feat(pipeline): PLC/SPS control-logic security scanner (IEC 61131-3) (#162)
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This commit was merged in pull request #162.
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-16 08:31:43 +00:00
parent a981311413
commit 6d02b138c6
13 changed files with 2599 additions and 8 deletions
Generated
+15 -8
View File
@@ -679,6 +679,7 @@ dependencies = [
"rand 0.9.2", "rand 0.9.2",
"regex", "regex",
"reqwest", "reqwest",
"roxmltree",
"secrecy", "secrecy",
"serde", "serde",
"serde_json", "serde_json",
@@ -2103,7 +2104,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb" checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"libc", "libc",
"windows-sys 0.52.0", "windows-sys 0.61.2",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
@@ -3698,7 +3699,7 @@ version = "0.50.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5" checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.60.2", "windows-sys 0.61.2",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
@@ -4628,6 +4629,12 @@ dependencies = [
"syn", "syn",
] ]
[[package]]
name = "roxmltree"
version = "0.20.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6c20b6793b5c2fa6553b250154b78d6d0db37e72700ae35fad9387a46f487c97"
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "rust-stemmers" name = "rust-stemmers"
version = "1.2.0" version = "1.2.0"
@@ -4679,7 +4686,7 @@ dependencies = [
"errno", "errno",
"libc", "libc",
"linux-raw-sys 0.4.15", "linux-raw-sys 0.4.15",
"windows-sys 0.52.0", "windows-sys 0.59.0",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
@@ -4692,7 +4699,7 @@ dependencies = [
"errno", "errno",
"libc", "libc",
"linux-raw-sys 0.12.1", "linux-raw-sys 0.12.1",
"windows-sys 0.52.0", "windows-sys 0.61.2",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
@@ -5215,7 +5222,7 @@ version = "0.8.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c1c97747dbf44bb1ca44a561ece23508e99cb592e862f22222dcf42f51d1e451" checksum = "c1c97747dbf44bb1ca44a561ece23508e99cb592e862f22222dcf42f51d1e451"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"heck 0.4.1", "heck 0.5.0",
"proc-macro2", "proc-macro2",
"quote", "quote",
"syn", "syn",
@@ -5570,10 +5577,10 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "82a72c767771b47409d2345987fda8628641887d5466101319899796367354a0" checksum = "82a72c767771b47409d2345987fda8628641887d5466101319899796367354a0"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"fastrand", "fastrand",
"getrandom 0.3.4", "getrandom 0.4.1",
"once_cell", "once_cell",
"rustix 1.1.4", "rustix 1.1.4",
"windows-sys 0.52.0", "windows-sys 0.61.2",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
@@ -6746,7 +6753,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22" checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.48.0", "windows-sys 0.61.2",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
+2
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ tokio-cron-scheduler = "0.13"
dotenvy = "0.15" dotenvy = "0.15"
hmac = "0.12" hmac = "0.12"
walkdir = "2" walkdir = "2"
# Read-only XML tree parsing for PLCopen project files (POU extraction).
roxmltree = "0.20"
base64 = "0.22" base64 = "0.22"
urlencoding = "2" urlencoding = "2"
futures-util = "0.3" futures-util = "0.3"
+1
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ pub mod lint;
pub mod orchestrator; pub mod orchestrator;
pub mod patterns; pub mod patterns;
pub mod plan; pub mod plan;
pub mod plc;
mod pr_review; mod pr_review;
pub mod repo_view; pub mod repo_view;
pub mod sbom; pub mod sbom;
@@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
// wizard-created targets, not just migrated ones. // wizard-created targets, not just migrated ones.
self.ensure_dast_target(target, &plan).await; self.ensure_dast_target(target, &plan).await;
// PLC control-logic analysis for PLC/SPS targets (a PlcProject artifact).
if plan.has(ScanType::PlcControlLogic) {
return self.run_plc_scan(target, &target_id, scan_run_id).await;
}
match target.code_artifact() { match target.code_artifact() {
Some(code) if code.kind == ArtifactKind::GitRepo => { Some(code) if code.kind == ArtifactKind::GitRepo => {
let repo = RepoView::from_target(target, code); let repo = RepoView::from_target(target, code);
@@ -478,6 +483,52 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
} }
} }
/// Analyze a PLC/SPS project (Structured Text / PLCopen XML) for
/// control-logic security issues and persist the new findings.
async fn run_plc_scan(
&self,
target: &OnboardedTarget,
target_id: &str,
scan_run_id: &str,
) -> Result<u32, AgentError> {
tracing::info!(target_id, "[{target_id}] PLC control-logic analysis");
self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "plc_analysis").await;
let ctx = crate::ingest::IngestContext::from_config(&self.config, target_id);
let ingest_set = crate::ingest::ingest_all(target, &ctx)?;
let path = target
.first_of(ArtifactKind::PlcProject)
.and_then(|a| ingest_set.get(&a.id))
.and_then(|ia| ia.working_path.clone());
let Some(path) = path else {
tracing::warn!(target_id, "PLC scan: no ingested PLC project path");
return Ok(0);
};
let findings = crate::pipeline::plc::analyze_tree(&path, target_id);
tracing::info!(
target_id,
found = findings.len(),
"PLC control-logic analysis complete"
);
let mut new_count = 0u32;
for mut finding in findings {
finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
if self
.db
.findings()
.find_one(doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint })
.await?
.is_none()
{
self.db.findings().insert_one(&finding).await?;
new_count += 1;
}
}
Ok(new_count)
}
/// Ingest the target's artifacts, classify (tramiton for firmware/RTOS/Yocto, /// Ingest the target's artifacts, classify (tramiton for firmware/RTOS/Yocto,
/// heuristics otherwise), and store the detected classification on the target. /// heuristics otherwise), and store the detected classification on the target.
/// Best-effort — never fails the scan. /// Best-effort — never fails the scan.
+226
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@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
//! Abstract syntax tree for IEC 61131-3 Structured Text (ST).
//!
//! This is the security-relevant subset: POUs with their variable declarations
//! and statement bodies, enough to run semantic control-logic rules over. It is
//! deliberately not a full language model — declarations we don't reason about
//! (e.g. exotic type definitions) are parsed loosely and kept as raw text.
/// A Program Organization Unit: a PROGRAM, FUNCTION, or FUNCTION_BLOCK.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Pou {
pub name: String,
pub kind: PouKind,
/// The declared variables, across all VAR_* sections.
pub vars: Vec<VarDecl>,
/// The statement body.
pub body: Vec<Stmt>,
/// 1-based line where the POU header appears (in the source that was parsed).
pub line: u32,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PouKind {
Program,
Function,
FunctionBlock,
}
impl PouKind {
pub fn label(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
PouKind::Program => "PROGRAM",
PouKind::Function => "FUNCTION",
PouKind::FunctionBlock => "FUNCTION_BLOCK",
}
}
}
/// A single declared variable.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct VarDecl {
pub name: String,
pub section: VarSection,
/// The declared type as written (e.g. `BOOL`, `INT`, `ARRAY[0..9] OF INT`).
pub type_name: String,
/// Whether the type is an ARRAY, and its declared bounds `(lo, hi)` when
/// they are literal integers — used by the array-bounds rule.
pub array_bounds: Option<(i64, i64)>,
/// The initializer expression, if any (`:= <expr>`).
pub init: Option<Expr>,
pub line: u32,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum VarSection {
Var,
Input,
Output,
InOut,
Global,
Temp,
External,
}
/// A statement.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Stmt {
Assign {
target: Expr,
value: Expr,
line: u32,
},
If {
/// (condition, body) for IF and each ELSIF, in order.
branches: Vec<(Expr, Vec<Stmt>)>,
else_body: Option<Vec<Stmt>>,
line: u32,
},
Case {
selector: Expr,
/// (label expressions, body) per CASE arm.
arms: Vec<(Vec<Expr>, Vec<Stmt>)>,
else_body: Option<Vec<Stmt>>,
line: u32,
},
For {
var: String,
from: Expr,
to: Expr,
by: Option<Expr>,
body: Vec<Stmt>,
line: u32,
},
While {
cond: Expr,
body: Vec<Stmt>,
line: u32,
},
Repeat {
body: Vec<Stmt>,
until: Expr,
line: u32,
},
/// A bare call statement, e.g. `TON1(IN := x, PT := T#5s);`.
Call {
callee: String,
args: Vec<CallArg>,
line: u32,
},
Return {
line: u32,
},
Exit {
line: u32,
},
/// `JMP label;` — an unstructured jump.
Jump {
label: String,
line: u32,
},
/// `label:` — a jump target.
Label {
name: String,
line: u32,
},
}
/// One argument in a call: positional (`name: None`) or named (`X := expr`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CallArg {
pub name: Option<String>,
pub value: Expr,
}
/// An expression.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Expr {
Int(i64, u32),
Real(f64, u32),
Bool(bool, u32),
/// A string literal, with the unquoted contents.
Str(String, u32),
/// A duration / date / time literal, kept as raw text (`T#5s`, `DT#...`).
