fix(dashboard): attach Keycloak token on agent API calls

Symptom: "unable to load repositories" — agent returns
"Missing authorization header" 401 on every protected endpoint
because the dashboard's server functions were calling reqwest::get
without an Authorization header. The Keycloak OIDC flow
(auth_login / auth_callback) was already wired up and storing the
access_token in tower-sessions, but the access_token was never
threaded into outbound calls.

Fix
- New `infrastructure::agent_client` module exposes:
  - `agent_request(method, path) -> RequestBuilder`
  - `agent_get(path) -> RequestBuilder` (sugar for GET)
  Both pull the session's access_token (via FullstackContext extract)
  and attach `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. When Keycloak is not
  configured the helper short-circuits — matching the dashboard's
  require_auth middleware which short-circuits in the same state.
- Migrated every #[server] function in:
  - chat, dast, findings, graph, issues, notifications, pentest,
    repositories, sbom, scans, stats
  - 57 call sites total, all replaced.
- Left as-is:
  - `infrastructure::server::webhook_proxy` — forwards to the agent's
    separate webhook server (port 3002), which is HMAC-authenticated,
    not JWT-authenticated.
  - `infrastructure::auth::auth_callback` — performs the KC token
    exchange itself; bearer auth would be circular.

Test plan
- cargo fmt --all clean
- cargo clippy -p compliance-dashboard --features server -- -D warnings
  clean
- cargo check -p compliance-dashboard --features server clean
- cargo check -p compliance-dashboard (web target) implicit via build
- Manual: after deploy, dashboard's repositories page loads without
  401; calls now carry Authorization: Bearer header to the agent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -7,17 +7,4 @@ ignore = [
     # not a realistic attack surface here. Revisit when mongodb bumps hickory.
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # NSEC3 loop, no fix available upstream
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # O(n²) name compression, fixed in hickory-proto >=0.26.1
-
-    # rmcp 0.16.0 — DNS rebinding in Streamable HTTP server transport (missing
-    # Host header validation). Patched in rmcp >= 1.4.0, which is a major API
-    # version jump from our pin; rmcp shipped 0.x → 1.x → 2.x in three months
-    # and the migration touches every tool handler + the auth middleware we
-    # just landed in #92. Threat model in our deployment: the MCP server is
-    # exposed at a public hostname (comp-mcp-dev.meghsakha.com) behind orca's
-    # TLS-terminating ingress with per-tenant bearer auth — the attack model
-    # (browser DNS-rebinding into localhost MCP server) doesn't directly apply.
-    # Defense-in-depth Host-header check is still a worthwhile follow-up.
-    # FOLLOW-UP: bump rmcp to 2.x in a dedicated PR (M7.3 follow-up, sized
-    # multi-hour due to API surface change).
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0189",
 ]

Cargo.lock

@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "jsonwebtoken",
  "mongodb",
  "octocrab",
- "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "reqwest",
  "secrecy",
@@ -819,15 +818,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "bson",
  "chrono",
  "compliance-core",
- "dashmap",
  "dotenvy",
- "hex",
  "mongodb",
  "rmcp",
  "schemars 1.2.1",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
- "sha2",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
  "tower-http",
@@ -4282,9 +4278,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn-proto"
-version = "0.11.15"
+version = "0.11.14"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4fcb935c5bec503c2f0e306bdd3e58bb9029dcb14fa8d9ac76e3a5256ac0763e"
+checksum = "434b42fec591c96ef50e21e886936e66d3cc3f737104fdb9b737c40ffb94c098"
 dependencies = [
  "bytes",
  "getrandom 0.3.4",

Cargo.toml

@@ -34,5 +34,3 @@ zip = { version = "2", features = ["aes-crypto", "deflate"] }
 dashmap = "6"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 aes-gcm = "0.10"
-rand = "0.9"
-base64 = "0.22"

compliance-agent/Cargo.toml

@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ tokio-tungstenite = { version = "0.26", features = ["rustls-tls-webpki-roots"] }
 futures-core = "0.3"
 dashmap = { workspace = true }
 tokio-stream = { workspace = true }
-rand = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] }

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/admin.rs

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-//! Cross-tenant admin endpoints (`/api/v1/admin/*`).
-//!
-//! Operator-only. Auth is a **static bearer token** (`ADMIN_API_TOKEN`
-//! env on the agent) — explicitly NOT a Keycloak JWT, because the
-//! whole point of these endpoints is to operate ACROSS tenants. A
-//! customer JWT (which always carries a single tenant_id) has no
-//! business mounting them.
-//!
-//! Routes are only registered when `ADMIN_API_TOKEN` is set. With no
-//! token, the endpoints don't exist at all (404), which is a stronger
-//! guarantee than "401 if you guess the path".
-//!
-//! Operations:
-//! - `GET    /api/v1/admin/tenants`              — list tenant DBs
-//! - `DELETE /api/v1/admin/tenants/{tenant_id}`  — GDPR delete
-//!
-//! Tenant ids in URLs are passed as-is to `DatabasePool::drop_tenant`,
-//! which sanitises them the same way it does for creation. Listing
-//! returns the raw DB names from `list_tenant_db_names` — operators
-//! can reverse-derive the tenant_id from the prefix.
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Request};
-use axum::http::{header, StatusCode};
-use axum::middleware::Next;
-use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
-use axum::Json;
-use secrecy::ExposeSecret;
-use serde::Serialize;
-
-use super::dto::AgentExt;
-
-#[derive(Serialize)]
-pub struct ListTenantDbsResponse {
-    pub tenant_db_names: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
-pub async fn list_tenant_dbs(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-) -> Result<Json<ListTenantDbsResponse>, StatusCode> {
-    let names = agent.db_pool.list_tenant_db_names().await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!("admin: list_tenant_db_names failed: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })?;
-    Ok(Json(ListTenantDbsResponse {
-        tenant_db_names: names,
-    }))
-}
-
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all, fields(tenant_id = %tenant_id))]
-pub async fn drop_tenant_db(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    Path(tenant_id): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, StatusCode> {
-    agent.db_pool.drop_tenant(&tenant_id).await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!("admin: drop_tenant failed: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })?;
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "status": "dropped" })))
-}
-
-/// Constant-time-ish comparison of the configured admin token against
-/// the incoming bearer. Uses `subtle`-style byte equality so timing
-/// attacks can't probe the token character by character.
-fn tokens_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    if a.len() != b.len() {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let mut diff = 0u8;
-    for (x, y) in a.bytes().zip(b.bytes()) {
-        diff |= x ^ y;
-    }
-    diff == 0
-}
-
-/// Middleware enforcing the static `ADMIN_API_TOKEN`. Mounted only on
-/// the admin sub-router, so this never runs on customer routes.
-pub async fn require_admin_token(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    request: Request,
-    next: Next,
-) -> Response {
-    let Some(expected) = agent.config.admin_api_token.as_ref() else {
-        // Belt-and-braces — if the routes were somehow mounted without
-        // a token configured, refuse rather than no-op-pass.
-        return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "admin disabled").into_response();
-    };
-    let presented = request
-        .headers()
-        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
-        .map(|s| s.trim());
-    let Some(presented) = presented.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing bearer token").into_response();
-    };
-    if !tokens_eq(presented, expected.expose_secret()) {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid admin token").into_response();
-    }
-    next.run(request).await
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tokens_eq_basic() {
-        assert!(tokens_eq("abc", "abc"));
-        assert!(!tokens_eq("abc", "abd"));
-        assert!(!tokens_eq("abc", "abcd"));
-        assert!(!tokens_eq("", "x"));
-        assert!(tokens_eq("", ""));
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mcp_tokens.rs

