chore(ucca): re-sync data/obligations join-keys copy (93 -> 95)

Registry grew to 95 (Capability materialization #5b added CORE obligations). Keep the ai-sdk build-context copy current so obligation-status reflects the live registry contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/advisor-status
2026-06-26 01:02:02 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 01:01:16 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 01:00:53 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 00:54:43 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 00:54:23 +02:00 · 2026-06-26 00:26:56 +02:00
37 changed files with 14001 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ COPY migrations/ ./migrations/
 # Copy policy files (YAML rules)
 COPY policies/ ./policies/

+# Copy Compliance Execution Graph data (file-backed: Registry join-key copy + accepted control
+# mappings + evidence requirements) consumed by GET /sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status.
+# data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json is a synced copy of the repo-root Registry contract
+# (the Obligation Registry owns the canonical file) — re-sync it when the Registry grows.
+COPY data/control_mappings/ ./data/control_mappings/
+COPY data/evidence_requirements/ ./data/evidence_requirements/
+COPY data/obligations/ ./data/obligations/
+
 # Create non-root user
 RUN adduser -D -u 1000 appuser
 USER appuser
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+// Control-Mapping: CRA Annex I -> NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. Eine Zeile = ein Mapping (Schema: ControlMapping).
+// Reviewt 2026-06-25 (benjamin): 3 accepted, mapping_type=primary_implementation (kanonische Primaer-Control je Anforderung).
+// Heimat der OWASP-Rejects (2)(e)/(2)(l)/(2)(i): dort war OWASP nicht der Zielstandard ("Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich").
+// related-Controls (SC-3(3), RA-5, AC-6, SI-16, ...) folgen separat als mapping_type=supports — hier nur der kanonische Einstieg.
+// obligation_id ADOPTIERT (2026-06-25, Registry-Handoff #4): SI-7->signed_update_integrity, SI-2->provide_security_updates, CM-7->remote_access_attack_surface_min. Join jetzt exakt (nicht citation_unit). CM-7 ist breiter als remote_access — Registry waehlte die vorhandene Obligation; Verfeinerung via Capability/cross_domain spaeter.
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "SI-7", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST SI-7 = Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity — kanonische Integritaetskontrolle (Signaturpruefung, Manipulationserkennung).", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Primaere Implementierung der CRA-Integritaetsanforderung; OWASP war hier kein passender Treffer. Related (spaeter, supports): SA-10, CM-14.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "signed_update_integrity"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "SI-2", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST SI-2 = Flaw Remediation — kanonische Update-/Patch-Kontrolle.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Primaere Implementierung der CRA-Update-Anforderung. Related (spaeter, supports): RA-5, CM-3, SA-11.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "provide_security_updates"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "target_control": "CM-7", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "NIST CM-7 = Least Functionality — Deaktivierung nicht benoetigter Ports/Dienste/Funktionen.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "CM-7 als Primaer-Control fuer Angriffsflaeche (nicht SC-3(3)). Related (spaeter, supports): SC-3(3), AC-6, SI-16.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "remote_access_attack_surface_min"}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// Control-Mapping: CRA Annex I -> OWASP ASVS 5.0. Eine Zeile = ein Mapping (Schema: ControlMapping).
+// Reviewt 2026-06-25 (benjamin): 7 accepted, 13 rejected. accepted = Audit-Wahrheit (Advisor nutzt acceptedOnly).
+// rejected bleiben als Audit-Spur ("warum verworfen"). KEIN confidence — kuratiert = fachliche Feststellung.
+// Architekturbeweis: CRA -> OWASP fuer AppSec/Auth/Crypto/Logging; Ops/Update/Attack-Surface/Integritaet -> NIST/BSI.
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V6.3.1", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V6 = Authentication.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V6 = Authentication, sauberer Treffer fuer Zugriffsschutz/Authentisierung.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "user_authentication_required"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V6.1.1", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V6 = Authentication.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V6 = Authentication, sauberer Treffer fuer Zugriffsschutz/Authentisierung.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "user_authentication_required"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V11.2.1", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V11 = Cryptography.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Korrektur von V14: V11 = Cryptography, richtiger Bereich fuer Verschluesselung.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "credential_confidentiality_protection"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V11.7.1", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V11.7 = Key Management.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "Korrektur von V14: V11.7 = Key Management fuer Verschluesselung/Schluesselverwaltung.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "auth_key_management"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V16.3.3", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V16 = Security Logging.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V16 = Logging, sauberer Treffer fuer sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V16.3.4", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V16 = Security Logging.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V16 = Logging, sauberer Treffer fuer sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V16.1.1", "mapping_type": "supports", "mapping_status": "accepted", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "V16 = Security Logging.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V16 = Logging, sauberer Treffer fuer sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse.", "version": "2026-06-25", "obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V14 = Config, kein Auth — verworfen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V14 = Config, Crypto gehoert zu V11 — verworfen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.3.2", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V14 = Config, Crypto gehoert zu V11 — verworfen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.2.3", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "V14 = Config, Crypto gehoert zu V11 — verworfen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V1.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V6.1.1", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V14.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V2.4.1", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V6.1.1", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V6.1.1", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V15.3.3", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren", "source_role": "operational_requirement", "target_framework": "OWASP ASVS", "target_control": "V8.2.4", "mapping_type": "related", "mapping_status": "rejected", "provenance": "human_curated", "rationale": "Retriever-Kandidat.", "reviewed_by": "benjamin", "review_date": "2026-06-25", "review_reason": "OWASP ASVS ist hier nicht der passende Zielstandard. Mapping ueber NIST/BSI erforderlich.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// Evidence-Requirements je NIST-SP-800-53-Control (Schema: EvidenceRequirement). Eine Zeile = eine geforderte Evidenz.
+// WICHTIG: evidence_type ist FRAMEWORK-AGNOSTISCH (geteilter Katalog config_export/test_report/repo_scan/sbom/...) —
+// dieselben Typen tragen CRA, NIST, ISO 27001, IEC 62443, BSI. (framework, control) ist nur der Verweis, nicht der Typ.
+// Stand 2026-06-25, Basis: die 3 accepted CRA->NIST primary_implementation-Mappings (SI-7 Integritaet, SI-2 Updates, CM-7 Angriffsflaeche).
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Secure-Boot-/Code-Signing-Konfiguration als Nachweis der Integritaetspruefung.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7", "evidence_type": "test_report", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Signatur-/Integritaets-Verifikationstest (CI) belegt funktionierende Manipulationserkennung.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Konfiguration des sicheren Update-/Patch-Mechanismus (signierte/automatische Updates) als technischer Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2", "evidence_type": "test_report", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Update-/Patch-Verifikationstest (CI) belegt, dass Sicherheitsupdates greifen.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Konfiguration deaktivierter Ports/Dienste/Funktionen als Nachweis minimierter Angriffsflaeche.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7", "evidence_type": "repo_scan", "evidence_source": "scanner", "freshness_requirement": "quarterly", "required": false, "rationale": "Angriffsflaechen-Scan (offene Ports/Dienste) — vertiefend, nicht Pflicht je Release.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// Evidence-Requirements je OWASP-ASVS-Control (Schema: EvidenceRequirement). Eine Zeile = eine geforderte Evidenz.
+// Autoriert/kuratiert (nicht Retriever). Der Advisor kann eine CRA-Anforderung erst dann als erfuellt melden,
+// wenn die required Evidenzen der gemappten, accepted Controls vorliegen + frisch genug sind.
+// Stand 2026-06-25, Basis: die 7 accepted CRA->OWASP-Mappings (Auth V6, Crypto V11, Logging V16).
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.3.1", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "IAM-/Zugriffskonfiguration als Nachweis der Authentisierungs-Anforderung.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.3.1", "evidence_type": "test_report", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Automatisierter Zugriffstest (CI) belegt funktionierende Zugriffskontrolle.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.3.1", "evidence_type": "pentest", "evidence_source": "manual_upload", "freshness_requirement": "annually", "required": false, "rationale": "Jaehrlicher PenTest der Authentisierung — vertieft, aber nicht Pflicht je Release.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.1.1", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Rollenmodell/Auth-Architektur als Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.2.1", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Krypto-Konfiguration (zugelassene Algorithmen) als Nachweis der Verschluesselung.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.2.1", "evidence_type": "sbom", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "SBOM weist die eingesetzten Krypto-Bibliotheken/-Versionen nach.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.7.1", "evidence_type": "policy", "evidence_source": "manual_upload", "freshness_requirement": "annually", "required": true, "rationale": "Key-Management-Policy (Rotation, Aufbewahrung) als organisatorischer Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.7.1", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Konfiguration der Schluesselverwaltung als technischer Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.3.3", "evidence_type": "audit_log", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "continuous", "required": true, "rationale": "Security-Audit-Logs belegen, dass sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse protokolliert werden.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.3.3", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Logging-Konfiguration als Nachweis der erfassten Ereignisarten.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.3.4", "evidence_type": "audit_log", "evidence_source": "ci", "freshness_requirement": "continuous", "required": true, "rationale": "Security-Audit-Logs.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
+{"framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.1.1", "evidence_type": "config_export", "evidence_source": "github", "freshness_requirement": "per_release", "required": true, "rationale": "Logging-Architektur-Konfiguration als Nachweis.", "version": "2026-06-25"}
@@ -0,0 +1,846 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_join_keys_v1",
+ "contract": "obligation_id ist der stabile Join-Key. Legal Knowledge Graph haengt citation_spans an obligation_id; Compliance Execution Graph mappt control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id. Interim-Bruecke = citation_units. obligation_id NIE neu vergeben (re-link).",
+ "count": 95,
+ "obligation_ids": [
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_creation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_dependency_coverage",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 3(36) i.V.m. Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_format_standard",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_maintenance_update",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_completeness_verification",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_tooling_automation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_access_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_authority_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
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+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_rollback",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "automatic_updates_optout",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_risk_assessment",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "secure_modification_control",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+
+	"github.com/breakpilot/ai-compliance-sdk/internal/ucca"
+)
+
+// ComplianceGraphHandlers serves the read-only Compliance Execution Graph
+// (Regulation -> Obligation -> Control -> Evidence) over the file-backed bridge artifacts.
+// It is intentionally SEPARATE from the DB-backed ObligationsHandlers: this is the curated
+// cross-session graph (Registry join keys + accepted control mappings + evidence requirements),
+// loaded once at startup. Fail-closed: if the graph could not load, every request answers 503.
+type ComplianceGraphHandlers struct {
+	joins    *ucca.ObligationJoinKeys
+	mappings *ucca.ControlMappingSet
+	evidence *ucca.EvidenceRequirementSet
+	loadErr  error
+}
+
+// NewComplianceGraphHandlers loads the graph once. Construction never fails; a load error is
+// retained and surfaced as 503 per request (matches the codebase's load-warn-continue startup).
+func NewComplianceGraphHandlers() *ComplianceGraphHandlers {
+	joins, mappings, evidence, err := ucca.LoadComplianceGraph()
+	return &ComplianceGraphHandlers{joins: joins, mappings: mappings, evidence: evidence, loadErr: err}
+}
+
+// LoadError exposes a startup load failure so the wiring can log a warning.
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) LoadError() error { return h.loadErr }
+
+// RegisterRoutes mounts the compliance-graph routes under /compliance.
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) RegisterRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
+	g := r.Group("/compliance")
+	g.GET("/obligation-status", h.ObligationStatus)
+}
+
+type cgControlDTO struct {
+	Framework        string   `json:"framework"`
+	Control          string   `json:"control"`
+	MappingType      string   `json:"mapping_type"`
+	EvidenceRequired []string `json:"evidence_required"`
+	EvidenceStatus   string   `json:"evidence_status"` // missing | partial | present | none_required
+}
+
+type cgStatusResponse struct {
+	ObligationID  string         `json:"obligation_id"`
+	OverallStatus string         `json:"overall_status"` // unknown_obligation | unmapped | not_assessed | open | met
+	LegalBasis    []string       `json:"legal_basis,omitempty"`
+	CitationSpans string         `json:"citation_spans"` // "pending" until the Legal-KG attaches spans
+	Controls      []cgControlDTO `json:"controls"`
+	Note          string         `json:"note,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ObligationStatus answers GET /sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status?obligation_id=...
+//
+// It NEVER asserts fulfillment automatically. With no evidence collection wired (MVP), a mapped
+// obligation is "not_assessed" and every required evidence is "missing" — the honest picture is
+// "required vs present evidence", not "a document exists". Fail-closed otherwise:
+//   - no obligation_id          -> 400
+//   - graph not loaded          -> 503
+//   - id not in the Registry    -> 200 overall_status=unknown_obligation
+//   - mapped but no control yet  -> 200 overall_status=unmapped
+func (h *ComplianceGraphHandlers) ObligationStatus(c *gin.Context) {
+	if h.loadErr != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "compliance graph unavailable", "detail": h.loadErr.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	obID := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("obligation_id"))
+	if obID == "" {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "obligation_id query parameter required"})
+		return
+	}
+	resp := cgStatusResponse{ObligationID: obID, CitationSpans: "pending", Controls: []cgControlDTO{}}
+
+	if h.joins.FindObligation(obID) == nil {
+		resp.OverallStatus = "unknown_obligation"
+		resp.Note = "obligation_id not in the Registry join-key contract"
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// MVP: hasEvidence=nil -> no collection wired -> all required evidence counts as missing.
+	st := ucca.AssessObligationStatus(h.joins, h.mappings, h.evidence, obID, nil)
+	resp.LegalBasis = st.LegalBasis
+
+	if len(st.Controls) == 0 {
+		resp.OverallStatus = "unmapped"
+		resp.Note = "no accepted control maps to this obligation yet"
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, cs := range st.Controls {
+		types := make([]string, 0, len(cs.RequiredEvidence))
+		for _, e := range cs.RequiredEvidence {
+			types = append(types, e.EvidenceType)
+		}
+		resp.Controls = append(resp.Controls, cgControlDTO{
+			Framework:        cs.Framework,
+			Control:          cs.Control,
+			MappingType:      cs.MappingType,
+			EvidenceRequired: types,
+			EvidenceStatus:   cgEvidenceStatus(len(cs.RequiredEvidence), len(cs.MissingEvidence)),
+		})
+	}
+	// No fulfillment claim without real evidence collection.