Time(String, u32),
Ident(String, u32),
/// `base[index]`.
Index {
base: Box<Expr>,
index: Box<Expr>,
line: u32,
},
/// `base.field`.
Member {
base: Box<Expr>,
field: String,
line: u32,
},
Unary {
op: UnOp,
expr: Box<Expr>,
line: u32,
},
Binary {
op: BinOp,
lhs: Box<Expr>,
rhs: Box<Expr>,
line: u32,
},
/// A function call used as an expression, e.g. `LIMIT(a, b, c)`.
Call {
callee: String,
args: Vec<CallArg>,
line: u32,
},
}
impl Expr {
/// The 1-based source line this expression starts on.
pub fn line(&self) -> u32 {
match self {
Expr::Int(_, l)
| Expr::Real(_, l)
| Expr::Bool(_, l)
| Expr::Str(_, l)
| Expr::Time(_, l)
| Expr::Ident(_, l)
| Expr::Index { line: l, .. }
| Expr::Member { line: l, .. }
| Expr::Unary { line: l, .. }
| Expr::Binary { line: l, .. }
| Expr::Call { line: l, .. } => *l,
}
}
/// If this expression is a plain identifier, its name.
pub fn as_ident(&self) -> Option<&str> {
match self {
Expr::Ident(name, _) => Some(name.as_str()),
_ => None,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum UnOp {
Not,
Neg,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum BinOp {
Add,
Sub,
Mul,
Div,
Mod,
Pow,
Eq,
Ne,
Lt,
Le,
Gt,
Ge,
And,
Or,
Xor,
}
+372
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@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
//! Lexer for IEC 61131-3 Structured Text.
//!
//! Tokenizes ST source into a flat token stream with 1-based line numbers.
//! Keywords are case-insensitive. Handles `(* *)` and `//` comments, `'..'` and
//! `".."` strings (with `''`/`""` escapes), based integers (`16#FF`, `2#1010`),
//! and duration/date literals (`T#5s`, `DT#...`) kept as raw text.
/// A lexed token with its source line.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Token {
pub kind: Tok,
pub line: u32,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum Tok {
Int(i64),
Real(f64),
Str(String),
Time(String),
Bool(bool),
Ident(String),
Kw(Keyword),
Assign, // :=
Plus, // +
Minus, // -
Star, // *
Slash, // /
Power, // **
LParen, // (
RParen, // )
LBrack, // [
RBrack, // ]
Dot, // .
DotDot, // ..
Comma, // ,
Semi, // ;
Colon, // :
Lt, // <
Le, // <=
Gt, // >
Ge, // >=
Eq, // =
Ne, // <>
Amp, // &
Eof,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Keyword {
Program,
EndProgram,
Function,
EndFunction,
FunctionBlock,
EndFunctionBlock,
Var,
VarInput,
VarOutput,
VarInOut,
VarGlobal,
VarTemp,
VarExternal,
Constant,
EndVar,
Array,
Of,
If,
Then,
Elsif,
Else,
EndIf,
Case,
EndCase,
For,
To,
By,
Do,
EndFor,
While,
EndWhile,
Repeat,
Until,
EndRepeat,
Return,
Exit,
Jmp,
Not,
And,
Or,
Xor,
Mod,
Type,
EndType,
Struct,
EndStruct,
}
fn keyword_from(word: &str) -> Option<Keyword> {
use Keyword::*;
Some(match word.to_ascii_uppercase().as_str() {
"PROGRAM" => Program,
"END_PROGRAM" => EndProgram,
"FUNCTION" => Function,
"END_FUNCTION" => EndFunction,
"FUNCTION_BLOCK" => FunctionBlock,
"END_FUNCTION_BLOCK" => EndFunctionBlock,
"VAR" => Var,
"VAR_INPUT" => VarInput,
"VAR_OUTPUT" => VarOutput,
"VAR_IN_OUT" => VarInOut,
"VAR_GLOBAL" => VarGlobal,
"VAR_TEMP" => VarTemp,
"VAR_EXTERNAL" => VarExternal,
"CONSTANT" => Constant,
"END_VAR" => EndVar,
"ARRAY" => Array,
"OF" => Of,
"IF" => If,
"THEN" => Then,
"ELSIF" => Elsif,
"ELSE" => Else,
"END_IF" => EndIf,
"CASE" => Case,
"END_CASE" => EndCase,
"FOR" => For,
"TO" => To,
"BY" => By,
"DO" => Do,
"END_FOR" => EndFor,
"WHILE" => While,
"END_WHILE" => EndWhile,
"REPEAT" => Repeat,
"UNTIL" => Until,
"END_REPEAT" => EndRepeat,
"RETURN" => Return,
"EXIT" => Exit,
"JMP" => Jmp,
"NOT" => Not,
"AND" => And,
"OR" => Or,
"XOR" => Xor,
"MOD" => Mod,
"TYPE" => Type,
"END_TYPE" => EndType,
"STRUCT" => Struct,
"END_STRUCT" => EndStruct,
_ => return None,
})
}
/// Tokenize `src`. Unknown characters are skipped (best-effort — a scanner must
/// not die on odd input).
pub fn lex(src: &str) -> Vec<Token> {
let chars: Vec<char> = src.chars().collect();
let mut i = 0usize;
let mut line = 1u32;
let mut out = Vec::new();
let bump_line = |c: char, line: &mut u32| {
if c == '\n' {
*line += 1;
}
};
while i < chars.len() {
let c = chars[i];
// Whitespace.
if c.is_whitespace() {
bump_line(c, &mut line);
i += 1;
continue;
}
// Line comment: //
if c == '/' && i + 1 < chars.len() && chars[i + 1] == '/' {
while i < chars.len() && chars[i] != '\n' {
i += 1;
}
continue;
}
// Block comment: (* ... *)
if c == '(' && i + 1 < chars.len() && chars[i + 1] == '*' {
i += 2;
while i + 1 < chars.len() && !(chars[i] == '*' && chars[i + 1] == ')') {
bump_line(chars[i], &mut line);
i += 1;
}
i = (i + 2).min(chars.len());
continue;
}
let tok_line = line;
// String literal: '...' or "..."
if c == '\'' || c == '"' {
let quote = c;
i += 1;
let mut s = String::new();
while i < chars.len() {
let ch = chars[i];
if ch == quote {
// Doubled quote is an escaped quote.
if i + 1 < chars.len() && chars[i + 1] == quote {
s.push(quote);
i += 2;
continue;
}
i += 1;
break;
}
bump_line(ch, &mut line);
s.push(ch);
i += 1;
}
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Str(s),
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
// Identifier / keyword / time literal / boolean.
if c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_' {
let start = i;
while i < chars.len() && (chars[i].is_ascii_alphanumeric() || chars[i] == '_') {
i += 1;
}
let word: String = chars[start..i].iter().collect();
// Duration/date/time literal prefix: T#, TIME#, DT#, D#, TOD#, LT# ...
if i < chars.len() && chars[i] == '#' {
let up = word.to_ascii_uppercase();
if matches!(
up.as_str(),
"T" | "TIME" | "DT" | "D" | "TOD" | "LT" | "DATE"
) {
let lit_start = start;
i += 1; // consume '#'
while i < chars.len()
&& (chars[i].is_ascii_alphanumeric()
|| chars[i] == '.'
|| chars[i] == '_'
|| chars[i] == ':')
{
i += 1;
}
let lit: String = chars[lit_start..i].iter().collect();
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Time(lit),
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
}
let kind = match word.to_ascii_uppercase().as_str() {
"TRUE" => Tok::Bool(true),
"FALSE" => Tok::Bool(false),
_ => match keyword_from(&word) {
Some(kw) => Tok::Kw(kw),
None => Tok::Ident(word),
},
};
out.push(Token {
kind,
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
// Number: decimal, real, or based (16#..., 2#...).
if c.is_ascii_digit() {
let start = i;
while i < chars.len() && (chars[i].is_ascii_digit() || chars[i] == '_') {
i += 1;
}
// Based literal: <base>#<digits>
if i < chars.len() && chars[i] == '#' {
let base_str: String = chars[start..i].iter().filter(|c| **c != '_').collect();
i += 1;
let dstart = i;
while i < chars.len() && (chars[i].is_ascii_alphanumeric() || chars[i] == '_') {
i += 1;
}
let digits: String = chars[dstart..i].iter().filter(|c| **c != '_').collect();
let radix = base_str.parse::<u32>().unwrap_or(10);
let val = i64::from_str_radix(&digits, radix.clamp(2, 36)).unwrap_or(0);
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Int(val),
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
// Real: has a '.' (not '..') or exponent.
let is_real =
i < chars.len() && chars[i] == '.' && !(i + 1 < chars.len() && chars[i + 1] == '.');
if is_real {
i += 1;
while i < chars.len() && (chars[i].is_ascii_digit() || chars[i] == '_') {
i += 1;
}
let raw: String = chars[start..i].iter().filter(|c| **c != '_').collect();
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Real(raw.parse().unwrap_or(0.0)),
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
let raw: String = chars[start..i].iter().filter(|c| **c != '_').collect();
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Int(raw.parse().unwrap_or(0)),
line: tok_line,
});
continue;
}
// Operators / punctuation (longest match first).