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-//! `/api/v1/mcp-tokens` — per-tenant API tokens for the MCP server.
-//!
-//! These are opaque static bearers issued via the dashboard (or a
-//! direct curl with a KC JWT) and copied into LLM clients (Claude
-//! Desktop / Cursor / ChatGPT). The MCP server hashes incoming bearers
-//! and looks them up in the cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`
-//! collection to derive the tenant_id for routing.
-//!
-//! The raw token is shown to the caller exactly once at creation; the
-//! database only ever stores the SHA-256 hash. Revocation is a soft
-//! delete (sets `revoked: true`) so the audit log keeps the record.
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path};
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::Json;
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _};
-use compliance_core::models::{McpToken, McpTokenView};
-use compliance_core::tenant_ctx::TenantCtx;
-use mongodb::bson::doc;
-use rand::RngCore;
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-
-use super::dto::{AgentExt, ApiResponse};
-
-/// Mongo collection name inside the admin DB.
-const COLLECTION: &str = "mcp_tokens";
-
-/// Token prefix the MCP server expects on every bearer.
-const TOKEN_PREFIX: &str = "mcpt_";
-
-/// Bytes of randomness behind each token. 32 → ~256 bits.
-/// Encoded as URL-safe base64 without padding → 43 chars.
-/// Combined with `mcpt_` → 48-char tokens.
-const TOKEN_RAND_BYTES: usize = 32;
-
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-pub struct CreateMcpTokenRequest {
-    pub name: String,
-}
-
-/// Returned exactly once at creation. The `token` field is gone from
-/// the listing endpoint — the user must save it now.
-#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
-pub struct CreateMcpTokenResponse {
-    pub token: String,
-    pub view: McpTokenView,
-}
-
-/// `POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens` — mint a new token for the caller's tenant.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
-pub async fn create_mcp_token(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-    Json(req): Json<CreateMcpTokenRequest>,
-) -> Result<Json<CreateMcpTokenResponse>, StatusCode> {
-    if req.name.trim().is_empty() {
-        return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-    }
-    let raw = generate_token();
-    let token_hash = sha256_hex(&raw);
-    let token_prefix: String = raw.chars().take(12).collect();
-
-    let mut token = McpToken {
-        id: None,
-        token_hash,
-        token_prefix,
-        tenant_id: tenant.0.tenant_id.clone(),
-        name: req.name.trim().to_string(),
-        created_by: tenant.0.user_id.clone(),
-        created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
-        last_used_at: None,
-        revoked: false,
-    };
-
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let res = col.insert_one(&token).await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!("Failed to insert MCP token: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })?;
-    token.id = res.inserted_id.as_object_id();
-
-    Ok(Json(CreateMcpTokenResponse {
-        view: McpTokenView::from(&token),
-        token: raw,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// `GET /api/v1/mcp-tokens` — list tokens for the caller's tenant.
-/// Hash is never returned; only metadata + the 12-char prefix so the
-/// user can identify which row is which.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
-pub async fn list_mcp_tokens(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-) -> Result<Json<ApiResponse<Vec<McpTokenView>>>, StatusCode> {
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let mut cursor = col
-        .find(doc! { "tenant_id": &tenant.0.tenant_id })
-        .sort(doc! { "created_at": -1 })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            tracing::error!("Failed to list MCP tokens: {e}");
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        })?;
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    while cursor.advance().await.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::warn!("MCP tokens cursor advance failed: {e}");
-        StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-    })? {
-        match cursor.deserialize_current() {
-            Ok(t) => out.push(McpTokenView::from(&t)),
-            Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Failed to deserialize MCP token: {e}"),
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(Json(ApiResponse {
-        data: out,
-        total: None,
-        page: None,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// `DELETE /api/v1/mcp-tokens/{id}` — revoke (soft delete).
-/// Scoped to the caller's tenant: a user can't revoke another tenant's
-/// token even if they guess its id.
-#[tracing::instrument(skip_all, fields(id = %id))]
-pub async fn revoke_mcp_token(
-    Extension(agent): AgentExt,
-    tenant: TenantCtx,
-    Path(id): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, StatusCode> {
-    let oid = mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId::parse_str(&id).map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
-    let col = agent.db_pool.admin_db().collection::<McpToken>(COLLECTION);
-    let result = col
-        .update_one(
-            doc! { "_id": oid, "tenant_id": &tenant.0.tenant_id },
-            doc! { "$set": { "revoked": true } },
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            tracing::error!("Failed to revoke MCP token: {e}");
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        })?;
-    if result.matched_count == 0 {
-        return Err(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
-    }
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "status": "revoked" })))
-}
-
-/// 32 bytes random → URL-safe base64 → 43 chars, no padding.
-/// Prefixed with `mcpt_` so the MCP server can sniff the format
-/// before bothering with the DB lookup.
-fn generate_token() -> String {
-    let mut bytes = [0u8; TOKEN_RAND_BYTES];
-    rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
-    format!("{TOKEN_PREFIX}{}", URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes))
-}
-
-fn sha256_hex(s: &str) -> String {
-    let mut h = Sha256::new();
-    h.update(s.as_bytes());
-    hex::encode(h.finalize())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn generated_tokens_are_unique_and_prefixed() {
-        let a = generate_token();
-        let b = generate_token();
-        assert_ne!(a, b);
-        assert!(a.starts_with(TOKEN_PREFIX));
-        assert!(b.starts_with(TOKEN_PREFIX));
-        // 5 + 43 = 48 chars
-        assert_eq!(a.len(), 5 + 43);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sha256_is_stable_and_64_hex() {
-        let h = sha256_hex("mcpt_abc");
-        assert_eq!(h.len(), 64);
-        assert!(h.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
-        assert_eq!(sha256_hex("mcpt_abc"), h);
-    }
-}

compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-pub mod admin;
 pub mod chat;
 pub mod dast;
 pub mod dto;
@@ -7,7 +6,6 @@ pub mod graph;
 pub mod health;
 pub mod help_chat;
 pub mod issues;
-pub mod mcp_tokens;
 pub mod notifications;
 pub mod pentest_handlers;
 pub use pentest_handlers as pentest;