+	resp.OverallStatus = "not_assessed"
+	resp.Note = "evidence collection not wired (MVP) — fulfillment not asserted"
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+}
+
+func cgEvidenceStatus(required, missing int) string {
+	switch {
+	case required == 0:
+		return "none_required"
+	case missing == 0:
+		return "present"
+	case missing == required:
+		return "missing"
+	default:
+		return "partial"
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+func newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t *testing.T) *gin.Engine {
+	t.Helper()
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	h := NewComplianceGraphHandlers()
+	if err := h.LoadError(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("compliance graph failed to load (candidate paths): %v", err)
+	}
+	r := gin.New()
+	h.RegisterRoutes(r.Group("/sdk/v1"))
+	return r
+}
+
+func getObligationStatus(t *testing.T, r *gin.Engine, query string) (int, cgStatusResponse) {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/sdk/v1/compliance/obligation-status"+query, nil)
+	r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	var resp cgStatusResponse
+	if w.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode body %q: %v", w.Body.String(), err)
+		}
+	}
+	return w.Code, resp
+}
+
+func TestObligationStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name         string
+		query        string
+		wantHTTP     int
+		wantOverall  string
+		wantControls bool // expect >=1 control
+	}{
+		{"missing param -> 400", "", http.StatusBadRequest, "", false},
+		{"unknown id -> unknown_obligation", "?obligation_id=does_not_exist", http.StatusOK, "unknown_obligation", false},
+		{"mapped (OWASP V6) -> not_assessed", "?obligation_id=user_authentication_required", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"NIST adopted (SI-2) -> not_assessed", "?obligation_id=provide_security_updates", http.StatusOK, "not_assessed", true},
+		{"in registry, no control -> unmapped", "?obligation_id=sbom_creation", http.StatusOK, "unmapped", false},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			code, resp := getObligationStatus(t, r, tt.query)
+			if code != tt.wantHTTP {
+				t.Fatalf("http %d, want %d", code, tt.wantHTTP)
+			}
+			if tt.wantHTTP != http.StatusOK {
+				return
+			}
+			if resp.OverallStatus != tt.wantOverall {
+				t.Errorf("overall_status=%q, want %q", resp.OverallStatus, tt.wantOverall)
+			}
+			if tt.wantControls && len(resp.Controls) == 0 {
+				t.Error("expected >=1 control")
+			}
+			if !tt.wantControls && len(resp.Controls) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("expected 0 controls, got %d", len(resp.Controls))
+			}
+			if resp.CitationSpans != "pending" {
+				t.Errorf("citation_spans=%q, want pending", resp.CitationSpans)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The MVP must NEVER auto-assert fulfillment: with no evidence collection wired, every required
+// evidence is "missing" and the overall status stays "not_assessed".
+func TestObligationStatus_NoFulfillmentClaim(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newComplianceGraphTestRouter(t)
+	code, resp := getObligationStatus(t, r, "?obligation_id=user_authentication_required")
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("http %d", code)
+	}
+	if resp.OverallStatus == "met" || resp.OverallStatus == "erfuellt" {
+		t.Fatalf("MVP must not assert fulfillment, got overall_status=%q", resp.OverallStatus)
+	}
+	for _, ctl := range resp.Controls {
+		if len(ctl.EvidenceRequired) > 0 && ctl.EvidenceStatus != "missing" {
+			t.Errorf("control %s/%s evidence_status=%q, want missing (no collection wired)", ctl.Framework, ctl.Control, ctl.EvidenceStatus)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ func buildRouter(cfg *config.Config, pool *pgxpool.Pool) *gin.Engine {
 	ragHandlers := handlers.NewRAGHandlers(corpusVersionStore)
 	obligationsHandlers := handlers.NewObligationsHandlersWithStore(obligationsStore)

+	// Compliance Execution Graph (file-backed: Registry join keys + accepted control mappings + evidence)
+	complianceGraphHandlers := handlers.NewComplianceGraphHandlers()
+	if err := complianceGraphHandlers.LoadError(); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("WARNING: compliance graph not loaded (obligation-status -> 503): %v", err)
+	}
+
 	// Regulatory News
 	allV2Regs, err := ucca.LoadAllV2Regulations()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -201,7 +207,8 @@ func buildRouter(cfg *config.Config, pool *pgxpool.Pool) *gin.Engine {
 		uccaHandlers, escalationHandlers, obligationsHandlers, ragHandlers,
 		roadmapHandlers, workshopHandlers, portfolioHandlers,
 		academyHandlers, trainingHandlers, whistleblowerHandlers, iaceHandler,
-		gapHandler, maximizerHandlers, regulatoryNewsHandlers, useCaseHandler)
+		gapHandler, maximizerHandlers, regulatoryNewsHandlers, useCaseHandler,
+		complianceGraphHandlers)

 	return router
 }
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ func registerRoutes(
 	maximizerHandlers *handlers.MaximizerHandlers,
 	regulatoryNewsHandlers *handlers.RegulatoryNewsHandlers,
 	useCaseHandler *handlers.UseCaseHandler,
+	complianceGraphHandlers *handlers.ComplianceGraphHandlers,
 ) {
 	v1 := router.Group("/sdk/v1")
 	{
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ func registerRoutes(
 		registerMaximizerRoutes(v1, maximizerHandlers)
 		registerUseCaseRoutes(v1, useCaseHandler)
 		v1.GET("/regulatory-news", regulatoryNewsHandlers.GetNews)
+		complianceGraphHandlers.RegisterRoutes(v1)
 	}
 }

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+)
+
+// graphCallerRel resolves a path relative to THIS source file (build-time location), so the
+// graph data is findable under `go test` (cwd = package dir) regardless of working directory.
+// In a built container the source is gone, so cwd-relative candidates carry the load instead.
+func graphCallerRel(rel string) string {
+	_, file, _, ok := runtime.Caller(0)
+	if !ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(file), rel)
+}
+
+// firstExisting returns the first candidate path that exists with the requested kind (dir vs
+// file). Empty candidates (e.g. unset env overrides) are skipped.
+func firstExisting(candidates []string, wantDir bool) string {
+	for _, p := range candidates {
+		if p == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := os.Stat(p)
+		if err != nil || info.IsDir() != wantDir {
+			continue
+		}
+		return p
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// LoadComplianceGraph loads the file-backed Compliance Execution Graph: the Registry join-key
+// contract (obligations/obligation_join_keys.json — owned by the Obligation session) + our
+// curated, accepted control mappings + evidence requirements. Locations are resolved across
+// three layouts: dev (cwd = ai-compliance-sdk/, canonical contract at ../obligations), container
+// (WORKDIR /app, data/ copied in incl. a synced data/obligations/ copy) and `go test`
+// (cwd = package dir, via graphCallerRel). Fail-closed: a missing/invalid source returns an
+// error so the handler serves 503 — never a half-built graph.
+//
+// NOTE: data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json is a SYNCED COPY of the repo-root contract
+// (the canonical owner is the Obligation session). Re-sync it when the Registry grows; dev/test
+// prefer the canonical repo-root path, only the container falls back to the copy.
+func LoadComplianceGraph() (*ObligationJoinKeys, *ControlMappingSet, *EvidenceRequirementSet, error) {
+	joinPath := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_OBLIGATION_JOIN_KEYS"),
+		"../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json",
+		graphCallerRel("../../../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json"),
+		"data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/obligations/obligation_join_keys.json"),
+	}, false)
+	if joinPath == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("obligation_join_keys.json not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+	mapDir := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_CONTROL_MAPPINGS_DIR"),
+		"data/control_mappings",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/control_mappings"),
+	}, true)
+	if mapDir == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("control_mappings dir not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+	evDir := firstExisting([]string{
+		os.Getenv("BP_EVIDENCE_DIR"),
+		"data/evidence_requirements",
+		graphCallerRel("../../data/evidence_requirements"),
+	}, true)
+	if evDir == "" {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("evidence_requirements dir not found in any candidate path")
+	}
+
+	joins, err := LoadObligationJoinKeys(joinPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load join keys (%s): %w", joinPath, err)
+	}
+	mappings, err := LoadControlMappings(mapDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load control mappings (%s): %w", mapDir, err)
+	}
+	evidence, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements(evDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load evidence (%s): %w", evDir, err)
+	}
+	return joins, mappings, evidence, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+package ucca
+
+// ObligationStatus is the Advisor's vertical slice over the compliance graph for ONE legal
+// obligation: which accepted controls satisfy it, what evidence they require, what's missing,
+// and the resulting status. The point is "the required evidence is (not) present", not "a
+// document exists". citation_spans is pending until the Legal-Knowledge-Graph session attaches
+// them to the obligation (the upper half of the bridge).
+type ObligationStatus struct {
+	ObligationID  string                    `json:"obligation_id"`
+	LegalBasis    []string                  `json:"legal_basis"` // the obligation's citation_units
+	Status        string                    `json:"status"`      // erfuellt | offen | unklar
+	Controls      []ObligationControlStatus `json:"controls"`
+	CitationSpans string                    `json:"citation_spans"` // "pending" until the registry fills them
+}
+
+// ObligationControlStatus is one control under an obligation with its evidence picture.
+type ObligationControlStatus struct {
+	Framework        string                `json:"framework"`
+	Control          string                `json:"control"`
+	MappingType      string                `json:"mapping_type"`
+	RequiredEvidence []EvidenceRequirement `json:"required_evidence"`
+	MissingEvidence  []EvidenceRequirement `json:"missing_evidence"`
+}
+
+// AssessObligationStatus traverses obligation_id -> (citation_unit) -> accepted Controls ->
+// required Evidence -> Status. hasEvidence reports whether a given (framework, control,
+// evidence_type) is already collected; pass nil in the MVP (no collection yet) -> everything
+// required is missing and the status is "offen". Unknown or unmapped obligation -> "unklar".
+func AssessObligationStatus(joins *ObligationJoinKeys, mappings *ControlMappingSet, evidence *EvidenceRequirementSet, obligationID string, hasEvidence func(framework, control, evidenceType string) bool) ObligationStatus {
+	ob := joins.FindObligation(obligationID)
+	if ob == nil {
+		return ObligationStatus{ObligationID: obligationID, Status: "unklar", CitationSpans: "pending"}
+	}
+	st := ObligationStatus{
+		ObligationID:  obligationID,
+		LegalBasis:    ob.CitationUnits,
+		CitationSpans: "pending",
+		Controls:      []ObligationControlStatus{},
+	}
+	ctrls := AcceptedControlsForObligation(*ob, mappings)
+	if len(ctrls) == 0 {
+		st.Status = "unklar" // no accepted control reaches it — we cannot assess
+		return st
+	}
+	anyMissing := false
+	for _, m := range ctrls {
+		req := evidence.RequiredFor(m.TargetFramework, m.TargetControl)
+		missing := make([]EvidenceRequirement, 0, len(req))
+		for _, e := range req {
+			if hasEvidence == nil || !hasEvidence(e.Framework, e.Control, e.EvidenceType) {
+				missing = append(missing, e)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(missing) > 0 {
+			anyMissing = true
+		}
+		st.Controls = append(st.Controls, ObligationControlStatus{
+			Framework:        m.TargetFramework,
+			Control:          m.TargetControl,
+			MappingType:      m.MappingType,
+			RequiredEvidence: req,
+			MissingEvidence:  missing,
+		})
+	}
+	if anyMissing {
+		st.Status = "offen"
+	} else {
+		st.Status = "erfuellt"
+	}
+	return st
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package ucca
+
+import "testing"
+
+func loadGraph(t *testing.T) (*ObligationJoinKeys, *ControlMappingSet, *EvidenceRequirementSet) {
+	t.Helper()
+	joins, err := LoadObligationJoinKeys("../../../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("join keys: %v", err)
+	}
+	maps, err := LoadControlMappings("../../data/control_mappings")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mappings: %v", err)
+	}
+	ev, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements("../../data/evidence_requirements")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("evidence: %v", err)
+	}
+	return joins, maps, ev
+}
+
+func TestAssessObligationStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	joins, maps, ev := loadGraph(t)
+
+	// covered obligation, no evidence collected yet (MVP) -> offen
+	st := AssessObligationStatus(joins, maps, ev, "user_authentication_required", nil)
+	if st.Status != "offen" {
+		t.Errorf("want offen, got %q", st.Status)
+	}
+	if len(st.Controls) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected controls for a covered obligation")
+	}
+	for _, c := range st.Controls {
+		if len(c.MissingEvidence) != len(c.RequiredEvidence) {
+			t.Error("MVP: all required evidence should be missing")
+		}
+	}
+	t.Logf("DURCHSTICH user_authentication_required: status=%s legal_basis=%v citation_spans=%s",
+		st.Status, st.LegalBasis, st.CitationSpans)
+	for _, c := range st.Controls {
+		t.Logf("  %s %s (%s): %d required evidence, %d missing", c.Framework, c.Control, c.MappingType, len(c.RequiredEvidence), len(c.MissingEvidence))
+	}
+
+	// all evidence present -> erfuellt
+	st2 := AssessObligationStatus(joins, maps, ev, "user_authentication_required", func(f, c, et string) bool { return true })
+	if st2.Status != "erfuellt" {
+		t.Errorf("want erfuellt with all evidence present, got %q", st2.Status)
+	}
+
+	// uncovered obligation (no accepted control reaches it) -> unklar
+	if st3 := AssessObligationStatus(joins, maps, ev, "sbom_creation", nil); st3.Status != "unklar" {
+		t.Errorf("uncovered sbom_creation: want unklar, got %q", st3.Status)
+	}
+
+	// unknown obligation_id -> unklar
+	if st4 := AssessObligationStatus(joins, maps, ev, "does_not_exist", nil); st4.Status != "unklar" {
+		t.Errorf("unknown obligation: want unklar, got %q", st4.Status)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ControlMapping is one persisted, versioned, REVIEWABLE link from a legal
+// obligation/requirement to a concrete framework control — a node in the curated
+// compliance graph (Regulation -> Obligation -> Control -> Evidence). The retriever only
+// PROPOSES candidates (mapping_status=candidate); a human/rule decision turns the good ones
+// into mapping_status=accepted, which is the audited truth the Advisor uses at runtime.
+//
+// There is intentionally NO probabilistic "confidence" field: once curated, a mapping is a
+// professional statement, not an AI guess. The retriever's score lives only in the rationale
+// of a candidate, never as structured truth.
+type ControlMapping struct {
+	SourceNorm      string `json:"source_norm"`             // e.g. "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c)"
+	SourceRole      string `json:"source_role"`             // source_role of the norm (operational_requirement, ...)
+	TargetFramework string `json:"target_framework"`        // e.g. "OWASP ASVS"
+	TargetControl   string `json:"target_control"`          // e.g. "V6.3.1"
+	MappingType     string `json:"mapping_type"`            // primary_implementation | implements | supports | partially_supports | related | contradicts
+	MappingStatus   string `json:"mapping_status"`          // candidate | accepted | rejected | superseded
+	Provenance      string `json:"provenance"`              // retriever_candidate | human_curated | rule_based
+	ObligationID    string `json:"obligation_id,omitempty"` // stable cross-session join key (Obligation Registry); empty until adopted, citation_unit is the interim bridge
+	Rationale       string `json:"rationale"`
+	ReviewedBy      string `json:"reviewed_by,omitempty"` // who decided (human or rule id)
+	ReviewDate      string `json:"review_date,omitempty"` // YYYY-MM-DD
+	ReviewReason    string `json:"review_reason,omitempty"`
+	Version         string `json:"version"`
+}
+
+// Allowed enum values — the deterministic "rule" layer that keeps the curated store clean.
