feat(m7.3): MCP tenant-scoped bearer tokens

LLM clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, ChatGPT) can't run a Keycloak
OIDC flow, so the MCP server can't use JWTs for auth. This PR
introduces opaque static bearer tokens minted per-tenant via new
agent endpoints, validated by the MCP server, and used to route
incoming MCP requests to the caller's per-tenant database.

Until now, the MCP server connected to a single shared MongoDB DB
with no auth and no tenant awareness — every tool (list_findings,
list_sbom_packages, etc.) returned data across all tenants. After
M7.2 made the agent per-tenant, MCP was the lone cross-tenant data
leak. This closes it.

Design summary
- Token format: `mcpt_<43 url-safe random chars>` (48 chars total).
  Opaque, never embeds tenant_id, never stored in plaintext.
- Storage: cross-tenant `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens` collection,
  keyed by SHA-256 hash. Each row carries the tenant_id, name,
  created_by, created_at, last_used_at, revoked flag.
- Agent endpoints (tenant-scoped via TenantCtx):
    POST   /api/v1/mcp-tokens    → mint (returns raw token ONCE)
    GET    /api/v1/mcp-tokens    → list (metadata + 12-char prefix,
                                   never the hash)
    DELETE /api/v1/mcp-tokens/id → soft revoke
- MCP middleware: extract `Authorization: Bearer mcpt_...`, sniff
  the prefix, SHA-256 → lookup in admin DB → reject if missing or
  revoked. Updates last_used_at fire-and-forget so it never blocks.
  Sets `tokio::task_local!` TENANT_ID for the inner service call;
  the rmcp tool handlers read it and resolve the per-tenant DB.
- task_local is scoped via TENANT_ID.scope(...) around next.run(req)
  so the rmcp tool handlers downstream see the tenant_id without
  modifying their (macro-generated) signatures.

Files
- compliance-core/src/models/mcp_token.rs (new) — McpToken +
  McpTokenView (public projection without the hash).
- compliance-agent/src/database.rs — DatabasePool::admin_db() +
  admin_db_name(): cross-tenant access for token storage.
- compliance-agent/src/api/handlers/mcp_tokens.rs (new) — three
  endpoints. Token generation: 32 random bytes → URL-safe base64,
  no padding. SHA-256 hex stored.
- compliance-mcp/src/database.rs — replaced single Database with
  DatabasePool. Tenant-scoped Database constructed per request.
  Same sanitization + 63-byte cap + hash fallback as the agent.
- compliance-mcp/src/auth.rs (new) — bearer middleware + task_local.
  Includes a SHA-256 round-trip test against a known vector.
- compliance-mcp/src/main.rs — HTTP transport: bearer middleware
  layered on /mcp (not /health, so orca's container probe still
  works). stdio transport: falls back to STDIO_TENANT_ID env (defaults
  to "dev") so local development still works; logged loudly as
  not-for-production.
- compliance-mcp/src/server.rs — each of the 12 tool handlers
  resolves the per-tenant DB via task_local before calling its tool
  fn. Tool fns themselves are unchanged.

Token UX
- Generated by the dashboard (or curl + KC JWT) — user sees raw
  token exactly once, copies it into their LLM client config.
- Dashboard UI for management is a follow-up; can use curl in the
  meantime:
    curl -X POST https://comp-dev.../api/v1/mcp-tokens \
      -H "Authorization: Bearer $KC_JWT" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -d '{"name":"Claude Desktop"}'

Test plan
- cargo fmt --all clean
- cargo clippy --workspace --exclude compliance-dashboard
  -- -D warnings clean
- cargo test -p compliance-core --lib — 7 pass
- cargo test -p compliance-agent --lib — 230 pass (+2 new for
  token generation + sha256 stability)
- cargo test -p compliance-agent --test tenant_isolation — 6 pass
- cargo test -p compliance-mcp — 34 pass (+1 new sha256 vector)

What's deferred
- Dashboard UI for managing tokens (page + create modal + list/
  revoke). Trivial once the API is live.
- Token expiry + per-tool scope (today every token grants access
  to all 12 tools for its tenant).
- Lifting DatabasePool into compliance-core (duplicated for now
  in compliance-mcp to keep this PR focused; lift if a third
  consumer appears).