compliance-agent/src/api/routes.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ use axum::routing::{delete, get, patch, post};
 use axum::Router;
 
 use crate::api::handlers;
+use crate::webhooks;
 
 pub fn build_router() -> Router {
     Router::new()
@@ -46,15 +47,6 @@ pub fn build_router() -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/sbom/diff", get(handlers::sbom_diff))
         .route("/api/v1/issues", get(handlers::list_issues))
         .route("/api/v1/scan-runs", get(handlers::list_scan_runs))
-        // MCP token management (per-tenant API tokens for the MCP server)
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/mcp-tokens",
-            get(handlers::mcp_tokens::list_mcp_tokens).post(handlers::mcp_tokens::create_mcp_token),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/mcp-tokens/{id}",
-            delete(handlers::mcp_tokens::revoke_mcp_token),
-        )
         // Graph API endpoints
         .route("/api/v1/graph/{repo_id}", get(handlers::graph::get_graph))
         .route(
@@ -183,10 +175,17 @@ pub fn build_router() -> Router {
             "/api/v1/pentest/stats",
             get(handlers::pentest::pentest_stats),
         )
-    // Webhook routes live on the separate webhook server (port 3002,
+        // Webhook endpoints (proxied through dashboard)
-    // see crate::webhooks::server). The M7.2-C tenant-in-URL form is
+        .route(
-    // `/webhook/{tenant_id}/{platform}/{repo_id}` and the handlers
+            "/webhook/github/{repo_id}",
-    // expect a (tenant_id, repo_id) path tuple. Anything mounting
+            post(webhooks::github::handle_github_webhook),
-    // them here on the API server would mismatch the handler
+        )
-    // signature, so the routes are not exported.
+        .route(
+            "/webhook/gitlab/{repo_id}",
+            post(webhooks::gitlab::handle_gitlab_webhook),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/webhook/gitea/{repo_id}",
+            post(webhooks::gitea::handle_gitea_webhook),
+        )
 }

compliance-agent/src/api/server.rs

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ use axum::extract::Request;
 use axum::http::HeaderValue;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::Response;
-use axum::routing::{delete, get};
+use axum::{middleware, Extension};
-use axum::{middleware, Extension, Router};
 use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 use tower_http::cors::CorsLayer;
 use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
@@ -15,7 +14,6 @@ use compliance_core::auth::{require_jwt_auth, require_tenant_status, JwksState};
 use compliance_core::{TenantContext, TenantStatus};
 
 use crate::agent::ComplianceAgent;
-use crate::api::handlers;
 use crate::api::routes;
 use crate::error::AgentError;
 
@@ -52,28 +50,7 @@ pub async fn inject_dev_tenant(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
 }
 
 pub async fn start_api_server(agent: ComplianceAgent, port: u16) -> Result<(), AgentError> {
-    // Admin sub-router. Routes are only mounted when ADMIN_API_TOKEN is
-    // configured — without it, the paths don't exist at all (404 rather
-    // than 401), so an operator who hasn't opted in can't fingerprint
-    // the surface area.
-    let admin_router: Router = if agent.config.admin_api_token.is_some() {
-        tracing::info!("Admin API enabled — /api/v1/admin/* mounted behind ADMIN_API_TOKEN bearer");
-        Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/admin/tenants",
-                get(handlers::admin::list_tenant_dbs),
-            )
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/admin/tenants/{tenant_id}",
-                delete(handlers::admin::drop_tenant_db),
-            )
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(handlers::admin::require_admin_token))
-    } else {
-        Router::new()
-    };
-
     let mut app = routes::build_router()
-        .merge(admin_router)
         .layer(Extension(Arc::new(agent.clone())))
         .layer(CorsLayer::permissive())
         .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())

compliance-agent/src/config.rs

@@ -59,7 +59,5 @@ pub fn load_config() -> Result<AgentConfig, AgentError> {
             .unwrap_or(true),
         pentest_imap_username: env_var_opt("PENTEST_IMAP_USERNAME"),
         pentest_imap_password: env_secret_opt("PENTEST_IMAP_PASSWORD"),
-        admin_api_token: env_secret_opt("ADMIN_API_TOKEN"),
-        tenant_registry_url: env_var_opt("TENANT_REGISTRY_URL"),
     })
 }

compliance-agent/src/database.rs

@@ -141,25 +141,6 @@ impl DatabasePool {
         &self.client
     }
 
-    /// Cross-tenant admin database used by features that intentionally
-    /// span tenants (today: MCP bearer tokens — each token row carries
-    /// a `tenant_id` and the MCP server reads them to route requests).
-    ///
-    /// The name `<db_prefix>__admin` (double underscore) is reserved —
-    /// the sanitizer never produces it for a normal tenant DB because
-    /// the natural format is `<db_prefix>_<sanitized_tenant_id>` (one
-    /// underscore) and tenant_ids would have to start with `_admin` to
-    /// collide. New tenant provisioning should reject such ids.
-    pub fn admin_db(&self) -> mongodb::Database {
-        self.client.database(&self.admin_db_name())
-    }
-
-    /// Name of the admin database — public so tests / operators can
-    /// drop it via the raw client.
-    pub fn admin_db_name(&self) -> String {
-        format!("{}__admin", self.db_prefix)
-    }
-
     /// List every Mongo database currently belonging to this pool,
     /// identified by the `<db_prefix>_` prefix. The result is the raw
     /// database names — opening one for offboarding/cleanup goes

compliance-agent/src/pentest/cleanup.rs

@@ -339,8 +339,6 @@ mod tests {
             pentest_imap_tls: true,
             pentest_imap_username: None,
             pentest_imap_password: None,
-            admin_api_token: None,
-            tenant_registry_url: None,
         }
     }
 

compliance-agent/src/scheduler.rs

@@ -7,18 +7,11 @@ use crate::agent::ComplianceAgent;
 use crate::database::Database;
 use crate::error::AgentError;
 
-/// Default tenant the scheduler runs against when neither the tenant
+/// Default tenant the scheduler runs against when `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS`
-/// registry nor `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS` are configured. Matches the
+/// isn't set. Matches the dev-injector default so a bare `cargo run` has
-/// dev-injector default so a bare `cargo run` has the scheduler
+/// the scheduler scanning whatever lives in `<prefix>_dev`.
-/// scanning whatever lives in `<prefix>_dev`.
 const DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID: &str = "dev";
 