+var (
+	mappingTypeValues   = map[string]bool{"primary_implementation": true, "implements": true, "supports": true, "partially_supports": true, "related": true, "contradicts": true}
+	mappingStatusValues = map[string]bool{"candidate": true, "accepted": true, "rejected": true, "superseded": true}
+	provenanceValues    = map[string]bool{"retriever_candidate": true, "human_curated": true, "rule_based": true}
+)
+
+// Validate checks required fields + enum membership, and enforces the audit trail: any
+// human/rule DECISION (accepted/rejected) must carry who/when/why. Fail-closed at load.
+func (m ControlMapping) Validate() error {
+	switch {
+	case m.SourceNorm == "":
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: source_norm required")
+	case m.TargetFramework == "":
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: target_framework required")
+	case m.TargetControl == "":
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: target_control required")
+	case !mappingTypeValues[m.MappingType]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: invalid mapping_type %q", m.MappingType)
+	case !mappingStatusValues[m.MappingStatus]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: invalid mapping_status %q", m.MappingStatus)
+	case !provenanceValues[m.Provenance]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("control mapping: invalid provenance %q", m.Provenance)
+	}
+	if m.MappingStatus == "accepted" || m.MappingStatus == "rejected" {
+		if m.ReviewedBy == "" || m.ReviewDate == "" || m.ReviewReason == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("control mapping %s->%s: status %q requires reviewed_by + review_date + review_reason (audit trail)",
+				m.SourceNorm, m.TargetControl, m.MappingStatus)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// IsAccepted reports whether this mapping is the active audited truth.
+func (m ControlMapping) IsAccepted() bool { return m.MappingStatus == "accepted" }
+
+// ControlMappingSet is the loaded, indexed mapping store (forward + reverse lookup).
+type ControlMappingSet struct {
+	All          []ControlMapping
+	bySourceNorm map[string][]ControlMapping
+	byControl    map[string][]ControlMapping
+}
+
+func controlKey(framework, control string) string { return framework + ":" + control }
+
+// ControlsFor returns the controls mapped to a source norm. acceptedOnly restricts to the
+// audited truth (what the Advisor may treat as fact).
+func (s *ControlMappingSet) ControlsFor(sourceNorm string, acceptedOnly bool) []ControlMapping {
+	return filterAccepted(s.bySourceNorm[sourceNorm], acceptedOnly)
+}
+
+// ObligationsFor returns the norms mapped to a framework control (reverse lookup).
+func (s *ControlMappingSet) ObligationsFor(framework, control string, acceptedOnly bool) []ControlMapping {
+	return filterAccepted(s.byControl[controlKey(framework, control)], acceptedOnly)
+}
+
+func filterAccepted(in []ControlMapping, acceptedOnly bool) []ControlMapping {
+	if !acceptedOnly {
+		return in
+	}
+	out := make([]ControlMapping, 0, len(in))
+	for _, m := range in {
+		if m.IsAccepted() {
+			out = append(out, m)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// LoadControlMappings reads every *.jsonl file under dir (one mapping per line; blank and
+// //-prefixed lines ignored), validates each row, and builds the index. An invalid row
+// aborts the whole load — fail-closed, because this is the audit truth, not best-effort.
+func LoadControlMappings(dir string) (*ControlMappingSet, error) {
+	files, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dir, "*.jsonl"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	set := &ControlMappingSet{
+		bySourceNorm: map[string][]ControlMapping{},
+		byControl:    map[string][]ControlMapping{},
+	}
+	for _, f := range files {
+		fh, err := os.Open(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		sc := bufio.NewScanner(fh)
+		sc.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64*1024), 1024*1024)
+		line := 0
+		for sc.Scan() {
+			line++
+			raw := strings.TrimSpace(sc.Text())
+			if raw == "" || strings.HasPrefix(raw, "//") {
+				continue
+			}
+			var m ControlMapping
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &m); err != nil {
+				fh.Close()
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: %w", f, line, err)
+			}
+			if err := m.Validate(); err != nil {
+				fh.Close()
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: %w", f, line, err)
+			}
+			set.All = append(set.All, m)
+			set.bySourceNorm[m.SourceNorm] = append(set.bySourceNorm[m.SourceNorm], m)
+			k := controlKey(m.TargetFramework, m.TargetControl)
+			set.byControl[k] = append(set.byControl[k], m)
+		}
+		fh.Close()
+		if err := sc.Err(); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return set, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestControlMapping_Validate(t *testing.T) {
+	candidate := ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "CRA Annex I", TargetFramework: "OWASP ASVS", TargetControl: "V6.3.1", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "candidate", Provenance: "retriever_candidate"}
+	if err := candidate.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid candidate rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	accepted := ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "implements", MappingStatus: "accepted", Provenance: "human_curated", ReviewedBy: "benjamin", ReviewDate: "2026-06-25", ReviewReason: "passt"}
+	if err := accepted.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid accepted rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	bad := []struct {
+		name string
+		m    ControlMapping
+	}{
+		{"no source_norm", ControlMapping{TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "candidate", Provenance: "retriever_candidate"}},
+		{"bad mapping_type", ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "nope", MappingStatus: "candidate", Provenance: "retriever_candidate"}},
+		{"bad mapping_status", ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "maybe", Provenance: "retriever_candidate"}},
+		{"bad provenance", ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "candidate", Provenance: "guessed"}},
+		{"accepted without audit trail", ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "accepted", Provenance: "human_curated"}},
+		{"rejected without reason", ControlMapping{SourceNorm: "A", TargetFramework: "X", TargetControl: "Y", MappingType: "supports", MappingStatus: "rejected", Provenance: "human_curated", ReviewedBy: "b", ReviewDate: "2026-06-25"}},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range bad {
+		if err := tt.m.Validate(); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: expected rejection", tt.name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadControlMappings(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	content := `// header comment, ignored
+{"source_norm":"CRA Annex I","source_role":"operational_requirement","target_framework":"OWASP ASVS","target_control":"V6.3.1","mapping_type":"supports","mapping_status":"accepted","provenance":"human_curated","reviewed_by":"benjamin","review_date":"2026-06-25","review_reason":"V6=Auth passt","rationale":"r","version":"2026-06-25"}
+{"source_norm":"CRA Annex I","source_role":"operational_requirement","target_framework":"OWASP ASVS","target_control":"V14.2.4","mapping_type":"related","mapping_status":"candidate","provenance":"retriever_candidate","rationale":"r","version":"2026-06-25"}
+
+`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "m.jsonl"), []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	set, err := LoadControlMappings(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(set.All) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 mappings, got %d", len(set.All))
+	}
+	if got := set.ControlsFor("CRA Annex I", false); len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("ControlsFor(all): want 2, got %d", len(got))
+	}
+	if got := set.ControlsFor("CRA Annex I", true); len(got) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("ControlsFor(acceptedOnly): want 1 (only accepted), got %d", len(got))
+	}
+	if got := set.ObligationsFor("OWASP ASVS", "V6.3.1", true); len(got) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("ObligationsFor accepted reverse lookup: want 1, got %d", len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadControlMappings_RejectsInvalid(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	// accepted without the who/when/why audit trail must fail-closed.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "bad.jsonl"), []byte(`{"source_norm":"A","target_framework":"X","target_control":"Y","mapping_type":"supports","mapping_status":"accepted","provenance":"human_curated","rationale":"r","version":"v"}`), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := LoadControlMappings(dir); err == nil {
+		t.Error("accepted mapping without audit trail must fail the load (fail-closed)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestControlMappings_SeedFileValid(t *testing.T) {
+	// The committed seed store must always load + validate.
+	set, err := LoadControlMappings("../../data/control_mappings")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed control_mappings failed to load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(set.All) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("seed control_mappings is empty")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// EvidenceRequirement is the last edge of the compliance graph: it says WHAT concrete
+// evidence proves a framework control is met, and how fresh that evidence must be. This is
+// what lets the Advisor eventually state "the CRA requirement is fulfilled" — not because a
+// document exists, but because the required, current evidence is present. Authored/curated,
+// not retriever-generated.
+type EvidenceRequirement struct {
+	Framework            string `json:"framework"`             // e.g. "OWASP ASVS"
+	Control              string `json:"control"`               // e.g. "V6.3.1"
+	EvidenceType         string `json:"evidence_type"`         // sbom|test_report|config_export|repo_scan|policy|ticket|audit_log|pentest
+	EvidenceSource       string `json:"evidence_source"`       // github|ci|scanner|manual_upload
+	FreshnessRequirement string `json:"freshness_requirement"` // per_release|quarterly|annually|continuous
+	Required             bool   `json:"required"`
+	Rationale            string `json:"rationale"`
+	Version              string `json:"version"`
+}
+
+// Allowed enum values — the rule layer that keeps the evidence catalog clean.
+var (
+	evidenceTypeValues   = map[string]bool{"sbom": true, "test_report": true, "config_export": true, "repo_scan": true, "policy": true, "ticket": true, "audit_log": true, "pentest": true}
+	evidenceSourceValues = map[string]bool{"github": true, "ci": true, "scanner": true, "manual_upload": true}
+	freshnessValues      = map[string]bool{"per_release": true, "quarterly": true, "annually": true, "continuous": true}
+)
+
+// Validate checks required fields + enum membership. Fail-closed at load.
+func (e EvidenceRequirement) Validate() error {
+	switch {
+	case e.Framework == "":
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence requirement: framework required")
+	case e.Control == "":
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence requirement: control required")
+	case !evidenceTypeValues[e.EvidenceType]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence requirement: invalid evidence_type %q", e.EvidenceType)
+	case !evidenceSourceValues[e.EvidenceSource]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence requirement: invalid evidence_source %q", e.EvidenceSource)
+	case !freshnessValues[e.FreshnessRequirement]:
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence requirement: invalid freshness_requirement %q", e.FreshnessRequirement)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// EvidenceRequirementSet is the loaded, indexed evidence catalog.
+type EvidenceRequirementSet struct {
+	All       []EvidenceRequirement
+	byControl map[string][]EvidenceRequirement
+}
+
+// For returns all evidence requirements declared for a framework control.
+func (s *EvidenceRequirementSet) For(framework, control string) []EvidenceRequirement {
+	return s.byControl[controlKey(framework, control)]
+}
+
+// RequiredFor returns only the required evidence for a control — the minimum that must be
+// present before the control may be treated as met.
+func (s *EvidenceRequirementSet) RequiredFor(framework, control string) []EvidenceRequirement {
+	out := make([]EvidenceRequirement, 0)
+	for _, e := range s.byControl[controlKey(framework, control)] {
+		if e.Required {
+			out = append(out, e)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// LoadEvidenceRequirements reads every *.jsonl file under dir (one requirement per line;
+// blank and //-prefixed lines ignored), validates each, and builds the per-control index.
+// An invalid row aborts the load — fail-closed.
+func LoadEvidenceRequirements(dir string) (*EvidenceRequirementSet, error) {
+	files, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dir, "*.jsonl"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	set := &EvidenceRequirementSet{byControl: map[string][]EvidenceRequirement{}}
+	for _, f := range files {
+		fh, err := os.Open(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		sc := bufio.NewScanner(fh)
+		sc.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64*1024), 1024*1024)
+		line := 0
+		for sc.Scan() {
+			line++
+			raw := strings.TrimSpace(sc.Text())
+			if raw == "" || strings.HasPrefix(raw, "//") {
+				continue
+			}
+			var e EvidenceRequirement
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &e); err != nil {
+				fh.Close()
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: %w", f, line, err)
+			}
+			if err := e.Validate(); err != nil {
+				fh.Close()
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: %w", f, line, err)
+			}
+			set.All = append(set.All, e)
+			k := controlKey(e.Framework, e.Control)
+			set.byControl[k] = append(set.byControl[k], e)
+		}
+		fh.Close()
+		if err := sc.Err(); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return set, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEvidenceRequirement_Validate(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := EvidenceRequirement{Framework: "OWASP ASVS", Control: "V6.3.1", EvidenceType: "config_export", EvidenceSource: "github", FreshnessRequirement: "per_release", Required: true}
+	if err := valid.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	bad := []struct {
+		name string
+		e    EvidenceRequirement
+	}{
+		{"no control", EvidenceRequirement{Framework: "X", EvidenceType: "sbom", EvidenceSource: "ci", FreshnessRequirement: "per_release"}},
+		{"bad evidence_type", EvidenceRequirement{Framework: "X", Control: "Y", EvidenceType: "screenshot", EvidenceSource: "ci", FreshnessRequirement: "per_release"}},
+		{"bad evidence_source", EvidenceRequirement{Framework: "X", Control: "Y", EvidenceType: "sbom", EvidenceSource: "email", FreshnessRequirement: "per_release"}},
+		{"bad freshness", EvidenceRequirement{Framework: "X", Control: "Y", EvidenceType: "sbom", EvidenceSource: "ci", FreshnessRequirement: "weekly"}},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range bad {
+		if err := tt.e.Validate(); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: expected rejection", tt.name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadEvidenceRequirements(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	content := `// header
+{"framework":"OWASP ASVS","control":"V6.3.1","evidence_type":"config_export","evidence_source":"github","freshness_requirement":"per_release","required":true,"version":"2026-06-25"}
+{"framework":"OWASP ASVS","control":"V6.3.1","evidence_type":"pentest","evidence_source":"manual_upload","freshness_requirement":"annually","required":false,"version":"2026-06-25"}
+`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "e.jsonl"), []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	set, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(set.All) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2, got %d", len(set.All))
+	}
+	if got := set.For("OWASP ASVS", "V6.3.1"); len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("For: want 2, got %d", len(got))
+	}
+	if got := set.RequiredFor("OWASP ASVS", "V6.3.1"); len(got) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("RequiredFor: want 1 (pentest is optional), got %d", len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEvidenceRequirements_SeedFileValid(t *testing.T) {
+	set, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements("../../data/evidence_requirements")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed evidence_requirements failed to load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(set.All) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("seed evidence_requirements is empty")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGraph_AcceptedControlsHaveEvidence wires the two layers: every control an accepted
+// CRA->OWASP mapping points to must have >=1 required evidence — the Obligation -> Control ->
+// Evidence chain must be connected, no dangling control nodes.
+func TestGraph_AcceptedControlsHaveEvidence(t *testing.T) {
+	maps, err := LoadControlMappings("../../data/control_mappings")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ev, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements("../../data/evidence_requirements")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, m := range maps.All {
+		if !m.IsAccepted() {
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(ev.RequiredFor(m.TargetFramework, m.TargetControl)) == 0 {
+			t.Errorf("accepted control %s %s has no required evidence (dangling graph node)", m.TargetFramework, m.TargetControl)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+package ucca
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ObligationKey is one entry of the Obligation Registry's cross-session contract
+// (obligations/obligation_join_keys.json). obligation_id is the STABLE join key — assigned
+// only by the Registry, never minted here. citation_units are the interim bridge until our
+// ControlMapping adopts obligation_id directly.
