feat(cra): cyber-meets-safety bridge as real logic (step 2)

Deterministic bridge (cra_safety_bridge.py): a cyber finding's attack capability
(remote_actuation / code_tampering / integrity_loss / auth_bypass, derived from
its CRA category) is matched against what each CE safety function is vulnerable
to. A match re-opens the mitigated hazard, flags the finding safety_impact (which
floors it to P0), and produces the cross-link. Endpoint accepts safety_functions;
frontend passes the project's safety functions and renders the LIVE cross-links
(no more hardcode). Safety functions are demo input now; come from the CE risk
assessment in production.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Admin
2026-06-14 08:59:41 +02:00
parent fb4d7641ab
commit 10c32d7f7c
5 changed files with 176 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -11,6 +11,24 @@ import { CRADemo, CRAFinding, Measure, DEMO_SCENARIO } from './useCRADemo'
export type Weights = Record<string, string> // objective -> high|medium|low export type Weights = Record<string, string> // objective -> high|medium|low
// Demo: CE-risk-assessment safety functions of the Kistenhub (would come from the
// project's CE risk assessment in production). The backend bridge decides which
// cyber findings can defeat them (and flags those safety_impact -> P0).
const SAFETY_FUNCTIONS = [
{
name: 'Zweihandschaltung + trennende Schutzeinrichtung am Hubwerk',
hazard: 'Unerwarteter Anlauf des Hubwerks → Quetschen zwischen Last und Rahmen',
original_measure: 'Zweihandschaltung + trennende Schutzeinrichtung (mechanisch, PL d)',
kind: 'prevent_unexpected_actuation',
},
{
name: 'Überlastsicherung / Lastmomentbegrenzer',
hazard: 'Überlast / Lastabsturz durch manipulierte Lastgrenze',
original_measure: 'Überlastsicherung / Lastmomentbegrenzer',
kind: 'signal_integrity',
},
]
function reqTitle(rationale: string): string { function reqTitle(rationale: string): string {
const i = rationale.indexOf(': ') const i = rationale.indexOf(': ')
return i >= 0 ? rationale.slice(i + 2) : rationale return i >= 0 ? rationale.slice(i + 2) : rationale
@@ -54,7 +72,7 @@ function merge(live: any): CRADemo {
coverage_pct: live.coverage_pct ?? DEMO_SCENARIO.coverage_pct, coverage_pct: live.coverage_pct ?? DEMO_SCENARIO.coverage_pct,
requirements_touched: live.requirements_touched || DEMO_SCENARIO.requirements_touched, requirements_touched: live.requirements_touched || DEMO_SCENARIO.requirements_touched,
open_measures, open_measures,
cross_links: DEMO_SCENARIO.cross_links, cross_links: live.cross_links && live.cross_links.length ? live.cross_links : DEMO_SCENARIO.cross_links,
deadlines: live.deadlines || DEMO_SCENARIO.deadlines, deadlines: live.deadlines || DEMO_SCENARIO.deadlines,
quick_wins: live.quick_wins || [], quick_wins: live.quick_wins || [],
objectives: live.objectives || [], objectives: live.objectives || [],
@@ -71,10 +89,10 @@ export function useCRA() {
const payload = { const payload = {
findings: DEMO_SCENARIO.findings.map((f) => ({ findings: DEMO_SCENARIO.findings.map((f) => ({
id: f.id, title: f.title, cwe: f.cwe, severity: f.scanner_severity, location: f.location, id: f.id, title: f.title, cwe: f.cwe, severity: f.scanner_severity, location: f.location,
// demo: flag the two findings tied to a safety cross-link as safety_impact
safety_impact: f.id === 'KH-CY-1' || f.id === 'KH-CY-2' || f.id === 'KH-CY-3',
})), })),
weights, weights,
// the bridge decides safety_impact from these (no frontend hardcode)
safety_functions: SAFETY_FUNCTIONS,
} }
fetch('/api/v1/cra/assess', { fetch('/api/v1/cra/assess', {
method: 'POST', method: 'POST',
@@ -32,14 +32,28 @@ class FindingIn(BaseModel):
exploited: Optional[bool] = False exploited: Optional[bool] = False
class SafetyFunctionIn(BaseModel):
name: str
hazard: Optional[str] = ""
original_measure: Optional[str] = ""
kind: Optional[str] = "" # prevent_unexpected_actuation | signal_integrity
vulnerable_to: Optional[List[str]] = None
class AssessRequest(BaseModel): class AssessRequest(BaseModel):
findings: List[FindingIn] findings: List[FindingIn]
# customer priorities for the discretionary tier: {objective: high|medium|low}. # customer priorities for the discretionary tier: {objective: high|medium|low}.