Production
- The `<prefix>__admin` DB needs to NOT collide with a tenant
  DB. Sanitized tenant_id never starts with `_admin` for any
  current tenant_id shape (UUIDs); flagged in the database.rs
  docstring so tenant provisioning can reject `_admin*` ids
  proactively.
- orca-infra MCP service block already has MONGODB_URI /
  MONGODB_DATABASE — no new env needed. No KC creds since MCP
  doesn't use Keycloak for its own auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

compliance-mcp/Cargo.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [dependencies]
-compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb"] }
+compliance-core = { workspace = true, features = ["mongodb", "axum"] }
 rmcp = { version = "0.16", features = ["server", "macros", "transport-io", "transport-streamable-http-server"] }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ bson = { version = "2", features = ["chrono-0_4"] }
 schemars = "1.0"
 axum = "0.8"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] }
+sha2 = { workspace = true }
+hex = { workspace = true }
+dashmap = { workspace = true }

compliance-mcp/src/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+//! Bearer-token authentication for incoming MCP HTTP requests.
+//!
+//! LLM clients (Claude Desktop / Cursor / ChatGPT / etc.) can't run
+//! Keycloak OIDC, so the MCP server uses opaque static tokens minted
+//! per-tenant via the agent's `POST /api/v1/mcp-tokens` endpoint.
+//!
+//! Flow per request:
+//! 1. Extract `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Missing → 401.
+//! 2. SHA-256 hash the token.
+//! 3. Look up the hash in `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`. Missing or
+//!    revoked → 401.
+//! 4. Fire-and-forget update of `last_used_at` so the dashboard can
+//!    show staleness without blocking the handler.
+//! 5. Stash the tenant_id in [`TENANT_ID`] (a `tokio::task_local`) so
+//!    the MCP tool handlers can read it without modifying rmcp's
+//!    handler signatures.
+//!
+//! The `task_local` is scoped around the inner service call via
+//! [`bearer_auth`], so every handler invoked downstream sees the
+//! tenant_id without us having to thread it through the macro-
+//! generated tool router.
+
+use axum::body::Body;
+use axum::extract::{Request, State};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::middleware::Next;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use mongodb::bson::doc;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::database::DatabasePool;
+
+tokio::task_local! {
+    /// Tenant id resolved from the bearer for this request. Set by
+    /// [`bearer_auth`] before the inner service runs; read by the
+    /// MCP tool handlers via [`current_tenant_id`].
+    pub static TENANT_ID: String;
+}
+
+/// Mongo collection name in `<prefix>__admin`.
+const COLLECTION: &str = "mcp_tokens";
+
+/// Returns the tenant_id set by the auth middleware. `None` outside a
+/// request scope (e.g. unit tests that bypass the middleware).
+pub fn current_tenant_id() -> Option<String> {
+    TENANT_ID.try_with(|s| s.clone()).ok()
+}
+
+/// Axum middleware: validate bearer → set [`TENANT_ID`] → call inner.
+pub async fn bearer_auth(
+    State(pool): State<DatabasePool>,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
+    let Some(token) = extract_bearer(&request) else {
+        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Missing bearer token").into_response();
+    };
+    if !token.starts_with("mcpt_") {
+        return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token format").into_response();
+    }
+    let token_hash = sha256_hex(&token);
+
+    let col = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
+    let found = match col
+        .find_one(doc! { "token_hash": &token_hash, "revoked": false })
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(Some(t)) => t,
+        Ok(None) => {
+            return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid or revoked token").into_response();
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!("MCP token lookup failed: {e}");
+            return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Token lookup error").into_response();
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Fire-and-forget last_used_at update — never block the handler.
+    let col2 = pool.admin_db().collection::<TokenLookup>(COLLECTION);
+    let hash_for_update = token_hash.clone();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let _ = col2
+            .update_one(
+                doc! { "token_hash": &hash_for_update },
+                doc! { "$set": { "last_used_at": mongodb::bson::DateTime::now() } },
+            )
+            .await;
+    });
+
+    let tenant_id = found.tenant_id;
+    let inner = next.run(request);
+    TENANT_ID.scope(tenant_id, inner).await
+}
+
+/// Bare-bones projection — we don't need the whole `McpToken` here,
+/// just enough to route and confirm validity.
+#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
+struct TokenLookup {
+    tenant_id: String,
+}
+
+fn extract_bearer(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
+    req.headers()
+        .get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
+        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+}
+
+fn sha256_hex(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut h = Sha256::new();
+    h.update(s.as_bytes());
+    hex::encode(h.finalize())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sha256_known_value() {
+        // python -c 'import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256(b"mcpt_known").hexdigest())'
+        assert_eq!(
+            sha256_hex("mcpt_known"),
+            "27cf6cf678a44244106863c1c031be8e57b84c2b3019d742f755f8e7afa75dfd"
+        );
+    }
+}