+type ObligationKey struct {
+	ObligationID  string   `json:"obligation_id"`
+	Regulation    string   `json:"regulation"`
+	Family        string   `json:"family"`
+	Tier          string   `json:"tier"`
+	CitationUnits []string `json:"citation_units"`
+	SourceRole    string   `json:"source_role"`
+}
+
+// ObligationJoinKeys is the loaded contract + a citation-unit index for the interim join.
+type ObligationJoinKeys struct {
+	SchemaVersion string          `json:"schema_version"`
+	Count         int             `json:"count"`
+	ObligationIDs []ObligationKey `json:"obligation_ids"`
+	byCitationKey map[string][]string
+}
+
+var citationRefRe = regexp.MustCompile(`\(([0-9a-zA-Z]+)\)`)
+
+// citationUnitKey normalizes a CRA Annex I reference for the INTERIM citation_unit join, so
+// our "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c)" and the Registry's "Annex I (2)(c)" collapse to the same
+// key ("i:2.c"). Interim only — superseded by the stable obligation_id once adopted.
+func citationUnitKey(cu string) string {
+	low := strings.ToLower(cu)
+	part := ""
+	switch {
+	case strings.Contains(low, "part ii"):
+		part = "ii"
+	case strings.Contains(low, "part i"), strings.Contains(low, "(2)"):
+		part = "i" // CRA Annex I Part I = the (2)(x) essential requirements
+	}
+	var refs []string
+	for _, m := range citationRefRe.FindAllStringSubmatch(cu, -1) {
+		refs = append(refs, strings.ToLower(m[1]))
+	}
+	return part + ":" + strings.Join(refs, ".")
+}
+
+// LoadObligationJoinKeys reads the Registry contract and indexes it by citation-unit key.
+func LoadObligationJoinKeys(path string) (*ObligationJoinKeys, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var o ObligationJoinKeys
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &o); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	o.byCitationKey = map[string][]string{}
+	for _, ob := range o.ObligationIDs {
+		for _, cu := range ob.CitationUnits {
+			k := citationUnitKey(cu)
+			o.byCitationKey[k] = append(o.byCitationKey[k], ob.ObligationID)
+		}
+	}
+	return &o, nil
+}
+
+// ObligationsForCitation returns the obligation_ids that join (interim) to a citation
+// reference such as a control_mapping.source_norm.
+func (o *ObligationJoinKeys) ObligationsForCitation(citationRef string) []string {
+	return o.byCitationKey[citationUnitKey(citationRef)]
+}
+
+// FindObligation returns the registry entry for an obligation_id (nil if unknown).
+func (o *ObligationJoinKeys) FindObligation(obligationID string) *ObligationKey {
+	for i := range o.ObligationIDs {
+		if o.ObligationIDs[i].ObligationID == obligationID {
+			return &o.ObligationIDs[i]
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// mappingReaches reports whether a control mapping reaches an obligation — EXACT via the
+// adopted obligation_id (semantic, preferred), else via the interim citation_unit join (for
+// not-yet-adopted rows). Once obligation_id is set, the coarse citation_unit match is ignored:
+// that is how the semantic join replaces the structural one (e.g. V11.2.1 crypto no longer
+// rides (2)(d) into user_authentication_required — it goes to credential_confidentiality_protection).
+func mappingReaches(m ControlMapping, ob ObligationKey, citationKeys map[string]bool) bool {
+	if m.ObligationID != "" {
+		return m.ObligationID == ob.ObligationID
+	}
+	return citationKeys[citationUnitKey(m.SourceNorm)]
+}
+
+// AcceptedControlsForObligation returns our accepted control mappings that reach an obligation
+// (deduped by target control), obligation_id-exact where adopted, citation_unit otherwise.
+func AcceptedControlsForObligation(ob ObligationKey, mappings *ControlMappingSet) []ControlMapping {
+	keys := make(map[string]bool, len(ob.CitationUnits))
+	for _, cu := range ob.CitationUnits {
+		keys[citationUnitKey(cu)] = true
+	}
+	out := []ControlMapping{}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, m := range mappings.All {
+		if !m.IsAccepted() || !mappingReaches(m, ob, keys) {
+			continue
+		}
+		ck := m.TargetFramework + ":" + m.TargetControl
+		if seen[ck] {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[ck] = true
+		out = append(out, m)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// ObligationCoverage is one row of the cross-session coverage report.
+type ObligationCoverage struct {
+	ObligationID     string   `json:"obligation_id"`
+	Family           string   `json:"family"`
+	Status           string   `json:"status"` // covered | mapped_rejected | uncovered
+	AcceptedControls []string `json:"accepted_controls"`
+	EvidenceCount    int      `json:"evidence_count"`
+}
+
+// ComputeObligationCoverage joins the Registry obligations to our control mappings — exact via
+// obligation_id where adopted, else via the interim citation_unit join — and reports per
+// obligation: covered (>=1 accepted control reaches it), mapped_rejected (only rejected
+// mappings reach it), or uncovered. The signal back to the Obligation session.
+func ComputeObligationCoverage(joins *ObligationJoinKeys, mappings *ControlMappingSet, evidence *EvidenceRequirementSet) []ObligationCoverage {
+	out := make([]ObligationCoverage, 0, len(joins.ObligationIDs))
+	for _, ob := range joins.ObligationIDs {
+		keys := make(map[string]bool, len(ob.CitationUnits))
+		for _, cu := range ob.CitationUnits {
+			keys[citationUnitKey(cu)] = true
+		}
+		cov := ObligationCoverage{ObligationID: ob.ObligationID, Family: ob.Family}
+		seen := map[string]bool{}
+		rejected := false
+		for _, m := range mappings.All {
+			if !mappingReaches(m, ob, keys) {
+				continue
+			}
+			if m.IsAccepted() {
+				ck := m.TargetFramework + ":" + m.TargetControl
+				if !seen[ck] {
+					seen[ck] = true
+					cov.AcceptedControls = append(cov.AcceptedControls, ck)
+					cov.EvidenceCount += len(evidence.RequiredFor(m.TargetFramework, m.TargetControl))
+				}
+			} else if m.MappingStatus == "rejected" {
+				rejected = true
+			}
+		}
+		switch {
+		case len(cov.AcceptedControls) > 0:
+			cov.Status = "covered"
+		case rejected:
+			cov.Status = "mapped_rejected"
+		default:
+			cov.Status = "uncovered"
+		}
+		out = append(out, cov)
+	}
+	return out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package ucca
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestCitationUnitKey_Join(t *testing.T) {
+	// our source_norm and the registry citation_unit must collapse to the SAME key.
+	if citationUnitKey("CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff") != citationUnitKey("Annex I (2)(c)") {
+		t.Errorf("interim join broken: %q vs %q",
+			citationUnitKey("CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c)"), citationUnitKey("Annex I (2)(c)"))
+	}
+	// Part II must NOT collide with Part I.
+	if citationUnitKey("Annex I Part II (1)") == citationUnitKey("CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c)") {
+		t.Error("Part II must not join to Part I")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadObligationJoinKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	o, err := LoadObligationJoinKeys("../../../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if o.Count != len(o.ObligationIDs) {
+		t.Errorf("count %d != len %d", o.Count, len(o.ObligationIDs))
+	}
+	if len(o.ObligationIDs) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("empty contract")
+	}
+	if got := o.ObligationsForCitation("CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c)"); len(got) == 0 {
+		t.Error("expected an obligation joined to (2)(c)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestObligationCoverage_Report(t *testing.T) {
+	joins, err := LoadObligationJoinKeys("../../../obligations/obligation_join_keys.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("join keys: %v", err)
+	}
+	maps, err := LoadControlMappings("../../data/control_mappings")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mappings: %v", err)
+	}
+	ev, err := LoadEvidenceRequirements("../../data/evidence_requirements")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("evidence: %v", err)
+	}
+	cov := ComputeObligationCoverage(joins, maps, ev)
+	if len(cov) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no coverage computed")
+	}
+	byStatus := map[string]int{}
+	for _, c := range cov {
+		byStatus[c.Status]++
+	}
+	t.Logf("COVERAGE: %d Obligations | covered=%d mapped_rejected=%d uncovered=%d",
+		len(cov), byStatus["covered"], byStatus["mapped_rejected"], byStatus["uncovered"])
+	for _, c := range cov {
+		if c.Status != "uncovered" {
+			t.Logf("  %-15s %-36s controls=%v evidence=%d", c.Status, c.ObligationID, c.AcceptedControls, c.EvidenceCount)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+# Capability Model v1 — Objektarten & Beziehungstypen (Schema-Papier, NICHT materialisiert)
+
+Status: **OFFEN / Entscheidung erforderlich (2026-06-26).** Dies ist Schritt **#5a** (Papier).
+Schritt **#5b** (Materialisierung: `capabilities.json`, Migration, Obligation→Capability-Links,
+Guidance-Mapping, Runtime) ist **GEGATED** auf die Annahme dieses Papiers. **Es wurde noch keine
+Zeile Daten verschoben.**
+
+Baut auf [legal_obligation_layer_v1.md](legal_obligation_layer_v1.md),
+[obligation_registry_v1.md](obligation_registry_v1.md) und dem Cross-Domain-Review
+(`obligations/cross_domain_relationships.json`, Commit `ed31fdc0`).
+
+---
+
+## 0. Warum ein Papier statt `capabilities.json`
+
+Die Plattform hat drei empirische Architektur-Sprünge gemacht:
+1. **Control ≠ Wissensobjekt** → Legal Obligation (sofort implementiert, datenbestätigt).
+2. **Procedure ist eigenständig** (implementiert: `cra_procedures.json`).
+3. **Capabilities tauchen domänenübergreifend wieder auf** (Cross-Domain-Review).
+
+(1) und (2) waren breit datenbelegt → sofort umgesetzt. Bei (3) ist die **Objektart selbst noch
+nicht definiert.** Wir wissen NICHT genau, was eine Capability ist. Materialisieren wir jetzt,
+riskieren wir, in drei Wochen festzustellen: „Attack Surface war gar keine Capability" → Umbau.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Der Auslöser: die 8 „Capabilities" sind NICHT eine Objektart
+
+Der Cross-Domain-Review fand 16 `SHARED_CAPABILITY`-Paare → 8 Cluster. Bei Inspektion zerfallen
+sie in **zwei verschiedene Objektarten**:
+
+| Cluster (Opus-Benennung) | Art | Begründung |
+|---|---|---|
+| `mfa` | **Capability** | implementierbar als Funktion |
+| `session_management` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `transport_encryption` (tls/mutual_tls/cert) | **Capability** | implementierbar (vom Klassifikator fein gesplittet → 1 Capability) |
+| `code_signing` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `anomaly_detection` | **Capability** | implementierbar |
+| `access_control` | **Ziel** (schwach) | abstraktes Ziel, kein Baustein — eher OVERLAP (siehe Konsolidierung) |
+
+Dazu die **zwei Gap-„Obligations" aus Handoff #4** (NIST SI-7/CM-7 waren breiter als jeder
+einzelne Treffer):
+
+| Kandidat | Art | Begründung |
+|---|---|---|
+| `software_integrity_protection` (SI-7) | **Sicherheitsziel** | wird NICHT direkt gebaut; erreicht durch code_signing + hash_verification + secure_boot |
+| `attack_surface_minimization` (CM-7) | **Sicherheitsziel** | erreicht durch least_functionality + Port-Deaktivierung + Interface-Reduktion |
+
+**Kernbeobachtung (User):** Es gibt **Typ 1 — technische Fähigkeiten** (implementierbar) und
+**Typ 2 — Sicherheitsziele** (nicht direkt implementierbar, durch mehrere Capabilities erreicht).
+Sie in eine `capabilities.json` zu werfen wäre der Fehler.
+
+```
+Integrity Protection (Ziel)            Access Protection (Ziel)
+   ↑ erreicht durch                       ↑ erreicht durch
+code_signing · hash_verification ·     mfa · session_management ·
+secure_boot (Capabilities)             credential_storage (Capabilities)
+```
+
+Das erklärt rückwirkend auch das **systematische Synth-Über-Tiering** (Auth 14→6, Remote 14→5):
+das LLM mischte ziel-nahe Obligations mit fähigkeits-nahen Mechanismen, weil die Modellsprache
+die Ebenen nicht trennte.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Kandidat-Objektarten
+
+| Objektart | Definition | Diskriminator-Test |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Regulation** | Rechtsakt (CRA, NIS2, DSGVO, MaschVO) | „Ist es ein Gesetz/VO?" |
+| **Legal Obligation** | rechtlich verankerte Pflicht. **CORE** (abstrakt, oft = Sicherheitsziel) ⊇ **DOMAIN** (spezialisiert) — die CORE/DOMAIN-Achse existiert bereits (portability). | „Steht das so (sinngemäß) im Recht? Kann ein Prüfer FEHLT/ERFÜLLT sagen?" |
+| **Capability** *(NEU)* | implementierbare, **regulierungs-agnostische** technische Funktion, als Einheit baubar & testbar | „Kann ein Hersteller GENAU DAS bauen/konfigurieren?" → ja |
+| **Procedure** | wiederholbarer operativer Prozess, der eine Capability ausbringt/erhält (bereits modelliert) | „Ist es eine Tätigkeit/ein Ablauf?" |
+| **Control** | testbare Prüfanweisung | „Kann man es prüfen (pass/fail)?" |
+| **Evidence** | Nachweis-Artefakt (Audit-Log, SBOM, Release Notes) | „Ist es ein Beleg-Dokument/Datum?" |
+| **Guidance** *(quer)* | externe Empfehlung WIE (NIST/OWASP/ENISA/BSI). **Nicht-bindend.** | „Beschreibt es eine empfohlene Umsetzung, kein Primärrecht?" |
+
+---
+
+## 3. DER ZENTRALE KNACKPUNKT: Ist „Security Objective" eine eigene Klasse?
+
+### Modell A — flach (Objektive = Obligations)
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation → Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+```
+Sicherheitsziele sind einfach **CORE Legal Obligations**; domänen-scoped Pflichten sind DOMAIN-
+Obligations, die per `specializes` an die CORE hängen.
+
+### Modell B — mit eigener Security-Objective-Klasse
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation → Security Objective → Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+```
+
+### Modell C — hybrid (Capability als einzige neue Klasse) ← **EMPFEHLUNG**
+```
+Regulation → Legal Obligation (CORE ⊇ DOMAIN) --realized_by--> Capability → Procedure → Control → Evidence
+                                   ▲                                  ▲
+                                   └── specializes (DOMAIN→CORE)      └── described_by ── Guidance (NIST/OWASP/…)
+```
+
+**Empfehlung: Modell C.** Begründung aus den Daten:
+- Die „Sicherheitsziele" (`software_integrity_protection`, `attack_surface_minimization`, CIA,
+  access-protection) **SIND im CRA bindende Pflichten** (Annex I (2)(a–m) ist Primärrecht). Ein
+  Sicherheitsziel ist also eine **CORE Legal Obligation**, kein neuer Objekttyp.
