refactor(agent-check): split routes file (2692→347 LOC) + wire B1/B3/A1 [guardrail-change]

Phase-5 split of agent_compliance_check_routes.py — the 2700-line
monolith was decomposed into 19 modules in compliance/api/agent_check/:

  - Phase A-F: resolve / profile+check / banner+TCF / vendors raw+finalize /
    HTML blocks top+mid+bot / email / persist
  - Helpers: _constants, _helpers, _fetch, _discovery, _single_check
  - Schemas + State + thin _orchestrator

A1 ZIP-Anhang nativ in _phase_e_email: evidence_zip_builder.py bundles
slices + manifest.json + audit_metadata.json (SHA256 per slice +
build_sha + source_url). smtp_sender.py erweitert um attachments-Parameter.

B1 COOKIE-CONSENT-UX-001 (Mobile Reachability): consent_reachability_check.py
parses footer anchors, classifies intent (reopen_cmp / info_only /
browser_deflect) + target (same_page_cmp / new_tab / external).
_b1_wiring.py fetches homepage with iPhone-UA + renders Art-7-Abs-3
severity-coloured block.

B3 TH-RETENTION (Cross-Doc Speicherdauer): retention_comparator.py
compares DSI claim ↔ cookie-table duration ↔ actual Max-Age/expires
with 5% tolerance + severity hierarchy (dsi_under_actual HIGH,
table_under_actual HIGH, dsi_vs_table MEDIUM, actual_under_table LOW
Safari-ITP-Hint). _b3_wiring.py + Top-10 mismatches table in mail.

Side-effects:
- Fixed silent UnboundLocalError in original Step 5 (gf_one_pager used
  audit_quality_findings before declaration, caught by surrounding
  except → block never rendered). New _phase_d3_blocks_bot.py runs
  audit-quality FIRST.
- agent_compliance_check_routes.py removed from loc-exceptions.txt
  ("Phase 5 split target" — done).

Tests: 55/55 grün (B1 22 + B3 27 + saving_scan 6).
E2E: smoke against Elli DSE+Cookie produced HIGH/missing B1 finding,
TH-RETENTION table (17 cookies / 3 ✓ / 3 ✗ / 11 ?), evidence-zip
with 2 slices + manifest + audit_metadata (12089B, SHA256-chained,
source verified), email sent (attachments=1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Admin
2026-06-06 14:47:25 +02:00
parent dfadff5b02
commit c2c8783fee
29 changed files with 4545 additions and 2408 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
"""
B1 — Cookie-Consent-UX-001: Mobile Reachability of Consent Settings.
DSGVO Art. 7 Abs. 3 requires that withdrawing consent must be as
easy as giving it. EDPB Cookie Banner Taskforce Report (2023) and
DSK OH Digitale Dienste v1.2 (2024) both demand a permanent, directly
reachable way to change cookie preferences — typically a Footer link
labelled "Cookie-Einstellungen" that re-opens the CMP in place.
Common anti-patterns we want to flag:
- Footer points to a Cookie-Policy *page* in a new tab, no CMP
- Footer only offers "more info" but no "manage settings"
- Only mention is a verbal reference to browser settings inside the
privacy-policy text
- Mobile footer hides the link in a multi-level accordion
This module does the STATIC HTML analysis. The dynamic part (mobile
viewport rendering, tap-target measurement, click-behaviour
verification) is performed by consent-tester via Playwright and feeds
back into `evaluate_combined` in a later phase.
Pure module — no DB, no network. Tests live in
tests/test_consent_reachability_check.py.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import re
from html.parser import HTMLParser
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Phrases that suggest "open the consent manager" rather than "show
# more info / open a policy page".
_REOPEN_PHRASES = (
"cookie-einstellungen", "cookie einstellungen",
"cookie-präferenzen", "cookie praeferenzen", "cookie-praferenzen",
"cookie-einwilligung", "einwilligung verwalten",
"consent manager", "consent settings", "consent-einstellungen",
"datenschutz-einstellungen", "datenschutzeinstellungen",
"cookies verwalten", "manage cookies", "manage preferences",
"privacy settings", "privacy preferences",
"tracking-einstellungen",
)
