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Author SHA1 Message Date
Sharang Parnerkar cb7b1b86f5 fix(m7.1): correct middleware layer order so JwksState is visible
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Axum applies layers outermost-first. With the previous ordering
(`Extension(jwks_state)` first, `require_jwt_auth` last), the JWT
middleware ran before the Extension layer attached `JwksState` to
the request, so `request.extensions().get::<JwksState>()` always
returned None and the middleware silently passed through every
request as if Keycloak weren't configured.

Verified end-to-end against the local CERTifAI Keycloak realm:
- no token / bad token -> 401
- active / trial -> 200 read, write reaches handler
- frozen -> 200 read, 402 on writes
- archived -> 410 on every method

The bug was invisible to the unit + integration tests because they
construct the layer stack manually; only the live wiring exhibited it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 17:20:37 +02:00
Sharang Parnerkar 05c01ea547 feat(m7.1): wire tenant claims, status enforcement, and db scoping helper
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Lays the platform-wide multi-tenancy infrastructure on top of the
existing Keycloak signature validation. JWTs now carry tenant_id,
tenant_slug, org_roles, products, plan, and tenant_status; the
middleware decodes them into a TenantContext and attaches it to the
request extensions. A TenantCtx Axum extractor exposes the context to
handlers, and a tenant_status middleware enforces the §5c lifecycle
(frozen tenants are 402 on writes; archived tenants are 410 on every
method).

A db::tenant_filter helper in compliance-core gives every future
collection a single grep-able pattern for tenant-scoped queries.
Per-collection wiring (adding tenant_id to each model + threading the
filter through every find/update/delete call) lands in a follow-up.

Tests: 6 inline unit tests for claims→context mapping, 2 for the
extractor, 6 integration tests for status middleware, 3 for db
filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:10:42 +02:00
14 changed files with 42 additions and 430 deletions
Generated
-18
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@@ -701,23 +701,19 @@ dependencies = [
name = "compliance-core" name = "compliance-core"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"axum",
"bson", "bson",
"chrono", "chrono",
"hex", "hex",
"jsonwebtoken",
"mongodb", "mongodb",
"opentelemetry", "opentelemetry",
"opentelemetry-appender-tracing", "opentelemetry-appender-tracing",
"opentelemetry-otlp", "opentelemetry-otlp",
"opentelemetry_sdk", "opentelemetry_sdk",
"reqwest",
"secrecy", "secrecy",
"serde", "serde",
"serde_json", "serde_json",
"sha2", "sha2",
"thiserror 2.0.18", "thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"tracing", "tracing",
"tracing-opentelemetry", "tracing-opentelemetry",
"tracing-subscriber", "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -831,20 +827,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tracing-subscriber", "tracing-subscriber",
] ]
[[package]]
name = "compliance-smoke"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"axum",
"compliance-core",
"reqwest",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
]
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "console_error_panic_hook" name = "console_error_panic_hook"
version = "0.1.7" version = "0.1.7"
-1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ members = [
"compliance-graph", "compliance-graph",
"compliance-dast", "compliance-dast",
"compliance-mcp", "compliance-mcp",
"compliance-smoke",
] ]
resolver = "2" resolver = "2"
+3 -3
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ edition = "2021"
workspace = true workspace = true
[dependencies] [dependencies]
compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "telemetry", "axum"] } compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "telemetry"] }
compliance-graph = { path = "../compliance-graph" } compliance-graph = { path = "../compliance-graph" }
compliance-dast = { path = "../compliance-dast" } compliance-dast = { path = "../compliance-dast" }
serde = { workspace = true } serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ dashmap = { workspace = true }
tokio-stream = { workspace = true } tokio-stream = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies] [dev-dependencies]
compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] } compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb"] }
tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
reqwest = { workspace = true } reqwest = { workspace = true }
serde_json = { workspace = true } serde_json = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true } tokio = { workspace = true }
@@ -53,4 +52,5 @@ mongodb = { workspace = true }
uuid = { workspace = true } uuid = { workspace = true }
secrecy = { workspace = true } secrecy = { workspace = true }
axum = "0.8" axum = "0.8"
tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] } tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] }
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
//! M7.1 — JWT validation + tenant context propagation. //! M7.1 — JWT validation + tenant context propagation.