+- Die **CORE/DOMAIN-Achse existiert schon** (portability_core ⊇ health/data_act). `attack_surface_
+  minimization` (CORE) ⊇ `remote_access_attack_surface_min` (DOMAIN) ist exakt dasselbe Muster.
+  → keine neue Klasse, nur konsequente Nutzung des Vorhandenen.
+- **Genau EINE** wirklich neue Klasse (**Capability**) ist sparsam und niedrig-risiko.
+- Modell B verdoppelt die normative Ebene (Obligation vs Objective), die im CRA 1:1 zusammenfällt
+  → Klasse, die niemand sauber befüllt.
+
+**Konsequenz für die #4-Gap:** `software_integrity_protection` + `attack_surface_minimization`
+werden als **CORE Legal Obligations** angelegt (nicht als Capabilities), und die domänen-scoped
+Treffer (`signed_update_integrity`, `remote_access_attack_surface_min`) `specializes` → CORE.
+NIST SI-7/CM-7 mappen dann `primary_implementation` auf die CORE.
+
+**Offen für den User:** Modell C akzeptieren? Oder ist die regulierungs-AGNOSTISCHE Vereinheitlichung
+(eine „confidentiality" über CRA+NIS2+ISO) so wertvoll, dass „Security Objective" doch eine eigene
+Klasse verdient (Modell B)? Das ist die einzige wirklich offene Architekturentscheidung.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Beziehungstypen — das Modell ist ein GRAPH, keine flache Ebene
+
+Der Review fand **vier distinkte Cross-Domain-Strukturrelationen** (nicht eine):
+`SUPPORTED_BY` 23 · `SHARED_CAPABILITY` 16 · `SHARED_EVIDENCE` 7 · `SHARED_PROCEDURE` 5 (+ 1 Merge).
+Das ist kein Baum. Vorgeschlagenes gerichtetes Kanten-Vokabular:
+
+| Kante | von → nach | aus Review-Relation |
+|---|---|---|
+| `specializes` | DOMAIN-Obligation → CORE-Obligation | (SUPPORTED_BY, Spezialfall) |
+| `contributes_to` | Obligation → Obligation | (SUPPORTED_BY, Beitrag) |
+| `realized_by` | Obligation → Capability | (SHARED_CAPABILITY ⇒ 2 Obl. teilen 1 Capability) |
+| `deployed_via` | Capability → Procedure | (SHARED_PROCEDURE) |
+| `verified_by` | Procedure/Capability → Control | — |
+| `produces` | Procedure → Evidence | (SHARED_EVIDENCE ⇒ 2 Obl. teilen 1 Nachweis) |
+| `described_by` | Capability → Guidance | (guidance_basis) |
+| `same_as` | Obligation ↔ Obligation | (SAME_OBLIGATION, Merge) |
+
+`SHARED_CAPABILITY`/`SHARED_EVIDENCE`/`SHARED_PROCEDURE` sind also **keine Obligation-Obligation-
+Kanten**, sondern Belege, dass zwei Obligations **denselben Knoten einer tieferen Ebene** teilen
+(Capability / Evidence / Procedure). Genau das ist der Mehrwert gegenüber „sieht ähnlich aus".
+
+---
+
+## 5. Die 8 offenen Fragen (Antwort + Tradeoff)
+
+1. **Was ist eine Capability?** Eine implementierbare, regulierungs-agnostische technische Funktion,
+   als Einheit baubar/konfigurierbar/testbar (MFA, TLS, Code Signing, Session-Mgmt, Anomaly-Detection).
+2. **Unterschied zur Obligation?** Obligation = rechtliche Pflicht (WAS das Recht verlangt, regulierungs-
+   verankert, normativ). Capability = technisches Mittel (WIE man sie erfüllt, agnostisch). n:m.
+3. **Unterschied zum Security Objective?** Ziel = erwünschter Sicherheitszustand (CIA, attack-surface-min);
+   Capability = Mittel dorthin. **Empfehlung (Modell C):** das Ziel ist eine CORE Obligation, kein
+   eigener Typ → Unterschied reduziert sich auf Obligation(abstrakt) vs Capability(Mittel).
+4. **Wann Guidance?** Wenn es eine **nicht-bindende externe Empfehlung zur Umsetzung** ist (NIST AC-12,
+   OWASP ASVS V6). Hängt an der **Capability** (meist) bzw. Procedure — NIE als `legal_basis` einer
+   LEGAL_MINIMUM-Obligation (Primärrecht-Regel bleibt).
+5. **Wann Procedure?** Wenn es ein **wiederholbarer operativer Ablauf** ist, der eine Capability
+   ausbringt/erhält (MFA konfigurieren, Schlüssel rotieren, Patch-Zyklus fahren).
+6. **Capability → mehrere Obligations?** **JA, belegt:** `mfa` erfüllt 6 Obligations (auth+remote),
+   `code_signing` 2 (auth+updates). n:m.
+7. **Obligation → mehrere Capabilities?** **JA, belegt:** access-protection ← mfa + session_management
+   + credential_storage. n:m.
+8. **Wo hängen NIST/OWASP/ENISA/BSI?** Primär an der **Capability** (sie beschreiben deren Umsetzung),
+   teils an Procedure. **Das erklärt, warum die über-getierten BP-Obligations `guidance_basis` trugen:
+   sie waren in Wahrheit Capabilities.** Sauberer Sitz von `guidance_basis` = Capability.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Worked Examples (4 Domänen, echte IDs)
+
+**Authentication** — `user_authentication_required` (Obl, CORE: access-protection)
+`--realized_by-->` { `mfa`, `session_management`, `credential_storage` } (Capabilities)
+`--described_by-->` NIST IA-2 / OWASP ASVS V6 (Guidance).
+
+**Updates** — `provide_security_updates` (Obl, LEGAL_MINIMUM) `--realized_by-->`
+{ `code_signing` (= signed_update_integrity-Capability), `automatic_update_delivery`, `rollback` }
+— exakt die `capability_candidate`-Marker aus `cra_updates.json`.
+
+**Remote Access** — CORE `attack_surface_minimization` (NEU, = CM-7-Ziel) `⊇ specializes ⊇`
+`remote_access_attack_surface_min` (DOMAIN) `--realized_by-->` { `least_functionality`, `port_disabling` }.
+
+**SBOM** — Sonderfall: die SBOM-Familie ist im Cross-Review der **Evidence-/Procedure-Input** für
+`vuln_identification_inventory` (5× SUPPORTED_BY-Hub), weniger Capability. → bestätigt, dass nicht
+jede Domäne primär Capabilities beisteuert; manche liefern **Evidence**. Stützt den Graph-Charakter.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Entscheidung, die ich vom User brauche (vor #5b)
+
+1. **Modell C** (Capability = einzige neue Klasse; Sicherheitsziele = CORE-Obligations) — akzeptiert?
+   Oder Modell B (Security Objective als eigene Klasse für regulierungs-agnostische Vereinheitlichung)?
+2. **Kanten-Vokabular** aus §4 — so einfrieren?
+3. **`guidance_basis` wandert konzeptionell an die Capability** — einverstanden? (Bricht nichts sofort;
+   die Obligations behalten den Verweis bis #5b.)
+4. Erst danach **#5b**: `capabilities.json` (capability_id, fulfills_obligations[] via `realized_by`,
+   guidance_basis hochgezogen), die 2 CORE-Gap-Obligations, der Merge (`vuln_remediation_patching` ≈
+   `provide_security_updates`), und die 2 Remote-Grenzfälle final tiern.
+
+## 8. Bewusst NICHT in #5a (gegated)
+
+Keine `capabilities.json`, keine Migration, kein Obligation-Rewrite, kein Guidance-Move, kein Runtime.
+Erst Modell-Annahme, dann Daten. „Erst das Schema, dann verschieben."
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "capability_layer_v1",
+ "model": "Modell C (docs-src/development/capability_model_v1.md)",
+ "note": "Capability = technische Faehigkeit (regulierungs-agnostisch). realized_by = Obligations, die sie erfuellt (n:m). guidance_basis hier KANONISCH hochgezogen aus den realisierten Obligations (die Obligation-Kopien bleiben vorerst als Legacy; Strip = Folge-Cleanup). Sicherheitsziele sind KEINE Capabilities -> cra_core.json.",
+ "dropped": {
+  "access_control": "OVERLAP (credential_confidentiality <-> sbom_confidentiality), nicht materialisiert"
+ },
+ "candidate_capabilities_followup": [
+  "automatic_update_delivery",
+  "update_rollback",
+  "trusted_update_source",
+  "hash_verification",
+  "secure_boot",
+  "least_functionality",
+  "credential_storage"
+ ],
+ "capabilities": [
+  {
+   "capability_id": "multi_factor_authentication",
+   "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication",
+   "description": "Mehrfaktor-Authentisierung als technische Faehigkeit (Besitz/Wissen/Inhaerenz).",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "mfa_required",
+    "privileged_op_reauth",
+    "remote_access_authentication",
+    "remote_access_mfa",
+    "remote_access_user_validation_ot",
+    "supplier_access_auth"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 6,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-63B",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "Out-of-Band-Authentifizierung",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "out_of_band_authentication"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "Hardware-basierte Authentifizierung (AAL3)",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "hardware_authenticators"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "E-Mail-Authentifizierungsmechanismen (SPF/DKIM/DMARC)",
+     "anchor": "",
+     "role": "implementation_guidance",
+     "merged_from": "email_authentication"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-02",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-02(1)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AC-17",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-53 IA-2",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "ICS Security Kompendium",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "ISO",
+     "anchor": "ISO 27001 A.5.19",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "session_management",
+   "name": "Session Management",
+   "description": "Sichere Sitzungsverwaltung: Timeouts, Bindung, Re-Auth, Beendigung.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "reauth_after_inactivity",
+    "remote_session_management",
+    "session_binding_management",
+    "temporary_remote_access_mgmt"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 4,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-63B 4.3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-53 AC-12",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "OWASP",
+     "anchor": "ASVS V3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AC-2(5)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "transport_encryption",
+   "name": "Transport Encryption",
+   "description": "Verschluesselter Transport (TLS, mutual-TLS, Zertifikats-Auth, VPN/Tunnel).",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "encrypted_auth_channel",
+    "mutual_authentication",
+    "reject_insecure_remote_protocols",
+    "remote_access_confidentiality_integrity",
+    "remote_access_encryption",
+    "service_to_service_auth",
+    "tls_certificate_auth"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 7,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "TR-02102-2",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-03",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SC-8",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "BSI",
+     "anchor": "IT-Grundschutz NET.3.3",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "OWASP",
+     "anchor": "API Security Top 10",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "IA-05(2)",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "code_signing",
+   "name": "Code & Update Signing",
+   "description": "Digitale Signatur + Integritaets-/Authentizitaetspruefung von Firmware/Software/Updates.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "firmware_software_authentication",
+    "signed_update_integrity"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 2,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SI-07",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-147 BIOS Protection",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "authentication",
+    "updates"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "capability_id": "security_monitoring_alerting",
+   "name": "Security Monitoring & Alerting",
+   "description": "Anomalie-/Bedrohungserkennung und Alarmierung aus Logs/Telemetrie.",
+   "type": "technical_capability",
+   "realized_by": [
+    "log_monitoring_alerting",
+    "remote_access_threat_detection"
+   ],
+   "realizes_count": 2,
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "AU-6/SI-4",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    },
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SP 800-94",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "domains": [
+    "logging",
+    "remote_access"
+   ],
+   "provenance": {
+    "source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"
+   }
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "controls_for_obligation_mapping_v1",
+ "purpose": "Accepted CRA->Framework controls (Compliance Execution Graph) for the Obligation Registry to propose the SEMANTIC control->obligation_id, replacing the coarse citation_unit interim join. Fill proposed_obligation_id per control, then we adopt it into control_mapping.obligation_id.",
+ "source": "ai-compliance-sdk control_mappings, mapping_status=accepted, reviewed_by=benjamin 2026-06-25. OWASP ASVS (7, gefuellt) + NIST SP 800-53 (3, pending).",
+ "filled_by": "obligation-registry-session 2026-06-25. OWASP 7/7 (4 auth/crypto + 3 logging). NIST 3/3 GEFUELLT (Obligation-Session): SI-2->provide_security_updates (stark, (2)(c)/Art.13) · SI-7->signed_update_integrity (update-scoped; SI-7 breiter) · CM-7->remote_access_attack_surface_min (remote-scoped; CM-7 breiter). GAP-BEFUND (Cross-Domain-Review): generische Parent-Obligations software_integrity_protection + attack_surface_minimization FEHLEN — SI-7/CM-7 sind breiter als die domaenen-scoped Treffer. Kandidaten fuer neue generische Obligations (User-Entscheidung). Damit 10/10 proposed_obligation_id gefuellt.",
+ "join_principle": "SEMANTISCH via obligation_id, NICHT via citation_unit/legal_basis-Anker. Die CRA-Anker sind im Registry teils approximativ (siehe anchor_quality_note) — daher ist obligation_id der stabile Primaerschluessel, nicht der Anker.",
+ "anchor_quality_note": "Registry-legal_basis-Anker sind teils CRA-Part-I-fehlzugeordnet (Opus-Synthese): user_authentication_required steht auf (2)(d) statt (2)(c); Crypto-Obligations auf (2)(e) statt (2)(d). CRA Annex I Part I: (2)(c)=Zugriffsschutz, (2)(d)=Vertraulichkeit, (2)(e)=Integritaet. Korrektur kommt mit dem zitierfaehigen Re-Ingest (span-genau). Deshalb: NICHT auf Anker joinen. ABER: der Logging-Cut (V16.*) ist korrekt auf (2)(k) verankert (echte Logging-Subsektion, kein Fehl-Anker).",
+ "mapping_type_note": "NEU: mapping_type=primary_implementation = die kanonische Primaer-Control einer Anforderung (genau eine), staerker als implements/supports. related-Controls (SC-3(3), RA-5, AC-6, SI-16, SA-10, ...) folgen separat als supports. Eine Obligation kann mehrere Controls haben, aber genau einen primary_implementation-Einstieg.",
+ "count": 10,
+ "controls": [
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.3.1",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(c)", "family": "auth", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "user_authentication_required",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "Zugriffsschutz/Authentisierung-vor-Zugriff = Nutzer-Auth (NICHT firmware, trotz strukturellem (2)(c)-Join)"
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V6.1.1",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(c) — Schutz vor unbefugtem Zugriff",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(c)", "family": "auth", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "user_authentication_required",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "wie V6.3.1"
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.2.1",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(d)", "family": "crypto", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "credential_confidentiality_protection",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "Vertraulichkeit von Auth-Daten. ALT: encrypted_auth_channel, falls V11.2.1 transit-/kanal-spezifisch ist — bitte aus eurem Control-Text bestaetigen."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V11.7.1",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(d) — Vertraulichkeit / Verschluesselung",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(d)", "family": "crypto", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "auth_key_management",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "Key Management = Schluessel erzeugen/speichern/HSM"
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.3.3",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(k)", "family": "logging", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "Umbrella-LM 'Produkt protokolliert sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse' (CRA (2)(k)). ALT bei access-decision-spezifischem Control-Text: access_control_event_logging — bitte aus eurem ASVS-V16.3-Text bestaetigen."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.3.4",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(k)", "family": "logging", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "Umbrella-LM (CRA (2)(k)). ALT bei admin-/privileg-spezifischem Control-Text: audit_trail_admin_actions — bitte aus eurem ASVS-V16.3-Text bestaetigen."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "OWASP ASVS", "control": "V16.1.1",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(k) — Sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse / Logging",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(k)", "family": "logging", "mapping_type": "supports",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "V16.1 = allgemeine Logging-Anforderung -> Umbrella-LM event_logging_security_events. Hohe Konfidenz."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-7",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(e) — Integritaet",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(e)", "family": "integrity", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "signed_update_integrity",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST SI-7 = Software/Firmware/Information Integrity (Signaturpruefung, Manipulationserkennung, Secure Boot, Runtime-Integritaet). Naechster vorhandener Treffer (93-Stand): signed_update_integrity (updates-Familie, Annex I (1)(3)(f)) — deckt aber NUR Update-Signatur. SI-7 ist BREITER (gesamte Produkt-Integritaet). Falls keine generische Integritaets-Obligation existiert: neue noetig (Vorschlag software_integrity_protection); sonst SI-7 primary_implementation fuer signed_update_integrity (update-scoped) + supports fuers Breitere. NICHT log_integrity_immutability (Audit-Log-Schutz, andere Ebene)."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "SI-2",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(l) — Sichere Updates",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(l)", "family": "update", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "provide_security_updates",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST SI-2 = Flaw Remediation. STARKER Treffer in eurer NEUEN updates-Familie (93-Stand): provide_security_updates (LEGAL_MINIMUM, Annex I (2)(c) + Art. 13) = DAS sichere-Update-LM. -> SI-2 primary_implementation = provide_security_updates. Verwandt (supports): vuln_remediation_patching (Part II Remediations-PROZESS), support_period_maintenance, update_testing_validation, update_rollback. Mein source_norm-Anker (2)(l) ist approximativ -> bitte (2)(c)/Art.13 via provide_security_updates nutzen."