# objectives: access | data | network_api | supply_updates | monitoring. # objectives: access | data | network_api | supply_updates | monitoring.
weights: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None weights: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None
# CE-risk-assessment safety functions for the cyber-meets-safety bridge.
safety_functions: Optional[List[SafetyFunctionIn]] = None
@router.post("/assess") @router.post("/assess")
async def assess(body: AssessRequest): async def assess(body: AssessRequest):
payload = {"findings": [f.model_dump() for f in body.findings], "weights": body.weights} payload = {
"findings": [f.model_dump() for f in body.findings],
"weights": body.weights,
"safety_functions": [s.model_dump() for s in body.safety_functions] if body.safety_functions else None,
}
return assess_findings_payload(payload) return assess_findings_payload(payload)
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from typing import Optional
from compliance.api.cra_annex_i_data import ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS, MEASURES, DEADLINES from compliance.api.cra_annex_i_data import ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS, MEASURES, DEADLINES
from compliance.services.cra_security_crosswalk import security_refs_for from compliance.services.cra_security_crosswalk import security_refs_for
from compliance.services.cra_prioritizer import prioritize, OBJECTIVES from compliance.services.cra_prioritizer import prioritize, OBJECTIVES
from compliance.services.cra_safety_bridge import build_cross_links
_REQ_INDEX = {r["req_id"]: r for r in ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS} _REQ_INDEX = {r["req_id"]: r for r in ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS}
_SEV_ORDER = {"LOW": 1, "MEDIUM": 2, "HIGH": 3, "CRITICAL": 4} _SEV_ORDER = {"LOW": 1, "MEDIUM": 2, "HIGH": 3, "CRITICAL": 4}
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ class CRAAssessment:
coverage_pct: float = 0.0 coverage_pct: float = 0.0
quick_wins: list = field(default_factory=list) # finding_ids: high impact, low effort quick_wins: list = field(default_factory=list) # finding_ids: high impact, low effort
objectives: list = field(default_factory=lambda: list(OBJECTIVES)) objectives: list = field(default_factory=lambda: list(OBJECTIVES))
cross_links: list = field(default_factory=list) # cyber-meets-safety bridge
deadlines: list = field(default_factory=lambda: list(DEADLINES)) deadlines: list = field(default_factory=lambda: list(DEADLINES))
@@ -197,13 +199,21 @@ def map_finding(f: ScannerFinding) -> MappedFinding:
) )
def assess_findings(findings: list, weights=None) -> CRAAssessment: def assess_findings(findings: list, weights=None, safety_functions=None) -> CRAAssessment:
"""Map findings to a deterministic CRA assessment, then prioritise them. """Map findings to a deterministic CRA assessment, then prioritise them.
weights: {objective: 'high'|'medium'|'low'} — the customer's priorities for weights: {objective: 'high'|'medium'|'low'} — customer priorities for the
the discretionary tier (the P0 floor ignores them). discretionary tier (the P0 floor ignores them).
safety_functions: CE-risk-assessment safety functions for the cyber-meets-
safety bridge; a finding that can defeat one is flagged safety_impact (→ P0).
""" """
mapped = prioritize([map_finding(f) for f in findings], weights) mapped = [map_finding(f) for f in findings]
cross_links = build_cross_links(mapped, safety_functions)
flagged = {fid for cl in cross_links for fid in cl["cyber_finding_ids"]}
for m in mapped:
if m.finding_id in flagged:
m.safety_impact = True
mapped = prioritize(mapped, weights)
by_risk = {"CRITICAL": 0, "HIGH": 0, "MEDIUM": 0, "LOW": 0} by_risk = {"CRITICAL": 0, "HIGH": 0, "MEDIUM": 0, "LOW": 0}
reqs_touched, measure_ids, unmapped = set(), [], [] reqs_touched, measure_ids, unmapped = set(), [], []
for m in mapped: for m in mapped:
@@ -226,6 +236,7 @@ def assess_findings(findings: list, weights=None) -> CRAAssessment:
unmapped_findings=unmapped, unmapped_findings=unmapped,
coverage_pct=round(100.0 * covered / total, 1) if total else 0.0, coverage_pct=round(100.0 * covered / total, 1) if total else 0.0,
quick_wins=[m.finding_id for m in mapped if m.quick_win], quick_wins=[m.finding_id for m in mapped if m.quick_win],
cross_links=cross_links,
) )
@@ -236,6 +247,7 @@ def assess_findings_payload(payload: dict) -> dict:
""" """
raw = payload.get("findings", []) if isinstance(payload, dict) else [] raw = payload.get("findings", []) if isinstance(payload, dict) else []
weights = payload.get("weights") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None weights = payload.get("weights") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
safety_functions = payload.get("safety_functions") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
findings = [ScannerFinding.from_dict(d) for d in raw] findings = [ScannerFinding.from_dict(d) for d in raw]
assessment = assess_findings(findings, weights) assessment = assess_findings(findings, weights, safety_functions)
return asdict(assessment) # recurses into nested MappedFinding dataclasses return asdict(assessment) # recurses into nested MappedFinding dataclasses
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
"""Cyber-meets-Safety bridge — deterministic, replaces the demo hardcode.
Links a cyber finding to a CE-risk-assessment safety function it can DEFEAT, by
matching the finding's attack *capability* against what the safety function is
*vulnerable to*. A match means: the cyber finding re-opens a hazard that was
considered mitigated → it must surface in the CE risk assessment (Machinery Reg
2023/1230) and is flagged safety_impact (which feeds the P0 priority floor).
