 Benjamin Admin
|
4e761c1363
|
feat: #5b materialize capability layer (Modell C) — capabilities.json + cra_core.json
User-Entscheidung Modell C + objective_tags-Safeguard (Tags, keine Klasse). Deterministisch
via materialize_capabilities.py:
- obligations/capabilities.json: 5 Capabilities (multi_factor_authentication/session_management/
transport_encryption/code_signing/security_monitoring_alerting), realized_by (n:m) +
guidance_basis KANONISCH hochgezogen. access_control gedroppt (OVERLAP).
- obligations/cra_core.json: 2 CORE-Sicherheitsziele (attack_surface_minimization (2)(j)/CM-7 +
software_integrity_protection (2)(f)/SI-7) -> fuellt den #4-NIST-Gap.
- DOMAIN specializes->CORE (remote_access_attack_surface_min, component_remote_interface_security,
signed_update_integrity, firmware_software_authentication) + objective_tags.
- Merge: vuln_remediation_patching -> deprecated_alias von provide_security_updates.
- remote_access_data_export_protection bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (pending Data-Act-Scope).
- join_keys 93->95 (core 2). Bidirektional validiert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-06-26 00:54:23 +02:00 |
|
|
Benjamin Admin
|
8937f105ea
|
feat(bridge): security-updates obligation cut (CRA Annex I (2)(c)/Art 13) — 9 obligations
- obligations/cra_updates.json: 9 (6 LEGAL_MINIMUM + 3 BEST_PRACTICE), Beziehungen.
Pipeline 670->318 micro->15 review-units -> Opus-Synthese. Synthese gut kalibriert ->
light review (KEINE Hart-Re-Tier, vs Auth/Remote-Access). out_of_scope M4/M7.
5 capability_candidate-Marker (signed/trusted/automatic/rollback/testing) fuer
Phase-4-Capability-Pruefung. Anker approximativ (curation.anchor_quality).
- obligation_join_keys.json: 84 -> 93 (updates 9). Alle 6 CRA-P1-Domaenen abgedeckt.
- precluster.py: updates-Scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-06-25 18:51:09 +02:00 |
|