use std::{
    collections::HashMap,
    sync::{Arc, RwLock},
};

use axum::{
    extract::Query,
    response::{IntoResponse, Redirect},
    Extension,
};
use rand::RngExt;
use tower_sessions::Session;
use url::Url;

use crate::infrastructure::{
    server_state::ServerState,
    state::{User, UserStateInner},
    Error,
};

pub const LOGGED_IN_USER_SESS_KEY: &str = "logged-in-user";

/// Data stored alongside each pending OAuth state. Holds the optional
/// post-login redirect URL and the PKCE code verifier needed for the
/// token exchange.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct PendingOAuthEntry {
    pub(crate) redirect_url: Option<String>,
    pub(crate) code_verifier: String,
}

/// In-memory store for pending OAuth states. Keyed by the random state
/// string. This avoids dependence on the session cookie surviving the
/// Keycloak redirect round-trip (the `dx serve` proxy can drop
/// `Set-Cookie` headers on 307 responses).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct PendingOAuthStore(Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, PendingOAuthEntry>>>);

impl PendingOAuthStore {
    /// Insert a pending state with an optional redirect URL and PKCE verifier.
    pub(crate) fn insert(&self, state: String, entry: PendingOAuthEntry) {
        // RwLock::write only panics if the lock is poisoned, which
        // indicates a prior panic -- propagating is acceptable here.
        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
        self.0
            .write()
            .expect("pending oauth store lock poisoned")
            .insert(state, entry);
    }

    /// Remove and return the entry if the state was pending.
    /// Returns `None` if the state was never stored (CSRF failure).
    pub(crate) fn take(&self, state: &str) -> Option<PendingOAuthEntry> {
        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
        self.0
            .write()
            .expect("pending oauth store lock poisoned")
            .remove(state)
    }
}

/// Generate a cryptographically random state string for CSRF protection.
#[cfg_attr(test, allow(dead_code))]
pub(crate) fn generate_state() -> String {
    let bytes: [u8; 32] = rand::rng().random();
    // Encode as hex to produce a URL-safe string without padding.
    bytes.iter().fold(String::with_capacity(64), |mut acc, b| {
        use std::fmt::Write;
        // write! on a String is infallible, safe to ignore the result.
        let _ = write!(acc, "{b:02x}");
        acc
    })
}

/// Generate a PKCE code verifier (43-128 char URL-safe random string).
///
/// Uses 32 random bytes encoded as base64url (no padding) to produce
/// a 43-character verifier per RFC 7636.
pub(crate) fn generate_code_verifier() -> String {
    use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};

    let bytes: [u8; 32] = rand::rng().random();
    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes)
}

/// Derive the S256 code challenge from a code verifier per RFC 7636.
///
/// `code_challenge = BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier))`
pub(crate) fn derive_code_challenge(verifier: &str) -> String {
    use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

    let digest = Sha256::digest(verifier.as_bytes());
    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(digest)
}

/// Redirect the user to Keycloak's authorization page.
///
/// Generates a random CSRF state, stores it (along with the optional
/// redirect URL) in the server-side `PendingOAuthStore`, and redirects
/// the browser to Keycloak.
///
/// # Query Parameters
///
/// * `redirect_url` - Optional URL to redirect to after successful login.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Error` if the Keycloak config is missing or the URL is malformed.
#[axum::debug_handler]
pub async fn auth_login(
    Extension(state): Extension<ServerState>,
    Extension(pending): Extension<PendingOAuthStore>,
    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, Error> {
    let kc = state.keycloak;
    let csrf_state = generate_state();
    let code_verifier = generate_code_verifier();
    let code_challenge = derive_code_challenge(&code_verifier);

    let redirect_url = params.get("redirect_url").cloned();
    pending.insert(
        csrf_state.clone(),
        PendingOAuthEntry {
            redirect_url,
            code_verifier,
        },
    );

    let mut url = Url::parse(&kc.auth_endpoint())
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("invalid auth endpoint URL: {e}")))?;

    url.query_pairs_mut()
        .append_pair("client_id", &kc.client_id)
        .append_pair("redirect_uri", &kc.redirect_uri)
        .append_pair("response_type", "code")
        .append_pair("scope", "openid profile email")
        .append_pair("state", &csrf_state)
        .append_pair("code_challenge", &code_challenge)
        .append_pair("code_challenge_method", "S256");

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(url.as_str()))
}

/// Token endpoint response from Keycloak.
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
struct TokenResponse {
    access_token: String,
    refresh_token: Option<String>,
}

/// Userinfo endpoint response from Keycloak.
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
struct UserinfoResponse {
    /// The subject identifier (unique user ID in Keycloak).
    sub: String,
    email: Option<String>,
    /// Keycloak `preferred_username` claim.
    preferred_username: Option<String>,
    /// Full name from the Keycloak profile.
    name: Option<String>,
    /// Keycloak may include a picture/avatar URL via protocol mappers.
    picture: Option<String>,
}

/// Handle the OAuth callback from Keycloak after the user authenticates.
///
/// Validates the CSRF state against the `PendingOAuthStore`, exchanges
/// the authorization code for tokens, fetches user info, stores the
/// logged-in user in the tower-sessions session, and redirects to the app.
///
/// # Query Parameters
///
/// * `code`  - The authorization code from Keycloak.
/// * `state` - The CSRF state to verify against the pending store.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Error` on CSRF mismatch, token exchange failure, or session issues.
#[axum::debug_handler]
pub async fn auth_callback(
    session: Session,
    Extension(state): Extension<ServerState>,
    Extension(pending): Extension<PendingOAuthStore>,
    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, Error> {
    let kc = state.keycloak;