# Weaker — these usually point at a policy page, not the CMP itself.
_INFO_ONLY_PHRASES = (
"cookie-richtlinie", "cookie richtlinie", "cookie-policy",
"cookie policy", "cookies (information)",
"datenschutz", "datenschutzerklärung", "privacy policy",
"weitere informationen", "more information",
)
# Phrases that try to shift the burden to the user's browser —
# Bundesländer-Datenschutzbeauftragte explicitly call this insufficient.
_BROWSER_DEFLECTION_PHRASES = (
"browser-einstellungen", "browsereinstellungen",
"einstellungen ihres browsers", "browser settings",
"in ihrem browser", "über ihren browser",
)
class _AnchorCollector(HTMLParser):
"""Collects <a> and <button> elements with text + attrs.
Track footer scope via a depth counter so we only return anchors
that are descendants of <footer> (or have role="contentinfo" /
id|class containing 'footer').
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__(convert_charrefs=True)
self._footer_depth = 0
self._current: dict | None = None
self._text_chunks: list[str] = []
self.anchors: list[dict] = []
def _is_footer_open(self, tag: str, attrs: dict) -> bool:
if tag == "footer":
return True
if attrs.get("role", "").lower() == "contentinfo":
return True
ident = (attrs.get("id", "") + " " + attrs.get("class", "")).lower()
return "footer" in ident or "site-footer" in ident
def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
a = {k.lower(): (v or "") for k, v in attrs}
if self._is_footer_open(tag, a):
self._footer_depth += 1
return
if self._footer_depth > 0 and tag in ("a", "button"):
self._current = {
"tag": tag,
"href": a.get("href", ""),
"target": a.get("target", ""),
"aria_label": a.get("aria-label", ""),
"data_cmp": a.get("data-cmp", ""),
"onclick": a.get("onclick", ""),
"id": a.get("id", ""),
"class": a.get("class", ""),
}
self._text_chunks = []
def handle_endtag(self, tag):
if tag == "footer" and self._footer_depth > 0:
self._footer_depth -= 1
elif self._current and tag == self._current["tag"]:
txt = " ".join(self._text_chunks).strip()
self._current["text"] = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", txt)[:200]
self.anchors.append(self._current)
self._current = None
self._text_chunks = []
def handle_data(self, data):
if self._current is not None:
self._text_chunks.append(data)
def find_consent_anchors_in_footer(html: str) -> list[dict]:
"""Parse <a> / <button> elements in <footer> and tag those that
look related to cookie/consent management.
Each returned dict:
{ tag, href, target, text, aria_label, onclick, id, class,
intent }
where intent ∈ {"reopen_cmp", "info_only", "browser_deflect",
"unrelated"}.
"""
if not html:
return []
parser = _AnchorCollector()
try:
parser.feed(html)
except Exception as e: # malformed HTML — recover silently
logger.warning("footer parser failed: %s", e)
return []
out: list[dict] = []
for a in parser.anchors:
label = " ".join([
a.get("text", ""), a.get("aria_label", ""),
a.get("data_cmp", ""), a.get("onclick", ""),
]).lower()
intent = "unrelated"
if any(p in label for p in _REOPEN_PHRASES):
intent = "reopen_cmp"
elif any(p in label for p in _BROWSER_DEFLECTION_PHRASES):
intent = "browser_deflect"
elif any(p in label for p in _INFO_ONLY_PHRASES):
intent = "info_only"
if intent != "unrelated":
a["intent"] = intent
out.append(a)
return out
def classify_anchor_target(
anchor: dict, base_url: str,
) -> str:
"""Decide whether the anchor would open the CMP in place or
navigate elsewhere.
