feat(plc): ephemeral soft-PLC provisioning + program load (#183)
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Dynamic PLC testing without reaching the customer's device: when a PLC/SPS
target ships control logic but no reachable live URL, instantiate that logic
ourselves on a throwaway OpenPLC container in-cluster, load + start it, probe
the provisioned Modbus endpoint, and tear it down. No customer network access,
sandboxed, and reproducible.

This is the phase-1 foundation of epic #183 (OpenPLC substrate). It covers:

- provision: ephemeral container lifecycle (docker CLI). Resource-capped
  (memory/cpus/pids), hardened (no-new-privileges), labelled, joined to the
  agent's own network with no host port exposure, and swept by a stale reaper
  for anything a crashed run leaks. The `docker` argv is built by pure functions
  so it is unit-tested without a daemon.
- openplc: drives the OpenPLC web UI to load a program — login → upload →
  save → compile (MatIEC) → start_plc (which opens Modbus/TCP 502).
- runtime::provision_and_test: composes them under a hard deadline with
  guaranteed teardown on every path (success / error / timeout), then runs the
  existing ICS probe against the provisioned endpoint. extract_program picks the
  best loadable program (complete ST > largest ST > PLCopen XML).
- orchestrator: for a PlcSps target with control logic and no live URL, run
  provision-and-test after the static PLC scan. Gated by PlcRuntimeConfig
  (PLC_RUNTIME_ENABLED, default off — needs Docker access in the agent).

DAST-against-WebVisu and CODESYS-runtime fidelity are follow-ups.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sharang Parnerkar
2026-07-17 00:39:54 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 1aba85b28e
commit 1ae6025286
12 changed files with 1083 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -404,6 +404,21 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
let ics = plan.has(ScanType::IcsProbe);
if plc {
new_count += self.run_plc_scan(target, &target_id, scan_run_id).await?;
// Provision-and-test (#183): with the control logic but no reachable
// device, instantiate it on an ephemeral soft-PLC and probe that
// instead of the customer's OT network. Opt-in (needs Docker) and only
// when there is no live URL to probe directly. Never fails the scan.
if self.config.plc_runtime.enabled && target.live_url().is_none() {
match self
.run_provisioned_plc_test(target, &target_id, scan_run_id)
.await
{
Ok(n) => new_count += n,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target_id = %target_id, error = %e, "provision-and-test failed")
}
}
}
}
if ics {
new_count += self.run_ics_probe(target, &target_id, scan_run_id).await?;
@@ -540,6 +555,77 @@ impl PipelineOrchestrator {
Ok(new_count)
}
/// Provision-and-test (#183): instantiate the target's control logic on an
/// ephemeral soft-PLC (OpenPLC), start it, probe the provisioned Modbus
/// endpoint, and tear the instance down. Used when a PLC/SPS target has the
/// control logic but no reachable live device to probe directly. Guarded by
/// `plc_runtime.enabled` (needs Docker); persists the same [`ScanType::IcsProbe`]
/// findings as a live probe.
async fn run_provisioned_plc_test(
&self,
target: &OnboardedTarget,
target_id: &str,
scan_run_id: &str,
) -> Result<u32, AgentError> {
self.update_phase(scan_run_id, "plc_provision").await;
// Locate a loadable control-logic program among the PLC-source artifacts
// (same selection as the static PLC scan: dedicated PLC projects plus code
// artifacts holding PLCopen XML / ST exports).
let ctx = crate::ingest::IngestContext::from_config(&self.config, target_id);
let ingest_set = crate::ingest::ingest_all(target, &ctx)?;
let program = target
.artifacts
.iter()
.filter(|a| {
matches!(
a.kind,
ArtifactKind::PlcProject | ArtifactKind::GitRepo | ArtifactKind::SourceArchive
)
})
.find_map(|a| {
let path = ingest_set.get(&a.id).and_then(|ia| ia.working_path.clone())?;
crate::pipeline::plc::runtime::extract_program(&path)
});
let Some(program) = program else {
tracing::info!(target_id, "provision-and-test: no loadable control-logic program");
return Ok(0);
};
let http = crate::pipeline::plc::runtime::http_client()?;
let provisioner =
crate::pipeline::plc::runtime::DockerSoftPlc::new(self.config.plc_runtime.clone());
let findings = crate::pipeline::plc::runtime::provision_and_test(
&provisioner,
&http,
&self.config.plc_runtime,
&program,
target_id,
)
.await?;
tracing::info!(
target_id,
found = findings.len(),
"provision-and-test complete"
);
let mut new_count = 0u32;
for mut finding in findings {
finding.scan_run_id = Some(scan_run_id.to_string());
if self
.db
.findings()
.find_one(doc! { "fingerprint": &finding.fingerprint })
.await?
.is_none()
{
self.db.findings().insert_one(&finding).await?;
new_count += 1;
}
}
Ok(new_count)
}
/// Probe a running PLC/SPS device over industrial protocols (Modbus/TCP, …)
/// and persist findings for exposed / unauthenticated control access. The
/// probe is read-only; it targets the Modbus port of the target's live URL.