Benjamin Admin
6a3e96d54c
Two-part nachhaltiger fix replacing the previous "fill to 5 mitigations no matter what" behavior that the GT-Bremse benchmark proved unfaithful (e.g. HP1625 "scharfe Kanten" returning M005 "Rotations- bewegung vermeiden" via category fallback; HP1651 "Wiederanlauf Roboter" returning M054 "Sichere thermische Auslegung" via mismatched pattern reference). PART A — Set-based category filter (handlers package): - acceptableMeasureCategories: replaces 1:1 patternCatToMeasureCat with a curated set per pattern category, so e.g. safety_function_failure now accepts software_control measures (watchdogs, plausibility checks) and emc_hazard accepts both electrical and software_control measures - isCategoryCompatible: gate every measure id against the accepted set before creating a mitigation; mismatches log MEASURE-SKIP - The old category fallback is REMOVED. A hazard whose pattern has no category-compatible measure is now created with zero mitigations and logged as COVERAGE-GAP — the operator must consult an expert. No more silent invention of generic defaults. PART B — 235 pattern author-error fixes across 26 files: - HP040-HP044 (AI): M101/M102/M103 (Auffangwanne/Absauganlage) -> M133 Anomalieerkennung + M214 Plausibilitaet + M213 Sensor-Redundanz + M044 Zweikanalige Steuerung + others - HP011-HP015, HP104-HP109, HP1085-HP1095, HP1281-HP1334 (electrical): M001-M005/M054/M061 placeholders -> M481/M482 Isolation + M511-M522 PE/Schutzleiter/RCD/Hauptschalter - HP110-HP1331 (material_environmental): M101-M103 -> M384-M395 Brandschutz/Laserschutz + M533/M408 SDB/PSA - HP800-HP858, HP1178-HP1264 (software/sensor/hmi): M101/M104 -> M105/M106/M107/M214 SPS/Watchdog/Plausibilitaet - HP026, HP611-HP1690 (ergonomic): M001/M082 -> M353-M360 + M530-M532 Hebehilfe/ergonomische Hoehe - HP201-HP1697 (mechanical): M054/M051 -> M002/M008/M061/M141 + M487/M488 Tueroeffnung-Stillsetzung/Wiederanlauf - Plus EMF/Strahlung/Brand/Lärm/Vibration/Kommunikation/Cyber Coverage shift (Pattern-Author-Fehler bei aktiviertem Set-Filter): start: 237 patterns with zero category-compatible measures after Stufe 1A: 5 (AI) after Stufe 1B: 20 (mechanical Bestand) after Stufe 1C: 35 (electrical Bestand) after Stufe 1D: 29 (material_environmental) after Stufe 1E: 29 (software/sensor/hmi) after Stufe 1F: 20 (ergonomic) after Stufe 1G: 80 (thermal/comm/radiation/fire/safety) final: 0 (28 extended.go/extended2.go duplicates fixed) New regression tests: - TestEveryPattern_HasCategoryCompatibleMeasure: every pattern in collectAllPatterns() must reference at least one category-compatible measure; gaps must be explicitly listed in AllowlistKnownGaps (currently empty). Fails CI for any new pattern that drifts. - TestAcceptableMeasureCategories: pins the set-mapping for the 7 most-bug-prone pattern categories. - TestIsCategoryCompatible_EmptyMeasureCat: protects legacy entries. A separate task #11 tracks 58 HP-ID duplicates between extended.go/extended2.go and cobot.go/press.go/operational.go — patterns are semantically different and TestGetBuiltinHazardPatterns_- UniqueIDs misses them because it only checks HP001-HP044. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
83 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
83 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package iace
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// builtinCyberPatterns returns HP035-HP039: cyber and network hazard patterns.