+  },
+  {
+   "framework": "NIST SP 800-53", "control": "CM-7",
+   "source_norm": "CRA Annex I Part I (2)(i) — Angriffsflaeche minimieren",
+   "citation_unit": "Annex I (2)(i)", "family": "attack_surface", "mapping_type": "primary_implementation",
+   "proposed_obligation_id": "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+   "mapping_method": "semantic",
+   "mapping_note": "NIST CM-7 = Least Functionality (deaktivierte Ports/Dienste/Funktionen, GESAMTE Angriffsflaeche). Naechster vorhandener Treffer (93-Stand): remote_access_attack_surface_min (remote_access-Familie) — deckt aber NUR Remote-Access-Flaeche. CM-7 ist BREITER. Vermutlich generische Obligation noetig (Vorschlag attack_surface_minimization); sonst CM-7 supports fuer remote_access_attack_surface_min. related (supports): SC-3(3)/AC-6/SI-16."
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -966,7 +966,10 @@
   "relationships": [],
   "citation_anchor_ids": [],
   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
-   "review_status": "draft"
+   "review_status": "draft",
+   "merged_into": "provide_security_updates",
+   "status": "deprecated_alias",
+   "merge_note": "SAME_OBLIGATION (Cross-Domain-Review). Kanonisch: provide_security_updates ((2)(c)/Art.13). ID bleibt als Alias aufloesbar; downstream provide_security_updates nutzen."
  },
  {
   "id": "vuln_handling_process",
@@ -10281,7 +10281,11 @@
    "cluster_size": 4,
    "llm_model": "claude-opus-4-8",
    "synthesis_version": "v1"
-   }
+   },
+   "specializes": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "integrity"
+   ]
  }
 ],
 "relationships": [
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_registry_v1",
+ "regulation": "CRA",
+ "regulation_code": "CRA",
+ "family": "core",
+ "theme": "CORE Security Objectives (CRA Annex I als regulierungs-agnostische Sicherheitsziele)",
+ "generated_by": "materialize_capabilities.py (#5b, Modell C)",
+ "note": "CORE Legal Obligations = Sicherheitsziele (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse). DOMAIN-Obligations specializes-en hierauf. objective_tags = Vorwaerts-Kompat zu Modell B.",
+ "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+ "obligations": [
+  {
+   "id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "name": "Minimierung der Angriffsflaeche",
+   "family": "core",
+   "description": "Das Produkt minimiert seine Angriffsflaeche: unnoetige Funktionen/Ports/Dienste/Schnittstellen sind deaktiviert (Least Functionality).",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS",
+   "applicability": "universal",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "attack_surface"
+   ],
+   "legal_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "CRA",
+     "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(j)",
+     "citation": "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"
+    }
+   ],
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "CM-7 Least Functionality",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "specialized_by": [
+    "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+    "component_remote_interface_security"
+   ],
+   "primary_implementation": "NIST CM-7",
+   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+   "review_status": "core_from_5b"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "name": "Schutz der Software-/Firmware-Integritaet",
+   "family": "core",
+   "description": "Das Produkt schuetzt Integritaet und Authentizitaet von Software/Firmware (Manipulationserkennung, Secure Boot, Signaturpruefung, Runtime-Integritaet).",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS",
+   "applicability": "universal",
+   "objective_tags": [
+    "integrity"
+   ],
+   "legal_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "CRA",
+     "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(f)",
+     "citation": "protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or processed data, software and configuration"
+    }
+   ],
+   "guidance_basis": [
+    {
+     "source": "NIST",
+     "anchor": "SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity",
+     "role": "best_practice"
+    }
+   ],
+   "specialized_by": [
+    "signed_update_integrity",
+    "firmware_software_authentication"
+   ],
+   "realized_by_capabilities": [
+    "code_signing"
+   ],
+   "primary_implementation": "NIST SI-7",
+   "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+   "review_status": "core_from_5b"
+  }
+ ],
+ "relationships": []
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_procedures_v1",
+ "regulation": "CRA",
+ "layer": "Regulation -> Legal Obligation -> Procedure -> Control -> Evidence",
+ "note": "Procedure ist KEINE neue Compliance-Pflicht. LEGAL_MINIMUM liegt an der Obligation; die Procedure beschreibt, WIE sie umgesetzt wird; Evidence belegt die Umsetzung. source_role=procedural_requirement (Konvergenz mit der Legal-Knowledge-Engine der anderen Session).",
+ "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+ "scope": "worked examples: SBOM + Vulnerability Handling",
+ "procedures": [
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "sbom_generation_process",
+   "name": "SBOM-Erstellungsprozess",
+   "description": "Erzeugen einer vollstaendigen, maschinenlesbaren Software Bill of Materials fuer ein Produkt mit digitalen Elementen.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["sbom_creation", "sbom_dependency_coverage", "sbom_format_standard", "sbom_tooling_automation"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Komponenten und (direkte + transitive) Abhaengigkeiten inventarisieren",
+    "SBOM automatisiert in der Build-/Toolchain generieren",
+    "Komponenten, Versionen, Lizenzen und Lieferanten erfassen",
+    "in anerkanntem maschinenlesbarem Format (CycloneDX/SPDX) ausgeben",
+    "Format- und Schemavalidierung durchfuehren"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "SBOM-Datei vorhanden",
+    "Format ist maschinenlesbar und standardkonform (CycloneDX/SPDX)",
+    "direkte und transitive Abhaengigkeiten enthalten"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["sbom.cyclonedx.json", "Format-Validierungs-Log", "Build-/Toolchain-Konfiguration"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "sbom_update_process",
+   "name": "SBOM-Aktualisierungsprozess",
+   "description": "Halten der SBOM aktuell ueber den Produktlebenszyklus bei Komponenten-, Versions- und Patch-Aenderungen.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["sbom_maintenance_update"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Komponentenaenderung erkennen (Dependency-/Patch-/Versionsaenderung)",
+    "SBOM neu generieren",
+    "Lieferanten-SBOMs aktualisieren",
+    "neue SBOM-Version speichern",
+    "SBOM in Release-Artefakte uebernehmen"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "CI prueft SBOM vorhanden",
+    "SBOM-Version passt zum Release",
+    "Supplier-Komponenten enthalten"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["sbom.json", "CI-Log", "Release-Artefakt", "Supplier-SBOM"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "sbom_supplier_integration_process",
+   "name": "Lieferanten-SBOM-Integration",
+   "description": "Beschaffen und Einarbeiten von Lieferanten-/Drittkomponenten-SBOMs in die Produkt-SBOM.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["sbom_supply_chain_contracts", "sbom_dependency_coverage"],
+   "steps": [
+    "SBOM-Anforderung in Lieferantenvertraege aufnehmen",
+    "Lieferanten-SBOMs einsammeln",
+    "in die Produkt-SBOM mergen",
+    "Drittkomponenten und deren Abhaengigkeiten nachverfolgen"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "vertragliche SBOM-Klausel vorhanden",
+    "Lieferanten-SBOMs eingegangen",
+    "Drittkomponenten in der SBOM gelistet"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Lieferantenvertrag-Klausel", "eingegangene Supplier-SBOMs", "gemergte SBOM"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "sbom_provision_process",
+   "name": "SBOM-Bereitstellungsprozess",
+   "description": "Zugaenglichmachen der SBOM fuer berechtigte Parteien (Nutzer, Behoerde) unter Wahrung der Vertraulichkeit.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["sbom_access_provision", "sbom_authority_provision", "sbom_confidentiality"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Zugangskanal definieren (Portal/API/dokumentierter Pfad)",
+    "Nutzer ueber den Zugangsweg informieren",
+    "auf begruendetes Verlangen der Marktueberwachungsbehoerde vertraulich bereitstellen",
+    "Zugriffskontrolle und Vertraulichkeitsmassnahmen anwenden"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "Zugangspfad dokumentiert",
+    "Zugriffskontrolle/Vertraulichkeit umgesetzt",
+    "Behoerden-Bereitstellungsprozess definiert"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Zugangskanal-Dokumentation", "Behoerden-Anfrage-Log", "Zugriffskontroll-Konfiguration"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "sbom_conformity_documentation_process",
+   "name": "SBOM in technischer Dokumentation/Konformitaet",
+   "description": "Aufnehmen der SBOM in die technische Dokumentation und Verifizieren der Vollstaendigkeit fuer die Konformitaetsbewertung.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["sbom_technical_documentation", "sbom_completeness_verification"],
+   "steps": [
+    "SBOM in die technische Dokumentation aufnehmen",
+    "Vollstaendigkeit gegen die real eingesetzte Softwarekomposition pruefen",
+    "der Konformitaetsbewertung beilegen (ggf. EUCC)"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "SBOM Teil der technischen Dokumentation",
+    "Vollstaendigkeit verifiziert",
+    "Konformitaetsnachweis vorhanden"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["technische Dokumentation", "Vollstaendigkeits-Pruefbericht", "Konformitaetsnachweis"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_handling_process_setup",
+   "name": "Schwachstellenbehandlungsprozess einrichten",
+   "description": "Dokumentierten Prozess und Meldekanal (CVD) fuer die Schwachstellenbehandlung etablieren.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["vuln_handling_process"],
+   "steps": [
+    "dokumentierten Schwachstellenbehandlungsprozess definieren",
+    "Coordinated-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Richtlinie und Meldekanal veroeffentlichen",
+    "eingehende Meldungen triagieren"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "Behandlungsprozess dokumentiert",
+    "Meldekanal/Kontaktstelle auffindbar (z.B. security.txt)",
+    "Triage-Verfahren vorhanden"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Prozessdokument", "security.txt / Kontaktstelle", "Triage-Log"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_identification_process",
+   "name": "Schwachstellen-Identifikation",
+   "description": "Bekannte Schwachstellen in eingesetzten Komponenten erkennen und inventarisieren.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["vuln_identification_inventory"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Advisories/CVE-Feeds beobachten",
+    "gegen die SBOM-Komponenten abgleichen",
+    "Schwachstellen-Inventar pflegen"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "Advisory-/CVE-Monitoring aktiv",
+    "SBOM-zu-CVE-Abgleich durchgefuehrt",
+    "Schwachstellen-Inventar gepflegt"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["CVE-Abgleich-Report", "Schwachstellen-Register"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_assessment_process",
+   "name": "Schwachstellen-Bewertung/Priorisierung",
+   "description": "Identifizierte Schwachstellen nach Schweregrad, Ausnutzbarkeit und Exposition bewerten und priorisieren.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["vuln_assessment_prioritization"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Schweregrad bewerten (z.B. CVSS)",
+    "Ausnutzbarkeit/Exposition einschaetzen",
+    "risikobasiert priorisieren"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "Schweregrad standardisiert bewertet",
+    "risikobasierte Priorisierung vorhanden"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Bewertungsdatensatz (CVSS)", "Prioritaetenliste"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_remediation_process",
+   "name": "Schwachstellen-Behebung",
+   "description": "Bekannte Schwachstellen fristgerecht durch Patches/Gegenmassnahmen beheben und Sicherheitsupdates bereitstellen.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["vuln_remediation_patching"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Fix/Gegenmassnahme entwickeln",
+    "testen",
+    "Sicherheitsupdate kostenfrei und zeitnah bereitstellen",
+    "bis zum Abschluss nachverfolgen"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "zeitnahe Behebung",
+    "Sicherheitsupdate bereitgestellt",
+    "Follow-up bis Closure"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Patch/Release", "Behebungs-Zeitleiste", "Follow-up-Log"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_disclosure_process",
+   "name": "Offenlegung + Nutzerinformation",
+   "description": "Koordinierte Offenlegung behobener Schwachstellen und Information der Nutzer ueber Schutzmassnahmen.",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["coordinated_vulnerability_disclosure", "vuln_info_dissemination_users"],
+   "steps": [
+    "Offenlegungszeitpunkt koordinieren",
+    "Security Advisory / CVE-Eintrag veroeffentlichen",
+    "Nutzer ueber behobene Schwachstelle und Schutzmassnahmen informieren"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "Advisory veroeffentlicht",
+    "Nutzer informiert"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["Security Advisory", "CVE-Eintrag", "Nutzer-Benachrichtigung"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  },
+  {
+   "procedure_id": "vuln_authority_reporting_process",
+   "name": "Behoerdenmeldung aktiv ausgenutzter Schwachstellen",
+   "description": "Aktiv ausgenutzte Schwachstellen fristgerecht an CSIRT/ENISA melden (CRA Art. 14-Kaskade).",
+   "source_role": "procedural_requirement",
+   "fulfills_obligations": ["exploited_vuln_reporting_authorities"],
+   "applicability_note": "bedingt: nur bei aktiv ausgenutzter Schwachstelle",
+   "steps": [
+    "aktive Ausnutzung erkennen",
+    "Fruehwarnung an CSIRT/ENISA (24h)",
+    "vollstaendige Meldung (72h)",
+    "Abschlussbericht (14 Tage)"
+   ],
+   "controls": [
+    "24h-Fruehwarnung erfolgt",
+    "72h-Meldung erfolgt",
+    "14d-Abschlussbericht erfolgt"
+   ],
+   "evidence": ["CSIRT/ENISA-Meldungsbelege", "Zeitstempel der Kaskade"],
+   "citation_spans": [], "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor"
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,846 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": "obligation_join_keys_v1",
+ "contract": "obligation_id ist der stabile Join-Key. Legal Knowledge Graph haengt citation_spans an obligation_id; Compliance Execution Graph mappt control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id. Interim-Bruecke = citation_units. obligation_id NIE neu vergeben (re-link).",
+ "count": 95,
+ "obligation_ids": [
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_creation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_dependency_coverage",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 3(36) i.V.m. Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_format_standard",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_maintenance_update",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_completeness_verification",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_tooling_automation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_access_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_authority_provision",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31 / Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_confidentiality",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31(4)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_supply_chain_contracts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "sbom_technical_documentation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "sbom",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 31 i.V.m. Annex VII"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "EVIDENCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_identification_inventory",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_assessment_prioritization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_remediation_patching",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (2) & (8)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_handling_process",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Article 13(8) & Annex VII"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "coordinated_vulnerability_disclosure",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (5)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "exploited_vuln_reporting_authorities",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Article 14 & Article 16"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "vuln_info_dissemination_users",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "vuln",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part II (4) & (6)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "attack_surface_minimization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(j)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "software_integrity_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "core",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "user_authentication_required",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "authentication_policy_documented",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "auth_exceptions_documented",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "mfa_required",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "step_up_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "privileged_op_reauth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "strong_crypto_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "credential_lifecycle_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "credential_confidentiality_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "password_policy",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "no_default_credentials",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(a)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "account_lockout_failed_attempts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "server_side_validation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "session_binding_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "reauth_after_inactivity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "token_validation_lifecycle",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "mutual_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "revocation_check",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "encrypted_auth_channel",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(e)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "tls_certificate_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "service_to_service_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "auth_key_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "biometric_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "federated_auth_assertions",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "separate_authn_authz",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "supplier_access_auth",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "personal_admin_accounts",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "firmware_software_authentication",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "authentication",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "event_logging_security_events",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "access_control_event_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "audit_trail_admin_actions",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_integrity_immutability",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_access_control_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_retention_archival",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "centralized_log_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_monitoring_alerting",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I Part I (2)(k)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_data_minimization_privacy",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_format_standardization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_timestamp_synchronization",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_availability_resilience",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_thread_safety_correctness",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_library_supply_chain",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_config_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "logging_governance_roles",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "incident_response_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "log_transmission_security",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "network_traffic_logging",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "logging",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_control_least_privilege",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_confidentiality_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(b)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_session_management",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_mfa",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_encryption",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "reject_insecure_remote_protocols",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_logging_audit",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(g)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_user_validation_ot",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_training",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_architecture_design",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_attack_surface_min",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)(a)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_vuln_patch_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(1)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_threat_detection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_maintenance_governance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "temporary_remote_access_mgmt",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_data_export_protection",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "component_remote_interface_security",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "remote_access_fallback_concept",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "remote_access",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "provide_security_updates",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)",
+    "Art. 13"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "support_period_maintenance",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Art. 13(8)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "signed_update_integrity",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(f)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "trusted_update_source",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(3)(d)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_testing_validation",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_rollback",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "GUIDANCE"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "automatic_updates_optout",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (2)(c)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "update_risk_assessment",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM",
+   "citation_units": [
+    "Annex I (1)(2)"
+   ],
+   "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS"
+  },
+  {
+   "obligation_id": "secure_modification_control",
+   "regulation": "CRA",
+   "family": "updates",
+   "tier": "BEST_PRACTICE",
+   "citation_units": [],
+   "source_role": "IMPLEMENTATION"
+  }
+ ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+"""P3 — Compliance-Advisor-Proof: obligation-basierte Antwort als vollstaendige
+BEGRUENDUNGSKETTE aus der Registry (NICHT RAG-Text, KEIN LLM):
+  Rechtsgrundlage -> Obligation -> Procedure -> Controls -> Evidence -> Antwort.