-/// Request timeout when fetching the live tenant list from the
-/// registry. Kept short — if the registry is slow we'd rather fall
-/// back to env-configured ids and finish the tick than block the
-/// scheduler loop.
-const REGISTRY_FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
-
 pub async fn start_scheduler(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Result<(), AgentError> {
     let sched = JobScheduler::new()
         .await
@@ -31,12 +24,7 @@ pub async fn start_scheduler(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Result<(), AgentError>
         let agent = scan_agent.clone();
         Box::pin(async move {
             tracing::info!("Scheduled scan triggered");
-            let tenants = scheduler_tenants(&agent).await;
+            for tenant_id in scheduler_tenants() {
-            tracing::debug!(
-                tenant_count = tenants.len(),
-                "Scheduled scan: tenants resolved"
-            );
-            for tenant_id in tenants {
                 scan_all_repos(&agent, &tenant_id).await;
             }
         })
@@ -54,12 +42,7 @@ pub async fn start_scheduler(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Result<(), AgentError>
         let agent = cve_agent.clone();
         Box::pin(async move {
             tracing::info!("CVE monitor triggered");
-            let tenants = scheduler_tenants(&agent).await;
+            for tenant_id in scheduler_tenants() {
-            tracing::debug!(
-                tenant_count = tenants.len(),
-                "CVE monitor: tenants resolved"
-            );
-            for tenant_id in tenants {
                 monitor_cves(&agent, &tenant_id).await;
             }
         })
@@ -75,14 +58,9 @@ pub async fn start_scheduler(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Result<(), AgentError>
         .await
         .map_err(|e| AgentError::Scheduler(format!("Failed to start scheduler: {e}")))?;
 
-    let tenants = scheduler_tenants(agent).await;
+    let tenants = scheduler_tenants();
-    let source = if agent.config.tenant_registry_url.is_some() {
-        "tenant-registry (env fallback)"
-    } else {
-        "env (SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS)"
-    };
     tracing::info!(
-        "Scheduler started: scans='{}', CVE monitor='{}', tenant source={source}, tenants={tenants:?}",
+        "Scheduler started: scans='{}', CVE monitor='{}', tenants={tenants:?}",
         agent.config.scan_schedule,
         agent.config.cve_monitor_schedule,
     );
@@ -93,40 +71,10 @@ pub async fn start_scheduler(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Result<(), AgentError>
     }
 }
 
-/// Tenants the scheduler iterates each tick.
+/// Tenants the scheduler iterates each tick. From `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS`
-///
+/// (comma-separated), or `DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID` if unset. M7.2-D
-/// Resolution order:
+/// will replace this with a pull from the tenant-registry.
-/// 1. **Tenant registry** at `agent.config.tenant_registry_url`
+fn scheduler_tenants() -> Vec<String> {
-///    (`GET /v1/tenants`). Fresh on every tick — picks up newly
-///    provisioned tenants without an agent restart.
-/// 2. **`SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS`** env (comma-separated) — fallback when
-///    the registry is unreachable, the response is malformed, or no
-///    registry URL is configured.
-/// 3. **`DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID`** (`"dev"`) — last-ditch fallback
-///    so the scheduler keeps doing something useful in dev.
-///
-/// We never panic out of this function — the scheduler must keep
-/// firing even if the registry is offline.
-async fn scheduler_tenants(agent: &ComplianceAgent) -> Vec<String> {
-    if let Some(url) = agent.config.tenant_registry_url.as_deref() {
-        match fetch_tenants_from_registry(&agent.http, url).await {
-            Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() => return v,
-            Ok(_) => {
-                tracing::warn!("tenant-registry returned empty list; falling back to env");
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    url = %url,
-                    error = %e,
-                    "tenant-registry fetch failed; falling back to env"
-                );
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    tenants_from_env()
-}
-
-fn tenants_from_env() -> Vec<String> {
     std::env::var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS")
         .ok()
         .map(|s| {
@@ -140,134 +88,6 @@ fn tenants_from_env() -> Vec<String> {
         .unwrap_or_else(|| vec![DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID.to_string()])
 }
 
-/// Shape we accept from the registry. Liberal in what we accept:
-/// the registry can return any field shape as long as either `id` or
-/// `tenant_id` is present. Other fields are ignored.
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-struct RegistryTenant {
-    #[serde(alias = "tenant_id")]
-    id: String,
-    /// Filter out non-running tenants if status is present. Missing
-    /// status defaults to "active" so older registry deployments keep
-    /// working.
-    #[serde(default = "default_status")]
-    status: String,
-}
-
-fn default_status() -> String {
-    "active".to_string()
-}
-
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-struct RegistryListResponse {
-    data: Vec<RegistryTenant>,
-}
-
-async fn fetch_tenants_from_registry(
-    http: &reqwest::Client,
-    base_url: &str,
-) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
-    let url = format!("{}/v1/tenants", base_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    let resp = http
-        .get(&url)
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(REGISTRY_FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS))
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("request failed: {e}"))?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return Err(format!("registry returned {}", resp.status()));
-    }
-    let body: RegistryListResponse = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("invalid JSON: {e}"))?;
-    Ok(filter_active(body.data))
-}
-
-/// Frozen/Archived tenants don't need scheduled scans; the M7.1
-/// status gate would 402/410 anyway. Skip them so we don't waste
-/// cycles. Active / trial / demo / anything-else-unknown all run.
-fn filter_active(rows: Vec<RegistryTenant>) -> Vec<String> {
-    rows.into_iter()
-        .filter(|t| !matches!(t.status.as_str(), "frozen" | "archived"))
-        .map(|t| t.id)
-        .collect()
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    fn tenant(id: &str, status: &str) -> RegistryTenant {
-        RegistryTenant {
-            id: id.to_string(),
-            status: status.to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn filter_active_keeps_running_skips_frozen_archived() {
-        let rows = vec![
-            tenant("a", "active"),
-            tenant("b", "trial"),
-            tenant("c", "demo"),
-            tenant("d", "frozen"),
-            tenant("e", "archived"),
-            tenant("f", "weird-but-not-known-dead"),
-        ];
-        let out = filter_active(rows);
-        assert_eq!(out, vec!["a", "b", "c", "f"]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn deserialize_registry_response_accepts_id_or_tenant_id() {
-        let body = r#"{"data":[
-            {"id":"a","status":"active"},
-            {"tenant_id":"b","status":"trial"},
-            {"id":"c"}
-        ]}"#;
-        let parsed: RegistryListResponse = serde_json::from_str(body).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(parsed.data.len(), 3);
-        assert_eq!(parsed.data[0].id, "a");
-        assert_eq!(parsed.data[1].id, "b");
-        assert_eq!(parsed.data[2].id, "c");
-        // Default status for the third entry should be "active"
-        assert_eq!(parsed.data[2].status, "active");
-    }
-
-    /// Combined into a single test: cargo runs tests in parallel and
-    /// env vars are process-global, so two separate tests touching
-    /// `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS` race each other. Doing both checks in
-    /// one test keeps them in a deterministic order.
-    #[test]
-    fn tenants_from_env_resolution() {
-        std::env::remove_var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS");
-        assert_eq!(
-            tenants_from_env(),
-            vec![DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID.to_string()],
-            "unset → default"
-        );
-
-        std::env::set_var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS", "acme, globex ,,hello");
-        let out = tenants_from_env();
-        std::env::remove_var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS");
-        assert_eq!(
-            out,
-            vec!["acme", "globex", "hello"],
-            "splits + trims + drops empty"
-        );
-
-        std::env::set_var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS", "");
-        let out = tenants_from_env();
-        std::env::remove_var("SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS");
-        assert_eq!(
-            out,
-            vec![DEFAULT_SCHEDULER_TENANT_ID.to_string()],
-            "empty → default"
-        );
-    }
-}
-
 /// Resolve the per-tenant database. Logs and returns `None` on failure
 /// so the loop in the caller can continue with other tenants.
 async fn tenant_db(agent: &ComplianceAgent, tenant_id: &str) -> Option<Database> {