//! //!
//! `require_jwt_auth` validates a Bearer JWT against Keycloak's JWKS and //! `require_jwt_auth` validates a Bearer JWT against Keycloak's JWKS and
//! attaches a [`TenantContext`] to the request extensions. Downstream //! attaches a `TenantContext` to the request extensions. Downstream
//! middleware ([`require_tenant_status`]) and Axum extractors //! middleware (`require_tenant_status`) and Axum extractors (`TenantCtx`)
//! ([`crate::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx`]) read it from there. //! read it from there.
//! //!
//! Skipped paths: //! Skipped paths:
//! * `/api/v1/health` — Kubernetes liveness; never authenticated. //! * `/api/v1/health` — Kubernetes liveness; never authenticated.
@@ -23,13 +23,12 @@ use axum::{
middleware::Next, middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response}, response::{IntoResponse, Response},
}; };
use compliance_core::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};
use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, jwk::JwkSet, DecodingKey, Validation}; use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, jwk::JwkSet, DecodingKey, Validation};
use reqwest::StatusCode; use reqwest::StatusCode;
use serde::Deserialize; use serde::Deserialize;
use tokio::sync::RwLock; use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use crate::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};
/// Cached JWKS from Keycloak for token validation. /// Cached JWKS from Keycloak for token validation.
#[derive(Clone)] #[derive(Clone)]
pub struct JwksState { pub struct JwksState {
@@ -148,83 +147,27 @@ async fn validate_token(token: &str, state: &JwksState) -> Result<TenantContext,
let kid = header let kid = header
.kid .kid
.clone()
.ok_or_else(|| "JWT missing kid header".to_string())?; .ok_or_else(|| "JWT missing kid header".to_string())?;
// First try against whatever's currently cached. If the kid isn't let jwks = fetch_or_get_jwks(state).await?;
// there or the signature doesn't verify, the cached JWKS is most
// likely stale (KC rotated keys) — refresh once and retry before
// giving up. Without this every key rotation produces a silent 401
// storm that only goes away when the agent restarts.
let jwks = fetch_or_get_jwks(state, false).await?;
match try_validate(token, &header, &kid, &jwks) {
Ok(ctx) => Ok(ctx),
Err(ValidationError::Permanent(e)) => Err(e),
Err(ValidationError::Stale(reason)) => {
tracing::info!(
kid = %kid,
reason = %reason,
"JWKS appears stale — forcing refresh and retrying"
);
let jwks = fetch_or_get_jwks(state, true).await?;
try_validate(token, &header, &kid, &jwks).map_err(|e| match e {
ValidationError::Stale(s) | ValidationError::Permanent(s) => s,
})
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)] let jwk = jwks
enum ValidationError {
/// Refresh-eligible: cached JWKS may be stale.
Stale(String),
/// Refusing the token regardless of JWKS freshness.
Permanent(String),
}
fn try_validate(
token: &str,
header: &jsonwebtoken::Header,
kid: &str,
jwks: &JwkSet,
) -> Result<TenantContext, ValidationError> {
let jwk = match jwks
.keys .keys
.iter() .iter()
.find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(kid)) .find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(&kid))
{ .ok_or_else(|| "no matching key found in JWKS".to_string())?;
Some(j) => j,
None => {
return Err(ValidationError::Stale(
"no matching key found in JWKS".to_string(),
))
}
};
let decoding_key = DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk) let decoding_key =
.map_err(|e| ValidationError::Permanent(format!("failed to create decoding key: {e}")))?; DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).map_err(|e| format!("failed to create decoding key: {e}"))?;
let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg); let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg);
validation.validate_exp = true; validation.validate_exp = true;
validation.validate_aud = false; validation.validate_aud = false;
let data = match decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation) { let data = decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
Ok(d) => d, .map_err(|e| format!("token validation failed: {e}"))?;
Err(e) => {
// Signature mismatch is the other refresh-eligible failure:
// the matching kid is present but the key bytes don't match.
