Machine/plant builders are hit by BOTH the CRA and the new Machinery Regulation.
New machinery_reg_cyber.py models its two well-corroborated Annex III cyber-with-
safety essential requirements (1.1.9 protection against corruption, 1.2.1 control-
system safety incl. foreseeable manipulation) in our own words; EU legal text is
freely reusable (Commission Decision 2011/833/EU, source acknowledged), harmonised
standards referenced by identifier only. The readiness check asks "is it
machinery?" and, if so, adds these obligations tagged "Maschinen-VO" alongside the
CRA ones — the combination is visible (regulations list + per-item source badge).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
For hardware CE projects (no repo) each networked component (controller/hmi/
gateway/drive/remote_access/sensor) yields typical ICS vulnerability CLASSES
(real CWE + "CISA-ICS — product-specific check" framing, NO fabricated CVEs);
they flow through the same CRA engine. /assess accepts components[]. MappedFinding
now echoes title/location/cwe so the response is self-contained for any finding
source. Live CISA-ICS/NVD per-product CVE lookup is the later enrichment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Semantic breadth (2): each finding's CRA-AI is mapped to a network_security
sub_topic and enriched with atom-grain, framework-traceable obligations from the
shared Controls-API (compliance.atom_classification) — at the endpoint/view layer
(SessionLocal), NOT in the pure mapper. CRA-AI anchor + curated measure +
NIST/OWASP crosswalk stay the lead; this is breadth + source evidence. Only
network_security is queried (atom-grain), scoped by sub_topic + limit. Frontend
renders it under the collapsible best-practice depth (control_id · title · source).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persist each CRA assessment as a versioned, auditable snapshot over the product
lifecycle. Reuses the existing compliance_cra_documents table (NO new schema,
frozen DB respected): doc_type='doc_risk_assessment', full assessment in
generation_context, requirements_coverage summary, auto-incrementing version,
prior version superseded. New endpoints: POST /projects/{id}/assess-snapshot,
GET /projects/{id}/assess-snapshots (history), GET /assess-snapshots/{id}.
Additive (no contract baseline change).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deterministic bridge (cra_safety_bridge.py): a cyber finding's attack capability
(remote_actuation / code_tampering / integrity_loss / auth_bypass, derived from
its CRA category) is matched against what each CE safety function is vulnerable
to. A match re-opens the mitigated hazard, flags the finding safety_impact (which
floors it to P0), and produces the cross-link. Endpoint accepts safety_functions;
frontend passes the project's safety functions and renders the LIVE cross-links
(no more hardcode). Safety functions are demo input now; come from the CE risk
assessment in production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deterministic prioritisation on top of the mapper (cra_prioritizer.py): a
non-negotiable P0 floor (safety-function compromise / actively exploited /
CRITICAL — customer weights cannot demote) plus a discretionary tier ranked by
severity x the customer's weight (high/medium/low) for the 5 business objectives
(access/data/network_api/supply_updates/monitoring). Quick-win flag (high impact,
low effort) for a second view; each finding carries a short priority reason.
Endpoint accepts weights + per-finding safety_impact/exploited. Rough pre-sort
only (devs re-sort in Jira). No DB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live HTTP entry for the deterministic CRA assessment — repo-scanner findings
in, CRA Annex I mapping + risk + curated measures + NIST/OWASP golden-set
crosswalk out. Project-less (works for any customer, no CE-RA/FMEA required);
reuses the tested mapper, same logic the MCP server exposes. Additive endpoint
(no contract baseline change); no DB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>