compliance-agent/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -66,8 +66,6 @@ impl TestServer {
             pentest_imap_tls: false,
             pentest_imap_username: None,
             pentest_imap_password: None,
-            admin_api_token: None,
-            tenant_registry_url: None,
         };
 
         let agent = ComplianceAgent::new(config, db_pool);

compliance-core/src/auth.rs

@@ -63,24 +63,16 @@ struct Claims {
 
 const PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/health"];
 
-/// Path prefixes that bypass JWT validation. The admin sub-router
-/// (`/api/v1/admin/*`) has its own static-bearer middleware and must
-/// not be routed through the customer-JWT path — a Keycloak token
-/// always carries a single tenant_id and would semantically conflict
-/// with cross-tenant admin operations.
-const PUBLIC_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["/api/v1/admin/"];
-
 /// Middleware that validates Bearer JWT tokens against Keycloak's JWKS
 /// and attaches a `TenantContext` extension on success.
 ///
-/// Skips validation for the health endpoint and any path under one of
+/// Skips validation for the health endpoint.
-/// the [`PUBLIC_PREFIXES`]. If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak
+/// If `JwksState` is not present (Keycloak not configured), requests
-/// not configured), requests pass through and downstream code must
+/// pass through and downstream code must handle the missing context.
-/// handle the missing context.
 pub async fn require_jwt_auth(mut request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     let path = request.uri().path();
 
-    if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) || PUBLIC_PREFIXES.iter().any(|p| path.starts_with(p)) {
+    if PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.contains(&path) {
         return next.run(request).await;
     }
 

compliance-core/src/config.rs

@@ -37,15 +37,6 @@ pub struct AgentConfig {
     pub pentest_imap_tls: bool,
     pub pentest_imap_username: Option<String>,
     pub pentest_imap_password: Option<SecretString>,
-    /// Static bearer for the cross-tenant admin endpoints under
-    /// `/api/v1/admin/*`. When `None`, those endpoints are not
-    /// mounted at all (defense-in-depth: ops endpoints never reach
-    /// any auth path if no operator has explicitly opted in).
-    pub admin_api_token: Option<SecretString>,
-    /// Live tenant-registry URL the scheduler consults for the list
-    /// of tenants to iterate. When `None` or unreachable, scheduler
-    /// falls back to `SCHEDULER_TENANT_IDS` env (M7.2-C).
-    pub tenant_registry_url: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]

compliance-core/src/models/mcp_token.rs

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-//! Per-tenant API tokens used by `compliance-mcp` to authenticate MCP
-//! HTTP requests on behalf of LLM clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor,
-//! ChatGPT, etc.) that can't run a Keycloak OIDC flow.
-//!
-//! Tokens are opaque strings of the form `mcpt_<44 url-safe random
-//! chars>`. The raw value is shown to the user exactly once at
-//! creation; the database only ever sees the SHA-256 hash. Lookups go
-//! through the cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens` collection
-//! and return the `tenant_id` the MCP server should route to.
-
-use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-/// Persisted token metadata. `token_hash` is the SHA-256 hex of the
-/// raw token; the raw token itself is never stored.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct McpToken {
-    #[serde(rename = "_id", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    pub id: Option<bson::oid::ObjectId>,
-    /// SHA-256 hex of the raw token. Unique index in the collection.
-    pub token_hash: String,
-    /// First 8 chars of the raw token — purely for UI display so users
-    /// can identify which token is which without re-issuing.
-    pub token_prefix: String,
-    /// Routes to `<db_prefix>_<tenant_id>` on MCP requests.
-    pub tenant_id: String,
-    /// User-given label, e.g. "Claude Desktop" or "Sharang's laptop".
-    pub name: String,
-    /// Keycloak `sub` of the user who created this token, for audit.
-    pub created_by: String,
-    #[serde(with = "super::serde_helpers::bson_datetime")]
-    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
-    #[serde(default, with = "super::serde_helpers::opt_bson_datetime")]
-    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    /// Soft-delete flag. A revoked token doc stays around for audit
-    /// but never authenticates.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub revoked: bool,
-}
-
-/// Public projection of a token — never includes the hash.
-/// Returned by `GET /api/v1/mcp-tokens`.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct McpTokenView {
-    pub id: String,
-    pub name: String,
-    /// `mcpt_xxxx…` so the user can identify which row is which.
-    pub token_prefix: String,
-    pub created_by: String,
-    #[serde(with = "super::serde_helpers::bson_datetime")]
-    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
-    #[serde(default, with = "super::serde_helpers::opt_bson_datetime")]
-    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub revoked: bool,
-}
-
-impl From<&McpToken> for McpTokenView {
-    fn from(t: &McpToken) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            id: t.id.map(|o| o.to_hex()).unwrap_or_default(),
-            name: t.name.clone(),
-            token_prefix: t.token_prefix.clone(),
-            created_by: t.created_by.clone(),
-            created_at: t.created_at,
-            last_used_at: t.last_used_at,
-            revoked: t.revoked,
-        }
-    }
-}

compliance-core/src/models/mod.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ pub mod finding;
 pub mod graph;
 pub mod issue;
 pub mod mcp;
-pub mod mcp_token;
 pub mod notification;
 pub mod pentest;
 pub mod repository;
@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ pub use graph::{
 };
 pub use issue::{IssueStatus, TrackerIssue, TrackerType};
 pub use mcp::{McpServerConfig, McpServerStatus, McpTransport};
-pub use mcp_token::{McpToken, McpTokenView};
 pub use notification::{CveNotification, NotificationSeverity, NotificationStatus};
 pub use pentest::{
     AttackChainNode, AttackNodeStatus, AuthMode, CodeContextHint, Environment, IdentityProvider,

compliance-dashboard/src/infrastructure/agent_client.rs

@@ -9,16 +9,7 @@
 //! When Keycloak is not configured (dev convenience), the helper
 //! returns an unauthenticated builder — matching the agent's
 //! pass-through behavior in the same state.
-//!
-//! **Token refresh**: KC access tokens are short-lived (5 min default
-//! in the certifai realm). Before attaching, we decode the JWT's `exp`
-//! claim and proactively refresh via the stored refresh_token if the
-//! access token is expired or about to expire. The session is updated
-//! with the new pair. If refresh fails, we send the (stale) token
-//! anyway — the agent's 401 will surface to the UI, which can prompt
-//! re-login.
 