// Everything else (expired, malformed, etc.) is permanent.
return Err(
if matches!(e.kind(), jsonwebtoken::errors::ErrorKind::InvalidSignature) {
ValidationError::Stale(format!("token validation failed: {e}"))
} else {
ValidationError::Permanent(format!("token validation failed: {e}"))
},
);
}
};
claims_to_context(data.claims).map_err(ValidationError::Permanent) claims_to_context(data.claims)
} }
/// Map the decoded JWT payload into the platform-wide `TenantContext`. /// Map the decoded JWT payload into the platform-wide `TenantContext`.
@@ -254,25 +197,14 @@ fn claims_to_context(c: Claims) -> Result<TenantContext, String> {
}) })
} }
async fn fetch_or_get_jwks(state: &JwksState, force: bool) -> Result<JwkSet, String> { async fn fetch_or_get_jwks(state: &JwksState) -> Result<JwkSet, String> {
if !force { {
let cached = state.jwks.read().await; let cached = state.jwks.read().await;
if let Some(ref jwks) = *cached { if let Some(ref jwks) = *cached {
return Ok(jwks.clone()); return Ok(jwks.clone());
} }
} }
// Hold the write lock across the fetch so concurrent refreshers
// don't all hammer Keycloak when keys rotate. If another writer
// already populated a fresh JWKS while we were waiting (and we
// weren't asked to force), use theirs.
let mut cached = state.jwks.write().await;
if !force {
if let Some(ref jwks) = *cached {
return Ok(jwks.clone());
}
}
let resp = reqwest::get(&state.jwks_url) let resp = reqwest::get(&state.jwks_url)
.await .await
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to fetch JWKS: {e}"))?; .map_err(|e| format!("failed to fetch JWKS: {e}"))?;
@@ -282,6 +214,7 @@ async fn fetch_or_get_jwks(state: &JwksState, force: bool) -> Result<JwkSet, Str
.await .await
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse JWKS: {e}"))?; .map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse JWKS: {e}"))?;
let mut cached = state.jwks.write().await;
*cached = Some(jwks.clone()); *cached = Some(jwks.clone());
Ok(jwks) Ok(jwks)
@@ -359,24 +292,6 @@ mod tests {
); );
} }
#[test]
fn try_validate_returns_stale_when_kid_missing_from_jwks() {
// Empty JWKS — the kid we ask for can't possibly match. The error
// must classify as Stale so the caller refreshes JWKS and retries.
let jwks = JwkSet { keys: vec![] };
let header = jsonwebtoken::Header {
alg: jsonwebtoken::Algorithm::RS256,
kid: Some("kid-rotated-out".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let err = try_validate("ignored.token.value", &header, "kid-rotated-out", &jwks)
.expect_err("should fail");
match err {
ValidationError::Stale(s) => assert!(s.contains("no matching key")),
ValidationError::Permanent(s) => panic!("must be Stale, got Permanent: {s}"),
}
}
#[test] #[test]
fn is_write_detects_methods() { fn is_write_detects_methods() {
assert!(!is_write(&Method::GET)); assert!(!is_write(&Method::GET));
+3
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@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
pub mod auth_middleware;
pub mod handlers; pub mod handlers;
pub mod routes; pub mod routes;
pub mod server; pub mod server;
pub mod tenant_ctx;
pub use server::start_api_server; pub use server::start_api_server;
pub use tenant_ctx::TenantCtx;
+5 -5
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@@ -7,9 +7,8 @@ use tower_http::cors::CorsLayer;
use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer; use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer; use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
use compliance_core::auth::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState};
use crate::agent::ComplianceAgent; use crate::agent::ComplianceAgent;
use crate::api::auth_middleware::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState};
use crate::api::routes; use crate::api::routes;
use crate::error::AgentError; use crate::error::AgentError;
@@ -45,9 +44,10 @@ pub async fn start_api_server(agent: ComplianceAgent, port: u16) -> Result<(), A
jwks_url, jwks_url,
}; };
tracing::info!("Keycloak JWT auth enabled for realm '{kc_realm}'"); tracing::info!("Keycloak JWT auth enabled for realm '{kc_realm}'");
// Layers execute outermost-first. Extension(jwks_state) must run // Layers execute outermost-first. The Extension must run before
// before require_jwt_auth so the middleware can read it; the // require_jwt_auth so that middleware can read JwksState from
// status gate runs after JWT so TenantContext is in extensions. // request extensions, and the status gate must run after the
// JWT auth so TenantContext is in extensions.