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func builtinCyberPatterns() []HazardPattern {
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return []HazardPattern{
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{
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ID: "HP035", NameDE: "Unbefugter Netzwerkzugriff", NameEN: "Unauthorized network access",
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RequiredComponentTags: []string{"networked"},
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RequiredEnergyTags: []string{"cyber"},
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GeneratedHazardCats: []string{"unauthorized_access"},
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SuggestedMeasureIDs: []string{"M111", "M112", "M113", "M140"},
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SuggestedEvidenceIDs: []string{"E01", "E16", "E17"},
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Priority: 90,
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ScenarioDE: "Angreifer erlangt ueber Netzwerkzugang Kontrolle ueber Maschinensteuerung oder Sicherheitsfunktionen.",
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TriggerDE: "Ausnutzung offener Ports, Standardpasswoerter oder ungepatchter Schwachstellen im Steuerungsnetz.",
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HarmDE: "Unkontrollierte Maschinenbewegung durch manipulierte Steuerbefehle, Produktionsstoerung.",
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AffectedDE: "Bedienpersonal, gesamte Produktionsumgebung",
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ZoneDE: "Netzwerkschnittstellen, Steuerungs-LAN, Remote-Zugaenge, OPC-UA-Endpoints",
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DefaultSeverity: 4, DefaultExposure: 3,
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},
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{
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ID: "HP036", NameDE: "Kommunikationsausfall", NameEN: "Communication failure",
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RequiredComponentTags: []string{"networked", "it_component"},
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RequiredEnergyTags: []string{},
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GeneratedHazardCats: []string{"communication_failure"},
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SuggestedMeasureIDs: []string{"M113", "M106", "M119", "M141"},
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SuggestedEvidenceIDs: []string{"E01", "E17"},
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Priority: 80,
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ScenarioDE: "Netzwerkverbindung zwischen Steuerungskomponenten faellt aus; Maschine verliert Synchronisation.",
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TriggerDE: "Kabelbruch, Switch-Ausfall, Paketverslust im Industrial Ethernet oder Busfehler.",
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HarmDE: "Asynchrone Achsbewegung, Verlust der Positionsrueckmeldung, unkontrollierter Stillstand mit Last.",
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AffectedDE: "Bedienpersonal, automatisierte Nachbaranlagen",
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ZoneDE: "Netzwerk-Switches, Profinet/EtherCAT-Leitungen, Feldbus-Stecker",
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DefaultSeverity: 3, DefaultExposure: 2,
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},
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{
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ID: "HP037", NameDE: "Firmware-Manipulation", NameEN: "Firmware manipulation",
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RequiredComponentTags: []string{"has_software", "networked"},
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RequiredEnergyTags: []string{"cyber"},
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GeneratedHazardCats: []string{"firmware_corruption"},
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SuggestedMeasureIDs: []string{"M116", "M138", "M146"},
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SuggestedEvidenceIDs: []string{"E01", "E16", "E18"},
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Priority: 85,
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ScenarioDE: "Angreifer spielt manipulierte Firmware auf Steuerung oder Antriebsregler, die Sicherheitsgrenzen deaktiviert.",
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TriggerDE: "Zugriff ueber ungesicherte Update-Schnittstelle, fehlende Signaturpruefung der Firmware.",
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HarmDE: "Deaktivierung von Sicherheitsfunktionen, Aenderung von Achsgrenzen, verdeckte Manipulation.",
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AffectedDE: "Bedienpersonal, gesamte Anlage",
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ZoneDE: "Steuerungshardware, Antriebsregler, Sicherheits-SPS, IoT-Gateways",
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DefaultSeverity: 5, DefaultExposure: 1,
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},
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{
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ID: "HP038", NameDE: "Drahtlos-Angriff (WiFi/Bluetooth)", NameEN: "Wireless attack (WiFi/Bluetooth)",
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RequiredComponentTags: []string{"wireless"},
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RequiredEnergyTags: []string{"cyber"},
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GeneratedHazardCats: []string{"unauthorized_access"},
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SuggestedMeasureIDs: []string{"M111", "M113", "M140"},
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SuggestedEvidenceIDs: []string{"E01", "E16"},
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Priority: 80,
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ScenarioDE: "Angreifer nutzt drahtlose Schnittstelle zum Einschleusen von Befehlen oder zum Abhoeren der Kommunikation.",
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TriggerDE: "Schwache WLAN-Verschluesselung, ungepatchte Bluetooth-Schwachstelle oder offener Wartungszugang.",
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HarmDE: "Uebernahme der Steuerung, Manipulation von Prozessdaten, Denial-of-Service.",
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AffectedDE: "Bedienpersonal, angebundene Systeme",
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ZoneDE: "Funkreichweite der drahtlosen Schnittstelle, HMI-Tablets, IoT-Sensoren",
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DefaultSeverity: 4, DefaultExposure: 2,
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},
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{
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ID: "HP039", NameDE: "Supply-Chain-Angriff auf IT-Komponenten", NameEN: "Supply chain attack on IT components",
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RequiredComponentTags: []string{"it_component", "has_software"},
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RequiredEnergyTags: []string{},
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GeneratedHazardCats: []string{"unauthorized_access", "firmware_corruption"},
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SuggestedMeasureIDs: []string{"M186", "M188", "M141"},
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SuggestedEvidenceIDs: []string{"E01", "E18", "E19"},
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Priority: 75,
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ScenarioDE: "Kompromittierte Komponente oder Bibliothek wird in der Lieferkette eingeschleust.",
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TriggerDE: "Bezug manipulierter Hardware/Software vom Zulieferer, fehlende Integritaetspruefung bei Wareneingang.",
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HarmDE: "Verdeckte Hintertuer in Steuerung, langfristige Kompromittierung, schwer detektierbar.",
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AffectedDE: "Bedienpersonal, IT-Sicherheitsverantwortliche, Betreiber",
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ZoneDE: "Alle IT-Komponenten (SPS, IPC, Switches, Sensoren mit Firmware)",
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DefaultSeverity: 4, DefaultExposure: 1,
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},
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}
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}
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