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
 use dioxus::prelude::ServerFnError;
 use dioxus_fullstack::FullstackContext;
 use reqwest::Method;
@@ -27,11 +18,6 @@ use super::auth::LOGGED_IN_USER_SESS_KEY;
 use super::server_state::ServerState;
 use super::user_state::UserStateInner;
 
-/// Seconds before the JWT's `exp` time at which we consider it stale
-/// enough to refresh. Covers clock skew + the round-trip to the agent
-/// so the token doesn't expire mid-flight.
-const REFRESH_SKEW_SECS: i64 = 30;
-
 /// Build a `RequestBuilder` for `<agent_api_url><path>` with the
 /// session's access token attached. `path` should include a leading
 /// `/`, e.g. `"/api/v1/repositories"`.
@@ -52,9 +38,10 @@ pub async fn agent_get(path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, ServerFnEr
 }
 
 /// Attach the session's bearer token if Keycloak is configured AND the
-/// session has a logged-in user. Refresh the token proactively if it's
+/// session has a logged-in user. Otherwise leave the request as-is.
-/// expired or about to expire. Persists refreshed tokens back into the
+///
-/// session.
+/// The Keycloak-disabled path mirrors the dashboard's `require_auth`
+/// middleware, which short-circuits when `state.keycloak.is_none()`.
 async fn attach_token(
     req: reqwest::RequestBuilder,
     state: &ServerState,
@@ -67,144 +54,8 @@ async fn attach_token(
         .get(LOGGED_IN_USER_SESS_KEY)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| ServerFnError::new(format!("session read failed: {e}")))?;
-    let Some(mut user) = user else {
+    Ok(match user {
-        return Ok(req);
+        Some(u) => req.bearer_auth(u.access_token),
-    };
+        None => req,
-
+    })
-    if token_needs_refresh(&user.access_token) {
-        tracing::debug!("Access token expired or near-expiring; refreshing");
-        match refresh_tokens(state, &user.refresh_token).await {
-            Ok((new_access, new_refresh)) => {
-                user.access_token = new_access;
-                if let Some(rt) = new_refresh {
-                    user.refresh_token = rt;
-                }
-                if let Err(e) = session.insert(LOGGED_IN_USER_SESS_KEY, &user).await {
-                    tracing::warn!("Failed to persist refreshed tokens: {e}");
-                }
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!("Token refresh failed: {e}; sending current token anyway");
-                // Fall through — the agent will 401 and the UI will
-                // prompt re-login. Better than failing the request at
-                // the dashboard layer with no helpful UX cue.
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    Ok(req.bearer_auth(user.access_token))
-}
-
-/// Decode the JWT's payload (no signature verification — the agent
-/// does that) and check the `exp` claim. Treats malformed tokens as
-/// expired so the refresh path runs.
-fn token_needs_refresh(jwt: &str) -> bool {
-    let Some(payload_b64) = jwt.split('.').nth(1) else {
-        return true;
-    };
-    let Ok(bytes) = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(payload_b64) else {
-        return true;
-    };
-    #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-    struct ExpClaim {
-        exp: i64,
-    }
-    let Ok(claims) = serde_json::from_slice::<ExpClaim>(&bytes) else {
-        return true;
-    };
-    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-    claims.exp - REFRESH_SKEW_SECS <= now
-}
-
-/// Exchange a refresh_token for a new access_token. Returns the new
-/// access_token and (optionally) the new refresh_token KC issued.
-/// KC may rotate refresh_tokens on use; we honor whatever it sends.
-async fn refresh_tokens(
-    state: &ServerState,
-    refresh_token: &str,
-) -> Result<(String, Option<String>), String> {
-    let kc = state
-        .keycloak
-        .ok_or_else(|| "Keycloak not configured".to_string())?;
-    if refresh_token.is_empty() {
-        return Err("no refresh_token in session".to_string());
-    }
-
-    #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-    struct TokenResp {
-        access_token: String,
-        refresh_token: Option<String>,
-    }
-
-    let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
-        .post(kc.token_endpoint())
-        .form(&[
-            ("grant_type", "refresh_token"),
-            ("client_id", kc.client_id.as_str()),
-            ("refresh_token", refresh_token),
-        ])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("refresh request failed: {e}"))?;
-
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-        return Err(format!("refresh rejected ({status}): {body}"));
-    }
-
-    let r: TokenResp = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("refresh response parse failed: {e}"))?;
-    Ok((r.access_token, r.refresh_token))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use base64::Engine;
-
-    /// Build a JWT-shaped string (header.payload.sig) with the given
-    /// payload. Signature is bogus — we never verify it locally.
-    fn make_jwt(payload: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
-        let payload_b64 = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(serde_json::to_vec(payload).unwrap());
-        format!("hdr.{payload_b64}.sig")
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn token_needs_refresh_true_when_expired() {
-        let exp = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() - 60;
-        let jwt = make_jwt(&serde_json::json!({ "exp": exp }));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh(&jwt));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn token_needs_refresh_true_within_skew_window() {
-        // 10 seconds left; less than the 30s skew → must refresh.
-        let exp = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + 10;
-        let jwt = make_jwt(&serde_json::json!({ "exp": exp }));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh(&jwt));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn token_needs_refresh_false_with_plenty_of_life() {
-        let exp = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + 600;
-        let jwt = make_jwt(&serde_json::json!({ "exp": exp }));
-        assert!(!token_needs_refresh(&jwt));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn token_needs_refresh_true_on_malformed_jwt() {
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh(""));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh("not.a.jwt"));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh("only-one-segment"));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh("hdr.not-base64!.sig"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn token_needs_refresh_true_when_exp_missing() {
-        let jwt = make_jwt(&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "abc" }));
-        assert!(token_needs_refresh(&jwt));
-    }
 }

compliance-mcp/Cargo.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [dependencies]
-compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] }
+compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb"] }
 rmcp = { version = "0.16", features = ["server", "macros", "transport-io", "transport-streamable-http-server"] }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -19,6 +19,3 @@ bson = { version = "2", features = ["chrono-0_4"] }
 schemars = "1.0"
 axum = "0.8"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] }
-sha2 = { workspace = true }
-hex = { workspace = true }
-dashmap = { workspace = true }