let two: String = chars[i..(i + 2).min(chars.len())].iter().collect();
let kind = match two.as_str() {
":=" => Some(Tok::Assign),
"<=" => Some(Tok::Le),
">=" => Some(Tok::Ge),
"<>" => Some(Tok::Ne),
".." => Some(Tok::DotDot),
"**" => Some(Tok::Power),
_ => None,
};
if let Some(k) = kind {
out.push(Token {
kind: k,
line: tok_line,
});
i += 2;
continue;
}
let one = match c {
'+' => Some(Tok::Plus),
'-' => Some(Tok::Minus),
'*' => Some(Tok::Star),
'/' => Some(Tok::Slash),
'(' => Some(Tok::LParen),
')' => Some(Tok::RParen),
'[' => Some(Tok::LBrack),
']' => Some(Tok::RBrack),
'.' => Some(Tok::Dot),
',' => Some(Tok::Comma),
';' => Some(Tok::Semi),
':' => Some(Tok::Colon),
'<' => Some(Tok::Lt),
'>' => Some(Tok::Gt),
'=' => Some(Tok::Eq),
'&' => Some(Tok::Amp),
_ => None,
};
if let Some(k) = one {
out.push(Token {
kind: k,
line: tok_line,
});
}
i += 1;
}
out.push(Token {
kind: Tok::Eof,
line,
});
out
}
+200
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
//! PLC control-logic security scanner for IEC 61131-3 targets.
//!
//! Parses Structured Text (raw `.st`/`.scl`/`.exp` files and PLCopen-XML
//! projects) into an AST and runs semantic control-logic security rules over it.
//! Implements [`ScanType::PlcControlLogic`].
pub mod ast;
pub mod lexer;
pub mod parser;
pub mod plcopen;
pub mod rules;
use std::path::Path;
use compliance_core::error::CoreError;
use compliance_core::models::{Finding, ScanType};
use compliance_core::traits::{ScanOutput, Scanner};
use crate::pipeline::dedup;
/// Scanner for `ScanType::PlcControlLogic`.
pub struct PlcControlLogicScanner;
impl Scanner for PlcControlLogicScanner {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"plc-control-logic"
}
fn scan_type(&self) -> ScanType {
ScanType::PlcControlLogic
}
#[tracing::instrument(skip_all)]
async fn scan(&self, repo_path: &Path, repo_id: &str) -> Result<ScanOutput, CoreError> {
let findings = analyze_tree(repo_path, repo_id);
Ok(ScanOutput {
findings,
sbom_entries: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
/// Walk a PLC project tree and produce findings.
pub(crate) fn analyze_tree(root: &Path, repo_id: &str) -> Vec<Finding> {
let mut findings = Vec::new();
for entry in walkdir::WalkDir::new(root)
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
{
if !entry.file_type().is_file() {
continue;
}
let path = entry.path();
let ext = path
.extension()
.and_then(|e| e.to_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
let is_st = matches!(ext.as_str(), "st" | "iecst" | "scl" | "exp" | "il");
let is_xml = matches!(ext.as_str(), "xml" | "plcopen" | "project");
if !is_st && !is_xml {
continue;
}
let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) else {
continue;
};
let pous = if is_xml {
plcopen::parse_plcopen(&content)
} else {
parser::parse(&content)
};
if pous.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let rel = path
.strip_prefix(root)
.unwrap_or(path)
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string();
for pou in &pous {
for hit in rules::analyze(pou) {
let line_s = hit.line.to_string();
let fingerprint =
dedup::compute_fingerprint(&[repo_id, &rel, hit.rule_id, &pou.name, &line_s]);
let mut f = Finding::new(
repo_id.to_string(),
fingerprint,
"plc-control-logic".to_string(),
ScanType::PlcControlLogic,
hit.title,
hit.description,
hit.severity,
);
f.file_path = Some(rel.clone());
f.line_number = Some(hit.line);
f.rule_id = Some(hit.rule_id.to_string());
f.cwe = hit.cwe.map(String::from);
f.remediation = Some(hit.remediation.to_string());
findings.push(f);
}
}
}
findings
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::path::PathBuf;
fn demo_dir() -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.parent()
.expect("workspace root")
.join("examples/plc-demo")
}
#[test]
fn scans_demo_project_end_to_end() {
let findings = analyze_tree(&demo_dir(), "demo-target");
assert!(!findings.is_empty(), "demo project should produce findings");
let rules: HashSet<&str> = findings
.iter()
.filter_map(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref())
.collect();
for r in [
"plc-hardcoded-credential",
"plc-default-password",
"plc-safety-bypass",
"plc-array-unchecked-index",
"plc-insecure-comm",
"plc-insecure-protocol-port",
"plc-unstructured-jump",
"plc-division-by-zero",
] {
assert!(rules.contains(r), "expected rule {r}; got {rules:?}");
}
// Every finding is well-formed for storage.
for f in &findings {
assert_eq!(f.repo_id, "demo-target");
assert!(f.file_path.is_some(), "finding needs a file");
assert!(f.line_number.is_some(), "finding needs a line");
}
// The guarded division (IF ScaleFactor <> 0.0) must not be double-counted:
// exactly one division-by-zero (the unguarded MeasuredFlow divide).
let div0 = findings
.iter()
.filter(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref() == Some("plc-division-by-zero"))
.count();
assert_eq!(div0, 1, "only the unguarded division should be flagged");
}
/// The realistic OpenPLC-style traffic-light sample is mostly sound control
/// logic: the scanner must surface its few genuine defects and stay quiet on
/// the timed state machine and the guarded duty-cycle division.
#[test]
fn realistic_sample_flags_only_real_issues() {
let all = analyze_tree(&demo_dir(), "demo-target");
let tl: Vec<_> = all
.iter()
.filter(|f| {
f.file_path
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|p| p.ends_with("traffic_light.st"))
})
.collect();
assert!(!tl.is_empty(), "traffic_light.st should produce findings");
let rules: HashSet<&str> = tl.iter().filter_map(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref()).collect();
// The three planted defects: hardcoded SCADA password, cleartext Modbus
// master (no auth), and a maintenance mode that drops the PedPermit.
for r in [
"plc-hardcoded-credential",
"plc-insecure-comm",
"plc-safety-bypass",
] {
assert!(rules.contains(r), "expected rule {r}; got {rules:?}");
}
// Modbus/TCP on 502 is also an insecure-protocol port.
assert!(rules.contains("plc-insecure-protocol-port"));
// Low false positives: the guarded `IF LampCount <> 0` division and the
// JMP-free state machine must not trip anything.
assert_eq!(
tl.iter()
.filter(|f| f.rule_id.as_deref() == Some("plc-division-by-zero"))
.count(),
0,
"the guarded duty-cycle division must not be flagged"
);
assert!(
!rules.contains("plc-unstructured-jump"),
"the CASE state machine uses no JMP"
);
}
}
+766
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
//! Recursive-descent parser for the security-relevant subset of Structured Text.
//!
//! Tolerant by design: it parses the POUs, variable sections, and statement
//! bodies it understands, and skips (with statement/POU-level recovery) anything
//! it does not, so a single odd construct never sinks the whole file.
use super::ast::*;
use super::lexer::{Keyword as K, Tok, Token};
pub struct Parser {
toks: Vec<Token>,
pos: usize,
}
impl Parser {
pub fn new(toks: Vec<Token>) -> Self {
Self { toks, pos: 0 }
}
// ── token helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
fn peek(&self) -> &Tok {
&self.toks[self.pos.min(self.toks.len() - 1)].kind
}
fn line(&self) -> u32 {
self.toks[self.pos.min(self.toks.len() - 1)].line
}
fn at_end(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.peek(), Tok::Eof)
}
fn advance(&mut self) -> Tok {
let t = self.toks[self.pos.min(self.toks.len() - 1)].kind.clone();
if self.pos < self.toks.len() - 1 {
self.pos += 1;
}
t
}
fn eat(&mut self, t: &Tok) -> bool {
if self.peek() == t {
self.advance();
true
} else {
false
}
}
fn eat_kw(&mut self, k: K) -> bool {
if matches!(self.peek(), Tok::Kw(x) if *x == k) {
self.advance();
true
} else {
false
}
}
fn at_kw(&self, k: K) -> bool {
matches!(self.peek(), Tok::Kw(x) if *x == k)
}
fn ident(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
if let Tok::Ident(s) = self.peek() {
let s = s.clone();
self.advance();
Some(s)
} else {
None
}
}
// ── top level ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Parse every POU in the token stream.
pub fn parse_units(&mut self) -> Vec<Pou> {
let mut pous = Vec::new();
while !self.at_end() {
match self.peek() {
Tok::Kw(K::Program) => {
self.advance();
if let Some(p) = self.parse_pou(PouKind::Program, K::EndProgram) {
pous.push(p);
}
}
Tok::Kw(K::Function) => {
self.advance();
if let Some(p) = self.parse_pou(PouKind::Function, K::EndFunction) {
pous.push(p);
}
}
Tok::Kw(K::FunctionBlock) => {
self.advance();
if let Some(p) = self.parse_pou(PouKind::FunctionBlock, K::EndFunctionBlock) {
pous.push(p);
}
}
// Skip TYPE...END_TYPE and anything else at top level.