app = app app = app
.layer(middleware::from_fn(require_tenant_status)) .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_tenant_status))
.layer(middleware::from_fn(require_jwt_auth)) .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_jwt_auth))
@@ -9,18 +9,17 @@
//! } //! }
//! ``` //! ```
//! //!
//! The middleware ([`crate::auth::require_jwt_auth`]) is responsible for //! The middleware (`require_jwt_auth`) is responsible for inserting the
//! inserting the context into the request extensions. If it's missing on //! context into the request extensions. If it's missing on a route that
//! a route that uses this extractor, that's a bug in the wiring — we //! uses this extractor, that's a bug in the wiring — we return 401 so the
//! return 401 so the caller sees an auth failure rather than a 500. //! caller sees an auth failure rather than a 500.
use axum::{ use axum::{
extract::FromRequestParts, extract::FromRequestParts,
http::{request::Parts, StatusCode}, http::{request::Parts, StatusCode},
response::{IntoResponse, Response}, response::{IntoResponse, Response},
}; };
use compliance_core::TenantContext;
use crate::TenantContext;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)] #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TenantCtx(pub TenantContext); pub struct TenantCtx(pub TenantContext);
@@ -58,8 +57,8 @@ where
#[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)] #[allow(clippy::expect_used, clippy::unwrap_used)]
mod tests { mod tests {
use super::*; use super::*;
use crate::TenantStatus;
use axum::http::Request; use axum::http::Request;
use compliance_core::TenantStatus;
fn ctx() -> TenantContext { fn ctx() -> TenantContext {
TenantContext { TenantContext {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//! M7.1 — integration tests for `compliance_core::auth::require_tenant_status`. //! M7.1 — integration tests for `require_tenant_status`.
//! //!
//! Exercises the middleware end-to-end through an Axum router so we //! Exercises the middleware end-to-end through an Axum router so we
//! catch wiring bugs (extension propagation, method matching) that pure //! catch wiring bugs (extension propagation, method matching) that pure
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ use axum::{
routing::{get, post}, routing::{get, post},
Router, Router,
}; };
use compliance_core::{auth::require_tenant_status, TenantContext, TenantStatus}; use compliance_agent::api::auth_middleware::require_tenant_status;
use compliance_core::{TenantContext, TenantStatus};
use tower::ServiceExt; use tower::ServiceExt;
fn ctx_with(status: TenantStatus) -> TenantContext { fn ctx_with(status: TenantStatus) -> TenantContext {
-13
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@@ -18,15 +18,6 @@ telemetry = [
"dep:tracing-subscriber", "dep:tracing-subscriber",
"dep:tracing", "dep:tracing",
] ]