Returns:
"same_page_cmp" — onclick / data-cmp / data-* / hash-only link
"same_origin" — relative link or same-origin page (still a
navigation away from the live banner)
"external" — link to a different origin
"new_tab" — target="_blank" or rel*=external
"javascript" — javascript: link, probably a CMP trigger
"""
href = (anchor.get("href") or "").strip()
target = (anchor.get("target") or "").strip().lower()
onclick = anchor.get("onclick", "") or ""
data_cmp = anchor.get("data_cmp", "") or ""
if data_cmp or onclick:
return "same_page_cmp"
if href.startswith("javascript:"):
return "javascript"
if target == "_blank":
return "new_tab"
if not href or href.startswith("#"):
return "same_page_cmp"
base_host = urlparse(base_url).netloc.lower() if base_url else ""
try:
target_host = urlparse(urljoin(base_url or "/", href)).netloc.lower()
except Exception:
target_host = ""
if not target_host or target_host == base_host:
return "same_origin"
return "external"
def evaluate_reachability(
footer_html: str,
base_url: str = "",
) -> dict:
"""Run static reachability analysis on a footer HTML fragment.
Returns a finding dict for the COOKIE-CONSENT-UX-001 check.
"""
anchors = find_consent_anchors_in_footer(footer_html)
has_reopen_anchor = False
reopen_anchor: dict | None = None
info_only_count = 0
browser_deflect_count = 0
for a in anchors:
intent = a.get("intent")
if intent == "reopen_cmp":
has_reopen_anchor = True
target_class = classify_anchor_target(a, base_url)
a["target_class"] = target_class
if reopen_anchor is None:
reopen_anchor = a
elif intent == "info_only":
info_only_count += 1
elif intent == "browser_deflect":
browser_deflect_count += 1
result: dict = {
"check_id": "COOKIE-CONSENT-UX-001",
"anchors_total": len(anchors),
"has_reopen_anchor": has_reopen_anchor,
"info_only_count": info_only_count,
"browser_deflect_count": browser_deflect_count,
"reopen_anchor": reopen_anchor,
"passed": True,
"severity": None,
"severity_reason": None,
"evidence_phrases": [],
"notes": [],
}
# Hard fail: no reopen anchor at all → withdrawal not as easy as
# opt-in (Art. 7 Abs. 3 DSGVO).
if not has_reopen_anchor:
result["passed"] = False
result["severity"] = "HIGH"
result["severity_reason"] = "missing"
result["notes"].append(
"no consent-manager link in footer; withdrawal path "
"missing or only indirect",
)
# Soft fail: anchor exists but opens in new tab — DSK OH calls this
# an avoidable hurdle. MEDIUM rather than HIGH because withdrawal
# is technically still possible.
if has_reopen_anchor and reopen_anchor is not None:
cls = reopen_anchor.get("target_class")
if cls == "new_tab":
result["passed"] = False
result["severity"] = "MEDIUM"
result["severity_reason"] = "misclassified"
result["notes"].append(
"consent-manager link opens in new tab — context-break",
)
elif cls == "external":
result["passed"] = False
result["severity"] = "MEDIUM"
result["severity_reason"] = "misclassified"
result["notes"].append(
"consent-manager link points to external host",
)
# Extra signal: only browser-deflection phrases and zero reopen
# anchor — this is the worst variant the LfDI BaWü explicitly
# flagged.
if (not has_reopen_anchor and browser_deflect_count > 0):
result["severity"] = "HIGH"
result["severity_reason"] = "factually_wrong"
result["notes"].append(
"withdrawal route only via browser-settings — not gleich "
"einfach wie Erteilung",
)
return result
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
"""
Evidence ZIP Builder — bundles cookie-evidence slices into one ZIP
suitable as email attachment for the audit trail.
Why: capture_cookie_evidence_slices() produces N PNG slices per check
with timestamps + per-slice SHA256. Without an attachment to the
compliance report, the evidence chain stops at the backend. The ZIP
makes the slices portable so a DSB / lawyer can hand them to an
auditor or supervisory authority.
ZIP layout:
evidence.zip
├── manifest.json # per-slice metadata
├── audit_metadata.json # run-level (check_id, url, build_sha, ...)
└── slice_001.png ... # binary PNG per slice
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import io
import json
import logging
import os
import zipfile
from datetime import datetime, timezone
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def build_evidence_zip(
slices: list[dict],
meta: dict | None = None,
check_id: str = "",
) -> bytes:
"""Build a ZIP archive with all slices + a manifest.
