fixup(m7.2-A): validate db_prefix at connect, bump hash to 16 bytes
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Addresses review feedback on the hash-fallback path. The original `debug_assert!(hashed.len() <= MAX_DB_NAME_LEN)` was a runtime hack that vanished in release builds. With an 8-byte hash truncation (~2^32 birthday-collision resistance), two tenant_ids hashing to the same suffix would silently share a database — no panic, no rollback, just cross-tenant data leak. Not acceptable for a regulated-industry product. Changes: - Bump hash truncation 8 → 16 bytes (32 hex chars). 2^64 birthday resistance — collision-impossible at our scale. - Add MAX_PREFIX_LEN (= 30) and validate db_prefix.len() at `DatabasePool::connect`. The runtime hash-fallback arithmetic is now provably within Mongo's 63-byte cap; drop the debug_assert!. - New test `connect_rejects_overlong_db_prefix` exercises the inclusive bound (30 passes, 31 fails). - Existing hash-fallback test now asserts a 32-char hex suffix + basic distinctness for two different inputs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -172,9 +172,45 @@ async fn tenant_db_name_falls_back_to_hash_when_too_long() {
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let name = pool.tenant_db_name(&huge);
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assert!(name.len() <= 63, "hashed name should fit: {name}");
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assert!(name.starts_with("m72a_long_"));
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// The hash suffix is 32 hex chars (16-byte SHA-256 truncation).
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let suffix = name.trim_start_matches("m72a_long_");
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assert_eq!(
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suffix.len(),
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32,
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"expected 32-hex suffix (16-byte hash), got {suffix:?}"
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);
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assert!(suffix.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
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// Stable: same input → same output.
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assert_eq!(name, pool.tenant_db_name(&huge));
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// Different inputs → different outputs (collision check on a tiny
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// sample — full birthday-resistance is a proof not a test).
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let huge2 = "y".repeat(100);
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assert_ne!(pool.tenant_db_name(&huge), pool.tenant_db_name(&huge2));
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn connect_rejects_overlong_db_prefix() {
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let uri = std::env::var("TEST_MONGODB_URI")
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| "mongodb://root:example@localhost:27017/?authSource=admin".into());
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// MAX_PREFIX_LEN is 30 (= 63 - 1 - 32). A 31-char prefix MUST be
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// rejected at construction so the hash-fallback path can never
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// produce an over-long db name at runtime.
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let too_long = "a".repeat(31);
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let err = DatabasePool::connect(&uri, &too_long).await.unwrap_err();
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let msg = format!("{err}");
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assert!(
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msg.contains("max is 30") || msg.contains(&too_long),
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"error should explain the cap: {msg}"
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);
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// Exactly 30 chars is the inclusive bound — must succeed.
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let just_right = "a".repeat(30);
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let _ = DatabasePool::connect(&uri, &just_right)
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.await
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.expect("30-char prefix should be accepted");
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}
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/// Short UUID slug for keeping test prefixes well under Mongo's 63-byte
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