compliance-mcp/src/auth.rs

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-//! Bearer-token authentication for incoming MCP HTTP requests.
-//!
-//! LLM clients (Claude Desktop / Cursor / ChatGPT / etc.) can't run
-//! Keycloak OIDC, so the MCP server uses opaque static tokens minted
-//! per-tenant via the agent's `POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens` endpoint.
-//!
-//! Flow per request:
-//! 1. Extract `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Missing → 401.
-//! 2. SHA-256 hash the token.
-//! 3. Look up the hash in `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`. Missing or
-//!    revoked → 401.
-//! 4. Fire-and-forget update of `last_used_at` so the dashboard can
-//!    show staleness without blocking the handler.
-//! 5. Stash the tenant_id in [`TENANT_ID`] (a `tokio::task_local`) so
-//!    the MCP tool handlers can read it without modifying rmcp's
-//!    handler signatures.
-//!
-//! The `task_local` is scoped around the inner service call via
-//! [`bearer_auth`], so every handler invoked downstream sees the
-//! tenant_id without us having to thread it through the macro-
-//! generated tool router.
-
-use axum::body::Body;
-use axum::extract::{Request, State};
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::middleware::Next;
-use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
-use mongodb::bson::doc;
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-
-use crate::database::DatabasePool;
-
-tokio::task_local! {
-    /// Tenant id resolved from the bearer for this request. Set by
-    /// [`bearer_auth`] before the inner service runs; read by the
-    /// MCP tool handlers via [`current_tenant_id`].
-    pub static TENANT_ID: String;
-}
-
-/// Mongo collection name in `<prefix>__admin`.
-const COLLECTION: &str = "mcp_tokens";
-
-/// Returns the tenant_id set by the auth middleware. `None` outside a
-/// request scope (e.g. unit tests that bypass the middleware).
-pub fn current_tenant_id() -> Option<String> {
-    TENANT_ID.try_with(|s| s.clone()).ok()
-}
-
-/// Axum middleware: validate bearer → set [`TENANT_ID`] → call inner.
-pub async fn bearer_auth(
-    State(pool): State<DatabasePool>,
-    request: Request,
-    next: Next,
-) -> Response {
-    let Some(token) = extract_bearer(&request) else {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing bearer token").into_response();
-    };
-    if !token.starts_with("mcpt_") {
-        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token format").into_response();
-    }
-    let token_hash = sha256_hex(&token);
-
-    let col = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
-    let found = match col
-        .find_one(doc! { "token_hash": &token_hash, "revoked": false })
-        .await
-    {
-        Ok(Some(t)) => t,
-        Ok(None) => {
-            return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid or revoked token").into_response();
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::error!("MCP token lookup failed: {e}");
-            return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Token lookup error").into_response();
-        }
-    };
-
-    // Fire-and-forget last_used_at update — never block the handler.
-    let col2 = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
-    let hash_for_update = token_hash.clone();
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let _ = col2
-            .update_one(
-                doc! { "token_hash": &hash_for_update },
-                doc! { "$set": { "last_used_at": mongodb::bson::DateTime::now() } },
-            )
-            .await;
-    });
-
-    let tenant_id = found.tenant_id;
-    let inner = next.run(request);
-    TENANT_ID.scope(tenant_id, inner).await
-}
-
-/// Bare-bones projection — we don't need the whole `McpToken` here,
-/// just enough to route and confirm validity.
-#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
-struct TokenLookup {
-    tenant_id: String,
-}
-
-fn extract_bearer(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
-    req.headers()
-        .get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
-        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-}
-
-fn sha256_hex(s: &str) -> String {
-    let mut h = Sha256::new();
-    h.update(s.as_bytes());
-    hex::encode(h.finalize())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sha256_known_value() {
-        // python -c 'import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256(b"mcpt_known").hexdigest())'
-        assert_eq!(
-            sha256_hex("mcpt_known"),
-            "27cf6cf678a44244106863c1c031be8e57b84c2b3019d742f755f8e7afa75dfd"
-        );
-    }
-}

compliance-mcp/src/database.rs

@@ -1,127 +1,19 @@
-//! Per-tenant Mongo broker for the MCP server.
+use mongodb::{Client, Collection};
-//!
-//! Mirror of the agent's `compliance_agent::database::DatabasePool` —
-//! duplicated here rather than lifted into `compliance-core` to keep
-//! this PR focused. If a third consumer ever needs it, lift then.
-//!
-//! Bearer tokens (validated by the auth middleware) carry a tenant_id
-//! and the handler resolves the per-tenant database via
-//! [`DatabasePool::for_tenant_id`]. The admin database
-//! (`<db_prefix>__admin`) holds the cross-tenant `mcp_tokens`
-//! collection that the middleware queries on every request.
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use dashmap::DashMap;
-use mongodb::{bson::doc, Client, Collection};
-use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
 
 use compliance_core::models::*;
 
-/// 63-byte Mongo db-name cap; same invariant as the agent's pool.
-const MAX_DB_NAME_LEN: usize = 63;
-/// 16-byte SHA-256 truncation, hex-encoded → 32 chars.
-const HASH_HEX_LEN: usize = 32;
-const MAX_PREFIX_LEN: usize = MAX_DB_NAME_LEN - 1 - HASH_HEX_LEN;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct DatabasePool {
-    client: Client,
-    db_prefix: String,
-    /// Tenants we've handed out a [`Database`] for. The MCP server
-    /// doesn't ensure indexes (the agent owns that side of the
-    /// schema), so the marker exists only to satisfy the parallel
-    /// shape — current code never reads it.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    seen: Arc<DashMap<String, ()>>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum DbError {
-    #[error("db_prefix '{prefix}' is {len} chars; max is {max} so the hash-fallback DB name fits Mongo's 63-byte cap")]
-    PrefixTooLong {
-        prefix: String,
-        len: usize,
-        max: usize,
-    },
-    #[error(transparent)]
-    Mongo(#[from] mongodb::error::Error),
-}
-
-impl DatabasePool {
-    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_prefix: &str) -> Result<Self, DbError> {
-        if db_prefix.len() > MAX_PREFIX_LEN {
-            return Err(DbError::PrefixTooLong {
-                prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
-                len: db_prefix.len(),
-                max: MAX_PREFIX_LEN,
-            });
-        }
-        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
-        client
-            .database("admin")
-            .run_command(doc! { "ping": 1 })
-            .await?;
-        tracing::info!(
-            "MCP MongoDB cluster reachable; per-tenant pool ready (db prefix '{db_prefix}')"
-        );
-        Ok(Self {
-            client,
-            db_prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
-            seen: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Read-only handle to the tenant's database. No indexes are
-    /// ensured here — the agent owns writes, MCP only reads.
-    pub fn for_tenant_id(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> Database {
-        let db_name = self.tenant_db_name(tenant_id);
-        self.seen.insert(tenant_id.to_string(), ());
-        Database::new(self.client.database(&db_name))
-    }
-
-    /// Cross-tenant admin DB — holds the `mcp_tokens` collection that
-    /// the auth middleware queries to map bearer → tenant_id.
-    pub fn admin_db(&self) -> mongodb::Database {
-        self.client.database(&format!("{}__admin", self.db_prefix))
-    }
-
-    pub fn tenant_db_name(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> String {
-        let sanitized = sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id);
-        let natural = format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, sanitized);
-        if natural.len() <= MAX_DB_NAME_LEN {
-            natural
-        } else {
-            let mut h = Sha256::new();
-            h.update(tenant_id.as_bytes());
-            let digest = h.finalize();
-            let suffix = hex::encode(&digest[..HASH_HEX_LEN / 2]);
-            format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, suffix)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id: &str) -> String {
-    tenant_id
-        .chars()
-        .map(|c| match c {
-            '/' | '\\' | '.' | '"' | '$' | ' ' | '\0' => '_',
-            c => c,
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-/// Typed accessors for the MCP-readable collections in a tenant DB.
-/// Matches the agent's `Database` shape but only exposes what the MCP
-/// tool handlers actually need.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct Database {
     inner: mongodb::Database,
 }
 