_ => {
self.advance();
}
}
}
pous
}
fn parse_pou(&mut self, kind: PouKind, end: K) -> Option<Pou> {
let line = self.line();
let name = self.ident().unwrap_or_else(|| "<anonymous>".to_string());
// Optional `: return_type` for functions.
if self.eat(&Tok::Colon) {
let _ = self.advance(); // return type token
}
let mut vars = Vec::new();
// Variable sections precede the body.
while let Some(section) = self.var_section_kw() {
self.advance();
let _ = self.eat_kw(K::Constant); // CONSTANT is informational for our rules
self.parse_var_decls(section, &mut vars);
}
// Body statements until END_<kind>.
let mut body = Vec::new();
while !self.at_end() && !self.at_kw(end) {
if let Some(s) = self.parse_stmt() {
body.push(s);
}
}
self.eat_kw(end);
Some(Pou {
name,
kind,
vars,
body,
line,
})
}
fn var_section_kw(&self) -> Option<VarSection> {
match self.peek() {
Tok::Kw(K::Var) => Some(VarSection::Var),
Tok::Kw(K::VarInput) => Some(VarSection::Input),
Tok::Kw(K::VarOutput) => Some(VarSection::Output),
Tok::Kw(K::VarInOut) => Some(VarSection::InOut),
Tok::Kw(K::VarGlobal) => Some(VarSection::Global),
Tok::Kw(K::VarTemp) => Some(VarSection::Temp),
Tok::Kw(K::VarExternal) => Some(VarSection::External),
_ => None,
}
}
fn parse_var_decls(&mut self, section: VarSection, out: &mut Vec<VarDecl>) {
while !self.at_end() && !self.at_kw(K::EndVar) {
let line = self.line();
// names: a, b, c
let mut names = Vec::new();
match self.ident() {
Some(n) => names.push(n),
None => {
// Not a declaration we understand — skip to next ; or END_VAR.
self.sync_decl();
continue;
}
}
while self.eat(&Tok::Comma) {
if let Some(n) = self.ident() {
names.push(n);
}
}
if !self.eat(&Tok::Colon) {
self.sync_decl();
continue;
}
let (type_name, array_bounds) = self.parse_type();
let init = if self.eat(&Tok::Assign) {
Some(self.parse_expr())
} else {
None
};
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
for n in names {
out.push(VarDecl {
name: n,
section,
type_name: type_name.clone(),
array_bounds,
init: init.clone(),
line,
});
}
}
self.eat_kw(K::EndVar);
}
/// Parse a (possibly ARRAY) type, returning its rendered name and literal
/// bounds when present.
fn parse_type(&mut self) -> (String, Option<(i64, i64)>) {
if self.eat_kw(K::Array) {
let mut bounds = None;
if self.eat(&Tok::LBrack) {
let lo = self.int_lit();
self.eat(&Tok::DotDot);
let hi = self.int_lit();
if let (Some(lo), Some(hi)) = (lo, hi) {
bounds = Some((lo, hi));
}
// Skip any further dimensions / tokens to the closing bracket.
while !self.at_end() && !self.eat(&Tok::RBrack) {
self.advance();
}
}
self.eat_kw(K::Of);
let elem = self.type_ident();
(format!("ARRAY OF {elem}"), bounds)
} else {
(self.type_ident(), None)
}
}
fn type_ident(&mut self) -> String {
// Types can be qualified idents; keep it simple: one token, plus any
// string-length suffix like STRING[80].
let base = match self.advance() {
Tok::Ident(s) => s,
Tok::Kw(_) => "TYPE".to_string(),
other => format!("{other:?}"),
};
if self.eat(&Tok::LBrack) {
while !self.at_end() && !self.eat(&Tok::RBrack) {
self.advance();
}
}
base
}
fn int_lit(&mut self) -> Option<i64> {
match self.peek() {
Tok::Int(n) => {
let n = *n;
self.advance();
Some(n)
}
Tok::Minus => {
self.advance();
if let Tok::Int(n) = self.peek() {
let n = -*n;
self.advance();
Some(n)
} else {
None
}
}
_ => None,
}
}
fn sync_decl(&mut self) {
while !self.at_end() && !self.eat(&Tok::Semi) && !self.at_kw(K::EndVar) {
self.advance();
}
}
fn sync_stmt(&mut self) {
while !self.at_end() && !self.eat(&Tok::Semi) {
// Stop at block terminators so recovery doesn't swallow structure.
if matches!(
self.peek(),
Tok::Kw(
K::EndIf
| K::EndFor
| K::EndWhile
| K::EndCase
| K::EndRepeat
| K::EndProgram
| K::EndFunction
| K::EndFunctionBlock
| K::Else
| K::Elsif
)
) {
return;
}
self.advance();
}
}
// ── statements ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn parse_stmt(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
match self.peek().clone() {
Tok::Semi => {
self.advance();
None
}
Tok::Kw(K::If) => self.parse_if(),
Tok::Kw(K::Case) => self.parse_case(),
Tok::Kw(K::For) => self.parse_for(),
Tok::Kw(K::While) => self.parse_while(),
Tok::Kw(K::Repeat) => self.parse_repeat(),
Tok::Kw(K::Return) => {
self.advance();
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Return { line })
}
Tok::Kw(K::Exit) => {
self.advance();
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Exit { line })
}
Tok::Kw(K::Jmp) => {
self.advance();
let label = self.ident().unwrap_or_default();
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Jump { label, line })
}
Tok::Ident(name) => {
// Could be `label:`, `call(...)`, or an assignment.
// Lookahead: ident ':' (not ':=') → label.
if matches!(
self.toks.get(self.pos + 1).map(|t| &t.kind),
Some(Tok::Colon)
) && !matches!(self.toks.get(self.pos + 2).map(|t| &t.kind), Some(Tok::Eq))
{
self.advance(); // ident
self.advance(); // ':'
return Some(Stmt::Label { name, line });
}
let lhs = self.parse_expr();
if self.eat(&Tok::Assign) {
let value = self.parse_expr();
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Assign {
target: lhs,
value,
line,
})
} else if let Expr::Call { callee, args, .. } = lhs {
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Call { callee, args, line })
} else {
// Bare expression / FB invocation without args recognized —
// skip to the terminator.