compliance-mcp/src/database.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,127 @@
-use mongodb::{Client, Collection};
+//! Per-tenant Mongo broker for the MCP server.
+//!
+//! Mirror of the agent's `compliance_agent::database::DatabasePool` —
+//! duplicated here rather than lifted into `compliance-core` to keep
+//! this PR focused. If a third consumer ever needs it, lift then.
+//!
+//! Bearer tokens (validated by the auth middleware) carry a tenant_id
+//! and the handler resolves the per-tenant database via
+//! [`DatabasePool::for_tenant_id`]. The admin database
+//! (`<db_prefix>__admin`) holds the cross-tenant `mcp_tokens`
+//! collection that the middleware queries on every request.
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use dashmap::DashMap;
+use mongodb::{bson::doc, Client, Collection};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
 
 use compliance_core::models::*;
 
+/// 63-byte Mongo db-name cap; same invariant as the agent's pool.
+const MAX_DB_NAME_LEN: usize = 63;
+/// 16-byte SHA-256 truncation, hex-encoded → 32 chars.
+const HASH_HEX_LEN: usize = 32;
+const MAX_PREFIX_LEN: usize = MAX_DB_NAME_LEN - 1 - HASH_HEX_LEN;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct DatabasePool {
+    client: Client,
+    db_prefix: String,
+    /// Tenants we've handed out a [`Database`] for. The MCP server
+    /// doesn't ensure indexes (the agent owns that side of the
+    /// schema), so the marker exists only to satisfy the parallel
+    /// shape — current code never reads it.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    seen: Arc<DashMap<String, ()>>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum DbError {
+    #[error("db_prefix '{prefix}' is {len} chars; max is {max} so the hash-fallback DB name fits Mongo's 63-byte cap")]
+    PrefixTooLong {
+        prefix: String,
+        len: usize,
+        max: usize,
+    },
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Mongo(#[from] mongodb::error::Error),
+}
+
+impl DatabasePool {
+    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_prefix: &str) -> Result<Self, DbError> {
+        if db_prefix.len() > MAX_PREFIX_LEN {
+            return Err(DbError::PrefixTooLong {
+                prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
+                len: db_prefix.len(),
+                max: MAX_PREFIX_LEN,
+            });
+        }
+        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
+        client
+            .database("admin")
+            .run_command(doc! { "ping": 1 })
+            .await?;
+        tracing::info!(
+            "MCP MongoDB cluster reachable; per-tenant pool ready (db prefix '{db_prefix}')"
+        );
+        Ok(Self {
+            client,
+            db_prefix: db_prefix.to_string(),
+            seen: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Read-only handle to the tenant's database. No indexes are
+    /// ensured here — the agent owns writes, MCP only reads.
+    pub fn for_tenant_id(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> Database {
+        let db_name = self.tenant_db_name(tenant_id);
+        self.seen.insert(tenant_id.to_string(), ());
+        Database::new(self.client.database(&db_name))
+    }
+
+    /// Cross-tenant admin DB — holds the `mcp_tokens` collection that
+    /// the auth middleware queries to map bearer → tenant_id.
+    pub fn admin_db(&self) -> mongodb::Database {
+        self.client.database(&format!("{}__admin", self.db_prefix))
+    }
+
+    pub fn tenant_db_name(&self, tenant_id: &str) -> String {
+        let sanitized = sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id);
+        let natural = format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, sanitized);
+        if natural.len() <= MAX_DB_NAME_LEN {
+            natural
+        } else {
+            let mut h = Sha256::new();
+            h.update(tenant_id.as_bytes());
+            let digest = h.finalize();
+            let suffix = hex::encode(&digest[..HASH_HEX_LEN / 2]);
+            format!("{}_{}", self.db_prefix, suffix)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn sanitize_tenant_id(tenant_id: &str) -> String {
+    tenant_id
+        .chars()
+        .map(|c| match c {
+            '/' | '\\' | '.' | '"' | '$' | ' ' | '\0' => '_',
+            c => c,
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Typed accessors for the MCP-readable collections in a tenant DB.
+/// Matches the agent's `Database` shape but only exposes what the MCP
+/// tool handlers actually need.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct Database {
     inner: mongodb::Database,
 }
 