Capabilities are derived from the finding's CRA Annex I category (deterministic,
no LLM). Safety functions come from the project's CE risk assessment (passed in);
for the demo they are supplied as scenario input. Output matches the frontend
CrossLink shape.
"""
from compliance.api.cra_annex_i_data import ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS
_REQ = {r["req_id"]: r for r in ANNEX_I_REQUIREMENTS}
# CRA Annex I category -> attack capabilities the finding grants.
_CATEGORY_CAPABILITIES = {
"Secure-by-Design": {"remote_actuation", "code_tampering"},
"Authentifizierung": {"auth_bypass", "remote_actuation"},
"Kryptografie": {"integrity_loss"},
"Supply Chain": {"code_tampering"},
"Updates": {"code_tampering", "integrity_loss"},
}
# Safety-function kind -> the capabilities that defeat it.
_SF_KIND_VULN = {
"prevent_unexpected_actuation": {"remote_actuation", "code_tampering", "auth_bypass"},
"signal_integrity": {"integrity_loss", "code_tampering"},
}
_CAP_LABEL = {
"remote_actuation": "Fern-Auslösung",
"code_tampering": "manipulierte Firmware/Software",
"integrity_loss": "manipulierte Signale/Parameter",
"auth_bypass": "Authentifizierungs-Umgehung",
}
def capabilities_for(mapped) -> set:
req = _REQ.get(getattr(mapped, "primary_requirement", ""), {})
return set(_CATEGORY_CAPABILITIES.get(req.get("category", ""), set()))
def build_cross_links(mapped_list: list, safety_functions: list) -> list:
"""For each safety function, collect the cyber findings that can defeat it.
safety_functions: [{name, hazard, original_measure, kind|vulnerable_to}].
Returns CrossLink dicts; empty if nothing matches.
"""
out = []
for sf in safety_functions or []:
vuln = set(sf.get("vulnerable_to") or _SF_KIND_VULN.get(sf.get("kind", ""), set()))
if not vuln:
continue
hits, caps = [], set()
for m in mapped_list:
inter = capabilities_for(m) & vuln
if inter:
hits.append(getattr(m, "finding_id", ""))
caps |= inter
if not hits:
continue
cap_txt = ", ".join(sorted(_CAP_LABEL.get(c, c) for c in caps))
out.append({
"cyber_finding_ids": hits,
"safety_hazard": sf.get("hazard", ""),
"safety_ref": sf.get("name", ""),
"original_measure": sf.get("original_measure", ""),
"cyber_breaks_it": (
"Über {} können die Cyber-Befunde diese Schutzfunktion aushebeln — "
"die mechanisch gemilderte Gefährdung ist wieder offen.".format(cap_txt)
),
"residual": "offen",
})
return out
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
"""Tests for the deterministic cyber-meets-safety bridge."""
from compliance.services.cra_finding_mapper import ScannerFinding, assess_findings
SF_ACTUATION = {"name": "Zweihandschaltung Hubwerk", "hazard": "Quetschen",
"original_measure": "PL d", "kind": "prevent_unexpected_actuation"}
SF_INTEGRITY = {"name": "Ueberlastsicherung", "hazard": "Lastabsturz",
"original_measure": "Lastmomentbegrenzer", "kind": "signal_integrity"}
def test_default_password_defeats_actuation_safety_function():
a = assess_findings(
[ScannerFinding(id="pw", title="default password", cwe="CWE-259", severity="critical")],
safety_functions=[SF_ACTUATION])
assert len(a.cross_links) == 1
assert "pw" in a.cross_links[0]["cyber_finding_ids"]
assert a.mapped[0].safety_impact is True
assert a.mapped[0].priority_tier == "P0"
def test_unencrypted_transit_defeats_signal_integrity_and_floors_low_severity():
a = assess_findings(
[ScannerFinding(id="mqtt", title="cleartext MQTT", cwe="CWE-319", severity="low")],
safety_functions=[SF_INTEGRITY])
assert len(a.cross_links) == 1
assert a.mapped[0].priority_tier == "P0" # safety_impact floors a low-severity finding
def test_logging_finding_does_not_defeat_actuation():
a = assess_findings(
[ScannerFinding(id="log", title="no security logging", cwe="CWE-778", severity="high")],
safety_functions=[SF_ACTUATION])
assert a.cross_links == []
assert a.mapped[0].safety_impact is False
def test_no_safety_functions_means_no_cross_links():
a = assess_findings([ScannerFinding(id="pw", title="default password", cwe="CWE-259", severity="critical")])
assert a.cross_links == []
def test_explicit_vulnerable_to_overrides_kind():
sf = {"name": "X", "hazard": "H", "vulnerable_to": ["integrity_loss"]}
a = assess_findings(
[ScannerFinding(id="mqtt", title="cleartext", cwe="CWE-319", severity="high")],
safety_functions=[sf])
assert len(a.cross_links) == 1