self.sync_stmt();
None
}
}
_ => {
self.sync_stmt();
None
}
}
}
fn parse_block_until(&mut self, terms: &[K]) -> Vec<Stmt> {
let mut body = Vec::new();
while !self.at_end() && !terms.iter().any(|k| self.at_kw(*k)) {
if let Some(s) = self.parse_stmt() {
body.push(s);
}
}
body
}
fn parse_if(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
self.eat_kw(K::If);
let mut branches = Vec::new();
let cond = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::Then);
let body = self.parse_block_until(&[K::Elsif, K::Else, K::EndIf]);
branches.push((cond, body));
while self.eat_kw(K::Elsif) {
let c = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::Then);
let b = self.parse_block_until(&[K::Elsif, K::Else, K::EndIf]);
branches.push((c, b));
}
let else_body = if self.eat_kw(K::Else) {
Some(self.parse_block_until(&[K::EndIf]))
} else {
None
};
self.eat_kw(K::EndIf);
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::If {
branches,
else_body,
line,
})
}
fn parse_case(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
self.eat_kw(K::Case);
let selector = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::Of);
let mut arms = Vec::new();
let mut else_body = None;
while !self.at_end() && !self.at_kw(K::EndCase) {
if self.eat_kw(K::Else) {
else_body = Some(self.parse_block_until(&[K::EndCase]));
break;
}
// labels: expr {, expr} :
let mut labels = vec![self.parse_expr()];
while self.eat(&Tok::Comma) {
labels.push(self.parse_expr());
}
self.eat(&Tok::Colon);
let body = self.parse_block_until(&[K::EndCase, K::Else]);
arms.push((labels, body));
}
self.eat_kw(K::EndCase);
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Case {
selector,
arms,
else_body,
line,
})
}
fn parse_for(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
self.eat_kw(K::For);
let var = self.ident().unwrap_or_default();
self.eat(&Tok::Assign);
let from = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::To);
let to = self.parse_expr();
let by = if self.eat_kw(K::By) {
Some(self.parse_expr())
} else {
None
};
self.eat_kw(K::Do);
let body = self.parse_block_until(&[K::EndFor]);
self.eat_kw(K::EndFor);
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::For {
var,
from,
to,
by,
body,
line,
})
}
fn parse_while(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
self.eat_kw(K::While);
let cond = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::Do);
let body = self.parse_block_until(&[K::EndWhile]);
self.eat_kw(K::EndWhile);
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::While { cond, body, line })
}
fn parse_repeat(&mut self) -> Option<Stmt> {
let line = self.line();
self.eat_kw(K::Repeat);
let body = self.parse_block_until(&[K::Until, K::EndRepeat]);
self.eat_kw(K::Until);
let until = self.parse_expr();
self.eat_kw(K::EndRepeat);
self.eat(&Tok::Semi);
Some(Stmt::Repeat { body, until, line })
}
// ── expressions (precedence climbing) ──────────────────────────
pub fn parse_expr(&mut self) -> Expr {
self.parse_or()
}
fn parse_or(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut lhs = self.parse_and();
loop {
let op = match self.peek() {
Tok::Kw(K::Or) => BinOp::Or,
Tok::Kw(K::Xor) => BinOp::Xor,
_ => break,
};
let line = self.line();
self.advance();
let rhs = self.parse_and();
lhs = Expr::Binary {
op,
lhs: Box::new(lhs),
rhs: Box::new(rhs),
line,
};
}
lhs
}
fn parse_and(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut lhs = self.parse_cmp();
while matches!(self.peek(), Tok::Kw(K::And) | Tok::Amp) {
let op = BinOp::And;
let line = self.line();
self.advance();
let rhs = self.parse_cmp();
lhs = Expr::Binary {
op,
lhs: Box::new(lhs),
rhs: Box::new(rhs),
line,
};
}
lhs
}
fn parse_cmp(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut lhs = self.parse_add();
loop {
let op = match self.peek() {
Tok::Eq => BinOp::Eq,
Tok::Ne => BinOp::Ne,
Tok::Lt => BinOp::Lt,
Tok::Le => BinOp::Le,
Tok::Gt => BinOp::Gt,
Tok::Ge => BinOp::Ge,
_ => break,
};
let line = self.line();
self.advance();
let rhs = self.parse_add();
lhs = Expr::Binary {
op,
lhs: Box::new(lhs),
rhs: Box::new(rhs),
line,
};
}
lhs
}
fn parse_add(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut lhs = self.parse_mul();
loop {
let op = match self.peek() {
Tok::Plus => BinOp::Add,
Tok::Minus => BinOp::Sub,
_ => break,
};
let line = self.line();
self.advance();
let rhs = self.parse_mul();
lhs = Expr::Binary {
op,
lhs: Box::new(lhs),
rhs: Box::new(rhs),
line,
};
}
lhs
}
fn parse_mul(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut lhs = self.parse_unary();
loop {
let op = match self.peek() {
Tok::Star => BinOp::Mul,
Tok::Slash => BinOp::Div,
Tok::Kw(K::Mod) => BinOp::Mod,
Tok::Power => BinOp::Pow,
_ => break,
};
let line = self.line();
self.advance();
let rhs = self.parse_unary();
lhs = Expr::Binary {
op,
lhs: Box::new(lhs),
rhs: Box::new(rhs),
line,
};
}
lhs
}
fn parse_unary(&mut self) -> Expr {
let line = self.line();
match self.peek() {
Tok::Kw(K::Not) => {
self.advance();
Expr::Unary {
op: UnOp::Not,
expr: Box::new(self.parse_unary()),
line,
}
}
Tok::Minus => {
self.advance();
Expr::Unary {
op: UnOp::Neg,
expr: Box::new(self.parse_unary()),
line,
}
}
_ => self.parse_postfix(),
}
}
fn parse_postfix(&mut self) -> Expr {
let mut e = self.parse_primary();
loop {
let line = self.line();
match self.peek() {
Tok::LBrack => {
self.advance();
let index = self.parse_expr();
self.eat(&Tok::RBrack);
e = Expr::Index {
base: Box::new(e),
index: Box::new(index),
line,
};
}
Tok::Dot => {
self.advance();
let field = self.ident().unwrap_or_default();
e = Expr::Member {
base: Box::new(e),
field,
line,
};
}
_ => break,
}
}
e
}
fn parse_primary(&mut self) -> Expr {
let line = self.line();
match self.advance() {
Tok::Int(n) => Expr::Int(n, line),
Tok::Real(r) => Expr::Real(r, line),
Tok::Bool(b) => Expr::Bool(b, line),
Tok::Str(s) => Expr::Str(s, line),
Tok::Time(t) => Expr::Time(t, line),
Tok::LParen => {
let e = self.parse_expr();
self.eat(&Tok::RParen);
e
}
Tok::Ident(name) => {
if self.eat(&Tok::LParen) {
let args = self.parse_call_args();
Expr::Call {
callee: name,
args,
line,
}
} else {
Expr::Ident(name, line)
}
}
// Unrecognized start of expression — yield a placeholder identifier.
_ => Expr::Ident(String::new(), line),
}
}
fn parse_call_args(&mut self) -> Vec<CallArg> {
let mut args = Vec::new();
if self.eat(&Tok::RParen) {
return args;
}
loop {
// Named arg: ident := expr (peek two tokens).
if let Tok::Ident(name) = self.peek().clone() {
if matches!(
self.toks.get(self.pos + 1).map(|t| &t.kind),
Some(Tok::Assign)
) {
self.advance(); // ident
self.advance(); // :=
let value = self.parse_expr();
args.push(CallArg {
name: Some(name),
value,
});
if self.eat(&Tok::Comma) {
continue;
}
break;
}
}
let value = self.parse_expr();
args.push(CallArg { name: None, value });
if self.eat(&Tok::Comma) {
continue;
}
break;
}
self.eat(&Tok::RParen);
args
}
}
/// Parse ST source into its POUs.
pub fn parse(src: &str) -> Vec<Pou> {
let toks = super::lexer::lex(src);
Parser::new(toks).parse_units()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
const SAMPLE: &str = r#"
PROGRAM Main
VAR
idx : INT;
pw : STRING := 'admin123';
buf : ARRAY[0..9] OF INT;
ok : BOOL := FALSE;
END_VAR
// a comment
IF idx > 0 THEN
buf[idx] := idx * 2;
ELSE
JMP done;
END_IF;
Comm(IP := '10.0.0.1', PORT := 502);
done:
ok := TRUE;
END_PROGRAM
"#;
#[test]
fn parses_program_vars_and_body() {
let pous = parse(SAMPLE);
assert_eq!(pous.len(), 1, "one POU");
let p = &pous[0];
assert_eq!(p.name, "Main");
assert_eq!(p.kind, PouKind::Program);
// vars: idx, pw, buf, ok
assert_eq!(p.vars.len(), 4);
let pw = p.vars.iter().find(|v| v.name == "pw").expect("pw");
assert!(matches!(&pw.init, Some(Expr::Str(s, _)) if s == "admin123"));
let buf = p.vars.iter().find(|v| v.name == "buf").expect("buf");
assert_eq!(buf.array_bounds, Some((0, 9)));
// body has an IF, a Call, a Label, and an Assign
assert!(p.body.iter().any(|s| matches!(s, Stmt::If { .. })));
assert!(p
.body
.iter()
.any(|s| matches!(s, Stmt::Call { callee, .. } if callee == "Comm")));
assert!(p
.body
.iter()
.any(|s| matches!(s, Stmt::Label { name, .. } if name == "done")));
}
#[test]
fn jmp_inside_if_is_captured() {
let pous = parse(SAMPLE);
let p = &pous[0];
// find the IF, check its else branch has a JMP
let has_jmp = p.body.iter().any(|s| match s {
Stmt::If { else_body, .. } => else_body
.as_ref()
.map(|b| b.iter().any(|s| matches!(s, Stmt::Jump { .. })))
.unwrap_or(false),
_ => false,
});
assert!(has_jmp, "JMP should be parsed inside the ELSE branch");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
//! PLCopen XML → Structured Text POUs.
//!
//! A PLCopen project stores each POU as `<pou name=".." pouType="..">` with an
//! `<interface>` (typed variable sections) and a `<body>`. We handle the
//! Structured-Text body form (`<ST>…</ST>`); FBD/LD/SFC bodies are skipped.
//!