 impl Database {
-    pub async fn connect(uri: &str, db_name: &str) -> Result<Self, mongodb::error::Error> {
-        let client = Client::with_uri_str(uri).await?;
-        let db = client.database(db_name);
-        db.run_command(mongodb::bson::doc! { "ping": 1 }).await?;
-        tracing::info!("MCP server connected to MongoDB '{db_name}'");
-        Ok(Self { inner: db })
+    pub(crate) fn new(inner: mongodb::Database) -> Self {
+        Self { inner }
     }
 
     pub fn findings(&self) -> Collection<Finding> {

compliance-mcp/src/main.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
+mod auth;
 mod database;
 mod server;
 mod tools;
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-use database::Database;
+use database::DatabasePool;
 use rmcp::transport::{
     streamable_http_server::session::local::LocalSessionManager, StreamableHttpServerConfig,
     StreamableHttpService,
@@ -24,36 +25,60 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
 
     let mongo_uri =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_URI").unwrap_or_else(|_| "mongodb://localhost:27017".to_string());
-    let db_name =
+    // MONGODB_DATABASE is reused as the per-tenant DB-name prefix —
+    // same convention as the agent so `<prefix>__admin.mcp_tokens`
+    // and `<prefix>_<tenant_id>` line up across services.
+    let db_prefix =
         std::env::var("MONGODB_DATABASE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "compliance_scanner".to_string());
 
-    let db = Database::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_name).await?;
+    let pool = DatabasePool::connect(&mongo_uri, &db_prefix).await?;
 
-    // If MCP_PORT is set, run as Streamable HTTP server; otherwise use stdio.
+    // HTTP transport: bind a small axum router with bearer-auth in
+    // front of the rmcp service. `/health` stays public for orca's
+    // container probe.
     if let Ok(port_str) = std::env::var("MCP_PORT") {
         let port: u16 = port_str.parse()?;
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on HTTP port {port}");
 
-        let db_clone = db.clone();
+        let pool_for_factory = pool.clone();
         let service = StreamableHttpService::new(
-            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(db_clone.clone())),
+            move || Ok(ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool_for_factory.clone())),
             Arc::new(LocalSessionManager::default()),
             StreamableHttpServerConfig::default(),
         );
 
         let router = axum::Router::new()
             .route("/health", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
-            .nest_service("/mcp", service);
+            .nest_service(
+                "/mcp",
+                axum::Router::new().fallback_service(service).layer(
+                    axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(pool.clone(), auth::bearer_auth),
+                ),
+            );
         let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
         tracing::info!("MCP HTTP server listening on 0.0.0.0:{port}");
         axum::serve(listener, router).await?;
     } else {
+        // stdio transport — used when run as a local MCP server next
+        // to the LLM client. There's no HTTP layer to do bearer auth,
+        // so we synthesize a tenant_id from STDIO_TENANT_ID for local
+        // development. NEVER use this in production.
         tracing::info!("Starting MCP server on stdio");
-        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(db);
+        let synth_tenant = std::env::var("STDIO_TENANT_ID").unwrap_or_else(|_| "dev".to_string());
+        tracing::warn!(
+            tenant_id = %synth_tenant,
+            "stdio transport — using synthetic tenant id; DO NOT use in production"
+        );
+        let server = ComplianceMcpServer::new(pool);
         let transport = rmcp::transport::stdio();
         use rmcp::ServiceExt;
-        let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
-        handle.waiting().await?;
+        auth::TENANT_ID
+            .scope(synth_tenant, async {
+                let handle = server.serve(transport).await?;
+                handle.waiting().await?;
+                Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())
+            })
+            .await?;
     }
 