Args:
slices: list of dicts from capture_cookie_evidence_slices():
each {"idx", "ts", "top_y", "bot_y", "sha256", "png_b64",
"png_size"}
meta: run-level dict from the same call:
{"total_height_px", "width_px", "accepted_banner",
"expanded", "url", "captured_at", "slice_count"}
check_id: the compliance-check job id
Returns:
raw ZIP bytes (suitable as email attachment payload)
"""
buf = io.BytesIO()
manifest_slices: list[dict] = []
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
for s in slices or []:
idx = int(s.get("idx", 0))
fname = f"slice_{idx + 1:03d}.png"
try:
png = base64.b64decode(s.get("png_b64", ""))
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(
"evidence_zip: skip slice %s, b64 decode failed: %s",
idx, e,
)
continue
zf.writestr(fname, png)
manifest_slices.append({
"filename": fname,
"slice_idx": idx,
"captured_at": s.get("ts", ""),
"top_y_px": s.get("top_y"),
"bot_y_px": s.get("bot_y"),
"sha256_short": s.get("sha256", ""),
"png_size_bytes": s.get("png_size", len(png)),
})
manifest = {
"schema_version": "1.0",
"check_id": check_id,
"slices": manifest_slices,
"slice_count": len(manifest_slices),
}
zf.writestr(
"manifest.json",
json.dumps(manifest, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False),
)
audit_meta = {
"schema_version": "1.0",
"check_id": check_id,
"build_sha": os.environ.get("BUILD_SHA", "unknown"),
"generated_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"source_url": (meta or {}).get("url", ""),
"captured_at": (meta or {}).get("captured_at", ""),
"accepted_banner": (meta or {}).get("accepted_banner"),
"expanded": (meta or {}).get("expanded"),
"total_height_px": (meta or {}).get("total_height_px"),
"width_px": (meta or {}).get("width_px"),
"slice_count": (meta or {}).get(
"slice_count", len(manifest_slices),
),
"note": (
"Each slice_NNN.png is an overlapping screenshot fragment "
"of the cookie policy page captured at captured_at. "
"sha256_short is the first 16 hex chars of the SHA-256 of "
"the raw PNG bytes — use it to verify the slice was not "
"modified after capture."
),
}
zf.writestr(
"audit_metadata.json",
json.dumps(audit_meta, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False),
)
data = buf.getvalue()
logger.info(
"evidence_zip built: %d slices, %d bytes, check_id=%s",
len(manifest_slices), len(data), check_id,
)
return data
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
"""
B3 — Cross-Doc Retention Consistency Comparator.
Compares three sources of truth for cookie storage duration:
1. DSI claim — sentence(s) in the privacy policy mentioning retention
("Die Speicherdauer beträgt 14 Monate", "_ga: 14 Monate", ...).
2. Cookie-table — the `duration` field parsed from the cookie policy
table (parse_flat_cookie_text / OCR / vendor-extract).
3. Actual cookie — `Max-Age` / `Expires` from the real Set-Cookie
header captured by the consent-tester.
Output is a per-cookie finding usable by the audit report:
- matches=True → all three sources agree (within tolerance)
- matches=False → mismatch with explicit type + severity_reason
Severity hierarchy (see project_audit_report_architecture.md):
HIGH/factually_wrong : DSI claim is shorter than reality
→ user is told "X" but tracked for longer
HIGH/factually_wrong : table duration is shorter than reality
→ cookie table understates what is set
MEDIUM/misclassified : DSI is shorter than table (internal docs disagree)
LOW/incomplete : only one source has data
The module is pure (no DB, no network) and meant to be called from the
report pipeline after cookies+DSI+HAR have already been collected.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# 5% tolerance — Safari ITP, leap years, server clocks etc.