//! For each ST POU we reconstruct an equivalent ST source (a `VAR` block built
//! from the interface + the ST body) and run it through the ST parser, so both
//! raw `.st` files and PLCopen projects flow through one analysis path.
use super::ast::Pou;
use super::parser;
/// Parse every Structured-Text POU out of a PLCopen XML document.
pub fn parse_plcopen(xml: &str) -> Vec<Pou> {
let doc = match roxmltree::Document::parse(xml) {
Ok(d) => d,
Err(_) => return Vec::new(),
};
let mut pous = Vec::new();
for pou in doc.descendants().filter(|n| n.has_tag_name("pou")) {
let name = pou.attribute("name").unwrap_or("pou").to_string();
let pou_type = pou.attribute("pouType").unwrap_or("program");
// ST body text (skip non-ST bodies).
let Some(st_node) = pou
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.has_tag_name("ST") && n.ancestors().any(|a| a.has_tag_name("body")))
else {
continue;
};
let body = collect_text(st_node);
if body.trim().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let var_block = build_var_block(pou);
let kw = match pou_type.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"function" => "FUNCTION",
"functionblock" | "functionblocktype" => "FUNCTION_BLOCK",
_ => "PROGRAM",
};
let synthetic = format!("{kw} {name}\n{var_block}{body}\nEND_{kw}\n");
pous.extend(parser::parse(&synthetic));
}
pous
}
/// Concatenate all descendant text of a node (ST bodies are often wrapped in
/// `<xhtml>` and may contain multiple text runs).
fn collect_text(node: roxmltree::Node) -> String {
node.descendants()
.filter_map(|n| n.text())
.collect::<String>()
}
/// Build an ST `VAR … END_VAR` block from a POU's `<interface>` variable
/// sections, so declarations (types, initial values) reach the rules.
fn build_var_block(pou: roxmltree::Node) -> String {
let Some(interface) = pou.children().find(|n| n.has_tag_name("interface")) else {
return String::new();
};
let mut out = String::from("VAR\n");
let mut any = false;
for container in interface.children().filter(|n| n.is_element()) {
// localVars / inputVars / outputVars / inOutVars / tempVars / globalVars / externalVars
if !container.tag_name().name().ends_with("Vars") {
continue;
}
for var in container.children().filter(|n| n.has_tag_name("variable")) {
let Some(vname) = var.attribute("name") else {
continue;
};
let ty = var
.children()
.find(|n| n.has_tag_name("type"))
.map(type_name)
.unwrap_or_else(|| "BOOL".to_string());
let init = var
.children()
.find(|n| n.has_tag_name("initialValue"))
.and_then(initial_value);
match init {
Some(v) => out.push_str(&format!(" {vname} : {ty} := {v};\n")),
None => out.push_str(&format!(" {vname} : {ty};\n")),
}
any = true;
}
}
out.push_str("END_VAR\n");
if any {
out
} else {
String::new()
}
}
/// Render a PLCopen `<type>` element as an ST type string.
fn type_name(type_node: roxmltree::Node) -> String {
let Some(inner) = type_node.children().find(|n| n.is_element()) else {
return "BOOL".to_string();
};
let tag = inner.tag_name().name();
match tag {
"derived" => inner.attribute("name").unwrap_or("DERIVED").to_string(),
"array" => {
let dim = inner.children().find(|n| n.has_tag_name("dimension"));
let (lo, hi) = dim
.map(|d| {
(
d.attribute("lower").unwrap_or("0").to_string(),
d.attribute("upper").unwrap_or("0").to_string(),
)
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| ("0".to_string(), "0".to_string()));
let base = inner
.children()
.find(|n| n.has_tag_name("baseType"))
.map(type_name)
.unwrap_or_else(|| "INT".to_string());
format!("ARRAY[{lo}..{hi}] OF {base}")
}
"string" | "wstring" => "STRING".to_string(),
// BOOL, INT, DINT, REAL, TIME, ... — the tag name is the ST type.
other => other.to_ascii_uppercase(),
}
}
/// Extract an initial value as an ST literal (quoting strings).
fn initial_value(iv: roxmltree::Node) -> Option<String> {
let simple = iv.descendants().find(|n| n.has_tag_name("simpleValue"))?;
let raw = simple.attribute("value")?.trim().to_string();
if raw.is_empty() {
return None;
}
// Numbers / booleans / time literals pass through; everything else is a
// string literal.
let is_scalar = raw.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true")
|| raw.eq_ignore_ascii_case("false")
|| raw.starts_with(['T', 't', 'D', 'd']) && raw.contains('#')
|| raw
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '.' || c == '-' || c == '+');
if is_scalar || raw.starts_with('\'') || raw.starts_with('"') {
Some(raw)
} else {
Some(format!("'{}'", raw.replace('\'', "''")))
}
}
+632
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,632 @@
//! Semantic control-logic security rules over the Structured Text AST.
//!
//! Each rule walks the parsed [`Pou`] and yields [`RuleHit`]s the scanner turns
//! into findings. Rules reason over structure (declarations, assignments, calls,
//! array accesses, division, jumps) rather than raw text, so they see through
//! formatting and comments.
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use compliance_core::models::Severity;
use super::ast::*;
/// One rule match within a POU.
pub struct RuleHit {
pub line: u32,
pub severity: Severity,
pub rule_id: &'static str,
pub title: String,
pub description: String,
pub cwe: Option<&'static str>,
pub remediation: &'static str,
}
/// Run every rule over a POU.
pub fn analyze(pou: &Pou) -> Vec<RuleHit> {
let mut hits = Vec::new();
let ctx = Ctx::build(pou);
// Declaration-level rules.
for v in &pou.vars {
if let Some(init) = &v.init {
check_credential_binding(&v.name, init, &pou.name, &mut hits);
check_default_password(init, &v.name, &pou.name, &mut hits);
}
}
// Body walk.
walk(&pou.body, pou, &ctx, &GuardSet::default(), &mut hits);
hits
}
/// Per-POU context precomputed once.
struct Ctx {
/// Names declared in VAR_INPUT (untrusted / externally driven).
input_vars: HashSet<String>,
/// Array variable name → declared (lo, hi) bounds.
arrays: HashMap<String, (i64, i64)>,
}
impl Ctx {
fn build(pou: &Pou) -> Self {
let mut input_vars = HashSet::new();
let mut arrays = HashMap::new();
for v in &pou.vars {
if v.section == VarSection::Input {
input_vars.insert(v.name.to_ascii_lowercase());
}
if let Some(b) = v.array_bounds {
arrays.insert(v.name.to_ascii_lowercase(), b);
}
}
Self { input_vars, arrays }
}
}
/// Variables proven non-zero on the current control-flow path (from enclosing
/// `IF`/`WHILE` conditions), so guarded divisions aren't false-flagged.
#[derive(Default, Clone)]
struct GuardSet {
nonzero: HashSet<String>,
}
impl GuardSet {
fn with(&self, names: Vec<String>) -> Self {
let mut g = self.clone();
g.nonzero.extend(names);
g
}
fn is_nonzero(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
self.nonzero.contains(name)
}
}
/// Variable names a condition proves non-zero (`v <> 0`, `v > 0`, `v >= 1`,
/// `v < 0`, and conjunctions thereof).
fn guards_from_cond(cond: &Expr) -> Vec<String> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
collect_nonzero(cond, &mut out);
out
}
fn collect_nonzero(e: &Expr, out: &mut Vec<String>) {
let Expr::Binary { op, lhs, rhs, .. } = e else {
return;
};
let is_zero = |x: &Expr| {
matches!(x, Expr::Int(0, _)) || matches!(x, Expr::Real(r, _) if r.abs() < f64::EPSILON)
};
let int_of = |x: &Expr| match x {
Expr::Int(n, _) => Some(*n),
_ => None,
};
match op {
BinOp::And => {
collect_nonzero(lhs, out);
collect_nonzero(rhs, out);
}
BinOp::Ne => {
if let (Some(v), true) = (lhs.as_ident(), is_zero(rhs)) {
out.push(v.to_ascii_lowercase());
}
if let (true, Some(v)) = (is_zero(lhs), rhs.as_ident()) {
out.push(v.to_ascii_lowercase());
}
}
BinOp::Gt | BinOp::Lt => {
// v > 0 or v < 0
if let (Some(v), true) = (lhs.as_ident(), is_zero(rhs)) {
out.push(v.to_ascii_lowercase());
}
}
BinOp::Ge => {
// v >= n, n >= 1
if let (Some(v), Some(n)) = (lhs.as_ident(), int_of(rhs)) {
if n >= 1 {
out.push(v.to_ascii_lowercase());
}
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
// ── the walker ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn walk(stmts: &[Stmt], pou: &Pou, ctx: &Ctx, guards: &GuardSet, hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>) {
for s in stmts {
match s {
Stmt::Assign {
target,
value,
line,
} => {
check_safety_bypass(target, value, *line, &pou.name, hits);
// A string bound to a secret-looking target is a credential.
if let Some(name) = flatten_ident(target) {
check_credential_binding(&name, value, &pou.name, hits);
check_default_password(value, &name, &pou.name, hits);
}
walk_expr(target, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
walk_expr(value, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
Stmt::Call { callee, args, line } => {
check_insecure_comm(callee, args, *line, &pou.name, hits);
check_credentials_in_call(callee, args, *line, &pou.name, hits);
for a in args {
walk_expr(&a.value, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
}
Stmt::Jump { label, line } => hits.push(RuleHit {
line: *line,
severity: Severity::Medium,
rule_id: "plc-unstructured-jump",
title: "Unstructured jump (JMP) in control logic".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{}` uses `JMP {label}`. Unstructured jumps make control flow hard to \
verify and can bypass safety interlocks or leave outputs in an undefined \
state on unexpected paths.",
pou.name
),
cwe: Some("CWE-691"),
remediation: "Replace JMP with structured constructs (IF/CASE/loops); reserve \
jumps for well-reviewed state machines only.",
}),
Stmt::If {
branches,
else_body,
..
} => {
for (cond, body) in branches {
walk_expr(cond, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
let child = guards.with(guards_from_cond(cond));
walk(body, pou, ctx, &child, hits);
}
if let Some(b) = else_body {
walk(b, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
}
Stmt::Case {
selector,
arms,
else_body,
..