# Pulls in the M7.1 Axum middleware + extractor. Consumers that don't
# embed an HTTP server (e.g. the wasm dashboard frontend) leave it off.
axum = [
"dep:axum",
"dep:jsonwebtoken",
"dep:reqwest",
"dep:tokio",
"dep:tracing",
]
[dependencies] [dependencies]
serde = { workspace = true } serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -46,7 +37,3 @@ opentelemetry-appender-tracing = { version = "0.29", optional = true }
tracing-opentelemetry = { version = "0.30", optional = true } tracing-opentelemetry = { version = "0.30", optional = true }
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, optional = true } tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tracing = { workspace = true, optional = true } tracing = { workspace = true, optional = true }
axum = { version = "0.8", optional = true }
jsonwebtoken = { version = "9", optional = true }
reqwest = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-5
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ pub mod telemetry;
pub mod tenant; pub mod tenant;
pub mod traits; pub mod traits;
#[cfg(feature = "axum")]
pub mod auth;
#[cfg(feature = "axum")]
pub mod tenant_ctx;
pub use config::{AgentConfig, DashboardConfig}; pub use config::{AgentConfig, DashboardConfig};
pub use error::CoreError; pub use error::CoreError;
pub use tenant::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus}; pub use tenant::{OrgRole, TenantContext, TenantStatus};
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
//! Tenant context propagated through every authenticated request. //! Tenant context propagated through every authenticated request.
//! //!
//! M7.1 single source of truth for "who is this request for". Claims come //! This module is the M7.1 single source of truth for "who is this request
//! from a Keycloak-issued JWT and land here via [`crate::auth::require_jwt_auth`] //! for". Claims come from a Keycloak-issued JWT and land here via
//! (enabled with the `axum` feature). Handlers reach into the request //! `compliance-agent`'s `require_jwt_auth` middleware. Handlers reach into
//! extensions with the [`crate::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx`] extractor. //! the request extensions with the `TenantCtx` Axum extractor.
//! //!
//! The shape mirrors the JWT claim names the breakpilot-platform realm //! The shape mirrors the JWT claim names the breakpilot-platform realm
//! emits (see `platform/orca-platform/dev/keycloak/realm-export.json`). //! emits (see `platform/orca-platform/dev/keycloak/realm-export.json`).
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ impl OrgRole {
} }
} }
/// Everything we know about the requesting tenant at the moment a request /// Everything `compliance-agent` knows about the requesting tenant at the
/// lands. Cheap to clone (every field is owned + small). /// moment a request lands. Cheap to clone (every field is owned + small).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)] #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TenantContext { pub struct TenantContext {
/// `tenants.id` from the platform's tenant-registry (UUID). /// `tenants.id` from the platform's tenant-registry (UUID).
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
[package]
name = "compliance-smoke"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
description = "Tiny Axum service exercising compliance-core M7.1 tenant gating. Run smoke.sh against it before merging anything that touches the auth/tenant path."
[lints]
workspace = true
[[bin]]
name = "compliance-smoke"
path = "src/main.rs"
[dependencies]
compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["axum"] }
axum = "0.8"
tokio = { workspace = true }
tracing = { workspace = true }
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true }
serde_json = { workspace = true }
reqwest = { workspace = true }
-111
View File
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
//! M7.1 smoke service.
//!
//! A standalone Axum binary whose only job is to host the
//! [`compliance_core::auth`] middleware + [`compliance_core::tenant_ctx`]
//! extractor on three endpoints, so `scripts/smoke.sh` can prove the
//! tenant-gating contract end-to-end before any auth-path PR merges.
//!
//! Endpoints:
//! * `GET /api/v1/health` — public, never authenticated.
//! * `GET /api/v1/echo` — protected read; returns the [`TenantContext`].
//! * `POST /api/v1/echo` — protected write; exercises the `Frozen → 402`
//! gate on the same handler.
//!
//! Configuration (env):
//! * `KEYCLOAK_URL` — e.g. `http://localhost:8080`. Required.
//! * `KEYCLOAK_REALM` — e.g. `certifai`. Required.
//! * `SMOKE_PORT` — defaults to `3010`.