_MATCH_TOLERANCE_PCT = 5
# Multipliers in DAYS for the German + English unit vocabulary used in
# our cookie tables and policies.
_UNIT_DAYS: dict[str, float] = {
"sekunden": 1 / 86400, "sekunde": 1 / 86400, "sec": 1 / 86400, "s": 1 / 86400,
"minuten": 1 / 1440, "minute": 1 / 1440, "min": 1 / 1440,
"stunden": 1 / 24, "stunde": 1 / 24, "h": 1 / 24,
"tage": 1, "tag": 1, "d": 1, "day": 1, "days": 1,
"wochen": 7, "woche": 7, "week": 7, "weeks": 7,
"monate": 30, "monat": 30, "month": 30, "months": 30,
"jahre": 365, "jahr": 365, "year": 365, "years": 365,
}
# Phrases that mean "session" — cookie deleted when browser closes.
_SESSION_TOKENS = {
"session", "sitzung", "sitzungsdauer", "browsersitzung",
"browser session", "browsing session", "tab",
}
# Phrases that mean "persistent without explicit cap".
_NO_EXPIRY_TOKENS = {
"unbegrenzt", "unbestimmt", "kein ablaufdatum",
"no expiry", "persistent", "permanent",
}
@dataclass
class RetentionClaim:
"""One retention statement found in the DSI text."""
sentence: str
days: float | None # None for session/unknown
is_session: bool
is_persistent: bool
context_terms: list[str] # cookie names / provider names mentioned nearby
def parse_duration_to_days(text: str) -> tuple[float | None, str]:
"""Convert a duration phrase to days.
Returns (days, kind) where kind ∈
{"days", "session", "persistent", "unknown"}.
For "session" / "persistent" days is None — comparisons must
handle these as special cases, not as 0 or infinity.
"""
if text is None:
return None, "unknown"
s = text.strip().lower()
if not s:
return None, "unknown"
for tok in _SESSION_TOKENS:
if tok in s:
return None, "session"
for tok in _NO_EXPIRY_TOKENS:
if tok in s:
return None, "persistent"
# "14 Monate", "1 Jahr", "24h", "30 Tage", "365 Tage", "30d"
m = re.search(
r"(?P<num>\d+(?:[.,]\d+)?)\s*(?P<unit>"
r"sekunden?|sec|s|minuten?|min|stunden?|h|"
r"tage?|d(?:ays?)?|wochen?|weeks?|"
r"monate?|months?|jahre?|years?)\b",
s,
)
if not m:
return None, "unknown"
num = float(m.group("num").replace(",", "."))
unit = m.group("unit")
mult = _UNIT_DAYS.get(unit)
if mult is None:
return None, "unknown"
return num * mult, "days"
def max_age_to_days(max_age_seconds: int | float | None) -> float | None:
"""Convert a Set-Cookie Max-Age (in seconds) to days."""
if max_age_seconds is None:
return None
try:
return float(max_age_seconds) / 86400.0
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
# Sentence splitter that respects German legal text style (lots of
# semicolons + parentheses but few capitalised abbreviations).
_SENTENCE_SPLIT = re.compile(r"(?<=[.!?])\s+(?=[A-ZÄÖÜ])")
# Quick anchor terms for retention sentences.
_RETENTION_ANCHORS = (
"speicherdauer", "speicherfrist", "speicher",
"aufbewahrungsdauer", "aufbewahrungsfrist",
"löschfrist", "löschung",
"gespeichert für", "wird gespeichert", "wird für",
"retention", "expires", "expiration", "lifetime",
"gültigkeit", "laufzeit",
)
def _looks_like_retention(sentence: str) -> bool:
s = sentence.lower()
if not any(a in s for a in _RETENTION_ANCHORS):
return False
# Need a unit token nearby — otherwise it's metadata not duration.
return bool(re.search(
r"\b\d[\d.,]*\s*("
r"sekunden?|minuten?|stunden?|tage?|wochen?|"
r"monate?|jahre?|sec|min|h|d|"
r"weeks?|months?|years?|days?)\b",
s,
))
def extract_retention_claims(
dsi_text: str,
cookie_names: list[str] | None = None,
vendor_names: list[str] | None = None,
) -> list[RetentionClaim]:
"""Find sentences in the DSI that state a retention period.
cookie_names / vendor_names attach themselves to a sentence when
they are mentioned in it; the comparator uses this to prefer the
most specific claim available for a given cookie.