} => {
walk_expr(selector, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
for (labels, body) in arms {
for l in labels {
walk_expr(l, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
walk(body, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
if let Some(b) = else_body {
walk(b, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
}
Stmt::For {
from, to, by, body, ..
} => {
walk_expr(from, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
walk_expr(to, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
if let Some(b) = by {
walk_expr(b, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
walk(body, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
Stmt::While { cond, body, .. } => {
walk_expr(cond, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
let child = guards.with(guards_from_cond(cond));
walk(body, pou, ctx, &child, hits);
}
Stmt::Repeat { body, until, .. } => {
walk(body, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
walk_expr(until, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
Stmt::Return { .. } | Stmt::Exit { .. } | Stmt::Label { .. } => {}
}
}
}
fn walk_expr(e: &Expr, pou: &Pou, ctx: &Ctx, guards: &GuardSet, hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>) {
match e {
Expr::Index { base, index, line } => {
check_array_bounds(base, index, *line, ctx, &pou.name, hits);
walk_expr(base, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
walk_expr(index, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
Expr::Binary { op, lhs, rhs, line } => {
if matches!(op, BinOp::Div | BinOp::Mod) {
check_division(rhs, *line, &pou.name, guards, hits);
}
walk_expr(lhs, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
walk_expr(rhs, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
Expr::Unary { expr, .. } => walk_expr(expr, pou, ctx, guards, hits),
Expr::Member { base, .. } => walk_expr(base, pou, ctx, guards, hits),
Expr::Call { args, .. } => {
for a in args {
walk_expr(&a.value, pou, ctx, guards, hits);
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
// ── individual rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────
const SECRET_HINTS: &[&str] = &[
"password",
"passwd",
"pwd",
"secret",
"apikey",
"api_key",
"token",
"credential",
"privkey",
"private_key",
"passphrase",
];
const DEFAULT_PASSWORDS: &[&str] = &[
"admin",
"administrator",
"password",
"passwd",
"1234",
"12345",
"123456",
"0000",
"1111",
"root",
"default",
"admin123",
"changeme",
"letmein",
"guest",
"user",
"system",
"plc",
"codesys",
];
const COMM_FB_HINTS: &[&str] = &[
"modbus", "tcp", "udp", "socket", "mqtt", "opcua", "opc_ua", "ethernet", "ethip", "enip",
"dnp3", "ftp", "telnet", "http", "send", "connect", "sock", "comm", "profinet", "s7",
];
/// Insecure cleartext service ports.
const INSECURE_PORTS: &[i64] = &[21, 23, 80, 502, 20000, 44818, 102];
fn check_credential_binding(var_name: &str, value: &Expr, pou: &str, hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>) {
let name = var_name.to_ascii_lowercase();
let looks_secret = SECRET_HINTS.iter().any(|h| name.contains(h));
if looks_secret {
if let Expr::Str(s, line) = value {
if !s.is_empty() {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line: *line,
severity: Severity::High,
rule_id: "plc-hardcoded-credential",
title: "Hardcoded credential in PLC program".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` binds a hardcoded secret to `{var_name}`. Credentials \
embedded in control logic are extracted trivially from a project export \
or a firmware dump and cannot be rotated without a redeploy."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-798"),
remediation: "Store secrets outside the program (secure parameter store / \
operator-entered, retained-but-protected memory); never commit \
them to the POU.",
});
}
}
}
}
fn check_default_password(value: &Expr, var_name: &str, pou: &str, hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>) {
if let Expr::Str(s, line) = value {
let lower = s.to_ascii_lowercase();
if DEFAULT_PASSWORDS.contains(&lower.as_str()) {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line: *line,
severity: Severity::Critical,
rule_id: "plc-default-password",
title: "Default/weak password in PLC program".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` uses the well-known default/weak password `{s}` (bound to \
`{var_name}`). Default PLC credentials are the first thing an attacker tries."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-1393"),
remediation:
"Require a strong, unique, operator-set password; block commissioning \
until the default is changed.",
});
}
}
}
fn check_credentials_in_call(
callee: &str,
args: &[CallArg],
line: u32,
pou: &str,
hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>,
) {
for a in args {
if let Some(name) = &a.name {
let n = name.to_ascii_lowercase();
if SECRET_HINTS.iter().any(|h| n.contains(h)) {
if let Expr::Str(s, l) = &a.value {
if !s.is_empty() {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line: *l,
severity: Severity::High,
rule_id: "plc-hardcoded-credential",
title: "Hardcoded credential passed to a function block".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` passes a hardcoded secret as `{name}` to `{callee}`."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-798"),
remediation: "Supply credentials from protected configuration at \
runtime, not as a literal argument.",
});
}
}
}
}
}
let _ = line;
}
fn check_safety_bypass(target: &Expr, value: &Expr, line: u32, pou: &str, hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>) {
let Some(name) = flatten_ident(target) else {
return;
};
let n = name.to_ascii_lowercase();
let safety = [
"safety",
"estop",
"e_stop",
"emergency",
"interlock",
"guard",
"permit",
]
.iter()
.any(|h| n.contains(h));
let watchdog = n.contains("watchdog") || n.contains("wdt");
// A safety enable / interlock / watchdog signal driven to FALSE or 0 in
// application logic is a bypass (e.g. `Safety_Enable := FALSE`, `Watchdog_Kick := 0`).
let disabling = matches!(value, Expr::Bool(false, _)) || matches!(value, Expr::Int(0, _));
if (safety || watchdog) && disabling {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line,
severity: Severity::Critical,
rule_id: "plc-safety-bypass",
title: "Safety interlock / watchdog disabled in logic".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` disables a safety-related signal (`{name}`) in program logic. \
Bypassing interlocks or watchdogs in code defeats the plant's protective \
functions and is a direct hazard."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-1384"),
remediation: "Never disable safety functions from application logic; safety must be \
handled by a certified safety controller / hard-wired circuit.",
});
}
}
fn check_array_bounds(
base: &Expr,
index: &Expr,
line: u32,
ctx: &Ctx,
pou: &str,
hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>,
) {
// Only reason about arrays we know the bounds of.
let Some(arr_name) = base.as_ident() else {
return;
};
if !ctx.arrays.contains_key(&arr_name.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
return;
}
// Index by an untrusted input variable → potential out-of-bounds access.
if let Some(idx_name) = index.as_ident() {
if ctx.input_vars.contains(&idx_name.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line,
severity: Severity::High,
rule_id: "plc-array-unchecked-index",
title: "Array indexed by unvalidated input".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` indexes array `{arr_name}` with the input variable `{idx_name}` \
without a validated bounds check. An out-of-range index corrupts adjacent \
memory or faults the PLC (loss of control)."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-129"),
remediation: "Clamp or validate the index against the array bounds (e.g. \
`LIMIT`/explicit `IF idx >= lo AND idx <= hi`) before the access.",
});
}
}
}
fn check_division(
divisor: &Expr,
line: u32,
pou: &str,
guards: &GuardSet,
hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>,
) {
// A divisor proven non-zero by an enclosing guard is safe.
if let Expr::Ident(name, _) = divisor {
if guards.is_nonzero(&name.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
return;
}
}
// Flag division by a variable (could be zero); nonzero literals are fine.
let risky = matches!(
divisor,
Expr::Ident(_, _) | Expr::Member { .. } | Expr::Index { .. } | Expr::Int(0, _)
);
if risky {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line,
severity: Severity::Medium,
rule_id: "plc-division-by-zero",
title: "Division by a variable without a zero-guard".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` divides by a variable that is not proven non-zero. A zero divisor \
raises a PLC exception and can halt the scan cycle (denial of control)."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-369"),
remediation: "Guard the divisor (`IF d <> 0 THEN …`) or use a safe-divide helper that \
returns a defined value for a zero denominator.",
});
}
}
fn check_insecure_comm(
callee: &str,
args: &[CallArg],
line: u32,
pou: &str,
hits: &mut Vec<RuleHit>,
) {
let c = callee.to_ascii_lowercase();
let is_comm = COMM_FB_HINTS.iter().any(|h| c.contains(h));
if !is_comm {
return;
}
// Auth/encryption explicitly disabled.
for a in args {
if let Some(name) = &a.name {
let n = name.to_ascii_lowercase();
let security_flag = ["auth", "secure", "encrypt", "tls", "ssl", "authentication"]
.iter()
.any(|h| n.contains(h));
if security_flag && matches!(a.value, Expr::Bool(false, _)) {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line,
severity: Severity::High,
rule_id: "plc-insecure-comm",
title: "Network communication with security disabled".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` calls `{callee}` with `{name} := FALSE`, disabling \
authentication/encryption on an industrial network link."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-319"),
remediation: "Enable authentication + transport encryption; segment OT \
networks and restrict the endpoint to trusted peers.",
});
}
}
// Well-known cleartext port literal.
if let Expr::Int(p, _) = &a.value {
if INSECURE_PORTS.contains(p) {
hits.push(RuleHit {
line,
severity: Severity::Medium,
rule_id: "plc-insecure-protocol-port",
title: "Cleartext industrial protocol port".to_string(),
description: format!(
"POU `{pou}` opens `{callee}` on port {p}, a well-known cleartext OT \
protocol port with no built-in authentication or encryption."
