feat: #5b materialize capability layer (Modell C) — capabilities.json + cra_core.json

User-Entscheidung Modell C + objective_tags-Safeguard (Tags, keine Klasse). Deterministisch
via materialize_capabilities.py:
- obligations/capabilities.json: 5 Capabilities (multi_factor_authentication/session_management/
  transport_encryption/code_signing/security_monitoring_alerting), realized_by (n:m) +
  guidance_basis KANONISCH hochgezogen. access_control gedroppt (OVERLAP).
- obligations/cra_core.json: 2 CORE-Sicherheitsziele (attack_surface_minimization (2)(j)/CM-7 +
  software_integrity_protection (2)(f)/SI-7) -> fuellt den #4-NIST-Gap.
- DOMAIN specializes->CORE (remote_access_attack_surface_min, component_remote_interface_security,
  signed_update_integrity, firmware_software_authentication) + objective_tags.
- Merge: vuln_remediation_patching -> deprecated_alias von provide_security_updates.
- remote_access_data_export_protection bleibt BEST_PRACTICE (pending Data-Act-Scope).
- join_keys 93->95 (core 2). Bidirektional validiert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

obligations/cra.json

@@ -966,7 +966,10 @@
    "relationships": [],
    "citation_anchor_ids": [],
    "citation_status": "pending_span_anchor",
-   "review_status": "draft"
+   "review_status": "draft",
+   "merged_into": "provide_security_updates",
+   "status": "deprecated_alias",
+   "merge_note": "SAME_OBLIGATION (Cross-Domain-Review). Kanonisch: provide_security_updates ((2)(c)/Art.13). ID bleibt als Alias aufloesbar; downstream provide_security_updates nutzen."
   },
   {
    "id": "vuln_handling_process",