"""
if not dsi_text:
return []
cookie_names = cookie_names or []
vendor_names = vendor_names or []
# Normalise — keep original case for the sentence so it can be
# cited verbatim in the audit report.
sentences = _SENTENCE_SPLIT.split(dsi_text)
claims: list[RetentionClaim] = []
for raw in sentences:
s = raw.strip()
if not s:
continue
if not _looks_like_retention(s):
continue
days, kind = parse_duration_to_days(s)
lower = s.lower()
contexts: list[str] = []
for n in cookie_names:
if n and n.lower() in lower:
contexts.append(n)
for v in vendor_names:
if v and v.lower() in lower:
contexts.append(v)
claims.append(RetentionClaim(
sentence=s[:400],
days=days,
is_session=(kind == "session"),
is_persistent=(kind == "persistent"),
context_terms=contexts,
))
return claims
def _best_dsi_claim(
claims: list[RetentionClaim],
cookie_name: str,
vendor_name: str | None,
) -> RetentionClaim | None:
"""Pick the most specific DSI claim for a given cookie.
Priority: claim that mentions the cookie name > claim that mentions
the vendor > generic (no context).
"""
if not claims:
return None
by_cookie = [c for c in claims if cookie_name and cookie_name in c.context_terms]
if by_cookie:
return by_cookie[0]
if vendor_name:
by_vendor = [c for c in claims if vendor_name in c.context_terms]
if by_vendor:
return by_vendor[0]
generic = [c for c in claims if not c.context_terms]
return generic[0] if generic else claims[0]
def _within_tolerance(a: float, b: float) -> bool:
if a == 0 and b == 0:
return True
base = max(abs(a), abs(b))
return abs(a - b) <= base * (_MATCH_TOLERANCE_PCT / 100.0)
def compare_retention(
cookie_name: str,
table_duration: str | None,
actual_max_age_seconds: int | float | None,
dsi_claims: list[RetentionClaim] | None = None,
vendor_name: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Per-cookie three-way retention comparison.
Returns a finding dict suitable for the audit-report aggregator
(theme = TH-RETENTION). Output schema is stable — extending it must
be additive so existing tests stay green.
"""
table_days, table_kind = parse_duration_to_days(table_duration or "")
actual_days = max_age_to_days(actual_max_age_seconds)
dsi_claim = _best_dsi_claim(
dsi_claims or [], cookie_name, vendor_name,
)
dsi_days = dsi_claim.days if dsi_claim else None
out: dict = {
"cookie_name": cookie_name,
"vendor_name": vendor_name,
"table_duration_raw": table_duration,
"table_days": table_days,
"table_kind": table_kind,
"actual_max_age_seconds": actual_max_age_seconds,
"actual_days": actual_days,
"dsi_days": dsi_days,
"dsi_sentence": dsi_claim.sentence if dsi_claim else None,
"dsi_context_terms": dsi_claim.context_terms if dsi_claim else [],
"matches": True,
"mismatch_type": None,
"severity_reason": None,
"severity": None,
"diff_days": None,
"notes": [],
}
sources = [v for v in (table_days, actual_days, dsi_days) if v is not None]
if len(sources) <= 1:
out["severity_reason"] = "incomplete"
out["severity"] = "LOW"
out["notes"].append("only_one_source_has_data")
return out
# Highest-severity check first: DSI claim is shorter than the cookie
# actually lives — user was misled.
if dsi_days is not None and actual_days is not None:
if not _within_tolerance(dsi_days, actual_days):
if dsi_days < actual_days:
out["matches"] = False
out["mismatch_type"] = "dsi_under_actual"
out["severity_reason"] = "factually_wrong"
out["severity"] = "HIGH"
out["diff_days"] = actual_days - dsi_days
# Cookie table understates reality — second highest.
if (out["matches"] and table_days is not None
and actual_days is not None):
if not _within_tolerance(table_days, actual_days):
if table_days < actual_days:
out["matches"] = False
out["mismatch_type"] = "table_under_actual"
out["severity_reason"] = "factually_wrong"
out["severity"] = "HIGH"
out["diff_days"] = actual_days - table_days
# Internal disagreement DSI vs. table (less severe — both are
# documentation, neither contradicts the live cookie).
if (out["matches"] and dsi_days is not None and table_days is not None):
if not _within_tolerance(dsi_days, table_days):
out["matches"] = False
out["mismatch_type"] = "dsi_vs_table"
out["severity_reason"] = "misclassified"
out["severity"] = "MEDIUM"
out["diff_days"] = abs(dsi_days - table_days)
# Catch over-declaration too — table says "2 years" but cookie
# lives 7 days (Safari ITP). Less severe but worth flagging.
if (out["matches"] and table_days is not None
and actual_days is not None):
if (not _within_tolerance(table_days, actual_days)
and table_days > actual_days):
out["matches"] = False
out["mismatch_type"] = "actual_under_table"
out["severity_reason"] = "incomplete"
out["severity"] = "LOW"
out["notes"].append("possible_safari_itp_cap")
out["diff_days"] = table_days - actual_days
return out
def build_retention_theme_summary(
findings: list[dict],
) -> dict:
"""Aggregate per-cookie findings into the per-theme block used by
the report (theme = TH-RETENTION).