),
cwe: Some("CWE-319"),
remediation: "Front the protocol with a secure gateway/VPN, or use the \
authenticated/encrypted variant; never expose it to untrusted \
networks.",
});
}
}
}
let _ = line;
}
/// The dotted/base identifier of an lvalue expression (`a`, `a.b` → `a.b`,
/// `a[i]` → `a`), for name-based rules.
fn flatten_ident(e: &Expr) -> Option<String> {
match e {
Expr::Ident(n, _) => Some(n.clone()),
Expr::Member { base, field, .. } => flatten_ident(base).map(|b| format!("{b}.{field}")),
Expr::Index { base, .. } => flatten_ident(base),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::pipeline::plc::parser;
const VULN: &str = r#"
FUNCTION_BLOCK CommCtrl
VAR_INPUT
cmdIndex : INT;
END_VAR
VAR
Password : STRING := 'admin123';
buffer : ARRAY[0..15] OF INT;
Safety_Enable : BOOL := TRUE;
divisor : INT;
result : INT;
END_VAR
Safety_Enable := FALSE;
result := 100 / divisor;
buffer[cmdIndex] := 1;
Modbus_Connect(IP := '192.168.0.10', PORT := 502, AUTH := FALSE);
IF cmdIndex > 100 THEN
JMP fault;
END_IF;
fault:
result := 0;
END_FUNCTION_BLOCK
"#;
fn rule_ids(src: &str) -> Vec<&'static str> {
parser::parse(src)
.iter()
.flat_map(analyze)
.map(|h| h.rule_id)
.collect()
}
#[test]
fn vulnerable_program_triggers_every_rule() {
let ids = rule_ids(VULN);
for expected in [
"plc-hardcoded-credential",
"plc-default-password",
"plc-safety-bypass",
"plc-division-by-zero",
"plc-array-unchecked-index",
"plc-insecure-comm",
"plc-insecure-protocol-port",
"plc-unstructured-jump",
] {
assert!(
ids.contains(&expected),
"expected rule {expected}, got {ids:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn clean_program_has_no_findings() {
let clean = r#"
PROGRAM Clean
VAR
a : INT := 5;
b : INT := 3;
total : INT;
END_VAR
IF b <> 0 THEN
total := a / b;
END_IF;
END_PROGRAM
"#;
assert!(rule_ids(clean).is_empty(), "clean program should be quiet");
}
}
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- Demo PLCopen project — conveyor sorter. Deliberately vulnerable. -->
<project xmlns="http://www.plcopen.org/xml/tc6_0201">
<types>
<pous>
<pou name="ConveyorCtrl" pouType="program">
<interface>
<localVars>
<variable name="AdminPwd">
<type><string/></type>
<initialValue><simpleValue value="password"/></initialValue>
</variable>
<variable name="Belt">
<type>
<array>
<dimension lower="0" upper="3"/>
<baseType><INT/></baseType>
</array>
</type>
</variable>
</localVars>
<inputVars>
<variable name="Slot"><type><INT/></type></variable>
</inputVars>
</interface>
<body>
<ST>
<xhtml xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Belt[Slot] := 1;
Ftp_Send(HOST := '192.168.1.5', PORT := 21, ENCRYPT := FALSE);
</xhtml>
</ST>
</body>
</pou>
</pous>
</types>
</project>
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(*
* Demo PLC program pump-station control (IEC 61131-3 Structured Text).
*
* Deliberately vulnerable, for the compliance-scanner PLC control-logic demo.
* Each issue below is flagged by pipeline::plc::rules.
*)
FUNCTION_BLOCK PumpStationCtrl
VAR_INPUT
OperatorCmd : INT; (* HMI command index untrusted *)
FlowSetpoint : REAL;
END_VAR
VAR_OUTPUT
PumpSpeed : REAL;
Fault : BOOL;
END_VAR
VAR
HmiPassword : STRING := 'admin123'; (* hardcoded + default credential *)
ApiKey : STRING := 'sk_live_9c1f2a'; (* hardcoded secret *)
PumpProfiles : ARRAY[0..7] OF REAL;
Safety_Enable : BOOL := TRUE;
Watchdog_Kick : INT := 1;
MeasuredFlow : REAL;
ScaleFactor : REAL;
i : INT;
END_VAR
(* Operator can index the profile table with an unvalidated command. *)
PumpSpeed := PumpProfiles[OperatorCmd];
(* Divisor is a live process value that can read zero on a stopped line. *)
ScaleFactor := FlowSetpoint / MeasuredFlow;
(* Safety interlock disabled straight from application logic. *)
IF OperatorCmd = 99 THEN
Safety_Enable := FALSE;
Watchdog_Kick := 0;
END_IF;
(* Unauthenticated Modbus/TCP link on the cleartext OT port. *)
Modbus_TCP_Connect(IP := '10.10.5.20', PORT := 502, AUTH := FALSE, PASSWORD := 'plc');
(* Unstructured jump around the fault handler. *)
IF MeasuredFlow > 1000.0 THEN
JMP trip;
END_IF;
(* A correctly guarded division must NOT be flagged. *)
IF ScaleFactor <> 0.0 THEN
PumpSpeed := PumpSpeed / ScaleFactor;
END_IF;
RETURN;
trip:
Fault := TRUE;
PumpSpeed := 0.0;
END_FUNCTION_BLOCK
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(*
* Pedestrian-crossing traffic-light controller.
*
* Structure adapted from the classic OpenPLC "traffic light" example
* (github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v3 examples) a timed state machine
* driving vehicle + pedestrian lamps, extended with a SCADA/Modbus link
* and a maintenance override so it reads like a real deployed program.
*
* The control logic itself is sound; the security-relevant defects are the
* kind that slip into field code under deadline: a hardcoded SCADA password,
* a cleartext Modbus/TCP master, and a maintenance mode that drops the
* pedestrian safety permit. Everything else should stay quiet.
*)
PROGRAM TrafficLight
VAR
State : INT := 0; (* 0 GreenVeh, 1 Amber, 2 RedVeh/WalkPed, 3 FlashPed *)
Tmr : TON;
StateElapsed : TIME;
CycleMs : DINT := 0;
(* Lamp outputs *)
VehGreen : BOOL := FALSE;
VehAmber : BOOL := FALSE;
VehRed : BOOL := FALSE;
PedWalk : BOOL := FALSE;
PedStop : BOOL := TRUE;
(* Pedestrian safety permit must be TRUE before the WALK phase asserts *)
PedPermit : BOOL := TRUE;
PedButton : BOOL := FALSE;
(* SCADA / remote monitoring *)
ScadaUser : STRING := 'operator';
ScadaPassword : STRING := 'Tr@ffic2019'; (* hardcoded SCADA credential *)
ModbusReady : BOOL := FALSE;
(* Maintenance override *)
MaintMode : BOOL := FALSE;
LampCount : INT := 5;
DutyPct : INT;
END_VAR
(* ---- SCADA uplink: publish state to the control room over Modbus/TCP ---- *)
IF NOT ModbusReady THEN
Modbus_TCP_Master(IP := '10.20.0.5', PORT := 502, AUTH := FALSE, USER := ScadaUser, PASS := ScadaPassword);
ModbusReady := TRUE;
END_IF;
(* ---- Duty-cycle for the flashing pedestrian lamp (guarded division) ---- *)
IF LampCount <> 0 THEN
DutyPct := (CycleMs * 100) / LampCount;
END_IF;
(* ---- Maintenance override: flash amber, hand control to the technician ---- *)
IF MaintMode THEN
VehGreen := FALSE;
VehRed := FALSE;
VehAmber := NOT VehAmber;
PedPermit := FALSE; (* drops the pedestrian safety permit in code *)
PedWalk := FALSE;
PedStop := TRUE;
ELSE
(* ---- Normal timed state machine ---- *)
Tmr(IN := TRUE, PT := T#5s);
StateElapsed := Tmr.ET;
CASE State OF
0: (* vehicles go, pedestrians stop *)
VehGreen := TRUE; VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := FALSE;
PedWalk := FALSE; PedStop := TRUE;
IF PedButton AND Tmr.Q THEN
State := 1; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
END_IF;
1: (* amber transition *)
VehGreen := FALSE; VehAmber := TRUE;
IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 2; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
2: (* vehicles stop, pedestrians walk only if permitted *)
VehAmber := FALSE; VehRed := TRUE;
IF PedPermit THEN
PedWalk := TRUE; PedStop := FALSE;
END_IF;
IF Tmr.Q THEN State := 3; Tmr(IN := FALSE); END_IF;
3: (* flashing don't-walk before returning to green *)
PedWalk := NOT PedWalk;
IF Tmr.Q THEN
State := 0; PedButton := FALSE; Tmr(IN := FALSE);
END_IF;
ELSE
State := 0;
END_CASE;
END_IF;
END_PROGRAM