    // --- CSRF validation via the in-memory pending store ---
    let returned_state = params
        .get("state")
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::StateError("missing state parameter".into()))?;

    let entry = pending
        .take(returned_state)
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::StateError("unknown or expired oauth state".into()))?;

    // --- Exchange code for tokens (with PKCE code_verifier) ---
    let code = params
        .get("code")
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::StateError("missing code parameter".into()))?;

    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
    let token_resp = client
        .post(kc.token_endpoint())
        .form(&[
            ("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
            ("client_id", kc.client_id.as_str()),
            ("redirect_uri", kc.redirect_uri.as_str()),
            ("code", code),
            ("code_verifier", &entry.code_verifier),
        ])
        .send()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("token request failed: {e}")))?;

    if !token_resp.status().is_success() {
        let body = token_resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
        return Err(Error::StateError(format!("token exchange failed: {body}")));
    }

    let tokens: TokenResponse = token_resp
        .json()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("token parse failed: {e}")))?;

    // --- Fetch userinfo ---
    let userinfo: UserinfoResponse = client
        .get(kc.userinfo_endpoint())
        .bearer_auth(&tokens.access_token)
        .send()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("userinfo request failed: {e}")))?
        .json()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("userinfo parse failed: {e}")))?;

    // Prefer `name`, fall back to `preferred_username`, then empty.
    let display_name = userinfo
        .name
        .or(userinfo.preferred_username)
        .unwrap_or_default();

    // --- Build user state and persist in session ---
    let user_state = UserStateInner {
        sub: userinfo.sub,
        access_token: tokens.access_token,
        refresh_token: tokens.refresh_token.unwrap_or_default(),
        user: User {
            email: userinfo.email.unwrap_or_default(),
            name: display_name,
            avatar_url: userinfo.picture.unwrap_or_default(),
        },
    };

    set_login_session(session, user_state).await?;

    let target = entry
        .redirect_url
        .filter(|u| !u.is_empty())
        .unwrap_or_else(|| "/".into());

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(&target))
}

/// Clear the user session and redirect to Keycloak's logout endpoint.
///
/// After Keycloak finishes its own logout flow it will redirect
/// back to the application root.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Error` if the session cannot be flushed or the URL is malformed.
#[axum::debug_handler]
pub async fn logout(
    session: Session,
    Extension(state): Extension<ServerState>,
) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, Error> {
    let kc = state.keycloak;

    // Flush all session data.
    session
        .flush()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("session flush failed: {e}")))?;

    let mut url = Url::parse(&kc.logout_endpoint())
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("invalid logout endpoint URL: {e}")))?;

    url.query_pairs_mut()
        .append_pair("client_id", &kc.client_id)
        .append_pair("post_logout_redirect_uri", &kc.app_url);

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(url.as_str()))
}

/// Persist user data into the session.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `Error` if the session store write fails.
pub async fn set_login_session(session: Session, data: UserStateInner) -> Result<(), Error> {
    session
        .insert(LOGGED_IN_USER_SESS_KEY, data)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| Error::StateError(format!("session insert failed: {e}")))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    #![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]

    use super::*;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // generate_state()
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn generate_state_length_is_64() {
        let state = generate_state();
        assert_eq!(state.len(), 64);
    }

    #[test]
    fn generate_state_chars_are_hex() {
        let state = generate_state();
        assert!(state.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn generate_state_two_calls_differ() {
        let a = generate_state();
        let b = generate_state();
        assert_ne!(a, b);
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // generate_code_verifier()
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn code_verifier_length_is_43() {
        let verifier = generate_code_verifier();
        assert_eq!(verifier.len(), 43);
    }

    #[test]
    fn code_verifier_chars_are_url_safe_base64() {
        let verifier = generate_code_verifier();
        // URL-safe base64 without padding uses [A-Za-z0-9_-]
        assert!(verifier
            .chars()
            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'));
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // derive_code_challenge()
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn code_challenge_deterministic() {
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let a = derive_code_challenge(verifier);
        let b = derive_code_challenge(verifier);
        assert_eq!(a, b);
    }

    #[test]
    fn code_challenge_rfc7636_test_vector() {
        // RFC 7636 Appendix B test vector:
        // verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
        // expected challenge = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = derive_code_challenge(verifier);
        assert_eq!(challenge, "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM");
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // PendingOAuthStore
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn pending_store_insert_and_take() {
        let store = PendingOAuthStore::default();
        store.insert(
            "state-1".into(),
            PendingOAuthEntry {
                redirect_url: Some("/dashboard".into()),
                code_verifier: "verifier-1".into(),
            },
        );
        let entry = store.take("state-1");
        assert!(entry.is_some());
        let entry = entry.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(entry.redirect_url, Some("/dashboard".into()));
        assert_eq!(entry.code_verifier, "verifier-1");
    }

    #[test]
    fn pending_store_take_removes_entry() {
        let store = PendingOAuthStore::default();
        store.insert(
            "state-2".into(),
            PendingOAuthEntry {
                redirect_url: None,
                code_verifier: "v2".into(),
            },
        );
        let _ = store.take("state-2");
        // Second take should return None since the entry was removed.
        assert!(store.take("state-2").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn pending_store_take_unknown_returns_none() {
        let store = PendingOAuthStore::default();
        assert!(store.take("nonexistent").is_none());
    }
}