"""
total = len(findings)
incomplete = sum(
1 for f in findings if f.get("severity_reason") == "incomplete"
)
# Incomplete findings keep matches=True (we did not observe a
# mismatch), but they don't count as a verified pass either.
passed = sum(
1 for f in findings
if f.get("matches") and f.get("severity_reason") != "incomplete"
)
failed = total - passed - incomplete
by_severity: dict[str, int] = {}
by_type: dict[str, int] = {}
for f in findings:
sev = f.get("severity")
if sev:
by_severity[sev] = by_severity.get(sev, 0) + 1
mt = f.get("mismatch_type")
if mt:
by_type[mt] = by_type.get(mt, 0) + 1
return {
"theme_id": "TH-RETENTION",
"total": total,
"passed": passed,
"failed": failed,
"incomplete": incomplete,
"pct": int(round(100 * passed / total)) if total else 0,
"by_severity": by_severity,
"by_mismatch_type": by_type,
"top_fails": sorted(
(f for f in findings
if not f.get("matches")
and f.get("severity_reason") == "factually_wrong"),
key=lambda f: -(f.get("diff_days") or 0),
)[:10],
}
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ Uses standard smtplib. Configuration via environment variables:
SMTP_FROM_ADDR (default: compliance@breakpilot.local)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import smtplib
from email import encoders
from email.mime.base import MIMEBase
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
@@ -28,22 +32,54 @@ def send_email(
body_html: str,
from_addr: str | None = None,
from_name: str | None = None,
attachments: list[dict] | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Send an email via SMTP. Returns dict with status and message_id."""
"""Send an email via SMTP. Returns dict with status and message_id.
attachments: optional list of dicts:
[{"filename": "evidence.zip", "data": <bytes>,
"mime": "application/zip"}, ...]
"""
sender_addr = from_addr or SMTP_FROM_ADDR
sender_name = from_name or SMTP_FROM_NAME
msg = MIMEMultipart("alternative")
if attachments:
msg = MIMEMultipart("mixed")
body = MIMEMultipart("alternative")
body.attach(MIMEText(body_html, "html", "utf-8"))
msg.attach(body)
for att in attachments:
mime = att.get("mime", "application/octet-stream")
maintype, _, subtype = mime.partition("/")
part = MIMEBase(maintype or "application", subtype or "octet-stream")
part.set_payload(att.get("data", b""))
encoders.encode_base64(part)
fname = att.get("filename", "attachment.bin")
part.add_header(
"Content-Disposition",
f'attachment; filename="{fname}"',
)
msg.attach(part)
else:
msg = MIMEMultipart("alternative")
msg.attach(MIMEText(body_html, "html", "utf-8"))
msg["From"] = f"{sender_name} <{sender_addr}>"
msg["To"] = recipient
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.attach(MIMEText(body_html, "html", "utf-8"))
try:
with smtplib.SMTP(SMTP_HOST, SMTP_PORT, timeout=10) as server:
with smtplib.SMTP(SMTP_HOST, SMTP_PORT, timeout=30) as server:
server.sendmail(sender_addr, [recipient], msg.as_string())
logger.info("Email sent to %s: %s", recipient, subject)
return {"status": "sent", "recipient": recipient, "subject": subject}
att_count = len(attachments or [])
logger.info(
"Email sent to %s: %s (attachments=%d)",
recipient, subject, att_count,
)
return {
"status": "sent", "recipient": recipient, "subject": subject,
"attachments": att_count,
}
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Failed to send email to %s: %s", recipient, e)
return {"status": "failed", "recipient": recipient, "error": str(e)}