 impl Database {
-    pub(crate) fn new(inner: mongodb::Database) -> Self {
+    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_name: &str) -> Result<Self, mongodb::error::Error> {
-        Self { inner }
+        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
+        let db = client.database(db_name);
+        db.run_command(mongodb::bson::doc! { "ping": 1 }).await?;
+        tracing::info!("MCP server connected to MongoDB '{db_name}'");
+        Ok(Self { inner: db })
     }
 
     pub fn findings(&self) -> Collection<Finding> {

compliance-mcp/src/main.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
-mod auth;
 mod database;
 mod server;
 mod tools;
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-use database::DatabasePool;
+use database::Database;
 use rmcp::transport::{
     streamable_http_server::session::local::LocalSessionManager, StreamableHttpServerConfig,
     StreamableHttpService,
@@ -25,60 +24,36 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
 
     let mongo_uri =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_URI").unwrap_or_else(|_| "mongodb://localhost:27017".to_string());
-    // MONGODB_DATABASE is reused as the per-tenant DB-name prefix —
+    let db_name =
-    // same convention as the agent so `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`
-    // and `<prefix>_<tenant_id>` line up across services.
-    let db_prefix =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_DATABASE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "compliance_scanner".to_string());
 
-    let pool = DatabasePool::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_prefix).await?;
+    let db = Database::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_name).await?;
 
-    // HTTP transport: bind a small axum router with bearer-auth in
+    // If MCP_PORT is set, run as Streamable HTTP server; otherwise use stdio.
-    // front of the rmcp service. `/health` stays public for orca's
-    // container probe.
     if let Ok(port_str) = std::env::var("MCP_PORT") {
         let port: u16 = port_str.parse()?;
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on HTTP port {port}");
 
-        let pool_for_factory = pool.clone();
+        let db_clone = db.clone();
         let service = StreamableHttpService::new(
-            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool_for_factory.clone())),
+            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(db_clone.clone())),
             Arc::new(LocalSessionManager::default()),
             StreamableHttpServerConfig::default(),
         );
 
         let router = axum::Router::new()
             .route("/health", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
-            .nest_service(
+            .nest_service("/mcp", service);
-                "/mcp",
-                axum::Router::new().fallback_service(service).layer(
-                    axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(pool.clone(), auth::bearer_auth),
-                ),
-            );
         let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
         tracing::info!("MCP HTTP server listening on 0.0.0.0:{port}");
         axum::serve(listener, router).await?;
     } else {
-        // stdio transport — used when run as a local MCP server next
-        // to the LLM client. There's no HTTP layer to do bearer auth,
-        // so we synthesize a tenant_id from STDIO_TENANT_ID for local
-        // development. NEVER use this in production.
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on stdio");
-        let synth_tenant = std::env::var("STDIO_TENANT_ID").unwrap_or_else(|_| "dev".to_string());
+        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(db);
-        tracing::warn!(
-            tenant_id = %synth_tenant,
-            "stdio transport — using synthetic tenant id; DO NOT use in production"
-        );
-        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool);
         let transport = rmcp::transport::stdio();
         use rmcp::ServiceExt;
-        auth::TENANT_ID
-            .scope(synth_tenant, async {
         let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
         handle.waiting().await?;
-                Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())
-            })
-            .await?;
     }
 
     Ok(())

compliance-mcp/src/server.rs

@@ -2,37 +2,20 @@ use rmcp::{
     handler::server::wrapper::Parameters, model::*, tool, tool_handler, tool_router, ServerHandler,
 };
 
-use crate::auth::current_tenant_id;
+use crate::database::Database;
-use crate::database::{Database, DatabasePool};
 use crate::tools::{dast, findings, pentest, sbom};
 
 pub struct ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pool: DatabasePool,
+    db: Database,
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<Self>,
 }
 
-impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    /// Resolve the per-tenant `Database` from the bearer-set
-    /// `task_local`. Every tool handler calls this; missing context
-    /// surfaces as `internal_error` because it means the auth
-    /// middleware was misconfigured (handler ran without scope).
-    fn tenant_db(&self) -> Result<Database, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
-            rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
-                "no tenant context — bearer middleware not in chain".to_string(),
-                None,
-            )
-        })?;
-        Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&tenant_id))
-    }
-}
-
 #[tool_router]
 impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(db: Database) -> Self {
         Self {
-            pool,
+            db,
             tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
         }
     }
@@ -46,8 +29,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::ListFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::list_findings(&self.db, params).await
-        findings::list_findings(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single finding by its ID")]
@@ -55,8 +37,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::GetFindingParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::get_finding(&self.db, params).await
-        findings::get_finding(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of findings counts grouped by severity and status")]
@@ -64,8 +45,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::FindingsSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::findings_summary(&self.db, params).await
-        findings::findings_summary(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── SBOM ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -77,8 +57,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::ListSbomPackagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&self.db, params).await
-        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -88,8 +67,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::SbomVulnReportParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&self.db, params).await
-        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── DAST ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -101,8 +79,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::ListDastFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        dast::list_dast_findings(&self.db, params).await
-        dast::list_dast_findings(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of recent DAST scan runs and finding counts")]
@@ -110,8 +87,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::DastScanSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        dast::dast_scan_summary(&self.db, params).await
-        dast::dast_scan_summary(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── Pentest ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -123,8 +99,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::ListPentestSessionsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&self.db, params).await
-        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single AI pentest session by its ID")]
@@ -132,8 +107,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestSessionParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_pentest_session(&self.db, params).await
-        pentest::get_pentest_session(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -143,8 +117,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetAttackChainParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_attack_chain(&self.db, params).await
-        pentest::get_attack_chain(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get chat messages from a pentest session")]
@@ -152,8 +125,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestMessagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&self.db, params).await
-        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -163,8 +135,7 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::PentestStatsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::pentest_stats(&self.db, params).await
-        pentest::pentest_stats(&db, params).await
     }
 }
 
@@ -178,7 +149,7 @@ impl ServerHandler for ComplianceMcpServer {
                 .build(),
             server_info: Implementation::from_build_env(),
             instructions: Some(
-                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions for your tenant."
+                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions."
                     .to_string(),
             ),
         }