+Deterministisch + zitierfaehig. Der Unterschied zu RAG: RAG beantwortet — BreakPilot
+begruendet UND operationalisiert.
+
+  python3 scripts/obligation_discovery/advisor_proof.py --registry obligations/cra.json \
+      --procedures obligations/cra_procedures.json --topic sbom --has-digital-elements
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+
+
+def applies(obl: dict, has_digital: bool) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    a = obl.get("applicability", "universal")
+    if a == "universal":
+        return True, ""
+    if a.startswith("domain:products_with_digital_elements"):
+        return has_digital, "nur fuer Produkte mit digitalen Elementen (CRA Art. 3)"
+    if a.startswith("domain:"):
+        return True, a.split(":", 1)[1]
+    if a.startswith("conditional:"):
+        return True, f"bedingt: {a.split(':',1)[1]}"
+    return True, ""
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--procedures", required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--topic", default="sbom")
+    ap.add_argument("--has-digital-elements", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--question", default="Muss ich als Maschinenbauer eine SBOM bereitstellen?")
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    reg = json.load(open(a.registry, encoding="utf-8"))
+    procs = json.load(open(a.procedures, encoding="utf-8"))["procedures"]
+
+    obls = [o for o in reg["obligations"]
+            if a.topic in o.get("family", "") or a.topic in o["id"]]
+    ids = {o["id"] for o in obls}
+    by_obl: dict[str, list] = {}
+    for p in procs:
+        for oid in p.get("fulfills_obligations", []):
+            by_obl.setdefault(oid, []).append(p)
+
+    pflicht = [o for o in obls if o["tier"] == "LEGAL_MINIMUM" and applies(o, a.has_digital_elements)[0]]
+    best = [o for o in obls if o["tier"] != "LEGAL_MINIMUM"]
+
+    print(f"FRAGE: {a.question}")
+    print(f"\nANTWORT: {'JA' if pflicht and a.has_digital_elements else 'NUR WENN CRA-anwendbar'} — "
+          f"sofern das Produkt unter den CRA faellt (product with digital elements, Art. 3).")
+    print("\n══ BEGRUENDUNGSKETTE (Recht → Obligation → Procedure → Controls → Evidence) ══")
+
+    req_evidence: list[str] = []
+    for o in pflicht:
+        lb = "; ".join(f"{b.get('source','')} {b.get('anchor','')}".strip() for b in o.get("legal_basis", []))
+        print(f"\n● PFLICHT: {o['id']} — {o.get('description','')[:80]}")
+        print(f"    Rechtsgrundlage: {lb or '—'}")
+        ps = by_obl.get(o["id"], [])
+        for p in ps:
+            print(f"    Procedure (wie umgesetzt): {p['procedure_id']} — Schritte: {len(p.get('steps',[]))}")
+            print(f"        Controls (Pruefung): {' · '.join(p.get('controls', []))[:96]}")
+            print(f"        Nachweis: {' · '.join(p.get('evidence', []))}")
+            req_evidence += p.get("evidence", [])
+        if not ps:
+            print("    Procedure: (noch keine modelliert)")
+
+    print("\n── REQUIRED EVIDENCE (aggregiert, womit wird es nachgewiesen) ──")
+    print("   " + " · ".join(dict.fromkeys(req_evidence)) if req_evidence else "   —")
+
+    print("\n── BEST PRACTICE (anerkannte Umsetzung, KEINE CRA-Wortlautpflicht) ──")
+    for o in best:
+        gb = "; ".join(b.get("source", "") for b in o.get("guidance_basis", []))
+        print(f"   • {o['id']} — {o.get('description','')[:64]}  | Guidance: {gb or '—'}")
+
+    print("\n── BEZIEHUNG (warum es zaehlt) ──")
+    for r in reg.get("relationships", []):
+        if r.get("from") in ids and r.get("to") not in ids:
+            print(f"   • {r['from']} --{r['type']}--> {r['to']}: {r.get('note','')[:64]}")
+
+    pend = sum(1 for o in pflicht if o.get("citation_status") == "pending_span_anchor")
+    print(f"\n── CITATION ──\n   {pend}/{len(pflicht)} Pflichten: pending_span_anchor "
+          f"(Textstellen-Anker folgen mit dem zitierfaehigen Re-Ingest)")
+    print("\n(RAG beantwortet — BreakPilot begruendet UND operationalisiert.)")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+"""Cross-Domain Relationship Discovery — Stufe 2: Opus klassifiziert jede Kandidaten-Beziehung
+in GENAU EINE Kategorie. Liefert das Rohmaterial der Compliance-Ontologie (insb. SHARED_CAPABILITY
+= Capability-Schicht). ANTHROPIC_API_KEY aus ENV (nie hartcodiert). Streaming.
+
+  ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=… python3 classify_relationships.py --pairs /tmp/cd_pairs.json \
+      --only-cross-family --out /tmp/cd_classified.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from collections import Counter
+
+SYS = """Du bist Compliance-Ontologe. Gegeben Paare von Legal Obligations (CRA), bestimme fuer
+JEDES Paar GENAU EINE Beziehung. Ziel ist NICHT Aehnlichkeit, sondern die STRUKTURELLE Beziehung.
+
+Kategorien (genau EINE; bei Mehrdeutigkeit gilt diese Prioritaet):
+1 SAME_OBLIGATION   — dieselbe rechtliche Pflicht, nur pro Domaene anders formuliert -> MERGE-Kandidat.
+2 SUPPORTED_BY      — A ist domaenenspezifische Auspraegung/Teilfall von B ODER A traegt zur Erfuellung von B bei. RICHTUNG angeben.
+3 SHARED_CAPABILITY — beide werden durch DIESELBE technische Faehigkeit erfuellt (z.B. MFA, TLS-Verschluesselung, digitale Signatur, Session-Management, Patch-Management, Logging-Pipeline). capability_name (snake_case) angeben.
+4 SHARED_PROCEDURE  — beide ueber denselben operativen Prozess erfuellt, ohne gemeinsames technisches Artefakt.
+5 SHARED_EVIDENCE   — beide erzeugen/nutzen denselben Nachweis (Audit-Log, SBOM, Release Notes). evidence_name angeben.
+6 SHARED_GUIDANCE   — beide berufen sich auf denselben externen Standard (NIST/OWASP/ISO), sonst distinkt.
+7 OVERLAP_ONLY      — nur oberflaechliche Wort-/Themenueberlappung, keine echte strukturelle Beziehung.
+8 UNRELATED         — Falsch-Positiv der Embedding-Naehe.
+
+Gib AUSSCHLIESSLICH JSON aus:
+{"results":[{"i":0,"relation":"SHARED_CAPABILITY","direction":"a->b|b->a|none","capability_name":"","evidence_name":"","reason":"max 18 Woerter"}]}
+Regeln: relation = genau eine der 8 Strings. direction nur bei SUPPORTED_BY, sonst "none".
+capability_name NUR bei SHARED_CAPABILITY (sonst ""), evidence_name NUR bei SHARED_EVIDENCE (sonst "").
+Sei streng: SHARED_GUIDANCE/OVERLAP_ONLY/UNRELATED grosszuegig nutzen; SAME_OBLIGATION nur bei echter Deckungsgleichheit.
+Gib fuer JEDES Paar (per Index i) genau ein Ergebnis."""
+
+
+def build_user(pairs: list[dict]) -> str:
+    lines = []
+    for i, p in enumerate(pairs):
+        lines.append(f'[{i}] A={p["a"]} ({p["fa"]}/{p["ta"]}): {p["da"]}\n'
+                     f'     B={p["b"]} ({p["fb"]}/{p["tb"]}): {p["db"]}  [sim={p["sim"]}]')
+    return "Paare:\n" + "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--pairs", required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--only-cross-family", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--min-sim", type=float, default=0.0)
+    ap.add_argument("--model", default="claude-opus-4-8")
+    ap.add_argument("--out", required=True)
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    d = json.load(open(a.pairs, encoding="utf-8"))
+    pairs = [p for p in d["pairs"]
+             if (not a.only_cross_family or p["cross_family"]) and p["sim"] >= a.min_sim]
+
+    import anthropic
+    client = anthropic.Anthropic(api_key=os.environ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"])
+    with client.messages.stream(model=a.model, max_tokens=24000, system=SYS,
+                                messages=[{"role": "user", "content": build_user(pairs)}]) as st:
+        msg = st.get_final_message()
+    txt = msg.content[0].text
+    m = re.search(r"\{.*\}", txt, re.DOTALL)
+    data = json.loads(m.group(0) if m else txt)
+
+    res = []
+    for r in data.get("results", []):
+        i = r.get("i")
+        if not isinstance(i, int) or i < 0 or i >= len(pairs):
+            continue
+        p = pairs[i]
+        res.append({"a": p["a"], "fa": p["fa"], "b": p["b"], "fb": p["fb"], "sim": p["sim"],
+                    "relation": r.get("relation", "?"), "direction": r.get("direction", "none"),
+                    "capability_name": r.get("capability_name", ""),
+                    "evidence_name": r.get("evidence_name", ""), "reason": r.get("reason", "")})
+    dist = Counter(r["relation"] for r in res)
+    out = {"n_pairs": len(pairs), "n_classified": len(res), "distribution": dict(dist),
+           "model": a.model, "results": res}
+    json.dump(out, open(a.out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+    print(f"classified {len(res)}/{len(pairs)} | {dict(dist)}")
+    print("written:", a.out)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Cross-Domain Relationship Discovery — Stufe 1 (key-frei, im bp-compliance-backend-Container).
+Alle Obligations mehrerer Registries -> BGE-M3-Embedding -> je Obligation Top-K Nachbarn ->
+Kandidaten-Paare (cross- UND same-family) >= min-sim. KEIN Urteil hier — nur Kandidaten.
+Stufe 2 (classify_relationships.py) klassifiziert die Beziehung per Opus.