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::{middleware, routing::get, Extension, Json, Router};
use compliance_core::{
auth::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState},
tenant_ctx::TenantCtx,
};
use serde::Serialize;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct EchoResponse {
method: &'static str,
tenant_id: String,
tenant_slug: String,
plan: String,
status: String,
products: Vec<String>,
org_roles: Vec<String>,
user_id: String,
user_name: Option<String>,
}
async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true }))
}
async fn echo_read(TenantCtx(ctx): TenantCtx) -> Json<EchoResponse> {
Json(echo(ctx, "GET"))
}
async fn echo_write(TenantCtx(ctx): TenantCtx) -> Json<EchoResponse> {
Json(echo(ctx, "POST"))
}
fn echo(ctx: compliance_core::TenantContext, method: &'static str) -> EchoResponse {
EchoResponse {
method,
tenant_id: ctx.tenant_id,
tenant_slug: ctx.tenant_slug,
plan: ctx.plan,
status: ctx.status.to_string(),
products: ctx.products,
org_roles: ctx.org_roles.iter().map(|r| format!("{r:?}")).collect(),
user_id: ctx.user_id,
user_name: ctx.user_name,
}
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
)
.init();
let kc_url = std::env::var("KEYCLOAK_URL")
.map_err(|_| "KEYCLOAK_URL is required (e.g. http://localhost:8080)")?;
let kc_realm = std::env::var("KEYCLOAK_REALM")
.map_err(|_| "KEYCLOAK_REALM is required (e.g. certifai)")?;
let port: u16 = std::env::var("SMOKE_PORT")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
.unwrap_or(3010);
let jwks_url = format!("{kc_url}/realms/{kc_realm}/protocol/openid-connect/certs");
let jwks_state = JwksState {
jwks: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
jwks_url: jwks_url.clone(),
};
// Layers execute outermost-first. The Extension must be registered
// before `require_jwt_auth` so the middleware can read JwksState; the
// status gate must run after JWT so `TenantContext` is in extensions.
let app = Router::new()
.route("/api/v1/health", get(health))
.route("/api/v1/echo", get(echo_read).post(echo_write))
.layer(middleware::from_fn(require_tenant_status))
.layer(middleware::from_fn(require_jwt_auth))
.layer(Extension(jwks_state));
let addr = format!("0.0.0.0:{port}");
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(&addr).await?;
tracing::info!(
port,
jwks = %jwks_url,
"compliance-smoke listening — try `scripts/smoke.sh`"
);
axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
Ok(())
}
-136
View File
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# M7.1 tenant-gating smoke test.
#
# Drives compliance-smoke against a live Keycloak realm with five test
# users (one per tenant_status), asserts the response code on each
# endpoint, and exits non-zero on any mismatch.
#
# Pre-reqs (one-time):
# * KC up at $KC_URL with realm $KC_REALM
# * Client $KC_CLIENT has direct-access-grants enabled
# * Users + tenant_status mappers per certifai/keycloak/realm-export.json
# * compliance-smoke binary running and reachable at $SMOKE_URL
#
# Usage:
# scripts/smoke.sh # uses defaults below
# SMOKE_URL=... scripts/smoke.sh
set -euo pipefail
KC_URL="${KC_URL:-http://localhost:8080}"
KC_REALM="${KC_REALM:-certifai}"
KC_CLIENT="${KC_CLIENT:-certifai-dashboard}"
SMOKE_URL="${SMOKE_URL:-http://localhost:3010}"
readonly TOKEN_ENDPOINT="${KC_URL}/realms/${KC_REALM}/protocol/openid-connect/token"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
red() { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
green() { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
yellow() { printf '\033[33m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
# Fetches an access token via direct access grant. Echoes the raw token.
get_token() {
local user="$1" pass="$2"
curl -sS -X POST "$TOKEN_ENDPOINT" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
-d "grant_type=password" \
-d "client_id=${KC_CLIENT}" \
-d "username=${user}" \
-d "password=${pass}" \
-d "scope=openid" \
| sed -n 's/.*"access_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
}
# Hits SMOKE_URL$path with the given method and (optional) bearer token,
# asserts the response status code matches $want.
assert_status() {
local label="$1" method="$2" path="$3" want="$4" token="${5:-}"
local args=(-sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "${SMOKE_URL}${path}")
if [[ -n "$token" ]]; then
args+=(-H "Authorization: Bearer ${token}")
fi
local got
got=$(curl "${args[@]}")
if [[ "$got" == "$want" ]]; then
printf ' %s %s %-4s %-15s → %s\n' "$(green PASS)" "$label" "$method" "$path" "$got"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
printf ' %s %s %-4s %-15s → got %s, want %s\n' "$(red FAIL)" "$label" "$method" "$path" "$got" "$want"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
}
header() {
printf '\n%s %s\n' "$(yellow '##')" "$1"
}
# ---- Pre-flight ----------------------------------------------------------
header "Pre-flight"
if ! curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${SMOKE_URL}/api/v1/health" | grep -q '^200$'; then
printf ' %s smoke service not reachable at %s\n' "$(red ERR)" "$SMOKE_URL"
exit 2
fi
if ! curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "${KC_URL}/realms/${KC_REALM}/.well-known/openid-configuration" | grep -q '^200$'; then
printf ' %s Keycloak realm %s not reachable at %s\n' "$(red ERR)" "$KC_REALM" "$KC_URL"
exit 2
fi
printf ' %s smoke service + Keycloak both up\n' "$(green OK)"
# ---- Public endpoint --------------------------------------------------
header "Public endpoint (no auth required)"
assert_status anon GET /api/v1/health 200
# ---- Anonymous access to protected endpoints ----------------------------
header "Anonymous → 401 on protected endpoints"
assert_status anon GET /api/v1/echo 401
assert_status anon POST /api/v1/echo 401
# ---- Bad token ----------------------------------------------------------
header "Bad token → 401"
assert_status bogus GET /api/v1/echo 401 "not-a-real-jwt"
assert_status bogus POST /api/v1/echo 401 "not-a-real-jwt"
# ---- Active tenant (admin user) -----------------------------------------
header "admin@certifai.local (active) → full access"
TOKEN=$(get_token admin@certifai.local admin)
if [[ -z "$TOKEN" ]]; then
printf ' %s failed to fetch token for admin\n' "$(red ERR)"
exit 2
fi
assert_status active GET /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
assert_status active POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
# ---- Active tenant (USER role) ------------------------------------------
header "user@certifai.local (active) → full access"
TOKEN=$(get_token user@certifai.local user)
assert_status active GET /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
assert_status active POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
# ---- Trial tenant -------------------------------------------------------
header "trial@acme.local (trial) → full access"
TOKEN=$(get_token trial@acme.local trial)
assert_status trial GET /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
assert_status trial POST /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
# ---- Frozen tenant ------------------------------------------------------
header "frozen@acme.local (frozen) → read-only, writes 402"
TOKEN=$(get_token frozen@acme.local frozen)
assert_status frozen GET /api/v1/echo 200 "$TOKEN"
assert_status frozen POST /api/v1/echo 402 "$TOKEN"
# ---- Archived tenant ----------------------------------------------------
header "archived@acme.local (archived) → 410 everywhere"
TOKEN=$(get_token archived@acme.local archived)
assert_status archived GET /api/v1/echo 410 "$TOKEN"
assert_status archived POST /api/v1/echo 410 "$TOKEN"
# ---- Summary ------------------------------------------------------------
printf '\n'
if [[ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]]; then
printf '%s %d passed, %d failed\n' "$(red FAIL)" "$PASS" "$FAIL"
exit 1
fi
printf '%s %d/%d assertions passed\n' "$(green PASS)" "$PASS" "$PASS"