diff --git a/compliance-agent/src/pipeline/plc/mod.rs b/compliance-agent/src/pipeline/plc/mod.rs
index b23991e..f64b676 100644
--- a/compliance-agent/src/pipeline/plc/mod.rs
+++ b/compliance-agent/src/pipeline/plc/mod.rs
@@ -153,4 +153,48 @@ mod tests {
             .count();
         assert_eq!(div0, 1, "only the unguarded division should be flagged");
     }
+
+    /// The realistic OpenPLC-style traffic-light sample is mostly sound control
+    /// logic: the scanner must surface its few genuine defects and stay quiet on
+    /// the timed state machine and the guarded duty-cycle division.
+    #[test]
+    fn realistic_sample_flags_only_real_issues() {
+        let all = analyze_tree(&demo_dir(), "demo-target");
+        let tl: Vec<_> = all
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|f| {
+                f.file_path
+                    .as_deref()
+                    .is_some_and(|p| p.ends_with("traffic_light.st"))
+            })
+            .collect();
+        assert!(!tl.is_empty(), "traffic_light.st should produce findings");
+
+        let rules: HashSet<&str> = tl.iter().filter_map(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref()).collect();
+        // The three planted defects: hardcoded SCADA password, cleartext Modbus
+        // master (no auth), and a maintenance mode that drops the PedPermit.
+        for r in [
+            "plc-hardcoded-credential",
+            "plc-insecure-comm",
+            "plc-safety-bypass",
+        ] {
+            assert!(rules.contains(r), "expected rule {r}; got {rules:?}");
+        }
+        // Modbus/TCP on 502 is also an insecure-protocol port.
+        assert!(rules.contains("plc-insecure-protocol-port"));
+
+        // Low false positives: the guarded `IF LampCount <> 0` division and the
+        // JMP-free state machine must not trip anything.
+        assert_eq!(
+            tl.iter()
+                .filter(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref() == Some("plc-division-by-zero"))
+                .count(),
+            0,
+            "the guarded duty-cycle division must not be flagged"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !rules.contains("plc-unstructured-jump"),
+            "the CASE state machine uses no JMP"
+        );
+    }
 }
diff --git a/examples/plc-demo/traffic_light.st b/examples/plc-demo/traffic_light.st
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98c3ba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/plc-demo/traffic_light.st
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+(*
+ * Pedestrian-crossing traffic-light controller.
+ *
+ * Structure adapted from the classic OpenPLC "traffic light" example
+ * (github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v3 examples) — a timed state machine
+ * driving vehicle + pedestrian lamps, extended with a SCADA/Modbus link
+ * and a maintenance override so it reads like a real deployed program.
+ *
+ * The control logic itself is sound; the security-relevant defects are the
+ * kind that slip into field code under deadline: a hardcoded SCADA password,
+ * a cleartext Modbus/TCP master, and a maintenance mode that drops the
+ * pedestrian safety permit. Everything else should stay quiet.
+ *)
+PROGRAM TrafficLight
+VAR
+    State        : INT := 0;      (* 0 GreenVeh, 1 Amber, 2 RedVeh/WalkPed, 3 FlashPed *)
+    Tmr          : TON;
+    StateElapsed : TIME;
+    CycleMs      : DINT := 0;
+
+    (* Lamp outputs *)
+    VehGreen     : BOOL := FALSE;
+    VehAmber     : BOOL := FALSE;
+    VehRed       : BOOL := FALSE;
+    PedWalk      : BOOL := FALSE;
+    PedStop      : BOOL := TRUE;
+
+    (* Pedestrian safety permit — must be TRUE before the WALK phase asserts *)
+    PedPermit    : BOOL := TRUE;
+    PedButton    : BOOL := FALSE;
+
+    (* SCADA / remote monitoring *)
+    ScadaUser    : STRING := 'operator';
+    ScadaPassword    : STRING := 'Tr@ffic2019';   (* hardcoded SCADA credential *)
+    ModbusReady  : BOOL := FALSE;
+
+    (* Maintenance override *)
+    MaintMode    : BOOL := FALSE;
+    LampCount    : INT := 5;
+    DutyPct      : INT;
+END_VAR
+
+(* ---- SCADA uplink: publish state to the control room over Modbus/TCP ---- *)
+IF NOT ModbusReady THEN
+    Modbus_TCP_Master(IP := '10.20.0.5', PORT := 502, AUTH := FALSE, USER := ScadaUser, PASS := ScadaPassword);
+    ModbusReady := TRUE;
+END_IF;
+
+(* ---- Duty-cycle for the flashing pedestrian lamp (guarded division) ---- *)
+IF LampCount <> 0 THEN
+    DutyPct := (CycleMs * 100) / LampCount;
+END_IF;
+
+(* ---- Maintenance override: flash amber, hand control to the technician ---- *)
+IF MaintMode THEN
+    VehGreen := FALSE;
+    VehRed   := FALSE;
+    VehAmber := NOT VehAmber;
+    PedPermit := FALSE;      (* drops the pedestrian safety permit in code *)
+    PedWalk  := FALSE;
+    PedStop  := TRUE;
+ELSE
+    (* ---- Normal timed state machine ---- *)
+    Tmr(IN := TRUE, PT := T#5s);
+    StateElapsed := Tmr.ET;
+
+    CASE State OF
+        0:  (* vehicles go, pedestrians stop *)
+            VehGreen := TRUE; VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := FALSE;
+            PedWalk := FALSE; PedStop := TRUE;
+            IF PedButton AND Tmr.Q THEN
+                State := 1; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
+            END_IF;
+        1:  (* amber transition *)
+            VehGreen := FALSE; VehAmber := TRUE;
+            IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 2; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
+        2:  (* vehicles stop, pedestrians walk — only if permitted *)
+            VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := TRUE;
+            IF PedPermit THEN
+                PedWalk := TRUE; PedStop := FALSE;
+            END_IF;
+            IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 3; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
+        3:  (* flashing don't-walk before returning to green *)
+            PedWalk := NOT PedWalk;
+            IF Tmr.Q THEN
+                State := 0; PedButton := FALSE; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
+            END_IF;
+    ELSE
+        State := 0;
+    END_CASE;
+END_IF;
+END_PROGRAM