+
+  python3 cross_domain_pairs.py /tmp/reg/cra.json /tmp/reg/cra_authentication.json ... \
+      --top-k 8 --min-sim 0.60 --out /tmp/cd_pairs.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from _core import cosine
+
+
+async def run(paths: list[str], top_k: int, min_sim: float, out: str) -> None:
+    from compliance.services.mc_embedding_matcher import _embed_texts
+
+    obls: list[dict] = []
+    for p in paths:
+        reg = json.load(open(p, encoding="utf-8"))
+        fam = reg.get("family", "")
+        for o in reg.get("obligations", []):
+            obls.append({"id": o["id"], "family": o.get("family", "") or fam,
+                         "tier": o.get("tier", ""), "name": o.get("name", ""),
+                         "desc": o.get("description", "")})
+    vecs = await _embed_texts([f'{o["name"]}. {o["desc"]}' for o in obls])
+    n = len(obls)
+    print(f"obligations={n}")
+
+    best: dict[tuple[int, int], float] = {}
+    for i in range(n):
+        nbrs = sorted(((cosine(vecs[i], vecs[j]), j) for j in range(n) if j != i), reverse=True)[:top_k]
+        for s, j in nbrs:
+            if s < min_sim:
+                continue
+            a, b = sorted((i, j))
+            if (a, b) not in best or s > best[(a, b)]:
+                best[(a, b)] = s
+
+    pairs = []
+    for (a, b), s in sorted(best.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1]):
+        pairs.append({
+            "a": obls[a]["id"], "fa": obls[a]["family"], "ta": obls[a]["tier"], "da": obls[a]["desc"][:220],
+            "b": obls[b]["id"], "fb": obls[b]["family"], "tb": obls[b]["tier"], "db": obls[b]["desc"][:220],
+            "sim": round(s, 3), "cross_family": obls[a]["family"] != obls[b]["family"]})
+    cf = sum(1 for p in pairs if p["cross_family"])
+    json.dump({"n_obligations": n, "n_pairs": len(pairs), "cross_family": cf, "pairs": pairs},
+              open(out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+    print(f"pairs={len(pairs)} (cross-family={cf}, same-family={len(pairs) - cf})  written: {out}")
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("registries", nargs="+")
+    ap.add_argument("--top-k", type=int, default=8)
+    ap.add_argument("--min-sim", type=float, default=0.60)
+    ap.add_argument("--out", default="/tmp/cd_pairs.json")
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    asyncio.run(run(a.registries, a.top_k, a.min_sim, a.out))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Exportiert den OBLIGATION_ID-Join-Key-Vertrag aus den Registry-Artefakten.
+Die obligation_id ist der stabile Brueckenschluessel zwischen Legal Knowledge Graph
+(citation_spans haengen an obligation_id) und Compliance Execution Graph
+(control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id). citation_units = die legal_basis-Anker,
+ueber die beide Seiten heute (vor obligation_id-Adoption) bruecken koennen.
+
+DISZIPLIN: obligation_id wird RE-GELINKT, NIE neu vergeben (Pendant zu span_id/control_uuid).
+
+  python3 scripts/obligation_discovery/export_join_keys.py obligations/cra.json obligations/cra_authentication.json
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("registries", nargs="+")
+    ap.add_argument("--out", default="obligations/obligation_join_keys.json")
+    a = ap.parse_args()
+    keys = []
+    for path in a.registries:
+        reg = json.load(open(path, encoding="utf-8"))
+        for o in reg.get("obligations", []):
+            citation_units = [b.get("anchor", "") for b in o.get("legal_basis", []) if b.get("anchor")]
+            keys.append({
+                "obligation_id": o["id"],
+                "regulation": reg.get("regulation", ""),
+                "family": o.get("family", ""),
+                "tier": o.get("tier", ""),
+                "citation_units": citation_units,
+                "source_role": o.get("source_role", ""),
+            })
+    out = {
+        "schema_version": "obligation_join_keys_v1",
+        "contract": "obligation_id ist der stabile Join-Key. Legal Knowledge Graph haengt "
+                    "citation_spans an obligation_id; Compliance Execution Graph mappt "
+                    "control_mapping.source_norm -> obligation_id. Interim-Bruecke = citation_units. "
+                    "obligation_id NIE neu vergeben (re-link).",
+        "count": len(keys),
+        "obligation_ids": keys,
+    }
+    json.dump(out, open(a.out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+    from collections import Counter
+    print(f"exportiert: {a.out}  ({len(keys)} obligation_ids)")
+    print("Regulierungen:", dict(Counter(k["regulation"] for k in keys)))
+    print("Familien:", dict(Counter(k["family"] for k in keys)))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+"""#5b — Materialisierung der Capability-Schicht (Modell C, User-Entscheidung 2026-06-26).
+
+Aus `cross_domain_relationships.json` (SHARED_CAPABILITY) + den 6 CRA-P1-Registries:
+- `obligations/capabilities.json` — Capability-Knoten: realized_by (n:m) + guidance_basis hochgezogen.
+- `obligations/cra_core.json` — 2 CORE-Obligations (Sicherheitsziele): attack_surface_minimization,
+  software_integrity_protection (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse; das Ziel IST eine
+  abstrakte CORE-Pflicht).
+- patcht DOMAIN-Obligations in ihren Registries: `specializes` (→CORE) + `objective_tags` (Vorwärts-
+  Kompat zu Modell B: Tags, keine Klasse).
+- markiert `vuln_remediation_patching` als deprecated_alias von `provide_security_updates` (Merge).
+- `remote_access_data_export_protection` bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (Notiz: pending Data-Act-Scope).
+
+Deterministisch. Lokal lauffähig (nur json). Danach export_join_keys neu (inkl. cra_core).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+
+REG_FILES = ["obligations/cra.json", "obligations/cra_authentication.json",
+             "obligations/cra_logging.json", "obligations/cra_remote_access.json",
+             "obligations/cra_updates.json"]
+
+# Cluster-capability_name -> kanonische capability_id (access_control absichtlich gedroppt: zu schwach)
+CONSOLIDATE = {"mfa": "multi_factor_authentication", "session_management": "session_management",
+               "tls_encryption": "transport_encryption", "mutual_tls": "transport_encryption",
+               "tls_certificate_auth": "transport_encryption", "code_signing": "code_signing",
+               "anomaly_detection": "security_monitoring_alerting"}
+CAP_META = {
+    "multi_factor_authentication": ("Multi-Factor Authentication",
+        "Mehrfaktor-Authentisierung als technische Faehigkeit (Besitz/Wissen/Inhaerenz)."),
+    "session_management": ("Session Management",
+        "Sichere Sitzungsverwaltung: Timeouts, Bindung, Re-Auth, Beendigung."),
+    "transport_encryption": ("Transport Encryption",
+        "Verschluesselter Transport (TLS, mutual-TLS, Zertifikats-Auth, VPN/Tunnel)."),
+    "code_signing": ("Code & Update Signing",
+        "Digitale Signatur + Integritaets-/Authentizitaetspruefung von Firmware/Software/Updates."),
+    "security_monitoring_alerting": ("Security Monitoring & Alerting",
+        "Anomalie-/Bedrohungserkennung und Alarmierung aus Logs/Telemetrie."),
+}
+CAP_ORDER = ["multi_factor_authentication", "session_management", "transport_encryption",
+             "code_signing", "security_monitoring_alerting"]
+
+# DOMAIN-Obligation -> (CORE-Ziel, objective_tags)
+SPECIALIZES = {
+    "remote_access_attack_surface_min": ("attack_surface_minimization", ["attack_surface"]),
+    "component_remote_interface_security": ("attack_surface_minimization", ["attack_surface"]),
+    "signed_update_integrity": ("software_integrity_protection", ["integrity"]),
+    "firmware_software_authentication": ("software_integrity_protection", ["integrity"]),
+}
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    regs = {f: json.load(open(f, encoding="utf-8")) for f in REG_FILES}
+    idx = {}
+    for f, r in regs.items():
+        for o in r.get("obligations", []):
+            idx[o["id"]] = (f, o)
+
+    # realized_by aus dem Artefakt
+    art = json.load(open("obligations/cross_domain_relationships.json", encoding="utf-8"))
+    realized = {cid: set() for cid in CONSOLIDATE.values()}
+    for rr in art["raw_results"]:
+        if rr["relation"] == "SHARED_CAPABILITY" and rr.get("capability_name") in CONSOLIDATE:
+            cid = CONSOLIDATE[rr["capability_name"]]
+            realized[cid].update([rr["a"], rr["b"]])
+
+    def guidance_for(ids):
+        seen, out = set(), []
+        for oid in ids:
+            if oid in idx:
+                for g in idx[oid][1].get("guidance_basis", []):
+                    k = (g.get("source", ""), g.get("anchor", ""))
+                    if k not in seen:
+                        seen.add(k)
+                        out.append(g)
+        return out
+
+    caps = []
+    for cid in CAP_ORDER:
+        obls = sorted(realized[cid])
+        name, desc = CAP_META[cid]
+        caps.append({"capability_id": cid, "name": name, "description": desc,
+                     "type": "technical_capability", "realized_by": obls, "realizes_count": len(obls),
+                     "guidance_basis": guidance_for(obls),
+                     "domains": sorted({idx[o][1].get("family", "") for o in obls if o in idx}),
+                     "provenance": {"source": "cross_domain_relationships.json SHARED_CAPABILITY"}})
+
+    capabilities = {
+        "schema_version": "capability_layer_v1", "model": "Modell C (docs-src/development/capability_model_v1.md)",
+        "note": "Capability = technische Faehigkeit (regulierungs-agnostisch). realized_by = Obligations, "
+                "die sie erfuellt (n:m). guidance_basis hier KANONISCH hochgezogen aus den realisierten "
+                "Obligations (die Obligation-Kopien bleiben vorerst als Legacy; Strip = Folge-Cleanup). "
+                "Sicherheitsziele sind KEINE Capabilities -> cra_core.json.",
+        "dropped": {"access_control": "OVERLAP (credential_confidentiality <-> sbom_confidentiality), nicht materialisiert"},
+        "candidate_capabilities_followup": ["automatic_update_delivery", "update_rollback",
+            "trusted_update_source", "hash_verification", "secure_boot", "least_functionality",
+            "credential_storage"],
+        "capabilities": caps}
+    json.dump(capabilities, open("obligations/capabilities.json", "w", encoding="utf-8"),
+              ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    core = [
+        {"id": "attack_surface_minimization", "name": "Minimierung der Angriffsflaeche", "family": "core",
+         "description": "Das Produkt minimiert seine Angriffsflaeche: unnoetige Funktionen/Ports/Dienste/"
+                        "Schnittstellen sind deaktiviert (Least Functionality).",
+         "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM", "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS", "applicability": "universal",
+         "objective_tags": ["attack_surface"],
+         "legal_basis": [{"source": "CRA", "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(j)",
+                          "citation": "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"}],
+         "guidance_basis": [{"source": "NIST", "anchor": "CM-7 Least Functionality", "role": "best_practice"}],
+         "specialized_by": ["remote_access_attack_surface_min", "component_remote_interface_security"],
+         "primary_implementation": "NIST CM-7", "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+         "review_status": "core_from_5b"},
+        {"id": "software_integrity_protection", "name": "Schutz der Software-/Firmware-Integritaet", "family": "core",
+         "description": "Das Produkt schuetzt Integritaet und Authentizitaet von Software/Firmware "
+                        "(Manipulationserkennung, Secure Boot, Signaturpruefung, Runtime-Integritaet).",
+         "tier": "LEGAL_MINIMUM", "source_role": "LEGAL_BASIS", "applicability": "universal",
+         "objective_tags": ["integrity"],
+         "legal_basis": [{"source": "CRA", "anchor": "Annex I Part I (2)(f)",
+                          "citation": "protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or processed data, software and configuration"}],
+         "guidance_basis": [{"source": "NIST", "anchor": "SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity", "role": "best_practice"}],
+         "specialized_by": ["signed_update_integrity", "firmware_software_authentication"],
+         "realized_by_capabilities": ["code_signing"],
+         "primary_implementation": "NIST SI-7", "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
+         "review_status": "core_from_5b"},
+    ]
+    json.dump({"schema_version": "obligation_registry_v1", "regulation": "CRA", "regulation_code": "CRA",
+               "family": "core",
+               "theme": "CORE Security Objectives (CRA Annex I als regulierungs-agnostische Sicherheitsziele)",
+               "generated_by": "materialize_capabilities.py (#5b, Modell C)",
+               "note": "CORE Legal Obligations = Sicherheitsziele (Modell C: KEINE eigene SecurityObjective-Klasse). "
+                       "DOMAIN-Obligations specializes-en hierauf. objective_tags = Vorwaerts-Kompat zu Modell B.",
+               "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor", "obligations": core, "relationships": []},
+              open("obligations/cra_core.json", "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    dirty = set()
+    patched = []
+    for oid, (coreid, tags) in SPECIALIZES.items():
+        if oid in idx:
+            f, o = idx[oid]
+            o["specializes"] = coreid
+            o["objective_tags"] = tags
+            dirty.add(f)
+            patched.append(oid)
+    if "vuln_remediation_patching" in idx:
+        f, o = idx["vuln_remediation_patching"]
+        o["merged_into"] = "provide_security_updates"
+        o["status"] = "deprecated_alias"
+        o["merge_note"] = ("SAME_OBLIGATION (Cross-Domain-Review). Kanonisch: provide_security_updates "
+                           "((2)(c)/Art.13). ID bleibt als Alias aufloesbar; downstream provide_security_updates nutzen.")
+        dirty.add(f)
+    if "remote_access_data_export_protection" in idx:
+        f, o = idx["remote_access_data_export_protection"]
+        o["tier_note"] = ("Bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (NICHT LM) bis Data-Act/Export-Scope sauber ist (User #5b.6). "
+                          "Evtl. Capability-or-Procedure statt Obligation.")
+        dirty.add(f)
+    for f in dirty:
+        json.dump(regs[f], open(f, "w", encoding="utf-8"), ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
+
+    print("capabilities.json:", len(caps), "Capabilities")
+    for c in caps:
+        print(f"  {c['capability_id']:30s} realizes {c['realizes_count']:2d} | guidance {len(c['guidance_basis'])} | {c['domains']}")
+    print("cra_core.json: 2 CORE (attack_surface_minimization, software_integrity_protection)")
+    print("specializes gepatcht:", patched)
+    print("alias: vuln_remediation_patching -> provide_security_updates")
+    print("dirty registries:", sorted(dirty))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -19,6 +19,20 @@ SCOPES = {
    "vuln": ["%schwachstellenbehandl%", "%schwachstellenmanagement%", "%vulnerability handling%",
             "%coordinated vulnerab%", "%vulnerability disclosure%", "%cvd-konzept%"],
    "auth": ["%authentisierung%", "%authentifizierung%", "%authentication%"],
+    "logging": ["%logging%", "%protokollierung%", "%audit-log%", "%audit-trail%",
+                "%ereignisprotokoll%", "%sicherheitsprotokoll%", "%audit-protokoll%",
+                "%log-management%", "%sicherheitsereignis%protokoll%", "%audit-trail%"],
+    "remote_access": ["%fernwartung%", "%fernzugriff%", "%fernzugang%", "%fernwartungs%",
+                      "%remote access%", "%remote maintenance%", "%remote management%",
+                      "%remote-wartung%", "%remote-zugriff%", "%remote-zugang%",
+                      "%sichere fernwartung%", "%fernsteuerung%"],
+    "updates": ["%sicherheitsupdate%", "%security update%", "%sicherheits-update%",
+                "%security patch%", "%sicherheitspatch%", "%patch-management%",
+                "%patchmanagement%", "%patch management%", "%firmware-update%",
+                "%firmware update%", "%software-update%", "%software update%",
+                "%automatische aktualisierung%", "%update-mechanismus%",
+                "%update-bereitstellung%", "%bereitstellung von updates%",
+                "%sichere aktualisierung%", "%signierte update%", "%update-paket%"],
 }