     Ok(())

compliance-mcp/src/server.rs

@@ -2,20 +2,37 @@ use rmcp::{
     handler::server::wrapper::Parameters, model::*, tool, tool_handler, tool_router, ServerHandler,
 };
 
-use crate::database::Database;
+use crate::auth::current_tenant_id;
+use crate::database::{Database, DatabasePool};
 use crate::tools::{dast, findings, pentest, sbom};
 
 pub struct ComplianceMcpServer {
-    db: Database,
+    pool: DatabasePool,
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     tool_router: rmcp::handler::server::router::tool::ToolRouter<Self>,
 }
 
+impl ComplianceMcpServer {
+    /// Resolve the per-tenant `Database` from the bearer-set
+    /// `task_local`. Every tool handler calls this; missing context
+    /// surfaces as `internal_error` because it means the auth
+    /// middleware was misconfigured (handler ran without scope).
+    fn tenant_db(&self) -> Result<Database, rmcp::ErrorData> {
+        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id().ok_or_else(|| {
+            rmcp::ErrorData::internal_error(
+                "no tenant context — bearer middleware not in chain".to_string(),
+                None,
+            )
+        })?;
+        Ok(self.pool.for_tenant_id(&tenant_id))
+    }
+}
+
 #[tool_router]
 impl ComplianceMcpServer {
-    pub fn new(db: Database) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(pool: DatabasePool) -> Self {
         Self {
-            db,
+            pool,
             tool_router: Self::tool_router(),
         }
     }
@@ -29,7 +46,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::ListFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        findings::list_findings(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::list_findings(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single finding by its ID")]
@@ -37,7 +55,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::GetFindingParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        findings::get_finding(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::get_finding(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of findings counts grouped by severity and status")]
@@ -45,7 +64,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<findings::FindingsSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        findings::findings_summary(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        findings::findings_summary(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── SBOM ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -57,7 +77,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::ListSbomPackagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        sbom::list_sbom_packages(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -67,7 +88,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<sbom::SbomVulnReportParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        sbom::sbom_vuln_report(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── DAST ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -79,7 +101,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::ListDastFindingsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        dast::list_dast_findings(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        dast::list_dast_findings(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a summary of recent DAST scan runs and finding counts")]
@@ -87,7 +110,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<dast::DastScanSummaryParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        dast::dast_scan_summary(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        dast::dast_scan_summary(&db, params).await
     }
 
     // ── Pentest ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -99,7 +123,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::ListPentestSessionsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::list_pentest_sessions(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get a single AI pentest session by its ID")]
@@ -107,7 +132,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestSessionParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        pentest::get_pentest_session(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_pentest_session(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -117,7 +143,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetAttackChainParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        pentest::get_attack_chain(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_attack_chain(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(description = "Get chat messages from a pentest session")]
@@ -125,7 +152,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::GetPentestMessagesParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::get_pentest_messages(&db, params).await
     }
 
     #[tool(
@@ -135,7 +163,8 @@ impl ComplianceMcpServer {
         &self,
         Parameters(params): Parameters<pentest::PentestStatsParams>,
     ) -> Result<CallToolResult, rmcp::ErrorData> {
-        pentest::pentest_stats(&self.db, params).await
+        let db = self.tenant_db()?;
+        pentest::pentest_stats(&db, params).await
     }
 }
 
@@ -149,7 +178,7 @@ impl ServerHandler for ComplianceMcpServer {
                 .build(),
             server_info: Implementation::from_build_env(),
             instructions: Some(
-                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions."
+                "Compliance Scanner MCP server. Query security findings, SBOM data, DAST results, and AI pentest sessions for your tenant."
                     .to_string(),
             ),
         }