ -110,8 +87,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::DastScanSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        dast::dast_scan_summary(&db, params).await
+        dast::dast_scan_summary(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── Pentest ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -123,8 +99,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::ListPentestSessionsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&db, params).await
+        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single AI pentest session by its ID")]
@@ -132,8 +107,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestSessionParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        pentest::get_pentest_session(&db, params).await
+        pentest::get_pentest_session(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -143,8 +117,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetAttackChainParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        pentest::get_attack_chain(&db, params).await
+        pentest::get_attack_chain(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get chat messages from a pentest session")]
@@ -152,8 +125,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestMessagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&db, params).await
+        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&self.db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -163,8 +135,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::PentestStatsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
-        pentest::pentest_stats(&db, params).await
+        pentest::pentest_stats(&self.db, params).await
     }
 }
 
@@ -178,7 +149,7 @@ impl ServerHandler for ComplianceMcpServer {
                 .build(),
             server_info: Implementation::from_build_env(),
             instructions: Some(
-                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions for your tenant."
+                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions."
                     .to_string(),
             ),
         }